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Structured Summary of the Opinion (C.P. Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These miscellaneous appeals arise from a proceeding under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) initiated by the appellants in rent appeals nos. 141, 142, 145, 146 & 147 of 1946 pending before the Subordinate Judge of Purnea. The appellants alleged that a compromise had been entered into between them and the respondents in those rent appeals. The Subordinate Judge recorded a compromise in favour of the appellants under Order 23, Rule 3. The respondents in the rent appeals brought these appeals against that order.

The record showed that there were six minor respondents: five sons of respondent 1, Abhay Kumar Singh, who were under the guardianship of their father, and one minor son of Jaikumar Singh under his father's guardianship. The court below held that the compromise was proved, lawful and should be enforced. On appeal, the High Court considered whether the recorded compromise could bind the minors where there was no application by the guardians for the leave of the Court under Order 32, Rule 7, nor any court order granting such leave, and no indication that the trial court had considered the minors' interests when recording the compromise.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a compromise recorded under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC can bind minors where the guardians or next friends did not apply for, and the Court did not grant, the leave expressly recorded in the proceedings as required by Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC.
  2. Whether the guardian or next friend may obtain leave after the terms of a compromise are concluded and whether merely negotiating terms without asking for leave suffices for compliance with Order 32, Rule 7.
  3. Whether the karta of a joint Hindu family (Abhaykumar Singh) can bind minor members of the family by entering into a compromise on behalf of the family, despite the protections of Order 32, Rule 7.
  4. Whether the compromise could be given effect to for the major appellants where the interests of the minors and majors are joint rather than separate.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents argued that a compromise had in fact been entered into on certain terms and recorded by the court below, and that this compromise should be enforced against all parties, including minors.
  • Counsel for the respondents cited precedents (including Rajeswararao v. Satyanarayana, Dharnidhar v. Phulkumari, Ramnarain Singh v. Atal Behari Singh and Ishan Chandra v. Nilratan) to support the proposition that leave of the Court need not follow any rigid formula or that leave could in some circumstances be obtained in relation to compromises concluded at different stages.
  • It was contended that because Abhaykumar Singh had entered into the compromise and (according to the court below) he had done so as karta of a joint family, the compromise should bind the minor members of that joint family.

