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  • SECTION 17 REGISTRATION ACT
  • provisions of Sections 17(1)(b) and 17(2)(v),
  • Section 23(b), Specific Relief Act,
  • Section 23(b), Specific Belief Act.
  • Section 54, T.P. Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 17 REGISTRATION ACT
  • provisions of Sections 17(1)(b) and 17(2)(v),
  • Section 23(b), Specific Relief Act,
  • Section 23(b), Specific Belief Act.
  • Section 54, T.P. Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This litigation arises from a suit for redemption and, in the alternative, for possession of immovable property based on two contemporaneous instruments dated 10 July 1917 and 11 July 1917. Gayadin was the original owner. The 10 July 1917 document purported to sell the property to Gobardhan. The 11 July 1917 instrument was an agreement by the vendee (Gobardhan) to reconvey the property on receipt of Rs. 1,400 to Gayadin or his male lineal descendants at any time they desired to repurchase. Gayadin died and Raghubir (plaintiff 3) is his son and legal representative.

Raghubir executed a document dated 3 February 1920, described as a relinquishment of his right of repurchase; that document was not registered. Later, on 15 January 1924, Raghubir purported to sell two-thirds of his rights under the 11 July 1917 agreement to Badri and Baldeo (plaintiffs 1 and 2).

The trial Court initially dismissed the suit holding the transaction was not a mortgage and that the plaintiffs had not explicitly claimed relief under the 11 July 1917 agreement. On appeal the lower appellate Court allowed amendment to claim possession under that agreement, remanded for factual findings, and ultimately dismissed plaintiffs 1 and 2 while decreeing possession to Raghubir on payment of Rs. 1,400. The lower appellate Court held the unregistered relinquishment of 3 February 1920 was inadmissible in evidence and therefore did not bar Raghubir's repurchase right.

Two second appeals followed: No. 1684 of 1926 by the defendant challenging the decree in favour of Raghubir, and No. 559 of 1927 by Badri and Baldeo insofar as they were held not entitled to relief because Raghubir's transfer to them was ineffective.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the two documents (sale deed dated 10 July 1917 and agreement dated 11 July 1917) should be read together so as to constitute a mortgage or whether they evidence two separate transactions (an absolute sale and a separate personal agreement to reconvey).
  2. Whether the right of repurchase created by the agreement of 11 July 1917 was a transferable interest or merely a personal right in personam (i.e., whether Raghubir could assign that right to Badri and Baldeo).
  3. Whether an unregistered deed of relinquishment dated 3 February 1920, purporting to extinguish Raghubir's repurchase right, was compulsorily registrable and therefore inadmissible in evidence if unregistered.
  4. Whether Badri and Baldeo (plaintiffs 1 and 2) could enforce the agreement under Section 23(b) of the Specific Relief Act as representatives of Raghubir.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Plaintiffs 1 & 2 (Badri and Baldeo) — as presented in the opinion

  • Contended that the sale deed of 10 July 1917 and the agreement of 11 July 1917 should be read together and treated as a mortgage transaction (i.e., the documents together evidence a mortgage).
  • Contended under Section 23(b) of the Specific Relief Act that Badri and Baldeo, as assignees of Raghubir, were entitled to enforce the agreement which Raghubir could have enforced.

Defendant / Respondent (as described in the opinion)

  • Set up the deed of relinquishment dated 3 February 1920 as a bar to any claim by Raghubir, asserting that Raghubir had relinquished all rights by that document.

