Ginwala, J.:— The only point which arises for our consideration in this writ petition is whether the appeals filed under rule 86 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1951 are governed by the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Limitation Act). The facts relevant for the purposes of question under consideration may briefly be stated.

2. It appears that the Income Tax Officer had forwarded to the Tax Recovery Officer a certificate under the provisions of section 222 of the Income Tax Act in the year 1964 for recovering an amount of Rs. 10,370.45 from the original petitioner, namely, Gopaldas Bulakhidas Mohta. After adjustments from time to time the demand came to be reduced to Rs. 4365 in the year 1972. In order to recover this amount, the Tax Recovery Officer, who is respondent No. 2 herein, attached two pieces of agricultural lands bearing survey No. 14 admeasuring 4 acres 31 gunthas and survey No. 18/1 admeasuring 1 acre 5 gunthas, both situated at Tajnapur. On 22-6-1972 the said Officer issued a proclamation of sale under rule 38 of the said Rules read with rule 52(2) declaring that those two lands would be sold by public auction at 1.00 p.m on 13-7-1972. In pursuance of this proclamation the sale was held on 13-7-1972 and survey No. 14 was knocked down for Rs. 75,500 and survey No. 18/1 for Rs. 15,500. The up set price for these two lands had been fixed at Rs. 75.000 and Rs. 15,000 respectively. On 10-8-1972 Gopaldas Mohta filed an application before the Tax Recovery Officer purporting to be under rule 61 read with rule 87 of the said Rules. In this application he contended that the sale held on 13-7-1972 was bad, firstly because it was held within 30 days from the date of proclamation and as such in contravention of the provision contained in rule 55 of the Second Schedule and secondly that a much larger property had been put to sale for recovering a meagre amount of Rs. 4365. It was contended that material irregularities had been committed in the conduct of sale, which had resulted in loss to the petitioner. It appears that besides Gopaldas Mohta, three ladies had also filed an application on 14-8-1972 under the said rules for setting aside the said sale on the ground that they were equitable mortgagees of the land bearing survey No. 14 and that the proclamation was silent with respect to their said right. Besides this, they also challenged the sale on the same two grounds, on which Gopaldas Mohta had done it under his application stated above. When the application of Gopaldas Mohta was pending before the Tax Recovery Officer, Gopaldas Mohta had filed two more applications on 7-9-1972 one for review of the order for sale and second for permitting him to sell the lands privately. Proviso (b) to rule 61 provides that an application made by a defaulter under that rule shall be disallowed unless the applicant deposits the amount recoverable from him in execution of the certificate. It appears that because of the requirement of this proviso, Gopaldas Mohta made an application for permission to deposit the amount due from him on 20-9-1972. It is alleged that the Tax Recovery Officer issued the requisite challan to him on 20-9-1972 and he deposited the amount on 30-9-1972. However, in the meanwhile the Tax Recovery Officer on 29-9-1972 passed his order on the application filed by Gopaldas Mohta on 10-8-1972 for setting aside the sale. The Tax Recovery Officer rejected the application holding that Gopaldas Mohta had not fulfilled the requisite conditions laid down in rule 61 for setting aside the sale, namely, (a) that he had not proved any substantial injury by reason of irregularity, and (b) that he had not deposited the amount recoverable from him in execution of the certificate. He also dismissed the application for review. On the same day the Tax Recovery Officer proceeded to confirm the sale in favour of respondent No. 4, who was the auction purchaser. While passing the order for confirming the sale, the Tax Recovery Officer held that the Officer conducting the sale was not empowered to sell the second lot, namely, survey No. 18/1. If the amount recoverable could be realised by the sale of the first lot, namely, the land bearing survey No. 14. In this view of the matter the Tax Recovery Officer confirmed the sale only in respect of the land bearing survey No. 14, but did not in respect of the of the other land. Being aggrieved by this order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer, it appears that Gopaldas Mohta filed a writ petition in this Court, instead of filing an appeal under rule 36. However, during the pendency of the said writ petition, he preferred an appeal to the Tax Recovery Commissioner, who is respondent No. 3 herein. Since he had preferred the appeal, he was allowed to withdraw the said writ petition with liberty to file a fresh petition. This was done on 12-2-1973. It appears that along with the appeal which Gopaldas Mohta had filed before the Tax Recovery Commissioner on 23-11-1972, he had also filed an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal on the same day. It may be mentioned here that rule 86 prescribes a period of limitation of 30 days from the date of the order appealed against for filing an appeal and obviously the appeal preferred on 23-11-72 had not been filed within 30 days from 29-9-1972, when the order had been passed by the Tax Recovery Officer. At this stage we are not concerned with the grounds which Gopaldas Mohta stated in this application for condoning the delay.