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contended that the guardians or next friends of the minors never applied for the leave of the Court, either in writing or orally, to enter into a compromise on behalf of the minors, and that no leave was recorded by the Court as required by Order 32, Rule 7.
  • They argued that where the guardian refuses to apply for leave, a compromise cannot be forced upon the minors even if the Court believes the compromise would be beneficial to them; thus the compromise is not binding on the minors.
  • The appellants further contended that even if the family were joint and Abhaykumar Singh the karta, the guardians' statutory role and the explicit requirements of Order 32, Rule 7 prevent a karta from binding minors without court leave obtained by the guardians.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajeswararao v. Satyanarayana, AIR (33) 1946 Mad 377 That a guardian-ad-litem can obtain the leave of the Court before the conclusion of the terms of compromise (i.e., leave must be obtained before compromise is concluded). The Court held this case did not support respondents because in the present case no leave was asked for or granted; the precedent actually indicates a guardian-ad-litem must obtain the Court's consent before compromise is concluded.
Dharnidhar v. Phulkumari, 24 Pat 529 That leave of the Court can be granted after the terms of compromise have been finalized; negotiating terms without leave is permissible. The Court noted the case permits leave after terms are finalized, but it does not assist respondents because in the present case there was no application for leave at all and guardians repudiated the compromise.
Rameshwar Pershad v. Ram Bahadur Singh, 34 Cal 70 A Privy Council decision referenced concerning compromise and guardian's leave in prior codes. The Court said this decision is of no assistance because it did not consider the equivalent provisions in O.32, R.7; from the report it appeared leave had been asked for and granted there.
Badri Singh v. Chhotu Singh, AIR (25) 1938 Pat 202 Held that when appellate Court was assured compromise was beneficial to minors, it could accept the compromise; contains observation that if court's attention was directed specifically to the minor the court must be assumed to have complied with the law. The Court said this case is not authority for recording a compromise without prior leave and expressed doubt about the correctness of the general proposition that mere notice to the court implies compliance; it was not necessary to decide that point here.
Umar v. Mahabir Lal, 18 Pat 708 Held that a decree based on an award contravening O.32, R.7 is not void but voidable at the instance of the minor. The Court observed this precedent does not shed light on the precise question before it (i.e., whether the compromise could be recorded and enforced without leave).
Sakinabai v. Shirinibai, 47 IA 88 Concerned a compromise arrived at while appeal was pending before the Privy Council. The Court said this case is not relevant to the decision needed here.
Ramnarain Singh v. Atal Behari Singh, AIR (26) 1939 Pat 387 Cited for proposition that no particular formula is required by the Court in granting leave under O.32, R.7. The Court observed this authority does not help respondents because the present case involved total non-compliance with O.32, R.7 rather than substantial compliance.
Ishan Chandra v. Nilratan, 2 Pat 538 Also cited to support that no particular formula is required for court leave. The Court held this case does not assist when the statutory provisions have been entirely ignored.
Ranga Rao v. Rajagopala Raju, 22 Mad 378 Held that when a guardian opposes a decree in terms of a compromise, the Court cannot enforce the compromise against the minors even if it appears beneficial. The Court treated this case as directly on point and endorsed its observations as being on all fours with the present facts; it supports the conclusion that a compromise cannot be enforced against minors whose guardian objects and has not sought leave.
Gulab Dei v. Vaish-Motor Co., 47 All 782 Accepted Ranga Rao's view and held that mere passing of a decree in terms of a compromise does not imply the Court granted leave; any compromise without leave is a nullity. The Court relied on this authority to reinforce that a compromise without recorded leave is null and cannot be forced on a minor whose guardian objects.
Hemangini Dasi v. Bhagwati Sundari Dasi, AIR (10) 1923 Cal 685 Held the Court cannot and will not force a compromise upon infants against opinion of their next friend or guardian; Court may remove a guardian acting improperly. The Court cited this as reinforcing the rule that guardians are the sole judges whether to apply for leave and that the Court will not force a compromise on infants contrary to their guardian's view.
Hanuman Rai v. Jagdis Rai, AIR (3) 1816 Pat 223 Held that a guardian may withdraw an application for leave to enter into an agreement at any time before the Court grants leave. The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that guardians retain control over whether to seek leave; a guardian's withdrawal prior to leave precludes enforcement.
Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row, 36 Mad 295 Held that if the father was guardian-ad-litem of his minor son, he could not, without leave of the Court, do acts in his capacity as family head that he is debarred from doing as guardian-ad-litem. The Court invoked this precedent to reject the contention that a karta of a joint family (even if such status were admitted) could bind minors without compliance with O.32, R.7; the guardian's statutory role is paramount.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded from statutory text and established practice under Order 32, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court noted that the present rule requires that "no next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor" and that any such agreement entered into without the Court's leave "so recorded" shall be voidable against parties other than the minor.

The Court explained that the qualifying words "expressly recorded in the proceedings" and "so recorded" were added to the present rule to embody prior practice. From the rule and authorities it follows, the Court concluded, that (a) leave of the Court must be sought by the next friend or guardian and the leave must be given by the Court before recording the compromise, and (b) while granting leave the Court must consider whether the proposed terms are for the benefit of the minor.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed there was no application by the guardians (Abhaykumar Singh or Jaikumar Singh) for leave, no order granting leave, and no indication on the record that the trial court had considered the minors' interests when recording the compromise. The guardians had repudiated the fact of any compromise. The Court therefore held there was a clear violation of Order 32, Rule 7.

The Court examined the authorities cited by respondents and found none that supported the proposition that a Court may record and enforce a compromise binding minors without the guardians having sought and obtained leave expressly recorded in the proceedings. Several authorities (notably Ranga Rao v. Rajagopala Raju and Gulab Dei v. Vaish-Motor Co.) were held to be directly on point and supportive of the principle that a guardian's opposition precludes enforcement of a compromise against minors and that a compromise without leave is a nullity insofar as it affects minors.

The Court further rejected the respondents' argument based on the alleged status of Abhaykumar Singh as karta of a joint family. It held that even if the family were joint and Abhaykumar the karta, the guardianship provisions and Order 32, Rule 7 prevail; the guardian must obtain leave in his representative capacity before entering into a compromise on behalf of minors. Moreover, because one minor was under a different guardian (Jaikumar Singh), acceptance by Abhaykumar alone could not bind that other minor.