Plaintiff-respondent's counsel (argument noted by the Court)

  • Argued that, under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a right of repurchase is intangible property and therefore any document putting an end to such a right is compulsorily registrable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suraj Pershad v. Phul Singh [1906] A.W.N. 180 Authority for proposition that an agreement to reconvey property is compulsorily registrable. The Court observed that this case is distinguishable from the present facts and stated that, even if not distinguishable, it cannot be regarded as good law because it assumes repurchase rights are rights in immovable property.
Bala Khandapa v. Sadashiv Hari, A.I.R. 1921 Bom. 442 Held that deed of sale and agreement together evidenced a mortgage and could not be construed as separate transactions. Noted as a case relied upon by the lower appellate Court for the proposition that such documents together may constitute a mortgage; Court contrasted this with other decisions.
Mir Gazi v. Miya Ali [1914] 38 Bom. 703 Held that an agreement to reconvey property sold by a contemporaneous deed does not require registration. Relied upon as supporting the view that an agreement of reconveyance is not compulsorily registrable; Court cited it among authorities favouring non-registration.
Sangawa v. Huchangowda, A.I.R. 1924 Bom. 174 Similar holding that agreement to reconvey does not require registration. Used as supporting authority for the proposition that such agreements are not compulsorily registrable.
Harikisandas Bhagwandas v. Bai Dhanu, A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 497 (Full Bench) Distinguished cases where sale + agreement constitute a mortgage (registration compulsory) from cases where sale with agreement to resell creates only a personal right (no compulsory registration). Adopted as an authoritative distinction consistent with the Court's view: where the agreement evidences merely a personal right to repurchase, registration is not compulsory.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and functional analysis of the two contemporaneous instruments and relevant statutory provisions and precedent. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps:

  1. Nature of the two documents: The Court examined the 10 July 1917 deed and the 11 July 1917 agreement and concluded that the first deed conveyed in explicit terms "all right, title and interest" of the vendor without reservation, and therefore operated as an absolute sale. The second document conferred only a right of repurchase on specified persons (the vendor and his male lineal descendants) and was thus a personal privilege rather than a proprietary right that runs with the land.
  2. Mortgage characterization test: The Court applied the established test that, to characterize a transaction as a mortgage, the property must be no more than security and the money advanced a loan. Finding no subsisting obligation amounting to a debt recognized by the documents and no reservation that turned the property into mere security, the Court upheld the lower appellate Court's finding that the instruments related to two separate transactions (a sale and an agreement to resell) rather than a mortgage.
  3. Assignability and equity of redemption: Because the right created by the 11 July 1917 agreement was personal (in personam) and limited to specific persons (male lineal descendants), the Court concluded Raghubir had no equity of redemption (as would exist in a mortgage) and no assignable proprietary interest that could be transferred to Badri and Baldeo, who were not male descendants.
  4. Section 23(b) Specific Relief Act argument: The Court treated the contention that Badri and Baldeo could enforce the agreement under Section 23(b) as assuming that they were legal representatives of Raghubir. Because the right was personal and non-assignable, the Court rejected the argument that they could be regarded as his representatives for specific performance purposes.
  5. Registration question for the relinquishment (3 Feb 1920): The Court disagreed with the lower appellate Court's view that the relinquishment required compulsory registration. It reasoned from the language of Sections 17(1)(b) and 17(2)(v) (Registration Act) that the crucial distinction is whether a document itself creates/declares/assigns/limits/extinguishes a right in immovable property (requiring registration) or merely creates a right to obtain another document which, when executed, will create or extinguish such a right (not requiring registration).
  6. Application to the facts: The Court found that the right dealt with by the 3 February 1920 agreement was the identical personal right created by the 11 July 1917 agreement — a right to obtain another document conferring a right in immovable property — and not itself a right to or in immovable property. Reliance was placed on Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, which, the Court explained, provides that a contract for sale does not of itself create any interest in the property, supporting the conclusion that the relinquishment was not compulsorily registrable.
  7. Treatment of precedents: The Court reviewed prior decisions. It considered Suraj Pershad v. Phul Singh as either distinguishable or not good law for the reason that it treats repurchase rights as rights in immovable property. The Court aligned with a line of Bombay High Court decisions (including Mir Gazi, Sangawa, and the Full Bench decision in Harikisandas Bhagwandas) that distinguish between agreements that form part of a mortgage (registrable) and agreements creating merely personal repurchase rights (not registrable).
  8. Consequence on admissibility and title: Because the relinquishment deed of 3 February 1920 did not require registration, it was admissible in evidence. The Court held that Raghubir expressly abandoned his repurchase right by that deed and, having no right left, he could not transfer any effective interest to Badri and Baldeo by the later document of 15 January 1924.

