R.A Jahagirdar, J.:—
The question that arises for consideration is on what basis computation of advocate's fees is to be made in suits for injunction. Here for purposes of court fees and jurisdiction, the claim was valued at Rs. 5 and on that pleader's fees in the lower Courts would be Rs. 15 according to Bombay Pleaders' Act, 1920, and in the High Court Rs. 30 according to Appendix E of the Appellate Side Rules. A suit for injunction falls under s. 7(iv)(d) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, and the legislature has left it to the discretion of the plaintiff or appellant to value the claim on amount which he chooses. When this is done, under s. 8 of the suits valuation Act, 1887, the value as determinable for computation of court fees and value for the’ purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same, because a suit for injunction comes under the excepted provisions of s. 7 of the Court-fees Act. Ad valorem fees are those which are provided by Sch. I of the Court-Fees Act; Schedule II deals with fixed fees. I submit therefore that for purposes of advocate's fees also, the value shall be the same as for court fees and jurisdiction. If the contention of the other side, viz., that advocate's fees should be accepted on Rs. 8,000 value of property as stated in plaint or on Rs. 50,000 as admitted by plaintiff in his deposition, is to be accepted, then Second Class Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Under s. 24 of the Civil Courts Act, 1869, a Second Class Subordinate Judge has jurisdiction to try suits wherein the subject matter does not exceed Rs. 5,000. So up to that limit, a plaintiff or appellant is entitled to put his own valuation for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction and that must be taken as value for assessing advocate's fees. There cannot be a third computation to be made for advocate's fees, in matters of injunction. It is advisably left to the plaintiff to put his own arbitrary value because it is not possible to assess the market value of claim for injunction, e.g, supposing an injunction is claimed in respect of a right of way or easements for air and light. How is it possible to put a specific market value in respect of such claims.
In Bai Meherbai v. Maganchand it was observed that real as well as the court fee value should be stated on every plaint and memorandum of appeal. That was however a suit for recovery of possession falling under cl. V of s. 7 of the Court-Fees Act in which value for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction is not the same. In suits for possession, the market and real value is to be mentioned in the plaint or in memo of appeal and that becomes the value for pleader's fees. This decision was followed in Nur Mahomed v. Secretary of State which was a matter relating to land acquisition proceedings, in which it was held that where a claimant in land acquisition proceedings files a suit to restrain Government from taking proceedings, oil a point of procedure, pleaders' fees are to be calculated on the value of the subject matter of the suit. In Kasanji Kuverji…Plaintiff v. Surat Municipality…Defendant . the decision in Bai Meherbai v. Maganchand and Nur Mahomed v. Secretary of State were followed, but that was a case in which the subject matter in dispute covered certain payments which plaintiff thought there was a danger of the municipality making and which it was the object of the suit to prevent. Nevertheless there is a class of cases in which it becomes impossible to determine the value of the subject matter. So for the purpose of obtaining uniformity, the legislature determined under s. 8 of the suits valuation Act, that in suits other than those referred to in the Court-Fees Act, 1870, s. 7 paras v, vi, ix and x(d), no court fees are payable ad valorem and value determinable for the computation of court fees and value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. I rely on the decisions in Parshotam v. Secretary of State and Jamnadas Vrijlal v. Chandulal.(5)
Kale, for opponent. I submit that no specific legal provisions are pointed out as governing advocate's fees in such cases. It is contended that legislature intended that, arbitrary valuation can be fixed by the plaintiff relying on s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and s. 24 of the Civil Courts Act. For the purposes of court fees, it is regulated by the provisions of Court-Fees Act and for the purposes of jurisdiction it is regulated by Suits Valuation Act. The preamble of the latter Act makes it clear. So also civil Courts determine only the jurisdiction of certain Courts. For the purposes of advocate's fees, however, I submit that when the value of the subject matter can be ascertained, the advocate's fees should be assessed according to that valuation. Here in the plaint itself the value of the land was stated as Rs. 8,000 and it was admitted in his deposition by plaintiff that it was Rs. 50,000.