Finally, the Court noted that the interests of the minors and the major appellants were joint, not separate, so the compromise could not be given effect to in a manner that would bind the minors without compliance with the statutory requirement for leave.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED — The High Court allowed the appeals and awarded costs. The Court ordered one set of hearing fees since all the appeals were heard together. Both judges concurred in the result.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the compromise recorded by the Subordinate Judge could not be enforced against the minor respondents because the statutory requirements of Order 32, Rule 7 (leave of the Court expressly recorded) were not complied with.
  • The Court reaffirmed that guardians or next friends must apply for and obtain the Court's leave, expressly recorded in the proceedings, before a compromise can bind minors; if guardians refuse to apply, a compromise cannot be forced upon the minors even if the Court believes the terms are beneficial.
  • The opinion does not state that it establishes a novel precedent beyond applying existing principles; its effect is to apply established rules to the facts and to disallow enforcement of the compromise in the absence of recorded leave under O.32, R.7.

Source material: opinion excerpt as provided. This summary refrains from adding facts or inferences beyond the opinion's text.

    Abhay Kumar Singh And Others v. Kirit Narain Singh And Others Resps.

    C.P Sinha, J.:— These misc appeals arise out of a proceeding under O. 23, R. 3 of the CPC which was initiated by the applts. in rent appeals Nos. 141, 142, 145, 146 & 147 of 1946 pending in the Ct. of the Subordinate Judge of Purnea. In the view which we take of these appeals, it is not at all necessary to mention the facts in detail: it is enough to say that the applts. in those rent appeals alleged that a compromise had been entered into between them & the resps. to those appeals. The applts. to those appeals got an order in their favour by the learned subordinate Judge under O. 23, R. 3 of the CPC recording the compromise as alleged by them. The resps. in the rent appeals have filed these appeals against the said order of the learned Subordinate Judge.

    2. It appears that in the rent appeals there were six minor resps., namely, five sons of resps. 1 Abhay Kumar Singh & they were under the guardianship of their father, & a minor son of Jaikumar Singh who was under the guardianship of his father. The Ct. below has found “that the compromise is proved & is lawful & as such must be enforced”. These appeals must be decided in favour of the applts. on a very short point. Abhaykumar Singh & Jaikumar Singh are brothers, & it is alleged by the resps. that the rent appeals were compromised on certain terms; & that according to the compromise Abhaykumar Singh, one of the applts. & a resp. in those rent appeals, had agreed to the terms of the compromise. In this case’, there was no appln. by the guardian, either written or oral, for the leave of the Ct. to enter into the compromise on behalf of the two sets of minors aforesaid; neither is there any order giving leave to the guardians of the minors to enter into compromise, nor is there any indication on the record to show that, while holding that the compromise should be recorded, the Ct. had consd. the interest of the minors in making its order under O. 23, R. 3 of the Code. It appears, therefore, that there is a clear violation of the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 of the CPC which runs as follows:

    “1. No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian.

    2. Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Ct. so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor.”

    It has to be remembered that the provisions contained in this rule, as they stood in the earlier Act of 1882, did not contain the words “expressly recorded in the proceedings” in Sub-R. (1) & the words “so recorded” in Sub-R. (2). These words were added in the present rule to give effect to the practice established under the old section. From the provision contained in the aforementioned rule, it is quite clear that the leave of the Ct. must be asked for by the next friend or guardian & the leave must be given by the Ct. before recording the compromise & it is also well settled now, upon authorities, that, while giving that leave to the guardian or the next friend, the Ct. must consider whether the proposed terms were for the benefit of the minor concerned. In the present case, the guardians had never applied for leave of the Ct. for entering into any compromise on behalf of the minor resps., rather they have been repudiating all through the factum of a compromise.