3. The Tax Recovery Officer, respondent No. 3, first took up the application for condonation of delay for consideration. It appears that it was contended on behalf of the auction purchaser, namely, respondent No. 4 herein, that the Tax Recovery Commissioner lacked the power to condone the delay firstly because rule 86 which prescribes the period of limitation for appeal did not invest him with any such power and secondly because section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable in view of the fact that the Tax Recovery Commissioner was not a ‘Court’ within the meaning of that section. This contention was opposed by the learned counsel appearing for Gopaldas Mohta before the Tax Recovery Commissioner on the ground that sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act applied sections 4 to 24 of the said Act to all cases where period of limitation had been laid down under a local or special law. It was contended before the said Commissioner that the Income Tax Act was a special law and since the said Act or Rules did not expressly exclude the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Act, section 5 of the said Act would be applicable to the proceeding under the Income Tax Act and hence the Tax Recovery Commissioner would be very much within his power to condone the delay by virtue of section 5 of the Limitation Act. This submission on behalf of Gopaldas Mohta did not find favour with the said Commissioner and, holding that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable and since there was no other provision in the said Rules he had no power to condone the delay and in this view of the matter, he rejected the application for condoning the delay. It is thereafter that Gopaldas Mohta filed the present petition on 25-2-1974. During the pendency of the petition Gopaldas Mohta expired and the present petitioners are his legal representatives.

4. Mr. R.S Pandit the learned counsel for the petitioners firstly submitted that the view taken by the Tax Recovery Commissioner (respondent No. 3) to the effect that he had no power to condone the delay in filing the appeal for the above stated reasons, is not correct. He submitted that though section 5 of the Limitation Act by virtue of its language applies to proceedings before a Court, sub-section (2) of section 29 of the said Act specifically enacts that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Mr. Pandit submitted that even though section 5 of the Limitation Act by itself speaks of a ‘Court’, sub-section (2) of section 29 would make the said provision applicable to proceedings before other authorities also if the special or local law under which the period of limitation is prescribed, does not exclude the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Pandit contends that the Tax Recovery Officer has not taken into consideration this aspect while considering the application for condonation of delay. Mr. Pandit further contended that even on merits the order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer could not be sustained, inasmuch as the sale had been held in clear contravention of rules 52 and 55 as the property worth more than necessary to satisfy the certificate had been sold and the sale had been held within 30 days from the date of the proclamation. Mr. Pandit contended that these are not only material irregularities, but illegalities, which vitiated the sale and hence it was necessary to set aside the same in this writ petition irrespective of the fact that the appeal filed by Gopaldas Mohta before the Tax Recovery Commissioner had not been entertained as barred by limitation.

5. Mr. R.G Deshpande the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 has, however, submitted that the Limitation Act is meant to apply to proceedings before a Court as such and not before any authorities, who could not be termed as Courts and if that is so, even section 29(2) of the Limitation Act will not be helpful in applying section 5 of the said Act to the appeal filed under rule 86 of the said Rules since the Income Tax Act or the said Rules do not empower the Tax Recovery Commissioner to condone the delay caused in filing the appeal. With regard to the validity of the sale, Mr. Deshpande submitted that even assuming that the provisions contained in rules 52 and 53 of the Rules had been contravened they would at the most amount to material irregularities and the defaulter would not be entitled to have the said sale set aside unless and until he satisfied the two conditions laid down in the proviso to rule 61, namely, that the applicant therein must establish that he had sustained substantial injury by reason of irregularity, and that the applicant defaulter had deposited the amount recoverable from him in execution of the certificate. Mr. Deshpande submitted that none of these two conditions had been satisfied by Gopaldas Mohta inasmuch as it had not been alleged in the application under rule 61, much less proved that he had sustained any substantial injury by reason of the alleged irregularities and the amount had been deposited subsequent to the day, when the application had been disposed of by the Tax Recovery Officer. In substance, therefore, Mr. R.G Deshpande upheld the order passed by the said Officer.

6. In the view which we take on the question of application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is not necessary for us to go into the question of the validity of the sale.

