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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These consolidated first appeals arise from an award dated 15 January 2001 passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad, concerning land acquisition proceedings for lands in Village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad. A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 5 January 1991 and published in the Gazette on 2 February 1991 proposing acquisition of 790-16-9 bighas (492.26 acres). Local publication occurred on 24 March 1991 and a last corrigendum on 4 April 1991. Declaration under Section 6 read with Section 17 was published on 7 January 1992. Possession was taken in parts on 30 March 1992, 7 August 1995 and 18 November 1995.

The Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) awarded compensation for an area of 747-5-1 bighas (467.03 acres), fixing market value at Rs. 1251 per square yard and awarding compensation at Rs. 110 per square yard after a 12% deduction for largeness. The Court of Reference under Section 18 enhanced market value to Rs. 297 per square yard and awarded compensation of Rs. 222 per square yard after a 25% deduction for largeness. These factual findings are stated in the opinion as undisputed.

The appeals were heard together because they are connected; the court issued a common judgment and order with binding effect upon all the first appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether these appeals are in parity with the earlier decision in Jagdish Chandra and others v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, NOIDA (reported 2008(1) ADJ 253) and therefore whether the same compensation principles applied there should be applied here.
  2. Whether a deduction on account of largeness of area is legally mandated or discretionary and, if discretionary, whether it should be applied to the lands acquired in these proceedings.
  3. Whether a subsequent notification (1991) can validly result in a lower compensation rate than an earlier notification (1989) for land in the same village, and whether such disparity should be corrected to maintain parity.
  4. Whether an exemplar sale-deed (agreement for sale and sale-deed) executed in 1989 can be treated as comparable for fixation of compensation for lands notified in 1991, including the significance of the timing and area of such exemplar instruments.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Claimants (represented by Mr. A.K. Misra, Senior Counsel)

  • The appeals are similarly placed with First Appeal No. 744 of 2001 (Jagdish Chandra and others v. NOIDA), decided by a Division Bench and reported in 2008(1) ADJ 253; the only difference is the date of notification (1989 in Jagdish Chandra vs. 1991 in these cases), and thus similar compensation should be awarded.
  • The land acquisitions here involve many small plots acquired by separate notifications which were then accumulated to show largeness; many individual plots are very small (examples given: as small as 0.12 bigha), undermining a deduction for largeness.
  • The exemplar sale-deed relied upon by the authority was executed in 1989 and is not contemporaneous with the 1991 notifications; lack of recital of the agreement for sale in some sale-deeds is not fatal to their evidentiary value.
  • Circle rates, though not determinative for compensation, have evidential value and cannot be dismissed as irregular; future potentiality was not considered in the Court below.
  • Basic parity factors are (a) area of the exemplar sale-deed and whether it was executed significantly prior to notification, and (b) whether accumulation of different-sized lands justifies a deduction for largeness.

Respondent / Authority (represented by Mr. Navin Sinha, Senior Counsel)

  • There is a material difference between Jagdish Chandra and these cases: the Court of Reference in these matters relied upon an agreement for sale of 1989 followed by sale-deeds that do not reference that agreement for sale for lands that are comparatively smaller, so those sale-deeds cannot be treated as exemplar sale-deeds.
  • In Jagdish Chandra there was no deduction because the authority intended to develop a Regional Park (making substantial resale unlikely), whereas in the present cases the authority requires land for commercial purposes, which supports applying deductions for largeness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagdish Chandra and others v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, NOIDA (First Appeal No. 744 of 2001), reported 2008(1) ADJ 253 Consideration of parity between acquisitions; the approach of not making a deduction for largeness in certain factual contexts (e.g., intended development as regional park) and addressing potential double benefit to authority arising from urbanisation and development charges. The court followed and applied the reasoning in Jagdish Chandra, declining to deviate from that earlier decision and directing that similar compensation be fixed in these appeals (i.e., allowing the landowners' appeals and dismissing the authority's appeals).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court explained its analysis in several steps:

  1. Binding precedent and parity: The court observed that these connected appeals are analogous to the earlier Division Bench decision in Jagdish Chandra and that it could not deviate from the order passed there. The court therefore started from the premise that parity with Jagdish Chandra had to be examined.
  2. Nature of deduction for largeness: The court noted there is no statutory provision in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that mandates deduction from compensation for largeness of area. Deductions of that nature are made by courts on a case-by-case subjective satisfaction; there is no automatic or hard-and-fast rule.
  3. Double benefit and urbanisation: The court adopted the reasoning in Jagdish Chandra that modern urbanisation enables authorities to both carry out development and operate commercially (including charging development charges and fixing prices competitively). The court emphasized the risk of double benefit to authorities if owners were not protected from disparities between notifications.
  4. Price parity across notifications: The court accepted appellants' contention that landowners are entitled to the market price available on the date of the notification under Section 4 (not today's price) and that allowing a later notification to produce a lower price than an earlier, similar-notification in the same village would create an apparent and unfair disparity. The court found both contentions (that owners are entitled to parity and that disparities would be manifestly unjust) to be affirmative and acceptable.
  5. Factual evaluation of largeness and exemplar sale-deeds: The court considered the chart produced by appellants detailing sizes of acquired plots and concluded that the accumulation of different-sized plots to demonstrate largeness was not established beyond doubt from the record. The exemplar sale-deeds relied upon by the authority were not found to conclusively justify a deduction for largeness in these appeals.
  6. Application to present appeals: On weighing the above legal and factual considerations, the court concluded that there was no cogent reason to fix compensation for the 1991 notifications at a rate lower than that fixed for the 1989 notifications in Jagdish Chandra. Consequently, similar pricing treatment was warranted.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court allowed the appeals of the landowners and dismissed the appeals of the authority, directing that compensation be fixed at parity with the earlier decision in Jagdish Chandra (i.e., similar pricing treatment to that decision).