Holding and Implications

Core rulings:

  • Appeal No. 559 of 1927 (Badri & Baldeo): Dismissed. The Court rejected the contention that the 10 July 1917 sale and 11 July 1917 agreement together constituted a mortgage, and rejected the contention that Badri and Baldeo could enforce rights under Section 23(b) as representatives of Raghubir.
  • Appeal No. 1684 of 1926 (defendant): Allowed. The Court held that the deed of relinquishment dated 3 February 1920 was not compulsorily registrable and was admissible in evidence; upon that deed Raghubir had abandoned his repurchase right.
  • Final disposition: The plaintiffs' suit was dismissed with costs in all the Courts.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • Raghubir lost his claimed right of repurchase by virtue of the unregistered but admissible relinquishment dated 3 February 1920 and therefore cannot now claim to exercise that right.
  • Badri and Baldeo, having acquired any purported interest after Raghubir's relinquishment, were not entitled to relief; their transfer from Raghubir was ineffective because there remained no assignable right to transfer.
  • The Court clarified that where an agreement gives only a personal right to repurchase (a right to obtain another document conferring rights in immovable property), such documents are not compulsorily registrable under the statutory test cited (Sections 17(1)(b) and 17(2)(v) as discussed) and an extinguishing agreement of similar character likewise does not require registration and is admissible.

Note: This summary is restricted to the statements, findings and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add material beyond the text of that opinion.

    Gobardhan v. Raghubir Singh .

    1. Second appeals 1684 of 1926 and 559 of 1927 arise out of the same suit brought by Badri Singh, Baldeo Singh and Raghubir Singh for redemption, on foot of two documents, one dated 10th July 1917 and the other dated 11th July 1917, alleged to evidence a transaction of mortgage, and in the alternative for possession of the property in suit on foot of the second of the two documents treating it as an agreement to reconvey the property. The facts in detail are these: Gayadin was originally the owner of the property in dispute. By the earlier deed above mentioned he purported to sell the property for Rs. 1400 to Gobardhan appellant before this Court. By the second of those deeds Gobardhan, the vendee, agreed to reconvey the property sold to him by the first deed, on receipt of Rs. 1,400 to Gayadin or his male lineal descendants at any time they or any of them desired to repurchase, Gayadin died, and Raghubir, plaintiff 3, is his son and legal representative. It has been found by the lower appellate Court that Raghubir relinquished his right of repurchase under the agreement dated 11th July 1917 by a document executed by him on 3rd February 1920 which was not registered. The lower appellate Court had also found that this deed was for consideration and that the relinquishment is valid except for want of registration, which in its view was compulsory. Subsequently, on 15th January 1924, Raghubir sold two-thirds of his rights under the agreement of 11th July 1917 to Badri and Baldeo plaintiffs 1 and 2. The present suit was brought by Badri, Baldeo and Raghubir, claiming possession of the property in suit treating the transaction evidenced by the deeds of 10th July 1917 and 11th July 1917 as one of mortgage, and in the alternative, as already stated, on the basis of the agreement dated 11th July 1917, giving them the rights to repurchase the property.