7. A question more or less similar had arisen for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Vasaji Ghale & Co. v. State of Maharashtra . 1967 Mh LJ 855.. There the petitioners had preferred a revision application before the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal under the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 and the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. That revision application came to be disposed of by the Tribunal on 29-11-63 and the judgment and decision was served on the petitioners on 31-12-1963. Under section 23 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 and under section 34 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 a provision had been made to enable assessees to have questions of law arising out of the order made by the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal referred to the High Court. By an application dated 20-3-1964 the petitioners requested the Tribunal to refer questions of law raised therein to the High Court. Now the time prescribed by sections 23 and 34 of the Acts stated above for such application was respectively sixty and ninety days from the date of the decision of the Tribunal. On 2-8-1965 the petitioners made another application to the Tribunal praying for condonation of delay caused in filing the earlier application on certain grounds. This latter application was rejected by the Tribunal observing that it had no power to condone the delay. It was against this order that the petitioners moved this Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The question, therefore, which fell for consideration in that writ petition was whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was applicable to the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the said Act. The Division Bench considered the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and also the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and noted the alteration which had been brought about by section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the law which prevailed under the Limitation Act of 1908. After careful consideration of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly those of section 29(2), the Division Bench concluded that the provisions contained in section 29(2) read with section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be applied to the application for reference filed before the Tribunal by the petitioners. The Division Bench rejected the contention urged on behalf of the respondents in that petition to the effect that sub-section (2) of section 29 and section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no relevance to proceedings which do not originate in Civil Court. In this connection the Division Bench referred to an earlier ruling of this Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Co. . 1967 Mh. LJ 261., where a Division Bench of this Court held that applications filed before the Bombay Employees Insurance Court after 1-1-64, when the Limitation Act of 1963 came into force would be subject to the period of limitation prescribed in article 137 of the said Act. Referring to this decision in the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation, the Division Bench in Vasanji Ghala's case held that the application under the Employees State Insurance Corporation Act was not made to a Civil Court and even so, the earlier Division Bench had come to the conclusion that article 137 applied to applications made under that Act. It would, therefore, appear that the Division Bench deciding Vasanji Ghala's case was clear in holding that for the application of section 5 read with section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 the proceedings need not originate in Civil Court. In our view the ruling in Vasanji Ghala's case is a complete answer to the view taken by the Tax Recovery Commissioner in the present case.

8. In Radheshyam v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal . 1969 Mh. LJ 689, a learned single Judge of this Court has held that section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to an application under section 36(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act, 1958 by virtue of section 29(2) of the said Limitation Act. It is needless to say that the authority to whom an application has to be made under section 37(1) of the said Tenancy Act cannot be termed as a Court and even so the learned single Judge has held that section 14 of the Limitation Act was applicable to such proceedings by virtue of section 29(2).

9. In Raghunath Agarwalla v. State of Orissa . 1975 TLR 2075. a Division Bench of Orissa High Court has taken the view that by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 thereof apply to proceedings under the Orissa Sales Tax Act to the extent they are not inconsistent with any specific provision in the said Act. It has held that though the Tribunal under the said Sales Tax Act is not a ‘Court’, section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to a reference application made to the Tribunal under section 24(1) of the said Act by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the Tribunal has jurisdiction under section 5 to condone the delay in making reference application. In this case the Division Bench of Orissa High Court has considered various rulings of the High Courts including the one of this Court in Vasanji Ghala's case (cited supra). It is after a careful consideration of these authorities that, that Court had reached the said conclusion. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with what has been said by the Orissa High Court in Raghunath's case. It is not necessary for us to cite any other authorities on this question. Suffice it to say that the consensus of judicial opinion is that by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act of 1963 the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the said Act are applicable to cases where period of limitation has been prescribed for suit, appeal or application as the case may be, under any special or local law unless the said sections are specifically excluded. In the background of the provision which has been stated above, it appears to us clear that the Tax Recovery Commissioner would be entitled to entertain an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 and to decide the same even though no specific power has been given to him under the Income Tax Act, 1961 or the rules contained in Schedule II thereof. In the view which we take, therefore, we cannot sustain the order passed by respondent No. 3 on 26-11-1973 a copy of which is at annexure-M on the application filed by Gopaldas Mohta for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal. We would, therefore quash that order and direct respondent No. 3 to dispose of the said application on its merits.

10. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by respondent No. 3 on 26-11-1973 (annexure-M) is hereby quashed and respondent No. 3 is hereby directed to consider and dispose of the application filed by Gopaldas Mohta on 23-11-1972 (annexure-L) on its own merits. In the circumstances of the case, we do not make any order as to costs.

Petition allowed.