Lindsay and Sulaiman, JJ.:— After stating the facts as above thus continued:—
The learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents has not challenged the finding of the court below that “the property mentioned in the will of Kunwar Singh is surely ancestral property.” That finding was vague but it is not challenged. The fact is that although the will mentioned that some property was the self-acquired property of Kunwar Singh, there is no evidence to show that Kunwar Singh had any independent source of income other than the income from his ancestral properties with which he could have acquired properties as his own.
The first question which we have to consider is whether the plaintiff has proved that he was a member of a joint Hindu family with Shib Sahai up to the year 1919.
[The judgement then proceeded to discuss the evidence for or against separation and continued:—]
In view of all these circumstances, we have no doubt in our minds that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of separation must be accepted. It is true that he has not discussed the matter satisfactorily and has referred to the ten or twelve witnesses produced on behalf of the plaintiff in a cursory manner and criticized them on the one general ground that the witnesses did not know the facts in connexion with the family. It is also true that he has either misdescribed the plaintiff or wrongly stated that the defendants had shirked the responsibility of coming into the witness-box, when as a matter of fact one of the defendants, Joti Prasad, was examined. We have examined the oral evidence and we are satisfied that it cannot in any way outweigh the inference drawn from the documentary evidence. It is not said that Shib Sahai and Harkesh continued joint in residence. No doubt for some time, as admitted by the vakil for the defendants in the Rubkar, dated the 26th of September, 1903, Harkesh went mad. It is impossible to hold that there was a re-union between Shib Sahai and Harkesh. Having regard to all these circumstances, we are of opinion that the plaintiff's claim that he was joint when the latter died, cannot be maintained. His claim for any share by right of survivorship, therefore, falls to the ground.
As remarked above, it has not been disputed before us that the finding of the Subordinate Judge, unsatisfactory though it is, that the properties mentioned in the will were ancestral properties, is open to challenge. We may, therefore, take it that all the properties mentioned in the will were ancestral in the hands of Kunwar Singh over which he had no absolute power of disposal without the consent of his coparceners. He purported to make a bequest of the entire property and allotted a few items to Shib Sahai exclusively and the other items to both of them jointly. There was no partition in the lifetime of Kunwar Singh and the will cannot be treated as a partition in the present time. At best it was the wish of Kunwar Singh which he desired should be given effect to after his death. When Kunwar Singh died, the plaintiff was a minor. It is, therefore, impossible to imagine that the plaintiff could legally have given his consent to the arrangement intended by Kunwar Singh. As held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Brijraj Singh v. Sheodan Singh, even the head of a joint Hindu family has no right to make a partition by will of joint property among the various members of the family except with their consent. They have independent rights in it with which he cannot interfere. Its validity can only depend on their acceptance of such an arrangement. The learned Subordinate Judge in a loose way has found that this arrangement was accepted and acquiesced in by the plaintiff for a period of forty-five years. The learned Judge has overlooked the fact that up to about 1896 Harkesh was a minor, and that for some time niter that there, was no disagreement between him and Shib Sahai, at any rate so long as his mother remained alive. He has also not attached due significance to the fact that from 1903 onwards Harkesh began to assert his right and to repudiate at least one provision of the will. The will had strictly provided that the property should not be divided without the consent of Shib Sahai. Ignoring that provision Harkesh proceeded to apply for partitions in the revenue court. Shib Sahai set up this will and relied on this provision. His objection was overruled by the revenue court and the plaintiff was granted the partitions. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the plaintiff accepted all the provisions contained in the will. He certainly repudiated one part of it. As regards the rest, there is no evidence on the record to show that he expressly or in clear language accepted the dispensation of the property made by his grandfather. The inference drawn by the Subordinate Judge is based entirely on the circumstance that the present suit was not instituted till the year 1923. From the long delay which has taken place the learned Judge has inferred that the plaintiff must have accepted the arrangement made by his grandfather. We are unable to draw that inference. Part of the delay is explained by the circumstance that the plaintiff was off and on of insane mind and it is also explained partly by the fact that he proceeded to get partitions of villages one after another through the revenue court, which was a much easier process than the institution of a suit in the civil court. We have shown that Harkesh did not accept one part of the will. There is no evidence to show that he expressly accepted the other parts. His mere silence for a long time or the delay in bringing the suit cannot, therefore, justify the inference that this will was accepted by him. So far as the mutation of names is concerned, that was effected soon after the death of Kunwar Singh when the plaintiff was a minor of tender years and had no voice in the matter. After the mutation took place the plaintiff could not get the entries corrected through the revenue court unless and until he had established his right through the revenue court. We are, therefore, unable to accept the finding of the Subordinate Judge that this arrangement was accepted and acquiesced in by the plaintiff so as to amount to an estoppel and prevent him from going behind it. Kunwar Singh, as pointed out above, had no dispensing power over the joint property and the document as a will is inoperative. We must, therefore, hold that it is not a bar to the present claim of the plaintiff.