    2. The Court of first instance at first dismissed the suit, holding that the transaction did not amount to a mortgage, and that the plaintiff had not claimed any relief explicitly on foot of the agreement dated 11th July 1917. On appeal the lower appellate Court allowed amendment of the plaint so as to contain the alternative relief of possession on foot of the agreement dated 11th July 1917. The lower appellate Court remanded the suit to the Court of first instance for a finding on the question whether the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed on the basis of the agreement dated 11th July 1917, assuming the transaction of 10th July 1917, taken with the agreement was not one of mortgage. The Court of first instance held that plaintiffs 1 and 2 acquired no interest under the deed dated 15th January 1924, because Raghubir had no assignable interest. His right, whatever it was, created by the agreement of 11th July 1917 was in personam. On receipt of the finding of the first Court the lower appellate Court dismissed the suit of plaintiffs 1 and 2 but decreed possession on payment of Rs. 1,400 to Raghubir. As regards the deed of relinquishment dated 3rd February 1920, which was set up as a bar against any possible claim by Raghubir, who, according to the defendant, had relinquished all rights by that document, it was held that in the absence of registration it was not admissible in evidence. In that view Raghubir's right to repurchase was left unaffected. The defendant has filed appeal No. 1684 of 1926, impugning the decree of the lower appellate Court in so far as it is in favour of Raghubir. Second appeal No. 559 of 1927 has been preferred by Badri and Baldeo in so far as they have not been held to be entitled to any relief, the transfer by Reghubir in their favour being held ineffective.

    3. The learned advocate for the appellant in appeal No. 559 of 1927 has contended that the sale deed of 10th July 1917 and the agreement of 11th July 1917 should be read together and considered to evidence a transaction amounting to a mortgage. The lower appellate Court has held that the requisite conditions to make the transaction a mortgage are wanting. We think that the view of the lower appellate Court is correct. Unless the property in dispute can be considered to be no more than a security and the money advanced as a loan, the transaction cannot be characterized as a mortgage. The first deed conveys in explicit terms all right, title and interest of the vendor without any reservation of any kind. The second document merely gives a right of repurchase to specified individuals, namely the vendor and his lineal male descendants. It is not a right which can run with the land, nor is it a right which can enure for the benefit of the legal representatives of the vendor. It is no more than a privilege. There is no subsisting right to a debt recognized by these documents. The property affected by them can in no sense be considered to be mere security. Under these circumstances we think that the finding of the lower appellate Court that the two documents relate to two different transactions, the first evidencing a transaction of sale and the second evidencing an agreement by the vendee to resell the property under given conditions is correct.

    4. In view of what we have held in respect of the nature of the transaction it must be conceded that Raghubir did not possess what would be called equity of redemption in case the transaction were one of mortgage. As already stated, he had a personal right to repurchase which could not be alienated to others, at any rate any one who is not a male descendant of the original vendor. It is not suggested that Badri and Baldeo are the male descendants of the vendor.

    5. It is next contended that under Section 23(b), Specific Relief Act, Badri and Baldeo are entitled to enforce the agreement, which their assignor Raghubir could have enforced. This argument begs the whole question, which is whether they are legal representatives of Raghubir at all. If the latter had only a personal interest, which he could not assign, Badri and Baldeo can in no sense be regarded as his representatives so as to be entitled., to obtain specifie performance under Section 23(b), Specific Belief Act. This argument must therefore be rejected. No other argument was addressed to us in support of second appeal No. 559, and in the view we take of the questions urged before us, this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

    6. Appeal No. 1684 of 1926 must, in our opinion, succeed. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the lower appellate Court as regards the necessity of registration of the deed of relinquishment dated 3rd February 1920. It is true it purports to extinguish the right of Raghubir to repurchase the property in dispute. Qua registration it stands on the same footing as a document which creates the right to repurchase. If an agreement to reconvey the property, which creates the right is not compulsorily registrable, it should follow that an agreement to extinguish the same right cannot require registration. We have referred to the close analogy existing between the two agreements, because the case law bearing on the question referred to by the lower appellate Court and relied on before us relates to agreements to reconvey the property. Apart from authority, the provisions of Sections 17(1)(b) and 17(2)(v), clearly cover the question before us. While under the former a non-testamentary instrument which purports or operates to create. Declare assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interests...of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards to or in immovable property requires registration, under the latter any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards to or in immovable property but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title and interest is not compulsorily registrable. The test, therefore, is whether the document in question itself creates any right in immovable property, or merely creates a right to obtain another document, which when executed, will create or extinguish a right in immovable property,

