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  • conclusive.Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • art. 11 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • art. 11 of the Limitation Act
  • order.Rule 58 of O. XXI
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  • conclusive.Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • art. 11 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • art. 11 of the Limitation Act
  • order.Rule 58 of O. XXI
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Divatia, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the plaintiff (the auction-purchaser in an execution sale) in a suit to recover possession of certain properties. Defendants Nos. 1–4 were members of a joint family holding an undivided one-fourth share in the suit lands. Before 1930 those shares had been mortgaged with possession for Rs. 200 to Mirza Abdul Begg. On 25 March 1930 defendants Nos. 3 and 4 redeemed the property: defendant No. 3 contributed Rs. 50 for his one-fourth share and defendant No. 4 paid Rs. 150 on behalf of himself and defendants Nos. 1 and 2, becoming subrogated to the mortgagee Mirza as regards the shares of defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

A decree-holder (Kadgauda) with a money decree against defendant No. 1 filed a Darkhast in 1935 to bring defendant No. 1's one-fourth share to sale. On 12 February 1936 defendant No. 4 applied under Order XXI, Rule 58, C.P.C. to have defendant No. 1's share sold subject to an incumbrance of Rs. 50 due to him by virtue of subrogation. The sale in execution took place on 16 July 1936 and the present plaintiff became the auction-purchaser. The claim petition under O. XXI, r. 58, was heard after the sale (11 August 1936) and was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that, because the sale had already taken place, the previous attachment had ended and the claim application was not tenable; the judge held that, in those circumstances, the claimant could not get the sale set aside or bind the purchaser by an order in that application.

Defendant No. 4 did not bring a suit within one year to set aside the dismissal of his application. He later sold his rights under the mortgage (to which he had been subrogated) to defendant No. 5 on 2 February 1937. The plaintiff (auction-purchaser) filed the present suit on 22 March 1938 to recover a share of the lands of defendant No. 1, asserting that because defendant No. 4 had not instituted a suit under O. XXI, r. 63, within one year of the dismissal of his claim application, defendant No. 4 was precluded from setting up the incumbrance and the plaintiff had acquired the property free of that burden.

At trial the main question was whether defendant No. 4 was debarred from setting up his charge in view of the dismissal of his claim application. The trial Judge held he was debarred (treating the executing Court's order as one under O. XXI, r. 63). On appeal the Assistant Judge reversed, holding that the rights under the incumbrance had not been lost and that it was not necessary to set aside the executing Court's order within one year under Article 11 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiff has appealed to the present Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order passed by the executing Court dismissing defendant No. 4's claim-application (O. XXI, r. 58) after the execution sale had taken place is an "order" within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 63, C.P.C., thereby mandating that the party against whom the order is made must institute a suit within one year under Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  2. If the executing Court's order is not an order under O. XXI, r. 63, whether defendant No. 4 was required to bring a suit within one year from that order to establish his claimed incumbrance.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff / Auction-purchaser)

  • The appellant's (plaintiff's) principal contention was that the order passed by the executing Court dismissing the claim petition must be regarded as an order under O. XXI, r. 63, and therefore the claimant (defendant No. 4) was obliged to institute a suit within one year from the date of that order under Article 11 of the Limitation Act; failure to do so precludes him from setting up his incumbrance in the present suit.

Respondent (Defendant No. 4 and others)