    3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the resps. has cited a number of authorities, which I will presently consider, but none of these authorities supports his contention that a compromise could be recorded by the Ct. without the guardian or the next friend having asked for the leave of the Ct. & without the leave having been granted. The case of ‘Rajeswararao v. Satyanarayana’, (AIR (33) 1946 Mad 377), has been cited to show that before the conclusion of the terms of the compromise & before the compromise is made a decree of the Ct., a guardian-ad-litem can obtain the leave of the Ct. It is not the case here that the leave of the Ct. was asked for & granted by any stage &, therefore, this case gives no support to the resps. It is rather against them as their Lordships say that a guardian-ad-litem must obtain the consent of the Ct., before the compromise is concluded. The case of ‘Dharnidhar v. Phulkumari’, (24 Pat 529), is also to the effect that leave of the Ct. can be granted after the terms of the compromise have been finalised & it is not necessary under O. 32, R. 7(1) for the guardian-ad-litem to obtain leave of the Ct. to negotiate the terms of the compromise. The case of ‘Rameshwar Pershad v. Ram Bahadur Singh’, (34 Cal 70), is a decision of the P.C This case is absolutely of no assistance, because, it does not consider the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 of the equivalent provisions thereof in the previous Code of Civil Procedure From the statement of the argument in the report, however, it appears that in that case also leave had been asked for and sanction of the Ct. had been given to the guardian concerned and the question which we have to decide in this case did not fail for consideration in the case before the P.C Reference has been made to the case of ‘Badri Singh v. Chhotu Singh’, AIR (25) 1938 Pat 202. That case also is no authority for the proposition that a Ct. can record a compromise without the guardian or the next friend of the minor having obtained leave of the Ct. In that case their Lordships held that a certain compromise was for the benefit of the minor concerned. What happened in that case was that a certain suit was decreed in terms of the compromise. Later, on an appln. for review of the order the Ct. set aside that order on the ground that the minors had not been benefited by that compromise & also that there was no express order by the Ct. recording the compromise that it was for the benefit of the minors, & the suit was restored to its original number. On appeal against the decree in the suit, their Lordships were assured that the compromise in the Ct. below was beneficial to the minors concerned, &, in that view of the matter; their Lordships accepted the terms of the original compromise & incidentally observed that

    “if the attention of the Ct. is directed specifically to the fact that there is a minor involved & the compromise is brought to its notice……….it must be assumed that the Ct. has complied with the requirements of the law.”

    No authorities were refd. to in support of this general proposition & I doubt very much its correctness. In this case, however, it is not necessary to decide that point. In the case of ‘Umar v. Mahabir Lal’, (18 Pat 708), it was held that a decree passed on an award made on a reference, which was in contravention of O. 32, R. 7 of the Code, was not void but voidable at the instance of the minor, &, therefore, could not be impeached in an execution proceeding arising out of that decree. This case also does not throw any light upon the question that we have to consider in this case. The case of Sakinabai v. Shirinibai’, (47 IA 88), was a case where a compromise was arrived at while the appeal was pending before the P.C & that case is not at all relevant to the decision of the question in his case.

    4. It has been further urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the resps. that no particular formula is required by the Ct. in granting leave & the case of Ramnarain Singh v. Atal Behari Singh’, (AIR (26) 1939 Pat 387), & the case of “Ishan Chandra v. Nilratan’, (2 Pat 538), have been reld. upon for this proposition. The learned counsel, however, forgets that the present case is not one where there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 of the CPC but it is a case where those provisions have been entirely ignored.

    5. The learned counsel appearing for the applts. has contended that a compromise cannot be forced upon the guardian or the next friend of a minor & that it is for the guardian & guardian alone to consider whether he should or should not apply for leave of the Ct. to enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of the minor; & that if he does not choose to enter into compromise & ask for leave of the Ct. to enter into a compromise on behalf of the minor, the minor cannot be forced to accept the compromise & if any such compromise is made a decree of the Ct. it is not binding upon the minor. He has placed before the Ct. several cases, & it is necessary to refer only to some of those cases which throw light on the point under consideration. In the case of ‘Ranga Rao v. Rajagopala Raju’, (22 Mad 378), the facts were that the guardian-ad-litem’ of the minors had agreed to a compromise in a suit & had also signed the petn. embodying the terms arrived at, but later on the guardian changed his mind & declined to present that petn. of compromise & opposed a decree being passed in terms thereof. One of the parties to the compromise wanted to enforce the terms of the compromise & an issue was raised in the suit, whether such a compromise had in tact been effected, & if so, whether it was binding on the minor defts. to the suit, & the Dist. J. held that the said compromise was valid & binding on the minors & he decreed the suit in terms of the compromise. The matter went up in appeal & their Lordships made the following observations:

    “Assuming that the applts' guardian did as urged for the resps. agree to compromise the suit on the terms alleged, was it competent to the Ct. in the circumstances of the case to enforce the compromise as against the applts? Now, leave to enter into such compromise was never asked for on behalf of the applts., & their guardian-‘ad-litem’ has all along been objecting to the Ct. passing a decree according to the compromise. In the face of such opposition on the part of the person representing the appits. in the litigation the Ct. had clearly no power to enforce the compromise, even though it appeared to the Ct. that the terms of the compromise were beneficial to the applts.”

