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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • section 53 of Act II of 1911, the Patents and Designs Act.
  • Act, Act V of 1888, but the provisions of that Act
  • English Act, the Patents and Designs Act of 1907
  • section 43(1) of the present Act
  • section 64 of the Indian Act
  • sub-section (3) of section 46
  • section 53. In section 29(1)
  • Act V of 1888 section 50(3)
  • Amending Act VII of 1930
  • section 43 to section 54
  • sub-section 2(b)
  • section 2(14)(b)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 53 of Act II of 1911, the Patents and Designs Act.
  • Act, Act V of 1888, but the provisions of that Act
  • English Act, the Patents and Designs Act of 1907
  • section 43(1) of the present Act
  • section 64 of the Indian Act
  • sub-section (3) of section 46
  • section 53. In section 29(1)
  • Act V of 1888 section 50(3)
  • Amending Act VII of 1930
  • section 43 to section 54
  • sub-section 2(b)
  • section 2(14)(b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit claiming possession of a certificate granted by the Controller of Designs dated 17 August 1920, certifying registration of design No. 43516 for trays made of brass or other metals under the Indian Patents and Designs Act of 1911. The design's novelty was described as "the grooves along the sides of the tray." The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had begun manufacturing trays of this design despite a notice from him, and sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from manufacturing and selling such trays along with damages of Rs. 200. The plaint was brought under section 53 of the Patents and Designs Act II of 1911, as the Amending Act VII of 1930 was not yet in force. The District Judge of Moradabad dismissed the suit, and the plaintiff appealed.

In the written statement, the defendants admitted the registration but claimed the design lacked utility, was not new at the date of application, and that the plaintiff was neither the author nor had acquired the design rights legitimately. Two issues were framed: (1) whether the certificate of design was liable to revocation under section 26 of the Act (which applies only to patents, not designs), and (2) the damages to which the plaintiff was entitled. The lower court heard evidence and found that the plaintiff was not the author nor had acquired rights from the author, and that the design was common prior to registration. Consequently, the court held the plaintiff was not the proprietor entitled to sue under section 53, leading to dismissal of the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, as the registered proprietor of the design under section 53 of the Patents and Designs Act 1911, is entitled to sue for infringement despite challenges to authorship and originality.
  2. Whether the defendants can raise defenses challenging the validity of the plaintiff's registration in a suit under section 53, or whether their remedy lies solely in an application for rectification of the register under section 64.
  3. The interpretation of the term "registered proprietor" within the Act—whether it means merely a person registered as proprietor or one who is in fact the proprietor and registered as such.
  4. The applicability of section 29(2) (which allows defenses in patent suits) to suits concerning registered designs.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff, holding a certificate of registration, is the "registered proprietor" under section 53 and thereby entitled to sue for infringement.
  • Defendants cannot challenge the validity of the registration or authorship in a suit under section 53; their only remedy is to apply for rectification of the register under section 64.
  • Section 29(2), which allows defenses in patent suits, does not have an equivalent for designs, implying no defense can be raised against a registered proprietor's suit.
  • The certificate of registration is conclusive proof of proprietorship for the purpose of suing under section 53.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Though the plaintiff had registered the design, the design was not new or original at the date of application.
  • The plaintiff was not the author nor had acquired the rights from the author; the design had been publicly manufactured and used for over fifty years.
  • The defense raised was that the certificate should be liable to revocation under section 26 (erroneously applied), challenging the validity of the plaintiff’s proprietorship.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bahai Rai v. Sumer Chand Established that a design must be new and original and that a registered proprietor must prove proprietorship; defenses challenging novelty and authorship are valid in infringement suits. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the plaintiff must prove he is the proprietor and that defenses concerning originality and prior use can be raised in suits under section 53.
Smith v. Grigg, Limited Referenced regarding the practice of raising defenses to validity of registration in interlocutory injunction applications. The Court noted that no opinion on validity defense was given in that case but acknowledged the English practice of applying for rectification of the register as a defense.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the statutory framework of the Patents and Designs Act II of 1911, distinguishing between patents and designs provisions. It noted that section 29(2) allowing defenses in patent infringement suits does not apply to designs. The definition of "proprietor" in section 2(14) requires the proprietor to be the author or one who has acquired rights from the author, implying that mere registration is not conclusive proof of proprietorship.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the certificate of registration conclusively establishes proprietorship and that defenses challenging authorship or originality are impermissible in suits under section 53. It held that the term "registered proprietor" should be understood as a person who is in fact the proprietor and also registered as such, not merely a person registered as proprietor without substantive rights.

