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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mears, C.J. and Mukerji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs (a firm known as Swarath Ram, Ram Saran, and Sital Prasad being one of the owners) from a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Agra in a suit for specific performance concerning the sale of a godown at Agra which the plaintiffs had long occupied as tenants. The landlords were the defendants.

Relevant events (as described in the opinion): in 1913 the defendants mortgaged the godown; in April 1917 negotiations occurred between the plaintiffs' representative Sital Prasad, Ram Ballabh (a person connected with the defendants' side), and Nemi Chand (the mortgagee) as to purchase for about Rs. 12,000; an earnest of Rs. 200 was said to have been paid into Nemi Chand’s account on that date. A letter from Ram Ballabh arrived at Agra on 22 May 1917 and was shown to the plaintiffs' representatives; a copy was produced in evidence at trial (the court later observed that proper preliminary steps to produce the original had not been taken). A power of attorney by the firm of Seth Ram Ballabh to Tara Chand and Kewal Chand was executed on 27 May 1917.

Disputes continued: questions arose about whether Hansraj (a son of Chunni Lal) should be a party to the sale-deed because of alleged prior bankruptcy; inquiries about Hansraj’s bankruptcy took months; the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs on 29 July 1917 urging that they should not delay. After a period of prolonged and largely unexplained silence by the plaintiffs (including a registered letter of repudiation from the defendants on 30 August 1918 asserting there was no contract), the defendants first party sold the godown to defendants second party on 23 March 1919 for Rs. 14,250. The plaintiffs instituted suit for specific performance on 14 June 1919. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim; the plaintiffs appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance of the alleged contract to purchase the godown.
  2. Whether Ram Ballabh had legal authority to bind the interests of minors (the children of a deceased partner) or to act on behalf of the partnership after the death of Ganga Bakhsh.
  3. What effect the death of a partner (Ganga Bakhsh) had on the power to carry through the sale and on the validity of any agreement made while the parties were only in negotiation.
  4. Whether plaintiffs’ delay and the plaintiffs’ reaction to the defendants’ registered repudiatory letter amounted to abandonment of the contract such that specific performance should be refused.
  5. The evidentiary question whether a copy of the letter from Ram Ballabh (arriving 22 May 1917) was properly received in evidence without taking the preliminary steps to procure the original.
  6. Whether the unresolved question of Hansraj’s bankruptcy (and whether Hansraj should have been a party to the conveyance) was a decisive outstanding issue preventing completion.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiffs) — summary of material contentions

  • The plaintiffs (through Sital Prasad and their munib Ratan Lal) assert there was an agreement to sell the godown to them for Rs. 12,000 and that earnest money of Rs. 200 was paid into Nemi Chand’s account on the day Nemi Chand mentioned that sum.
  • The plaintiffs relied upon a letter that purportedly came from Ram Ballabh (arriving 22 May 1917) showing that the munib had seen Nemi Chand and that the writer expected earnest money to be secured and that the purchaser be treated politely.
  • The plaintiffs contended that they took steps (inquiries concerning Hansraj’s bankruptcy, correspondence, and urging completion) and that they were entitled to specific performance when defendants later repudiated and sold to third parties.