  • The respondents (defendants Nos. 4 and 5) contended that the rights relating to the incumbrance had not been lost by the order in the claim proceedings because the dismissal (being an order made after the sale on the ground that the application was not tenable) did not fall within O. XXI, r. 63 and consequently Article 11 of the Limitation Act did not require a suit to be brought within one year.
  • The appellate Judge below distinguished Trimbak v. Ziparu and followed Madras decisions (Abdul Kadir v. Somasundaram Chettiar and Kandasami v. Sivagarunatha) to hold the claim-petition dismissal did not amount to an order under r. 63.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Trimbak v. Ziparu Example of a case where the order on the claim was passed before the sale and was held to fall under O. XXI, r. 63. Classified among first-class decisions showing that orders passed before sale, whether on merits or by virtue of procedural grounds, fall under r. 63.
Venkataratnam v. Ranganayakamma Decision where the order was passed before the sale because application was late; held to fall under r. 63. Used as another example of pre-sale orders being within r. 63.
Kandasami v. Sivagarunatha Illustrates that where an application was allowed to be withdrawn (i.e., not disposed on merits) the order did not fall under r. 63. Relied on to show the nuance that r. 63 applies to orders disposing of claims on merits or by acquiescence, not to orders that do not decide merits.
Cannanore Bank, Ltd. v. Madhavi Another instance of a pre-sale order being treated as within r. 63 (one of the first-class cases). Included among first-class authorities supporting that pre-sale orders are governed by r. 63.
Jagannadham v. Bura Pydayya Single-judge decision holding that the executing Court may consider a claim under O. XXI, r. 58 even if made after the sale and that the order would be governed by r. 63. Noted and criticized by the Court as inconsistent with later full-bench or other High Court decisions; the Court rejected broad reasoning that attachment subsists after sale under r. 55 as a basis for this rule.
Abdul Kadir v. Somasundaram Chettiar Madras decision (referred to) where the lower Court had refused jurisdiction and had not acted under O. XXI, r. 58; Chief Justice concluded the claim petition was made after the sale and the order did not fall under r. 58. Distinguished from Jagannadham; used to show divergence of Madras authorities and to support the view that orders made after sale dismissing claims as not tenable are not orders under r. 63.
Ramchandra v. Kayam Hussain Held that objection to attachment after sale was tenable under O. XXI, r. 58 and the order dismissing the objection fell under rule 60, so a suit under r. 63 was necessary. Relied upon by appellant but criticized by the Court for depending on Jagannadham's reasoning and r. 55 analysis, which the Court found unpersuasive.
Puhupdei Kuar v. Ramcharitar Patna Division Bench decision holding that after the sale the attachment was ipso facto determined and the Court had no jurisdiction to try the claim; decree-holder need not file suit under r. 63. Noted as one side of a conflicting pair of Patna decisions; cited as authority that post-sale dismissal may not attract r. 63 consequences.
Deoki Singh v. Sri Thakur Raghavindra Bhagwan Single-judge Patna decision refusing to follow the Division Bench in Puhupdei; held that where an application under r. 58 was filed but not heard until after the sale, the Court retained jurisdiction to hear it. Noted to illustrate conflicting decisions within Patna High Court on whether post-sale disposal falls within r. 63.
Maung Po Pe v. Maung Kwa Rangoon High Court decision that application under O. XXI, r. 58 should be made before sale; entertaining after sale is excess of jurisdiction; followed Calcutta decision. Recorded to show support from Rangoon for the view that post-sale claim petitions are beyond jurisdiction and thus their dismissal is not an order under r. 63.
Gopal Chandra Mukerjee v. Notohar Kundu Calcutta High Court held the executing Court acted in excess of authority in allowing a claim petition under O. XXI, r. 58 after the attached property was sold; r. 60 indicates orders on r. 58 applications should be made before sale and upon sale the application ipso facto terminates. Favoured by the Court in the present opinion; the Court preferred the reasoning of this Calcutta decision and its follow-up decision (Sasthi Charan) in holding that post-sale dismissals for being not tenable do not come under r. 63.
Sasthi Charan v. Gopal Chandra Calcutta decision following Gopal Chandra Mukerjee: after sale the executing Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a r. 58 claim and a dismissal after sale did not fall under r. 63; thus a suit more than one year later was not barred under Article 11. Cited and followed by the Court in the present opinion as analogous and persuasive authority for the proposition that post-sale dismissals are not orders under r. 63.
Sant Lal v. Udho Ram-Walait Ram Lahore High Court holding that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a r. 58 claim after sale and that no declaratory suit under r. 63 was competent; title passes to auction-purchaser from date of sale. Referenced as supporting the proposition that post-sale claim petitions are not properly dealt with under r. 58 and do not attract r. 63 consequences.
Najimunnessa Bibi v. Nacharuddin Sardar Considered for the meaning of r. 63: that the order referred to in r. 63 must relate to the merits of the claim and not be a preliminary order that the Court cannot enquire into the merits. Used by the Court to interpret r. 63 narrowly (order must relate to merits); cited in support of the conclusion that dismissal on the ground that the Court cannot inquire post-sale is not within r. 63.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the relevant statutory provisions:

  • Order XXI, Rule 58, C.P.C.: provides for investigation of a claim or objection to attachment of property in execution, and permits adjournment or postponement of sale pending such investigation (subject to a proviso about unnecessary delay).
  • Order XXI, Rule 63, C.P.C.: provides that where a claim or objection is preferred and an order is made against the claimant, the party may institute a suit to establish the right claimed to the property, but subject to the result of such suit the order shall be conclusive.
  • Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act prescribes one year for a suit by a person against whom an order is passed on a claim preferred to or an objection made to the attachment of property in execution of a decree.