    7. We have no doubt that the right extinguished by the agreement dated 3rd February 1920, is a right to obtain another document, which when executed, will confer a right in immovable property. The right disposed of or dealt with by the agreement itself does not attach to any immovable property. It is, as we have already stated, the identical right created by the agreement dated 11th July 1917. The same right is created by one and extinguished by the other. Neither in one case nor in the other the right is a right to or in immovable property. Section 54, T.P. Act, clearly lays down that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract which does not of itself create any interest in or charge on such property. Whatever doubt might have previously existed on the effect of this provision, Act 2 of 1927 has made it clear that such document was never meant to be one requiring registration. The learned advocate for the plaintiff-respondent has referred to another part of Section 54, T.P. Act, in support of the contention that a right of repurchase is intangible property, and therefore, any document putting an end to such a right is compulsorily registrable under section. We are not prepared to give effect to this argument holding, as we do, that the right to repurchase, which has been extinguished by the agreement of 3rd February 1920 is a purely personal right. It cannot be regarded as intangible property of the character contemplated by Section 54, T.P. Act.

    8. The lower appellate Court has referred to the case of Suraj Pershad v. Phul Singh [1.906] A.W.N. 180, as an authority for the proposition that an agreement to reconvey property is compulsorily registrable. It is possible to distinguish that case from the one before us; but even if it is not distinguishable, it cannot be regarded as good law now. It proceeds on the assumption that the right to repurchase property in future is a right to or in immovable property. We have already discussed this aspect of the question and shown that this view cannot be accepted. The parties to the suit out of which the appeal before the learned single Judge who decided that case arose were not the parties to the agreement but their representatives-in-interest, and if the agreement in question in that case were regarded as conferring merely a personal right, the suit was liable to dismissal on that ground. The party relying on the agreement had, therefore, to accept the position that the agreement contained a covenant running with the land. On this hypothesis registration becomes compulsory. The judgment is a very brief one and the various questions which require consideration are not adverted to.

    9. Bala Khandapa v. Sadashiv Hari A.I.R. 1921 Bom. 442, is another case relied on by the lower appellate Court. It was held that the deed of sale and the agreement together evidence the transaction of a mortgage and could not be construed separately as evidencing two transactions. On that supposition the agreement was an integral part of the document creating a mortgage and, therefore, compulsorily registrable.

    10. In a later case Mir Gazi v. Miya Ali [1914] 38 Bom. 703, it was held that an agreement to reconvey property sold by a contemporaneous deed does not require registration. In Sangawa v. Huchangowda A.I.R. 1924 Bom. 174, the same view was taken. Lastly, in Harikisandas Bhagwandas v. Bai Dhanu A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 497, which is a ruling of Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, a distinction has been drawn between a case in which the agreement and the sale-deed constitute a mortgage and a case in which it is to be regarded as a sale with an agreement to resell. In the former registration of the agreement is compulsory, evidently because it evidences the transaction of the mortgage. In the latter case the agreement relating to a purely personal right does not require registration.

    11. The view which has been repeatedly taken by the Bombay High Court and which we are inclined to take is based on the provisions of Section 17, Registration Act already referred to.

    12. In view of the conclusions arrived at by us on the question of registration, we hold that the agreement of 3rd February 1920, is admissible in evidence, though unregistered. It is not impugned on any other ground. The right of Raghubir to repurchase the property in dispute was expressly abandoned and he had no right left which could be transferred, assuming he had a transferable right, by the latter deed of 15th January 1924 in favour of Badri and Baldeo, plaintiffs 1 and 2. This being so, Raghubir lost his right to repurchase when he executed the agreement dated 3rd February 1920; and he cannot now claim to exercise that right.

    13. In view of the conclusions arrived at by us, this appeal is allowed. The plaintiffs suit is dismissed with costs in all the Courts.

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    Comments

    Gobardhan v. Raghubir Singh .
    (Nov 14, 1929)