Respondents (Defendants) — summary of material contentions

  • The defendants denied there was ever a concluded contract for sale and, by a registered letter (mentioned at page 93 of the record and dated 30 August 1918 in the opinion), explicitly repudiated any contract, stating: “I neither sold any house to you, nor took any earnest money.”
  • The defendants proceeded to sell the property to the second-party defendants for Rs. 14,250 on 23 March 1919, implying they did not regard plaintiffs as purchasers.
  • The defendants relied on the fact that, after the death of a partner (Ganga Bakhsh), the partnership had not been reconstituted and that persons like Ram Ballabh lacked legal authority to bind minors or the partnership in respect of such a sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin (Privy Council) A guardian or manager cannot bind a minor by a personal covenant; a guardian does not possess power to impose a personal liability on the ward. The court invoked this authority to support the conclusion that Ram Ballabh could not bind the minors by a personal obligation and thus could not supply the mutuality necessary for specific performance against the minors.
Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri (Privy Council; Lord Macnaghten) Neither a manager of a minor's estate nor a guardian is competent to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property; absence of mutuality prevents specific performance. The court treated this principle as authority for the proposition that a minor cannot be made subject to specific performance of such contracts entered into by a guardian/manager; it reinforced the conclusion that the minors could not be bound here.
Patchu Ramajogayya v. Vajjulla Jagannadhan Followed Waghela v. Masludin: a decree cannot be passed against a minor or his estate on a covenant entered into on his behalf by a guardian so as to impose personal liability. The court cited this case as a strong authority corroborating the rule that guardians cannot impose personal liability on minors and thus supporting dismissal of specific performance against the minors in this suit.
Imambandi v. Mutsaddi Mentioned in connection with the body of authorities concerning the limits of guardian/manager power to bind minors. The court noted the case as part of the same line of authority but did not elaborate further beyond listing it among relevant decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded through several discrete strands that together led to dismissal of the appeal.

  1. Evidentiary issue concerning the copy of Ram Ballabh’s letter (22 May 1917):

    The court held that the copy ought not to have been received in evidence because the necessary preliminary steps to procure the original from the person in possession (Tikam Chand, the son and successor of Nemi Chand) or from any other likely possessor (e.g., Ram Kumar) had not been taken. Despite expressing that view on admissibility, the court nonetheless proceeded to accept the copy as a true copy of a document that did arrive at Agra on 22 May 1917 and came from Ram Ballabh. The contents of the letter supported the plaintiffs’ account that the munib had seen Nemi Chand and that earnest money was expected and requested to be received.

  2. Authority and effect of the death of a partner (Ganga Bakhsh):

    After the partition of January 1917 the business was carried on by the sons of Ram Gopal and by the son of Bal Mukand (Ganga Bakhsh). On Ganga Bakhsh’s death (dead by 27 May), the court observed that there was no evidence that the partnership had been lawfully reconstituted, that Ram Ballabh had any legal authority to act for the minors (children of the deceased partner), or that the minors had been incorporated into the firm. The court concluded in law that Ram Ballabh had no authority to act on behalf of these minors.

  3. Application of precedents regarding guardians and minors:

    Even if Ram Ballabh had authority, the court held he could not by engagement impose a personal obligation on the minors. The court relied on the Privy Council authorities (Waghela Rajsanji; Mir Sarwarjan) and Madras decisions (Patchu Ramajogayya) to emphasize that a guardian/manager cannot bind a minor by a personal covenant, and that the element of mutuality required for specific performance is absent where personal liability of a minor is sought to be enforced.

  4. Outstanding issues as to the convenanting parties and the role of Hansraj:

    The court identified an important unresolved factual and legal issue: whether Hansraj’s name was to be included as a party to the conveyance. Sital Prasad’s testimony that “it was agreed” the name should not be inserted was criticized as a conclusory statement; the witness did not specify when, where, or how he communicated assent to Ram Ballabh. The uncertainty about whether Sital Prasad had in fact communicated acceptance of omission of Hansraj’s name left an important matter outstanding for many months.

    In addition, the plaintiffs took a very long time (the court records varying accounts: one to two months according to Ratan Lal; five to six months according to Sital Prasad) to obtain proof of Hansraj’s bankruptcy record from Bombay (the conclusive document bearing the seal of the Bombay High Court dated 30 September 1918). The court found such delay unreasonable for an inquiry that could have been made expeditiously.

  5. Delay and repudiation:

    The court highlighted two lengthy periods of inactivity by the plaintiffs: from 29 July 1917 to about August 1918 (an unbroken silence) and then a further delay of about ten months after the defendants’ registered repudiation (letter dated 30 August 1918). The defendants’ repudiatory letter plainly denied any contract. The court emphasised that a plaintiff seeking specific performance must take positive steps to force defendants either to complete or to repudiate; mere verbal urging was insufficient. The combination of unexplained delay and the outstanding Hansraj issue led the court to infer that the plaintiffs had effectively abandoned the contract and only acted when they discovered the property might be sold to a third party.