The Court treated the pivotal question as the proper interpretation of "order" in r. 63 and the relationship between r. 58, r. 60 and r. 63. To resolve that, the Court surveyed a number of authorities and classified the reported decisions into two broad classes:

  1. Cases where the order on the claim application had been passed before the sale — these were treated as falling within O. XXI, r. 63 (examples: Trimbak v. Ziparu; Venkataratnam v. Ranganayakamma; Kandasami v. Sivagarunatha; Cannanore Bank, Ltd. v. Madhavi). The Court reasoned that when an order is passed before sale either on merits or by acquiescence, it is a dismissal or disposal of the claimant's application and therefore falls under r. 63.
  2. Cases where the order was passed after the sale — these the Court subdivided into (a) applications made after the sale and (b) applications made before the sale but disposed of after the sale. The Court observed divergence of opinion among High Courts on whether such post-sale orders fall under r. 63.

On the disputed category (applications disposed of after sale), the Court rejected reasoning that treated the attachment as subsisting after sale (a line of reasoning used in Jagannadham v. Bura Pydayya and followed in Ramchandra v. Kayam Hussain). The Court said that the question is not when attachment is to be deemed withdrawn under r. 55, but whether the order on an application under r. 58 is required to be made before the sale. The Court read r. 58 and r. 60 together, and concluded that those provisions indicate the legislative intention that the application should be decided before the sale; r. 60 specifically contemplates postponement of sale pending the investigation, which points to disposal prior to sale if possible.

The Court preferred the reasoning of the Calcutta High Court in Gopal Chandra Mukerjee v. Notohar Kundu and Sasthi Charan v. Gopal Chandra, which held that where an application under r. 58 is dismissed after the sale on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain it (or that the application is not tenable after sale), such a dismissal is not an order under r. 63. The Court relied on these authorities to hold that the material date is the date when the Court passes the order (not the date of filing the application), and that rights of the auction-purchaser come into existence from the date of sale (not only when the sale is made absolute). It also emphasized that r. 63, by its language ("subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive"), contemplates orders that relate to the merits of the claim; a preliminary dismissal on the ground that the Court cannot enquire into the merits after sale does not qualify.

Applying this analysis to the present facts, the Court found that the executing Court's dismissal of defendant No. 4's claim petition after the sale on the ground that the attachment had ended and the claim was not tenable was not an order under O. XXI, r. 63. Consequently, Article 11 of the Limitation Act (one-year period to bring suit under r. 63) did not apply to bar defendant No. 4 from setting up his incumbrance; in short, the claimant was not required to bring a suit within one year from the date of that dismissal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the decision of the lower appellate Court (which had held that defendant No. 4 was not precluded from setting up his incumbrance and that Article 11 did not require a suit within one year) is confirmed. The decree is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. (Decree confirmed.)

Implications and direct consequences:

  • For the parties: The Court held that the executing Court's dismissal of the claim petition after the sale on the ground that the application was not tenable did not fall under Order XXI, Rule 63, C.P.C.; therefore defendant No. 4 was not obliged to institute a suit within one year under Article 11 of the Limitation Act, and he was not automatically debarred from setting up his incumbrance in the present suit.
  • Procedureally: The Court endorsed the line of authorities (notably the Calcutta decisions of Gopal Chandra Mukerjee and Sasthi Charan) that an order dismissing a claim because the sale has already taken place is not an order on the merits under r. 63 and does not attract the one-year limitation in Article 11.
  • Scope of r. 63: The Court emphasized that r. 63 applies to orders that relate to the merits of the claim; preliminary dismissals made on the ground that the Court cannot enquire into the merits after sale are not covered by r. 63.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Ningauda Girimallappa Patil v. Nabisahed Abalal Patil

    Divatia, J.:—

    This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit to recover possession of certain properties. The facts which have led to the appeal are shortly as follows:—

    Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are brothers constituting a joint family having an undivided one-fourth share in the suit lands. They had mortgaged them with possession to one Mirza Abdul Begg for Rs. 200 some time before 1930. On March 25, 1930, defendants Nos. 3 and 4 redeemed the property from the mortgagee. Defendant No. 3 had contributed Rs. 50 for his one-fourth share, and the balance of Rs. 150 was paid by defendant No. 4 on behalf of himself and defendants Nos. 1 and 2. He was thus subrogated to the position of the mortgagee Mirza so far as the shares of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were concerned. One Kadgauda had obtained a money decree against defendant No. 1 alone and he filed Darkhast No. 345 of 1935 for bringing his one-fourth share in the suit property to sale. On February 12, 1936, defendant No. 4 applied to the Court under O. XXI, r. 58, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to have the share of defendant No. 1 sold subject to the incumbrance of Rs. 50 due to him by virtue of the subrogation. The sale, which had not been stayed during the pendency of this application, took place on July 16, 1936, and the present plaintiff became the auction-purchaser. The claim petition came for hearing on August 11, 1936, after the sale had taken place. The Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that as the sale had already taken place, the previous attachment of the property at the instance of the decree-holder was no longer subsisting and that the application was liable to be rejected as not tenable. In his view the attachment having come to an end, the claimant could not get the sale set aside or take steps to bind the purchaser by virtue of any order in that application. The application was, therefore, dismissed. No suit to have the order of dismissal set aside and to have his claim established was brought by the claimant defendant No. 4 within one year after the passing of that order. Thereafter he sold his rights under the mortgage to which he had been subrogated to defendant No. 5 on February 2, 1937. The plaintiff as the auction-purchaser in the execution sale filed the present suit on March 22, 1938, to recover one-fourth share in one land and one-eighth share in the other land of defendant No. 1. His case was that as defendant No. 4 did not file a suit under O. XXI, r. 63, within one year from the date of the dismissal of his application, he was precluded from setting up his rights under the incumbrance, and that the plaintiff had, therefore, acquired the entire rights in the property without any burden in favour of defendant No. 4.

    The suit was defended by defendant No. 4 and the main question was whether he was debarred from setting up the charge in view of the dismissal of his application in the claim proceedings. The trial Judge held that he was debarred because his application was made under O. XXI, r. 58, and the order thereon came under r. 63. That being so, he ought to have filed a suit within one year from the date of the order, and he had therefore lost his right in the present suit to set up his claim which had been rejected by the executing Court.

    On appeal by defendants Nos. 4 and 5, the Assistant Judge reversed that decision and held that the rights of those defendants relating to the incumbrance on the property had not been lost by the order in the claim proceedings as it was not necessary for them to set it aside within one year under art. 11 of the Indian Limitation Act. The learned appellate Judge has distinguished the decision of this Court in Trimbak v. Ziparu, and has followed the two decisions of the Madras High Court in Abdul Kadir v. Somasundaram Chettiar, and Kandasami v. Sivagarunatha, in taking the view that the dismissal of the claim petition on the ground that it was not tenable after the sale took place was not an order under O. XXI, r. 63. He, therefore, allowed the appeal.

    The plaintiff has now appealed to this Court and the main contention of his learned advocate is that the order passed by the executing Court must be taken to be one under O. XXI, r. 63, with the result that a suit ought to have been filed within one year from the date of the order.

    Rule 58 of O. XXI says that where any claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment of, any property attached in execution of a decree on the ground that such property was not liable to such attachment, the Court must proceed to investigate the claim or objection, provided that no such investigation shall be made where it considers that the claim or objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed. It is further provided that where the property to which the claim applies has been advertised for sale, the Court ordering the sale may postpone it pending the investigation of the claim.

    Then r. 63 says that where a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute, but, subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive.

    Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act prescribes a period of one year for a suit by a person against whom an order is passed on a claim preferred to or an objection made to the attachment of property in execution of a decree.

    It is contended on behalf of the appellant that under those provisions of law where an application had been made by a claimant objecting to attachment and an order had been passed against him, he must institute a suit to establish his claim within one year from the date of the order. It is true that r. 63 speaks of an order and does not specify the nature of the order. But in order to see what the nature of the order should be, we must read all the rules from 54 to 63 and determine the intention of the legislature. This point has been considered in a number of cases of different High Courts. They may be broadly divided into two classes, firstly, where, the order on the application had been passed before the property, was sold in execution, and, secondly, where it was made after the sale took place. The decisions in Trimbak v. Ziparu, Venkataratnam v. Ranganayakamma, Kandasami v. Sivagarunatha, and Cannanore Bank, Ltd. v. Madhavi are cases falling under the first class where the order was passed before the sale although the reasons for passing the order were, different in all these cases. In Trimbak v. Ziparu the order was passed because the application fell under the proviso to r. 58. In Venkataratnam v. Ranganayakamma the order was passed because the application was filed late and therefore the Court refused to investigate the claim. In Kandasami v. Sivagarunatha the application was allowed to be withdrawn by the claimant, and in the last case of Cananore Bank, Ltd. v. Madhavi the application was not pressed at the hearing. In Kandasami v. Sivagarunatha it was held that the order did not fall under r. 63 as the claim had not been disposed of on merits while in the other three cases the decision was that it fell under that rule. It may be taken that where an order is passed, either on merits or on the acquiescence of the applicant, before the sale has taken place, it is an order dismissing the application of the claimant, and that it must, therefore, fall under O. XXI, r. 63.