The Court further explained that section 46(3) creates only a prima facie presumption of proprietorship from the register entry, which can be rebutted by evidence. The Court found that the defendants had produced evidence showing the design was common and that the plaintiff failed to prove authorship or acquisition of rights.

Relying on the precedent Bahai Rai v. Sumer Chand, the Court confirmed that defenses based on prior use and lack of novelty are valid in infringement suits under section 53. The Court also noted the impracticality of requiring defendants to seek rectification under section 64 in a different court as the sole defense.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The Court held that a plaintiff suing under section 53 of the Patents and Designs Act must prove that he is in fact the proprietor of the registered design, not merely registered as such. Defenses challenging the validity of the registration, including lack of novelty and authorship, are permissible in infringement suits. The certificate of registration provides only prima facie evidence of proprietorship and can be rebutted by evidence. The defendants’ remedy is not confined to an application for rectification under section 64. This decision directly affects the parties by upholding the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit and does not establish any new precedent beyond reaffirming existing principles regarding proprietorship and defenses in design infringement suits.

    Muhammad Abdul Karim v. Muhammad

    Niamat-ullah and Bennet, JJ.:— This is a first appeal brought by the plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed by the court of first instance, the District Judge of Moradabad. The plaintiff sued on the ground that he was in possession of a certificate granted by the Controller of Designs dated the 17th of August, 1920, certifying that a design No. 43516 had been registered in respect of the application of such design to trays of brass or other suitable metal under the Indian Patents and Designs Act of 1911. The photograph which is attached shows a large brass tray and the agents for the applicant specified the novelty by stating “The novelty of the design lies in the grooves along the sides of the tray.” The plaint set forth that the defendants had also begun to manufacture big trays of this design and that the plaintiff had given them a notice but that they paid no heed. Paragraph 5 of the plaint stated: “According to the certificate granted by the Controller of Designs the plaintiff alone is entitled to manufacture big trays approved of for five years commencing from the 17th September, 1929.” The plaintiff prayed for the relief of injunction to restrain the defendants from manufacturing and selling big trays of this design and for a sum of Rs. 200 damages. The plaint did not set out under what Act and section it was brought, but apparently it was brought under section 53 of Act II of 1911, the Patents and Designs Act. Learned counsel argued that the Amending Act VII of 1930 would apply, but that Act did not come into force until the first day of July, 1930, under section 1(2), and the plaint was brought on the 22nd of April, 1930. The plaint therefore comes under the Act II of 1911 and not under the Amending Act.