Direct consequences implemented by the court:

  • The landowners' appeals are allowed by fixing similar price (as in Jagdish Chandra) for the lands covered by the 1991 notifications.
  • The appeals filed by the authority are dismissed.
  • No order as to costs was made.
  • Defective appeals that had only court-fee deficiencies (which were subsequently cured) are governed by this judgment on merit and are allowed without imposing any cost; the office was directed to allot regular numbers to such appeals.
  • Any substitution applications pending in these appeals are allowed without imposing costs.
  • The lower court records are to be returned to the concerned court expeditiously.
  • The opinion records concurrence by Hon'ble Shishir Kumar, J.

Broader implications: The opinion does not expressly announce a new legal precedent beyond applying the Jagdish Chandra decision; the court applied the earlier Division Bench reasoning to maintain parity in compensation for similar acquisitions. No further or novel legal principle was stated as being established in this opinion.

This summary was prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No additional facts, documents, or outside authorities were considered or inferred.

    Ganeshi Singh And Others v. State Of U.P.And Others

    Hon'ble Amitava Lala, J.-

    Since all the aforesaid first appeals are con­nected and have been heard analogously, the same are being decided by this common judgment and order having binding effect upon all the first appeals.

    2. The aforesaid bunch of first appeals are arising out of an award dated 15th January, 2001 passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad in the appropriate land acquisition reference's. The lands under acquisition fall in Village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called as the 'Act') was issued on 5th January, 1991, which was duly published in the Gazette on 2nd February, 1991 proposing to acquire land measuring area 790-16-9 bighas corresponding to 492.26 acres. Publication in the local newspapers was done on 24th March, 1991. Last corrigendum was issued on 4th April, 1991. Declaration under Section 6 read with Section 17 of the Act was made on 7th January, 1992 by publication in the Ga­zette. Possession was taken in parts on 30ttJ March, 1992, 7th August, 1995 and 18th November, 1995. Special Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter called as the 'S.L.A.O.') made his offer by way of award only in respect of an area of 747-5-1 bighas, comparable to 467.03 acres. The market value was determined at the rate of Rs. 1251- per square yard. Compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 110/- per square yards after making deduction of 12% on account of largeness of area. Court of reference under Section 18 of the Act enhanced the market value upto Rs. 297/- per square yard and awarded compensation of Rs. 222/- per square yard after making deduction of 25% on account of largeness of area. These facts are undisputed.