The next point to consider is whether the claim is barred by limitation. The learned Advocate for the respondent has argued that the present suit is governed by article 127 of the Limitation Act and that, therefore, the period began to run from the date when the plaintiff was excluded from the joint family property. We are of opinion that article is not applicable inasmuch as there is no joint family now in existence. As held in the case of Bisheshar Tewari v. Bisheshar Dayal and the case of Banoo Tewary v. Doona Tewary, that article presupposes the existence of a joint family and the exclusion of a co-parcener from his joint family property. The proper article governing this suit is article 144, in which case the defendants must prove adverse possession for more than twelve years. The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the plaintiff has been out of possession over these properties for more than twelve years and that Shib Sahai had been in adverse possession. As regards the properties which were the properties of the parties and which did not under the will come exclusively to Shib Sahai, both Shib Sahai and Harkesh must be treated as co-parceners. Even after 1903 when a disruption in the joint status of the family took place, the parties must be deemed to have continued to be co-owners entitled to equal shares in the undivided properties. It is well established that the exclusive possession of one co-sharer even though coupled with the non-payment of profits, cannot amount to a clear adverse possession unless there has been an ouster of the other co-parceners to their knowledge and openly. Burns v. Bryan.
The learned Subordinate Judge was perhaps conscious of this difficulty and hence he relied on the setting up of the will by Shib Sahai in the litigations of 1903. As remarked above, one of the pleas raised by Shib Sahai in the partition suit was that the claim for partition was not maintainable in view of the provision of the will that there should be no partition without Shib Sahai's consent. The learned Subordinate Judge has not appreciated that the partition proceedings related to properties which were jointly entered in the names of the two parties and not to the properties which were exclusively assigned under the will. The written statement of Shib Sahai, therefore, cannot be taken to be an express assertion of adverse possession as regards the first class of items, namely, those which were entered exclusively in his name and which were not in dispute before the revenue court. The mere fact that Shib Sahai relied upon one provision of the will would not justify us in holding that he was openly asserting his adverse possession as regards items to which he did not refer and which were not even in dispute. We are, therefore, of opinion that the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge, that Shib Sahai asserted his adverse possession as early as 1903 and that since that date his possession has been adverse, cannot be accepted. It is true that the feelings between the parties were highly estranged and protracted litigation was going on. It is also true that Shib Sahai apparently did not pay the plaintiff's share of the property. It is also apparent that the plaintiff did not put forward any express claim or demand in respect of it for a large number of years, but in the absence of a clear demand and a clear refusal, we cannot hold that the possession of one co-sharer became adverse as against the other. The learned Subordinate Judge has thought that this possession became adverse since the date of the denial. This denial he takes to mean as set up in the provision of the will. That, in our opinion, however, did not amount to a clear denial of the plaintiff's title. Although, therefore, there has been a great delay in the institution of the suit, we are compelled to hold that there is no satisfactory evidence, direct or circumstantial, to prove that Shib Sahai had acquired title to the plaintiff's half share in the joint property by exercise of adverse possession for over twelve years. The plaintiff's claim cannot, therefore, be barred by limitation.
The last point which requires consideration is which property is joint and which is the exclusive property of Shib Sahai. [The judgement then proceeded to decide this point.]
The result, therefore, is that the plaintiff's claim for the entire property by right of survivorship cannot be sustained, but his claim, for a half share in the entire property in suit must be decreed. We accordingly allow this appeal, and setting aside the decree of the court below, decree the plaintiff's claim for a half share in the properties mentioned in schedules A and B attached to this judgement which have been approved of and accepted by the counsel of the parties. We direct that the parties should bear their own costs in both courts.
Appeal allowed.