    The second class may be sub-divided into two kinds, first, where the application of the claimant is made after the sale is held, and second, where it is made before the sale but the order thereon has been passed after the sale. With regard to these two sub-divisions there has been difference of opinion among the High Courts. In Jagannadham v. Bura Pydayya, which is a decision by a single Judge, the view taken was that the executing Court can consider a claim under O. XXI, r. 58, even if the application was made after the sale, and that the order on such an application would be governed by O. XXI, r. 63. The decision was also based on the ground that the case fell within the proviso to r. 58, that is to say, there was unnecessary delay on the part of the claimant. The reason given for the decision was that the attachment must be deemed to be subsisting even after the sale took place and to be continuing till any of the three occasions mentioned in O. XXI, r. 55, had occurred. The previous decision of the same High Court in Abdul Kadir v. Somasundaram Chettiar was sought to be distinguished on the ground that there the lower Court had refused jurisdiction and had not acted under O. XXI, r. 58. In the latter decision the Chief Justice, to whom the matter was referred on account of difference of opinion between the two Judges who originally heard the appeal, was of the opinion on the facts that the claim petition must have been made after the sale actually took place though on the same day, and that the application having been dismissed on the ground that the sale had already been concluded, the order passed by the executing Court did not fall under O. XXI, r. 58. This decision is inconsistent with that of the single Judge in Jagannadham v. Bura Pydayya. The observations of the full bench in the latest decision of the Madras High Court in Cannanore Bark, Ltd. v. Madhavi, are contrary to the decision in Jayannadham's case. The order of the executing Court in the full bench case was passed before the sale took place, but it was observed that the dismissal of a petition presented after the Court had sold the attached property on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it can scarcely be regarded as an adverse order which was required to be set aside under O. XXI, r. 63. The reasoning in Jagannadham v. Bura Pydayya, that the attachment subsists even after the sale takes place under O. XXI, r. 55, is not convincing. The rule says that where the decretal amount is paid into Court or satisfaction of the decree is otherwise made through the Court, or the decree is set aside or reversed, the attachment shall be deemed to be withdrawn. But the question is not when the attachment should be deemed to have been withdrawn but whether the order on an application under r. 58 is required to be made before the sale takes place. It is provided in sub-r. (2) of that rule, that the sale may be adjourned pending the investigation of a claim preferred under sub-r. (1) That along with the provisions of r. 60 indicates the intention of the legislature that the application should be decided before the sale, and if, therefore, the Court refuses to deal with it after the sale had somehow taken place, the order of refusal cannot come under r. 63.

    The same criticism, in my opinion, applies to another case on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant, namely, Ramchandra v. Kayam Hussain. There it was held that the objection to attachment after the sale took place was tenable under O. XXI, r. 58, that the order dismissing the objection fell under rule 60, and that a suit had to be filed under r. 63. The learned Judge based his decision mainly on Jagannadham v. Bura Pydayya, and he also accepted the reasoning based upon O. XXI, r. 55.

    There are on this point two decisions of the Patna High Court which are opposed to each other. In Puhupdei Kuar v. Ramcharitar it was held that after the sale took place the attachment was ipso facto determined and the Court had no longer any jurisdiction to try the claim, under O. XXI, r. 58. There the claim application was made before the sale, and thereafter the sale took place, and after the sale the claim objection was allowed. It was held that the decree-holder need not have filed a suit under O. XXI, r. 63. This decision was by a division bench, but in a subsequent decision in Deoki Singh v. Sri Thakur Raghavindra Bhagwan, a single Judge of that High Court refused to follow the former decision and held that where an application under O. XXI, r. 58, was filed but was not heard till after the sale was held, the Court did not cease to have jurisdiction to hear the application merely because the sale had already taken place.