  6. Overall conclusion from the combined considerations:

    Because (a) Ram Ballabh had no legal authority to bind the minors (and, in any event, a guardian cannot impose personal liability on minors), and (b) there were significant outstanding matters (notably Hansraj) plus inexcusable delay and the defendants’ clear repudiation, the court agreed with the Subordinate Judge that specific performance should not be granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court rendered the following dispositive rulings.

DISMISSED — The appeal is dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties

  • The plaintiffs’ suit for specific performance was rejected and the appeal dismissed.
  • The court specifically held that Ram Ballabh had no authority in law to act on behalf of the minors, and that even if he had such authority he could not by his engagement impose a personal obligation on the minors; this was a central ground for dismissal.
  • Costs orders: Ram Ballabh and the other defendants first party were deprived of their costs in this Court because Ram Ballabh had given untruthful statements (that the contract had to be carried through within 3 months and that Kewal Chand had ceased to be his munib when in fact Kewal Chand acted under a power of attorney). Sarju Prasad was awarded his costs of the appeal from the plaintiffs. Defendants second party Nos. 5 to 13 were awarded their costs from the plaintiffs.

Broader implications

The opinion applied established authorities concerning the limits of the power of guardians/managers to bind minors and the necessity of mutuality for specific performance; it did not purport to create new precedent beyond applying those authorities. The court expressly stated it was satisfied that the case must fail on the grounds discussed and dismissed the appeal.

Order: Appeal dismissed.

    Swarath Ram v. Ram Ballabh

    Mears, C.J and Mukerji, J.:— The facts of this case will be better understood by a reference to the following pedigree:—