I rely on the decisions in Nur Mahomed v. Secretary of State and Kasanji Kuverji…Plaintiff v. Surat Municipality…Defendant .. These cases are on all fours with the present case and illustrate the proposition that in ascertaining the advocate's fees, the subjectmatter in dispute has to be ascertained and advocate's fees are to be assessed on that valuation. The decisions in Parshotam v. Secretary of State and Jamnadas Vrijlal v. Chandulal have no bearing on the present question.
I therefore submit that advocate's fees should be assessed on Rs. 8,000 value of the land in plaint, if the Court is not inclined to value them on Rs. 50,000 the value as admitted in evidence.
Beaumont, C.J:—This is an application to the Court under r. 132 of the Appellate Side Rules. The question relates to the amount allowed by the Taxing Officer for the advocate's fee, and the application raises an important question of principle.
The suit is a suit for an injunction, in which the plaintiff asks that the defendants may be restrained from interfering with his possession of the suit property. The plaintiff's case was that he was the absolute owner of the suit property as his separate estate, and the defence was that the property was joint family property and vested in the plaintiff and the defendants, the plaintiff's share being an undivided third. The plaintiff's suit failed at the trial, and his appeal to the Assistant Judge and a second appeal to this Court were dismissed. In the result, therefore, the finding is that the property is not the separate property of the plaintiff.
It is plain that although this is in form a suit for an injunction, it is really a suit which raises the question as to the plaintiff's title to the suit land. If the plaintiff had sued for possession of the suit land, he would have had to pay court-fee on the value of the land ascertained under s. 7(v) of the Court-fees Act. No doubt, he did not require an order for possession, because he was in possession, and we do not suggest that he was not entitled to file this suit for an injunction. Where a suit is for an injunction, the amount of the court-fee is fixed by the plaintiff arbitrarily in his plaint in accordance with s. 7(iv)(d) of the Court-fees Act, and the plaintiff in this case assessed the court-fee at Rs. 5. Under s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887, in a suit for an injunction the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction are the same. That being so, the value for purposes of jurisdiction being less than Rs. 5,000, the case was triable by a Second Class Subordinate Judge.
We think that the question of the valuation of suits for an injunction and some other suits of the classes referred to in s. 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act is a matter which might well engage the attention of the Legislature. It frequently happens that in the course of the trial of a suit, where the court-fee is a nominal one, it transpires that the actual value of the subject-matter of the suit can be ascertained at a much higher figure. In this particular case the real subject-matter of the suit is the plaintiff's right to an undivided two-thirds share of the suit property, which is worth very much more than Rs. 5. It might be desirable to give the Court jurisdiction in cases of this sort to revise the valuation of the court-fee stamp as a result of evidence given at the trial and thus save loss of revenue to Government, and we are told that practice has been adopted in other Provinces. However, in this particular case there is no doubt that the plaintiff was entitled to value the suit for purposes of court-fee at Rs. 5, and that determined the value for purposes of jurisdiction.
What we have to deal with is the question of the advocate's fee. That subject is dealt with in matters in the High. Court by Appendix E of the Appellate Side Rules. The provisions of Appendix E follow the terms of the Pleaders Act, which relates to litigation in the mofussil. Rule I of Appendix E provides that in suits which decide on the merits the real dispute between the parties, and in, among other things, appeals from decrees (including preliminary decrees) other than appeals from execution proceedings which decide on the merits the real dispute between the parties, the amount of the advocate's fee shall be computed on the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute in the suit, appeal or proceeding at the rates therein specified. The learned Government Pleader on behalf of the plaintiff contends that the value of the advocate's fee under that rule should be the same as the value for purposes of the court-fee and for jurisdiction, and that on that basis the value of the subject-matter being Rs. 5, only the minimum advocate's fee should be allowed under Appendix E, Rule VI. But it is to be noticed that Appendix E does not refer to the value for purposes of the court-fee or jurisdiction. It bases the amount of the advocate's fee on the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute in the suit.