    In the written statement it was admitted that the plaintiff had got this design registered and it was claimed that the invention of the plaintiff had no utility, and that it was not a new invention or design at the date of the application for registration. Further that the applicant was not the principal or first inventor of the design and he had knowingly and fraudulently included in the application a design which is at least over 50 years old and which had been publicly manufactured and used and sold in thousands within British India by scores of people. The following two issues were-framed: (1) Would the certificate of design be liable to revocation under section 26, clause (1)(a) or (b) or (c) or (e)? (2) To what damages is the plaintiff entitled? It is clear that there was a certain amount of confusion in the minds of learned counsel as they applied section 26, which only applies to patents and not to registered designs. In Act II of 1911 the first part up to section 42 refers to patents, and the second part from section 43 to section 54 refers to designs, and the third part is general. By section 29(2) it was provided that “Every ground on which a patent may be revoked under this Act shall be available by way of defence to a suit for infringement.” The defence therefore and the court were apparently under the impression at the time the issues were framed that this section would apply and that therefore the first issue was framed in the manner indicated as a short way of summarising the points which had been raised in the written statement. The attitude taken up by learned counsel for the plaintiff was stated in the judgment: “That these issues were irrelevant and that he was entitled to succeed on the plaint and the written statement as they stood and that evidence was unnecessary.” That has been the attitude or learned counsel for the plaintiff in this Court. The lower court however heard the evidence of the parties and gave a decision on the questions of fact raised in the first issue as well as on the, question of law. The lower court found as a matter of fact that the plaintiff was not the author of the design and that he had not acquired it from anyone who had the rights of an author in the design and that the design was a common one for a long period prior to registration. Therefore the lower court concluded that a suit under section 53 of the Act would not he because the plaintiff was not the proprietor of the design. The first ground of appeal states: “Because the plaintiff having got the design in dispute duly registered at the Patent Office and being the holder of a certificate of registration granted to him as the proprietor of the design was ‘registered proprietor of the design within the meaning of the expression used in section 53 of the Patents and Designs Act.” The third ground stated: “Because no question was raised or could be raised by the defendants that the plaintiff was not a registered proprietor of the design in dispute and on their admission that they were using the design in spite of plaintiff's registration, his suit should have been decreed for damages and injunction against the defendants.” This was the main argument addressed to us. The view which the learned counsel took was that where a suit is brought under section 53 of the Patents and Designs Act of 1911 it is not open to the defence to raise any question of the nature pleaded in the written statement in this case, but that the fact that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the design is shown by his certificate and that is conclusive proof of the fact that he is a registered proprietor for the purpose of section 53. Learned counsel points to section 64 of the general portion of the Act which provides for any person making an application to the High Court for rectification of the register of patents or of designs on the ground that any entry was wrongly made. Under this section no doubt it would be open to the defendants to make such an application on the 9 grounds they alleged. The contention of learned counsel was that this is the only remedy open to them and that if they made no such application they cannot urge these grounds. Learned counsel dwelt on the point that section 29 specifically provides for a defence on these grounds in the case of patents, and he argued that as there is no section in regard to designs corresponding to section 29 in regard to patents, therefore the Act does not contemplate such a defence in the case of registered designs. We consider that the specific section 29(2) exists in the case of patents because the language used in section 29(1) differs from the language used in section 53. In section 29(1) the words are: “A patentee may institute a suit in a district court etc.” The Act defines a patentee in section 2(12) as “the person for the time being entitled to the benefit of a patent”, and in sub-section (11) a patent is defined as “a patent granted under the provisions of this Act”. There is nothing therefore in the definition of patent or patentee which implies an invention. That provision in regard to invention is found in section 3 which deals with the application for a patent. Now section 53 with which we are concerned does not contain any similar language but it refers, in sub-section (2)(a), to “the registered proprietor”, and in sub-section 2(b) to “the proprietor”. The definition of “proprietor” is not merely a person registered under the Act as proprietor, but in section 2(14) the definition is as follows: “Proprietor of a new and original design,—(a) where the author of the design, for good consideration, executes the work for some other person, means the person for whom the design is so executed; and (b) where any person acquires the design or the right to apply the design to any article, either exclusively of any other person or otherwise, means, in the respect and to the extent in and to which the design or right has been so acquired, the person by whom the design or right is so acquired; and (c) in any other case, means the author of the design; and, where the property in, or the right to apply, the design has devolved from the original proprietor upon any other person, includes that other person.” This definition implies that the proprietor must be the author or one who has acquired the design from the author or a person on whom such rights have devolved. For this reason, because the term “proprietor” is defined as involving authorship, it was not necessary, in our opinion, to make a specific provision in section 53 similar to the provision in section 29(2).

    It appears to us that the words “registered proprietor” which are nowhere defined in the Act may be interpreted in two ways. According to the ground No. 1 of appeal learned counsel desires to interpret the words “registered proprietor” merely as a person who has been registered as a proprietor. There is no definition in the Act that “registered proprietor” can bear this meaning, nor has learned counsel shown that in any other case involving the word “registered” such a result follows. For example, in the case of the Registration Act where a sale deed is registered, this does not imply that the document is a sale deed. It is open to challenge in court that a document registered as a sale deed is not in fact a sale deed but is a deed of gift or something else. Similarly where there is registration of a firm it may be shown that what has been registered is not a firm but a single individual. Further, where a proprietor has his name entered in the khewat he may be considered as a registered proprietor; but that only in certain cases in revenue courts raises a presumption that he is a proprietor and it is open to challenge in a civil court.