    This is the appeal of the plaintiffs from a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Agra in a suit for specific performance. The learned Subordinate Judge decided, for reasons which we shall discuss, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief claimed by them. The plaintiff firm is known as Swarath Ram, Ram Saran, and Sital Prasad is one of the owners of that firm. For many years they had occupied as tenants a godown at Agra. The landlords were the defendants. The defendants in the year 1913 mortgaged this godown together with other properties to Nemi Chand for the sum of Rs. 90,000 carrying interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. On the 11th of April, 1914, it appears that the defendant firm sent a notice to the plaintiffs enhancing their rent from Rs. 400 to Rs. 750 a year. On the 13th of January, 1917, there was a partition. The principal parties to that partition were the sons of Bal Mukand, Ram Kumar and Ram Gopal. The effect of the partition was that Nandan Lal, the son of Ram Kumar, was bought out and thereafter the son of Bal Mukand, Ganga Bakhsh, and the sons of Ram Gopal each had a half share in the business, which, we have been told, was that of commission agents, that is to say, presumably at the end of each financial year the profits of the business would be equally divided between the sons of Ram Gopal and the son of Bal Mukand. In April, 1917, and probably towards the end of that month, there was a conversation between Sital Prasad, Ram Ballabh and Nemi Chand as regards the purchase of the godown by the plaintiffs. There was some conversation as regards the price ranging round Rs. 11,300 but eventually on the suggestion of Nemi Chand, Sital Prasad expressed his willingness to give Rs. 12,000 for the property. Ram Ballabh seems to have acquiesced in this as being a reasonable offer and one which he himself would have accepted had the decision rested entirely with him and he stated that he would return to Sambhar and discuss it with the other people who were interested in the property. At this date there is reason to believe that Ganga Bakhsh was alive. He was undoubtedly dead on the 27th of May. According to the evidence no message came from Sambhar as to the offer and about the 18th of May, Ratan Lal, the munib of the plaintiff firm, went to Sambhar and had an interview with Ram Ballabh. The question whether he ever went there has been disputed and it has been pointed out that in this firm one would expect to find a record of his expenses, whereas it is admitted that no record exists. The answer is, according to the evidence, that Sital Prasad paid the sum of Rs. 10, 12 or 15 which was said to be the cost of the journey from Agra to Sambhar and back, out of his own pocket. We think he must have gone, and on his return he said that there had been an agreement by all the interested parties. The next matter is one of importance. It is said that on the 20th of May Ram Ballabh wrote a letter to Nemi Chand addressed to Ajmere. At that date apparently Nemi Chand was in Agra. He was at all events in Agra on the 22nd of May and on the 22nd of May he sent for Sital Prasad, who, with Ratan Lal, went to see him. He is stated to have shown the original letter of Ram Ballabh to Sital Prasad and Ratan Lal and Ratan Lal is said to have taken a copy. Before reading the letter we might just mention here that in our opinion the copy of the letter which was preferred to the court and which was received in evidence ought not to have been received for the reason that the preliminary steps were not taken which would have made that document evidence. Nemi Chand having died, the presumption would be that the letter was in the possession of Tikam Chand, his son and successor to the business, and a notice ought undoubtedly to have been sent to Tikam Chand to produce that document. If Tikam Chand had then said that it was not in his possession, then, if it was likely that it was in the possession of anyone else, another notice should have been sent to that person. Indeed it was suggested that the letter had passed into the possession of a man named Ram Kumar, who was said to be a long way away from the court at a place called Hoshangabad. No matter whether he was there or not, the rules of the court must be obeyed and before the Judge could have received this copy in evidence he ought to have been satisfied that the preliminary steps had been taken both as regards Tikam Chand and Ram Kumar, to find out the whereabouts of that original document. However, the case proceeded and the court accepted the letter and we also now accept it as a true copy of a document which did arrive at Agra on the 22nd of May, 1917, and did come from Ram Ballabh. That letter shows that the writer expected that the munib of the plaintiffs was very likely to have come to Nemi Chand in respect of the sugar godown and the letter further says that the munib has also seen him. That does support Batan Lal in his statement that he had in fact gone to Sambhar. “Please send for him and get earnest money in respect of Rs. 12,000 deposited. Please bring him round politely.” Now that undoubtedly meant that Ram Ballabh did not want to lose a purchaser at Rs. 12,000 and he wanted Nemi Chand, who is a man of considerable social position at Agra, to deal carefully and prudently with the munib and arrange the contract. There is the sum of Rs. 12,000 mentioned and it had already been a matter of assent by Nemi Chand that if this money were paid he would reduce the principal sum under the mortgage to Rs. 78,000 with a corresponding reduction of interest, and inasmuch as the defendants were receiving Rs. 400 only as rent and were paying Rs. 720 per annum as interest, it was obviously to their interest to get his matter carried through without delay and it was good business to sell the godown. Sital Prasad says that he assented to the terms of this letter and that in fact he gave Nemi Chand a document in writing setting out all the particulars. Again, no step was taken by the plaintiffs to get the document and there is no evidence before this court as to its contents. But we know that on that day Nemi Chand mentioned Rs. 200 as the necessary earnest money and on that day the Rs. 200 was paid into the account of Nemi Chand. On the 27th of May, 1917, the firm of Seth Ram Ballabh executed a power of attorney to two people, one Tara Chand and the other Kewal Chand. On the 14th of July, 1917, a stamp-vendor at Agra sold a Rs. 120 stamp to a man whose name he recorded as Kewal Chand, munib of Hira Lal, Chunni Lal. It is said that Kewal Chand came down to Agra on this very business and was there round and about the 14th of July. It is further stated that a draft of the sale-deed was prepared by Ikram Husain, that it was submitted to Kewal Chand, that the parties went to a pleader named Basdeo Sahai. Basdeo Sahai thought it better to re-draft the whole agreement. Kewal Chand took that document away with him. At this interview with Basdeo Sahai, and possibly before, the name of Hansraj was mentioned. He, it will be seen, is the son of Chunni Lal and Sital Prasad was anxious that Hansraj should be one of the executants of the sale-deed. Kewal Chand opposed it and said that it was not necessary because Hansraj had become bankrupt in Bombay some time before and had ceased to have any interest in the business. Sital Prasad was clearly not satisfied with this and instituted inquiries and those inquiries, according to Ratan Lal, took one and a half to, two months and according to Sital Prasad five to six months before it was ascertained that Hansraj had been adjudicated bankrupt. Later we shall show that there is a curious circumstance in connection with this because we have not been able to discover on the record Exhibit IV, mentioned in the evidence of Sital Prasad. The conclusive document which shows that Hansraj did become bankrupt is under the seal of the Bombay High Court. The date when the document was obtained from Bombay is the 30th of September, 1918, and it evidences Hansraj's bankruptcy in 1914. On the 29th of July; 1917, the defendants wrote a letter to the plaintiffs. It is a document which has given us cause for a certain amount of doubt as to whether Kewal Chand was in fact in Agra at the time when the stamp of Rs. 120 was purchased, because the whole tone of the letter is that of a man who has never seen the text of any draft, who is anxious to get the matter through and who is prepared to send Kewal Chand after the receipt of it. But at all events, whatever may be the real truth about it, whether Kewal Chand came to Agra or not, this letter of the 29th of July, 1917, asks the plaintiffs not to make a delay. From that date, viz., the 29th of July, 1917, there is an unbroken silence for a year. It is said that during that period the plaintiffs were verbally urging the defendants to complete, but the evidence is very