1. The plaintiff being the owner of a house in Bander applied to the Municipality for permission to rebuild it on 25th April 1911. The Municipality, in reply to her application on 5th June 1911 prescribed conditions, presumably under Section 96(2) of the District Municipal Act.
2. The permit was granted to her, subject to conditions noted on the back, for pulling down the building and building a new building on the land by keeping a space so as to leave a width of road 14 feet and a half on the south side of the building, in pursuance of the order passed by the Managing Committee on 6th May 1911, and the first condition of the permit is that “For the improvement of the said road you must leave on that side a space in length and in width 14 feet and build the house” and seventh condition states: “As your building stands on the public road you should take precautions to see that the water from your roof does not fall upon persons passing by that way.”
3. Now the public road at the time of the permit was considerably less than 14 feet namely, 8 feet 4 inches. The power of the Municipality under the section to prescribe the location of the building is given in relation to “any street existing or projected as they think proper.” They have prescribed the location of the building in relation, not to the existing street, but to a street which may come into existence in the future. But we do not think that on the admitted facts it can be said that there is a projected street 14 feet in width, for there is no regular line determined either for the existing street or for the future as contemplated in S. 92. The permit clearly shows that the first condition is not for the purpose of sanitation or for the purpose of ventilation, but simply for the improvement of the street by widening it, and the object is to get a set-back which cannot be obtained under S. 92, because the conditions contemplated in that section do not yet exist. The result is that if the condition of the permit were complied with the plaintiff would have to give up or keep vacant and unproductive a considerable portion of her land, and the Municipality would have the opportunity of paying compensation for it at any time they might feel disposed to do so, which would be contrary to the provisions of S. 92 which contemplate that when a set-back is determined upon, compensation shall be paid to the owner. The case is very similar to Queen-Empress v. Veeramlmal (1).
4. We think that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief which she prays, namely an injunction restraining the defendants from pulling down the building or any portion thereof, or from putting in force their notice of 12th September 1911. The defendants must pay the costs throughout. The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside.
G.P/R.K
5. Decree set aside.