    The High Court at Rangoon has held in Maung Po Pe v. Maung Kwa that an application for removal of attachment under O. XXI, r. 58, of the Civil Procedure Code, should be made before the property attached has been sold, and that a Court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it entertains such application after the sale. The learned Judge there followed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gopal Chandra Mukerjee v. Notohar Kundu. It was held in this latter case that the Court acted in excess of its authority and in violation of the express provisions of the Statute in allowing a claim petition preferred under O. XXI, r. 58, after the property attached was sold. The facts of that case were very much similar to those of the present case. The claim was preferred there in February, 1911, the property was sold in April, and the order was passed in August of that year. Rules 58 and 60 were construed together and it was held that r. 60 indicated that an order upon an application under r. 58 must be made before the sale had taken place, and upon the sale the application by which the claim had been preferred ipso facto terminated. That view has been adhered to by that High Court in a later decision in Sasthi Charan v. Gopal Chandra. It was there held, following Gopal Chandra Mukerjee v. Notobar Kundu, and differing from Jagannadhan v. Bura Pudayya, that after a sale had taken place the executing Court, had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim or objection filed under O. XXI, r. 58, even though the application might have been made prior to the sale and the sale might not have been confirmed at the date of the order. There the application under r. 58 filed before the sale was dismissed for default after the sale, and it was held that a suit brought more than one year after the date of the order was not barred under art. 11 of the Limitation Act because the order did not fall under O. XXI, r. 63.

    Lastly, there is a decision of the Lahore High Court in Sant Lal v. Udho Ram-Walait Ram. It was held there that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim or objection under O. XXI, r. 58, after the sale in execution had taken place, and that no declaratory suit under O. XXI, r. 63, was, therefore, competent. An opinion was expressed that it made no difference whether mi the objections under O. XXI, r. 58, were made before or after the confirmation of the sale, because when the sale was confirmed the title passed to the auction-purchaser from the date of the sale.

    As I said before, this appeal falls under the second sub-division of the second class, namely, where the claim petition is made before the date of the sale but disposed of after it took place either on the ground of default of the petitioner or on the ground that the application cannot be heard after the sale. The two decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Gopal Chandra Muherjee v. Notobar Kundu and Sasthi Charan v. Gopal Chandra are similar to the facts of the present case. The decisions relating to the disposal of the application before the sale stand on a different footing, because an order passed in such a case clearly falls under rule 58, and as such would be governed by r. 63. But where the order is passed after the sale has been held and proceeds on the ground that the application is not tenable because the attachment has come to an end or that the claim cannot be adjudicated upon after the sale, the provisions of r. 63 would have no application.

    It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the case, where the claim has been advanced before the sale, stands, on a different footing from the claim petition preferred after the sale, because in the former case the application having been filed at a time when the attachment was subsisting, the Court was bound to dispose of the application even after the sale was over, and any order disposing of such an application would be an order under r. 63. But the material date is not the date when the application was filed but, as I have shown above, the date when the Court passes an order on the application. It is then contended that so long as the sale is not made absolute, it cannot be said that the sale Proceedings are over and that therefore the Court can pass an order on the merits before the sale is made absolute. It is true that after the sale is held, it is liable to be set aside on several grounds within thirty days at the expiration of which it becomes absolute but the rights under the sale come into existence at its date and not when it is made absolute, and the claim is to be disposed of before the right of the auction-purchaser begins from the date of the sale. I think the reasoning of the Calcutta decisions is correct and I prefer to follow them and hold that where an order is passed by the executing Court even within one month after the sale actually took place to the effect that the Court had no jurisdiction to pass any order on the merits on the claim petition and dismisses it on that ground, it does not fall under O. XXI, r. 63, of the Civil Procedure Code. Moreover r. 63 states that subject to the result of the suit the order shall be conclusive. That means that the order must relate to the merits of the claim and must not be passed on the preliminary ground that the Court cannot enquire into the merits of the claim: see Najimunnessa Bibi v. Nacharuddin Sardar.

    For all these reasons I am of the opinion that the order of the executing Court in the present case being not governed by the provisions of O. XXI, r. 63, it was not necessary for defendant No. 4 to bring a suit within one year to establish his claim.

    The decision of the lower appellate Court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.

    Decree confirmed.
    J.G.B
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    Ningauda Girimallappa Patil v. Nabisahed Abalal Patil
    (Dec 5, 1940)