slender on that and in any circumstance a plaintiff seeking specific performance must show a great deal more than verbal requests week after week and month after month to complete. The plaintiffs must force the defendants either to complete or to repudiate. There is no real explanation of how it happened that the delay occurred, but it may very well be that Basdeo Sahai, at the interview when the name of Hansraj came up, pointed out to Sital Prasad that the mere fact of a bankruptcy of a member of the firm did not make that member walk out of the firm, but merely substituted his trustee in bankruptcy for him and that if in fact Hausraj had any property in this business that was of value, the trustee in bankruptcy could come in and could claim it. That may have been one of the circumstances that disposed the plaintiffs to hesitate as to whether this contract was worth carrying through. On the 26th of August, 1918, the defendants wrote a letter to the plaintiffs asking for an account relating to the godown which is rented by them. It is very curious that there is no reference whatever to be found in this letter to the fact that they had through the agency of Nemi Chand entered into a firm contract of the sale of the godown for Rs. 12,000 and the letter is the ordinary letter which one would expect from people who had stood to each other in the relationship of landlord and tenant. For the moment we pass over a very material date to mention that on the 5th of September, 1918, an account was sent by the plaintiffs in which they included the son of Rs. 200 which had been paid as earnest money and the further sum of Rs. 120 which had been spent in the purchase of the stamp-paper. The explanation of that may possibly be that a munib was told to make out the account as it stood between the parties and he merely took a copy of the ledger exactly as it was and that there was in that ledger no separate rent account and no separate purchase account. An important date to which we have to refer is the 30th of August, 1918. At page 93 of the record will be found a letter of the most definite repudiation. It shows that there had been a registered letter sent by the plaintiffs after the 12 months of unexplained silence. That registered letter, we are told, was a notice directed to the defendants to complete the contract. We think there is no doubt that by this time the plaintiff firm had come to know that the defendants second party on the record—Sarju Prasad and others—had begun the negotiation for the purchase of this godown. The letter of repudiation written on behalf of the firm by a pleader says: “I neither sold any house to you, nor took any earnest money.” It makes a reference to the fact that the rent should be Rs. 750 and again asks for an account. Notwithstanding that most plain assertion by the defendants that there was no contract and never had been one, the plaintiffs wait ten more months before they commence the action and in fact Bend the account of September 5th. In the interval they send notices to various people who are connected with Sarju Prasad and others, the defendants second party, telling them that they (the plaintiffs) have entered into a contract for purchase of the godown and warning them not to buy over their head. On the 23rd of March, 1919, the defendants first party sold the godown to the defendants second party for the sum of Rs. 14,250. On the 14th of June, 1919, this suit was instituted. The first question that one has to consider is what was the effect of the death of Ganga Bakhsh at a time when beyond question the proceedings were in the negotiation stage only. From the time of the partition, which had taken place some four months before, the business presumably had been carried on jointly by Ram Ballabh and Ram Bilas on the one side and Ganga Bakhsh on the other. When Ganga Bakhsh died it did not seem to occur to any of these contracting parties that by operation of law the partnership had come to an end and that there would have to be a reconstitution of the partnership before any sale of this character could be carried through, nor apparently did it occur to the parties that Musammat Godaveri, the mother of Vithal Das and Nanik Chand, who were boys of tender age, was the legal guardian of those minors. At its highest the case is that Ram Ballabh has been spoken of in this Court as the de facto manager of the business and de facto guardian of the minors. The fact is that there was in law no partnership business and Ram Ballabh had not behind him any record of past management of the business as it stood at and, after the death of Ganga Bakhsh. There is no evidence given to us to show that there was any reconstitution of the business and no evidence given to show that Musammat Godaveri requested Ram Ballabh to look after the interest of the minors or that they had been incorporated into the firm. We are of opinion that in law Ram Ballabh had no authority to act on behalf of these minors. If, however, he had, then it appears to us that the plaintiffs are met by the difficulty which has been pointed out in Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin , viz., that Ram Ballabh was purporting to bind the minors by a personal obligation. In this case the mother and guardian of a minor conveyed certain villages which were part of a taluqdari estate in liquidation of debts which were chargeable upon the estate and, stating that those villages were rent free, covenanted that if the villages should be assessed to Government revenue, she, the guardian, and her minor son, the ward, would be liable to pay to the purchaser the amount of such Government revenue. The liability was also charged upon other parts of the minor's estate. In fact, later, those villages were declared assessable to revenue and the question then arose as to whether the minor could be made liable to repay the amount which the purchaser of the village had been called upon to pay. The important passage is to be found at page 561 and their Lordships of the Privy Council stated that it was conceded that there was not in Indian law any rule which gives a guardian and manager greater power to bind the, infant ward by a personal covenant than exists in English law. They continue that they are not aware of any law in which the guardian has such a power, nor do they see why it should be so in India. They stated that it would be a very improper thing to allow the guardian to make a covenant in the name of his ward so as to impose a personal liability upon the ward and they held that in this case the guardian exceeded her powers so far as she purported to bind her ward and that so far as the suit was founded on the personal liability of the taluqdar, must fail. The emphasis there is laid upon personal liability, and it is to be noted that in this suit for specific performance the personal liability of the minors is sought to be enforced against them. We have also had called to our notice the case of Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri in which Lord Macnaghten in the Privy Council laid it down that neither the manager of a minor's estate nor the guardian of a minor is competent to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property. The reason which their Lordships gave was that the minor not being bound by the contract there was no mutuality and even though the minor in that case had reached his majority he could not obtain specific performance of a contract. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has put it in argument that the principle in that case is equally applicable whether a minor be a purchaser or a vendor of an immovable property and that in either case, the element of mutuality being wanting, no suit for specific performance can. He brought by or against the minor. We need not decide this point as we are satisfied that the case must fail on other grounds. Another case which has been brought to our notice is Patchu Ramajogayya v. Vajjulla Jagannadhan . In that case the learned Chief Justice gave a judgment, which followed the case of Waghela v. Masludin to the full and held that a decree cannot be passed against a minor or his estate on a covenant entered into on his behalf by a guardian for his benefit. Two other learned Judges who arrived at the same conclusion of law gave some rather different reasons for their decision. The case is a strong one, because the minor had through his mother borrowed money for the purposes, of defraying the expenses of his sister. It was held that his mother as guardian could not enter into a contract on big behalf so as to impose any personal liability on him and in the peculiar tenure of the property it was held that the mortgage which had been given was invalid. The question, however, for the decision of the Madras Bench was solely the question of personal liability. In this connection the case of Imambandi v. Mutsaddi might also be considered.