    This case is on all fours with the facts of the present case &, with very great respect to their Lordships, I entirely endorse the observations, made above. In the case of ‘Gulab Dei v. Vaish-Motor Co.’, (47 All 782), their Lordships, accepting the view of the Madras H.C in ‘Ranga Rao v. Rajagopala Raju’, (22 Mad 378), have observed.:

    “The mere fact that the decree has been passed in terms of the compromise does not necessarily justify an inference that the Ct. granted leave, or that it was satisfied that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor. Any compromise without the leave of the Ct. is a nullity. As, before any leave has been granted, the guardian herself does not want the compromise, it is impossible to force the compromise on the minor.”

    6. That the guardian or the next friend of the minor is the sole judge as to whether or not he should enter into any agreement on behalf of the minor, has been reiterated by their Lordships of the Calcutta H.C in ‘Hemangini Dasi v. Bhagwati Sundari Dasi’, (AIR (10) 1923 Cal 685) Their Lordships have held:

    “It is settled law that although the Ct. can & must approve of a comprpmise on behalf, of Infants, it cannot & will not force one upon them: against the opinion of their next friend or guardian ‘ad litem’ in the action.”

    & further

    “No doubt if the Ct. found that a guardian or next friend was acting improperly & against the infant's interests in refusing to assent to an arrangement which appeared clearly beneficial to them, steps might be taken to remove him & substitute some other person.”

    In the case of ‘Hanuman Rai v. Jagdis Rai”, AIR (3) 1816 Pat 223, a Bench of this Ct. has held: that it is open to a guardian to withdraw the appln. for leave to enter into an agreement at any time before the leave of the Ct. was granted.

    7. On a review of the authorities mentioned above, it is clear that if it is intended that minors to an action be bound by a compromise, then the guardian or the next friend of the minor must apply for the leave of the Ct. to enter into the compromise & if the guardian refuses to do so a compromise cannot be forced on the minor concerned although, in the opinion of the Ct. the terms of the proposed compromise may be beneficial to the minor. It is the guardian or the next friend alone who can decide for himself whether or not he should obtain the leave of the Ct. to enter into a compromise. If he chooses not to apply for leave, then no compromise could affect the interest of the minor & the minor is not bound by any compromise which may have been entered into between the parties to the action.

    8. It was contended by Mr. Sanyal, the learned counsel for the resps. that Abhaykumar Singh being the karta of the joint family, of which the minors are members, & it having been found by the Ct. below that he had entered into the compromise, the compromise should be held binding upon the minors as well. That the family of the applts. is joint, is not admitted by Mr. G.C Mukherji, learned counsel for the applts. Even if the family was joint & Abhaykumar Singh was the karta of the family, the resps. cannot get any advantage out of it. In the first place, the minors & urnier the guardianship of their respective fathers & as such the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 will apply & the powers of the karta of a joint Hindu family must be subject to the provisions of that rule, that is to say, the leave cl the Ct. must be asked for by the guardian to enter into compromise & after the leave is granted by the Ct., the guardian can enter into compromise. In the second place, one of the minors is under the guardianship of his father Jaikumar Singh & the case of the resps. being that Abhaykumar Singh had entered into the compromise on behalf of the family, the acceptance of the compromise by Abhaykumar Singh alone will not bind the other minor. It has been held by the P.C in the case of ‘Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row’, (36 Mad 295), that if the father was guardian-‘ad-litem’ of his minor son, then he could not, without the leave of the Ct. do any act in his capacity of father or managing member of the family, which he was debarred from doing as guardian-‘ad-litem’. Their Lordships observed that to hold otherwise would be to defeat, the object of the enactments. Their Lordships were considering Section 462 of the CPC which was replaced by O. 32, R. 7 of the present Code.

    9. Lastly, it was contended that if the compromise is not binding on the minors, the compromise is binding on the major applts. The difficulty in accepting this argument is that the interest of the minors & the major applts. are joint & not separate, &, therefore, the compromise cannot be given effect to.

    10. In the result, the appeals are allowed with costs.

    11. There will be one set of hearing fee as all these appeals were heard together.

    12. B.P Sinha, J.:— I agree.

    V.B.B

    13. Appeals allowed.

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    Abhay Kumar Singh And Others v. Kirit Narain Singh And Others Resps.
    (Jan 3, 1951)