It was held in Bai Meherbai v. Maganchand, which was a suit for possession of land, that in such a suit the advocate's fee should be calculated on the actual value of the property, and not on the value estimated for purposes of court-fee under the Court-fees Act. That principle has been applied in two cases of suits for an injunction. Those two cases are Nur Mahomed v. Secretary of State and Kasanji Kuverji…Plaintiff v. Surat Municipality…Defendant .. In the first of those cases the injunction asked for was to restrain Government from taking possession of land acquired compulsorily under the Land Acquisition Act, and the Court held that the advocate's fee should be based on the value of the land. Whether that valuation was right may perhaps be open to question, because the subject-matter of the suit was not really the value of the land, but the difference between the value of the land and the sum which Government was going to pay for it under the Land Acquisition Act. However, the principle was adopted that in a suit for an injunction where it is possible to ascertain the value of the subject-matter, that value should be the basis for determining the advocate's fee. In Kasanji Kuverji…Plaintiff v. Surat Municipality…Defendant . (supra) the suit was for a declaration and an injunction to restrain a Municipality from spending a sum of Rs. 20,000 contrary to law, as the plaintiff alleged, and there the advocate's fee was based on the sum in dispute, that is to say, Rs. 20,000. In both those cases there were materials on record, which enabled the Court to ascertain what was the real value of the subject-matter in dispute. In Parshottam v. Secretary of State that was not possible, and in that case the Court allowed only the minimum, advocate's fee under Appendix E, Rule VI.
We think the true rule to be derived from the terms of Appendix E and the decisions upon it, is that the advocate's fee should be computed on the value of the subject-matter in dispute, where that value can be ascertained by the Taxing Officer from materials on the record. In the case of an injunction it may frequently be quite impossible to ascertain that value, for example, in a suit for an injunction to restrain interference with a right of way. In such a suit the value of the right of way may bear little relation to the value either of the dominant tenement or of the servient tenement, and the value of the benefit to the dominant tenement and the burden to the servient tenement may not be the same. In such a case it may be impossible for the Taxing Officer to say what is the value of the right of way which is in dispute, and in such a case his proper course is to allow the minimum fee. But if the materials on record enable the Taxing Officer to say what is the value of the subject-matter in dispute, he should base the advocate's fee on that value, subject however to this qualification, that the value of the subject-matter of the suit should never be regarded as greater than the amount necessary for ascertaining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. It may, no doubt, sometimes happen, as was noticed in Jamnadas Vrijlal v. Chandulal, that a Second Class Subordinate Judge, whose jurisdiction is limited to Rs. 5,000, may be justified in trying a suit, where the subject-matter really exceeds that value, the suit being one in which the plaintiff has fixed arbitrarily the value for court-fees, which determines the value for jurisdiction. But however that may be, it seems to us that it would be illogical in a suit tried by a Court on the basis that the value of the subject-matter does not exceed Rs. 5,000, to allow a higher figure for the advocate's fee. The whole procedure would be different, if the value of the subject-matter for jurisdiction exceeded Rs. 5,000. We are dealing in this case with a second appeal, but if the value of the subject-matter had exceeded Rs. 5,000, there would have been no second appeal; there would have been only a first appeal to this Court. Therefore, we think that the Taxing Officer should never base the advocate's fee on an amount in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court which tried the suit.
Now, in this case, as we have already indicated, we think the real subject-matter in dispute is the plaintiff's right or interest in two-thirds of the suit property. Evidence was given that the suit property had been acquired for sums amounting to Rs. 8,000. In the course of the trial the plaintiff had alleged that the value had risen to Rs. 50,000, and the Taxing Officer has held him to that allegation, and has based the advocate's fee on that value. Apart from the fact that exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, we think that it would be hardly fair in ascertaining value for pleader's fee to hold a party to an allegation as to value made alio intuitu. But we see no reason why the Court should not act on the evidence that the property was acquired for Rs. 8,000, and, at any rate, has not deteriorated in value according to the plaintiff's own case.
We think, therefore, that the advocate's fee should be based on two-thirds of Rs. 8,000, not exceeding Rs. 5,000. As two-thirds of Rs. 8,000 does exceed Rs. 5,000, the proper order to make is that the advocate's fee should be based on a value of Rs. 5,000.
The applicant must pay the costs of the application.
Order accordingly.
J.G.R