    The result, therefore, is that first of all we hold that Ram Ballabh assumed an authority to deal with the minors' property which he did not possess in law. Even if he did possess it in law we hold that he could not by any engagement entered into by him put the minors under a personal obligation. There are other matters which, in our opinion, are fatal to this case and we have already mentioned the matter of Hansraj. Undoubtedly the question did arise as to whether Hansraj was to be a party to the conveyance or not. Sital Prasad never appears to have told Ram Ballabh that his objection to the omission of Hansraj's name from the document had been swept away. One had better see exactly what he did say. He said that “it was agreed” between him and Ram Ballabh that the name should not be inserted. That statement, “it was agreed,” is a conclusion of fact. It was not for a witness to draw a conclusion of fact, but it was for the witness to give evidence of facts from which the Judge would draw his own conclusion as to whether or not it was agreed. Sital Prasad never informed the court when or where or in what manner he had communicated to Ram Ballabh the fact that he assented to the omission of Hansraj's name from the document. He says:— “I had a talk with Ram Ballabh about the name of Hansraj being mentioned on receiving the copy of application from Bombay.” We have been quite unable to fix what that date is. If it is a reference to some period about five to six months after May it would be understandable, but it is not; understandable if it is a reference to the 30th of September, 1918, on which date he obtained a copy of the record of insolvency, because it is inconceivable that Ram Ballabh then said “very well”, as Sital Prasad represents him to have done, when one remembers that exactly a month before the defendants had written a letter of repudiation in the plainest terms. He says:— “When the draft was prepared I did not tell Kewal Chand in how many days I would make inquiry about Hansraj. I said only so much that I would inquire about Hansraj from Bombay. Had not the inquiry satisfied me I would not have obtained the sale-deed. I did not also tell Kewal Chand that I would inform him after making an inquiry.”. The position, therefore, with regard to Hansraj is, as we have said before, that it was one important outstanding matter which was certainly outstanding for many months and one which Sital Prasad may never have subsequently discussed with Ram Ballabh or with Kewal Chanel.