    The other meaning to be attached to the words ‘registered proprietor” is a person who is in fact the proprietor and who has also been registered as such. This we consider is the natural meaning to attach to these words. At this stage learned counsel advanced an argument that if this meaning were correct the proprietor of a design would obtain no benefit from registering it. This is not correct. The proprietor of a design, apart from the Act and apart from registration, has, no right to prevent any other persons from using that design. It is only when he registers his design that he obtains such a right. If he is a proprietor and if he registers his design, then firstly under section 47(1) he has Copyright in the design for five years from the date of registration; secondly under section 53(1) it is unlawful for anyone else to use the design for that period; thirdly under section 53(2) he may recover damages or get an injunction against such person; and fourthly under section 46(3) there is a prima facie presumption that he is a proprietor. Learned counsel contested this last point and urged that this provision would not apply to the question of proprietorship. His argument was that under section 46 the only matters which are entered in the register are the addresses of proprietors of registered designs, notifications of assignments and of transmissions of registered designs, and such other matters as may be prescribed by the rules. But we consider that the language in section 46(1) implies in the words “addresses of proprietors of registered designs” that there is an entry that the plaintiff is the proprietor of the registered design in question, and under sub-section (3) of section 46 such an entry is prima facie evidence to that effect. That is, there is not under the Act conclusive proof from the entry that the plaintiff is the proprietor of the design but there is prima facie evidence that he is the proprietor. The plaintiff therefore has the advantage that in a case like the present if no evidence at all is given then the certificate is sufficient evidence that he is the proprietor. In the present case evidence on both sides has been given and therefore it is a question for the courts to weigh that evidence and come to a finding. The English Act, the Patents and Designs Act of 1907 is precisely similar to the Indian Act II of 1911 in its provisions. Learned counsel referred to Smith v. Grigg, Limited(1). That was an application for an interlocutory injunction, and the question before us was mentioned as to whether the defence as regards the validity of the registration of a design could be raised. But no opinion was given by the learned Judges on that point. As a matter of practice in England it is apparently usual for the defence to make an application to the court similar to the application under section 64 of the Indian Act for rectification of the register. That proceeding is no doubt convenient in England because the court hearing the suit for infringement is the same court to which such an application can be made. In India it is not the same court because a suit under section 53 is brought in the district court and the application under section 64 must be made in the High Court. It is obvious, therefore, that it would be highly inconvenient if it were necessary for the defence to, make an application under section 64 in this Court and ask that the matter should then be sent to the district court for inquiry in order that they should put forward their defence. We do not think that this is the intention of Act II of 1911.

    The matter had once before been before this Court in Bahai Rai v. Sumer Chand. That case was under the former Act, Act V of 1888, but the provisions of that Act were very similar, with a slight difference. In that case the plaintiffs who were manufacturers of Farrukhabad curtains had got a certain design registered and proceeded to sue the defendants for infringement, and the defence was that the defendants had been, previously making curtains before registration and that the design was not a new one and two years before registration the design had been published in British India by a merchant in Bombay receiving a copy of the design, which was an Italian one, by post from London. Under these circumstances a Bench of this Court held that the defence had been established and that the plaintiffs failed to show that they were the proprietors. On page 498 it was stated: “A further requirement is that the design shall be a new and original design. It is perfectly manifest from the evidence that this design is not a new and, original design. The fact that it was in the possession of Jehangir Framji in 1897, two years before the registration of the design by the plaintiffs, is conclusive evidence on this point.” Now in Act V of 1888 there was a slight difference in regard to the word “proprietor”. In section 51(1) there was a provision similar in effect to the present section 43 for an application for registration of designs, and it was stated: “Any person, whether a British subject or not, claiming to be the proprietor of any new and original design not previously published in British India may apply to the Governor-General in Council for an order for the registration of the design.” In section 43(1) of the present Act it is stated: “The Controller may, on the application of any person claiming to be the proprietor of any new or original design not previously published in British India, register a design under this part.” In Act V of 1888 section 50(3) stated: “The author of any new and original design shall be considered the proprietor hereof etc.” The definition in Act II of 1911 is similar, and in place of “proprietor thereof” we have a definition of “proprietor of a new and original design”. We consider that no substantial change was intended by this alteration in the Act. No importance therefore can be attached to this alteration. The ruling of this Court in Bahai Rai v. Sumer Chand appears to us to apply with equal force to the law as it now stands in Act II of 1911. We see no reason to differ from that ruling which clearly laid down that the points pleaded in the written statement are points which can be raised in a suit like the present. Therefore we consider that the points of law raised for the appellant are incorrect.

    We now come to deal with the appeal on the facts. In our opinion it was for the defendants to show that the plaintiff was not the proprietor of the registered design in question. The defendants called evidence to show that this design had been commonly used in Moradabad for so years. [After discussing the evidence on the record the judgment concluded.] Under these circumstances it is clear that the plaintiff has failed to prove his allegation that his brother Muhammad Husain was the author of the design or that the plaintiff or his father had acquired the design from Muhammad Husain. In our opinion, to acquire a design within the meaning of section 2(14)(b) means the transfer of proprietary rights in a design and not merely learning a design. For all these reasons we consider that the defence has been established and that the present suit of the plaintiff must fail. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal with costs.

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    Muhammad Abdul Karim v. Muhammad
    (Feb 7, 1934)