    3. According to Mr. A.K. Misra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the claimants, the aforesaid cases are similarly placed with that of First Appeal No. 744 of 2001 (Jagdish Chandra and others v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, NOIDA and another) alongwith the connected appeals arising out of the same .village, in which a Division Bench of this Court was pleased to deliver a judgment reported in 2008(1) ADJ 253. The only difference is period of notifica­tion. In such cases i.e. Jagdish Chandra (supra) the notification under Section-4 (1) of the Act was of the year 1989, whereas in the present cases the notifications are of the year 1991. Therefore, at least similar compensation is to be awarded in these cases too. On the other hand, Mr. Navin Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the authority contended that there is a difference between the case of Jagdish Chandra (supra) and these cases. In these cases, the Court of refer­ence has relied upon agreement for sale of the year 1989 followed by the sale-deed without any reference or recital with regard to such agreement for sale in respect of lands comparably smaller in size, which cannot be held to be the exemplar sale-deed. Secondly, in those cases deduction was not made by the Court from the payable compensation because the authority needed to develop a Regional Park on such land unlike the lands of the present cases where it is required for commercial purpose. Mr. Misra, in reply thereto, contended before this Court that the lands acquired by the authority are not large in area. On the contrary, various small plots are acquired by separate notifications and accumu­lated to show largeness only to differentiate from the comparable lands. He has produced a chart to establish that in only appeal i.e. First Appeal No. 34 of 2007 (Ganeshi and others v. NOIDA and another) the acquired land is 29.15 bigha approximately. There are different plots in the appeals where the acquired lands are even less than a bigha. However, from the said chart we find that the land area in First Appeal No. 386 of 2001 (Nandu and others v. Noida) is 31 bigha kachcha (10.33 bigha pakka) and in First Appeal No. 394 of 2001 (Kishan Lal v. Noida) is 43.16 bigha kachcha (14.33 pakka), which are the highest areas as shown in the chart. The smallest area in the chart of the land is 0.12 bigha in First Appeal No. 403 of 2001 (Kalu Ram and others v. Noida). The chart as placed before this Court is made part and parcel of the record. Mr. Misra further contended that the agree­ment for sale was also part and parcel of the land in question, in respect of which the order has already been passed not in respect of the lands in question in these proceedings. Moreover, no reference of agreement for sale in the recital of the sale-deed is not so fatal that the execution of the same will be ignored. Moreover, the sale-deeds were executed in the year 1989 not immediately before or around 1991 when the notification was published. The land area in the exemplar sale-deed is 5-18-10 bigha (pakka). No future potentiality has been considered by the Court. Thus, potentiality before notification as shown by the parties are reflected in the order impugned. Moreover, though circle rate cannot be considered as a basis for fixation of compensation but for the purpose of stamp duty etc. yet evidential value of the same in coming to a finding cannot be said to be irregular. These appeals cannot be said to be different from the appeals, which have been adjudicated by the Court in the earlier occasion. Therefore, Court will only see the parity of these appeals with the other appeals, which have been disposed of by this Court. Basic factors of looking into the parity are two folds herein. Firstly, what is the area of exemplar sale-deed and whether such exemplar sale-deed is executed in the period considerably prior to the date of notifica­tion or not. Secondly, when the land areas of different size lands under differ­ent notifications are accumulated, can the formula of deduction due to large­ness of the land be applicable or not. Lastly, when price of Rs. 297/- per square yard in. respect of the land in Jagdish Chandra (supra) arising out of the notification of the year 1989 in respect of the area of same village is accepted position, the price for the subsequent notification after two years will be less than such amount or not.

    4. We have carefully considered the respective submissions of the parties but we cannot deviate ourselves from passing the similar order, which has been passed in Jagdish Chandra (supra). It is true to say that in the case of Jagdish Chandra (supra) "question of no deduction" was considered on the basis of the fact that the authority therein wanted to make a regional park over the acquired land but not residential or commercial complex, for which various common places are required to be made and as such the authority cannot be able to sell substan­tial portion of land to the ultimate purchasers. Firstly, we have to say that there is no legal provision of deduction from the amount of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Various Courts normally pass such order of deduction on the subjective satisfaction of each case. Therefore, there is no hard and fast rule to make any deduction. Secondly, an important question of double benefit of the authorities was also considered by the Court in Jagdish Chandra (supra) on the basis of today's outlook of the authorities. Fast-growing urbanisation is grasping the rural areas. In fact, the people of rural areas are being pushed back. Today's urbanisation does not restrict the authorities to confine their activities for the benefit of the people but also to carry on business directly or indirectly in collabo­ration with the private parties. Although necessary developments are being car­ried out in such lands either directly or indirectly but the prices are also being fixed by them on the higher side with a competitive outlook with the private par­ties. Thereafter, they are charging development charges from the ultimate purchasers. On the other hand, by virtue of law and legal interpretations, the land owners, who are loosing their lands, can get price available on the date of notifica­tion under Section 4 of the Act. Neither they can get today's price nor they are asking for the same herein. Their contention is that when an earlier notification of the similar area fixed a price, whether they can get lesser price on the basis of the subsequent notification or not. If they get lesser price than the price fixed in respect of the earlier notification, whether the same will create apparent disparity or not. According to us, both the submissions are affirmative in nature and we accept the same. Another aspect is also to be taken care of by the Court on the basis of the submissions as made by the appellants-land owners, whether ques­tion of largeness will be applicable in the acquired land or not. Factually, it ap­pears to us that lands of different sizes were acquired and accumulated by the authorities to project that the land is much large in nature in comparison to exem­plar sale-deeds, which cannot be said to be established fact beyond doubt upon going through the chart having been part and parcel of the record.

    5. Therefore, in totality we do not find any cogent reason in fixing the price of the lands in question herein under the notification/s of the year 1991 at least not at par with that of the notification/s of the year 1989. Thus, the appeals of the land owners-claimants are allowed by fixing the similar price and the appeals of the authorities are dismissed.

    6. However, no order is passed as to costs.

    7. So far as the aforesaid defective appeals are concerned, from the office report we find that in those appeals only defect/s was/were deficiency of Court fees, which have been made good. Therefore, such appeals will also be governed by this judgment on merit and are accordingly allowed without imposing any cost. However, for the sake of formality, office will allot regular number to such appeals. Substitution application/s, if any, pending in these appeals are also allowed, however, without imposing any cost.

    8. Let the lower Court's record/s be returned to the Court concerned as expeditiously as possible.

    Hon'ble Shishir Kumar, J.-I agree.

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    Ganeshi Singh And Others v. State Of U.P.And Others
    (May 9, 2008)