    Then comes the final matter of delay. The first delay that is mentioned in the record is five to six months for obtaining information about Hansraj. Batan Lal says one and a half to two months. If in fact Sital Prasad took all that time to inquire, Sital Prasad was grossly negligent, because an inquiry of that kind, if made through a proper person, would have resulted in an answer being obtained certainly within 21 days. The only thing which was wanted was the answer to one question—has one Hansraj been adjudicated bankrupt by the Bombay High Court? There was no need to wait for formal documents, yet in that way, according to Sital Prasad himself, six months pass by. We have already pointed out that from the 29th of July, 1917, to some time in August, 1918, there is no sign of activity on the part of Sital Prasad. Lastly, when on the 30th of August, 1918, the defendants tell him in terms which admit of no possible doubt that they do not regard him in any sense as a purchaser of the godown, again Sital Prasad waits some ten months. We think those are circumstances which, coupled with the substantial difficulty about Hansraj, entitle us to assume that Sital Prasad had in fact abandoned all intention of going on with this contract, but was stimulated into activity by learning that the property was likely to be sold over his head. Thereafter he wrote the series of letters of which we have spoken in the hope that Sarju Prasad would not continue negotiations, and, that having failed, brought the suit for specific performance. We agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that this is a case in which specific performance should not be granted, and, inasmuch as we have decided that Ram Ballabh had no authority to act on behalf of the infants, it follows that the whole suit must fail and we, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

    In view of the fact that Ram Ballabh said untruthfully that the contract had to be carried through within 3 months and in view of the fact that he had also stated that Kewal Chand had ceased to be his munib, whereas in truth and in fact Kewal Chand was carrying through on their behalf a sale of Rs. 45,000 in value, on the 23rd of November, 1918, and was acting obviously under the power of attorney of the 27th of May, 1917, we deprive Ram Ballabh and the other defendants first party of their costs in this Court. Sarju Prasad will get his costs of this appeal from the plaintiffs.

    The defendants second party No. 5 to 13 will get their costs from the plaintiffs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Swarath Ram v. Ram Ballabh
    (Apr 22, 1925)