AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition under Article 226 challenges the U.P. Public Services Tribunal's review order dated 30-9-1992 which set aside the Tribunal's earlier judgment (dated 28-12-1985) and quashed the Municipal Administrator's order of removal dated 27-8-1974 and the order dismissing the subsequent appeal dated 11-5-1977. The respondent No. 2 was a confirmed meter reader in the Water Works Department of Nagar Palika, Amroha. On 13-5-1974 the Executive Officer reported unsatisfactory work, the respondent was suspended on 14-5-1974 and a charge-sheet was served the same day. An inquiry was conducted, the Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 24-6-1974, a show cause notice was issued on 16-7-1974, the respondent replied on 8-8-1974, and the Administrator removed him by order dated 27-8-1974. The appeal was dismissed on 11-5-1977. The respondent then filed a claim before the Tribunal which dismissed it on 28-12-1985; he later filed a review application which the Tribunal allowed by its 30-9-1992 judgment. The Municipal Board (petitioners) challenged that review allowance in the instant writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether mere non-payment of subsistence allowance during suspension ipso facto renders an order of removal invalid.
  2. Whether the Tribunal erred in allowing the review application by placing reliance on State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan (AIR 1983 SC 803) which, the petitioners contend, is not applicable to the facts of this case.
  3. Whether a breach of the principles of natural justice (by non-payment of subsistence allowance) alone is sufficient to vitiate inquiry proceedings and consequent punitive orders, or whether demonstrable prejudice is also required.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Municipal Board) Arguments

  • The Tribunal committed illegality by relying on State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan (AIR 1983 SC 803), which the petitioners contend is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
  • Mere non-payment of subsistence allowance is not, by itself, sufficient to invalidate the inquiry proceedings and the consequential order of punishment; real prejudice must be shown.
  • Relied upon authorities: Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and others ((1999) 2 UPLBEC 1280) and Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1973 SC 1183) to show the circumstances where non-payment did vitiate proceedings (i.e., where inability to attend inquiry was caused by non-payment).

Respondent No. 2's Arguments

  • Contended that mere non-payment of subsistence allowance was sufficient to invalidate the order of removal.
  • Relied on State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma (JT 1996 (3) SC 722) in support of his contention.

Respondent No. 1 (State) Arguments

  • Submitted that non-payment of subsistence allowance amounts to a violation of principles of natural justice and the Tribunal rightly allowed the review and set aside the earlier orders.
  • Relied on Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer and another (AIR 1986 SC 1168) to support the submission that denial of subsistence allowance can amount to denial of reasonable opportunity in certain statutory proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan, AIR 1983 SC 803 Decision concerning vires of a proviso (second proviso to Rule 151 (1)(ii)(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959) dealing with subsistence allowance of Rs.1 per month; Supreme Court held that proviso unreasonable and void. The Tribunal had relied on this decision to allow the review; the Court held that this judgment was not applicable to the facts of the present case and that reliance on it by the Tribunal was misplaced.
Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer and another, AIR 1986 SC 1168 Held that non-payment of subsistence allowance during pendency of an application under Section 33(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, amounted to denial of reasonable opportunity and violated principles of natural justice. The Court acknowledged this principle but treated it as context-specific (Section 33(3) cases). It did not treat the principle as automatically proving invalidity absent proof of prejudice.
Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India and others, AIR 1994 SC 1558 Expounds that principles of natural justice are flexible; a procedural breach warrants relief only if it causes real prejudice — mere technical infringement is insufficient. The Court relied on paragraphs 20–24 to hold that mere violation of natural justice (e.g., non-payment of subsistence allowance) is not enough; some real prejudice must be shown to invalidate proceedings.
Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 1183 Illustrates circumstances where non-payment of subsistence allowance prevented attendance at inquiry due to lack of funds, resulting in vitiation of proceedings. Used by the Court to recognize that where non-payment causes real prejudice (such as inability to attend), proceedings can be vitiated; contrasted with the present case where no such prejudice was shown.
Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and others, (1999) 2 UPLBEC 1280 Similar principle: non-payment of subsistence allowance caused inability to participate in inquiry and so vitiated the proceedings. Recognized by the Court as an authority supporting the proposition that prejudice (inability to attend due to lack of funds) can vitiate proceedings; not applicable here where attendance and opportunity were not impeded.
State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma, JT 1996 (3) SC 722 Decision cited by respondent No. 2 (specific rule cited not concerned with non-payment of subsistence allowance per the Court). The Court observed that that judgment did not raise or consider the question of non-payment of subsistence allowance and therefore was of no help to respondent No. 2.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621; AIR 1978 SC 597 Authority cited in Ravi Naik for the definition and importance of principles of natural justice in administrative law ("fair play in action"). Invoked within the Ravi Naik discussion to frame the proper approach to natural justice — flexible and context-dependent; the Court applied that contextual approach here.
Union of India v. Tulsi Ram, AIR 1985 SC 1416 Referenced in Ravi Naik as part of the articulation of natural justice principles. Used within the reasoning imported from Ravi Naik to support the proposition that natural justice violations must be assessed in context and relief granted only where justice requires it.
Malloc v. Alberdeen Corporation, (1971) 2 All ER 1278 Quoted in Ravi Naik for the English approach: relief for breach of procedure requires proof of substantive loss ("the Court does not act in vain"). Adopted as persuasive support for the requirement of real prejudice before invalidating proceedings.
A.M Allison & H.P Brigg v. B.L Sen & Others, 1957 SCR 359; AIR 1957 SC 227 Established that a High Court exercising Article 226 has power to refuse writs if satisfied there has been no failure of justice. Relied on within the Ravi Naik exposition to support refusal of relief where there is no failure of justice; applied to deny relief here because no prejudice shown.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise analytical fashion, grounded in the authorities it cited:

  1. The Tribunal's sole ground for allowing the review was that no subsistence allowance had been paid to respondent No. 2; the Tribunal founded its decision on State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan (AIR 1983 SC 803). The Court held that Chandra Bhan concerned the vires of a specific proviso in the Bombay Civil Services Rules (payment of subsistence at Rs.1 per month) and therefore was not factually applicable to the present matter — accordingly, reliance on it was misplaced.
  2. The Court recognized the principle in Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki (AIR 1986 SC 1168) that non-payment of subsistence allowance in certain statutory contexts (specifically, pendency of proceedings under Section 33(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) can amount to denial of reasonable opportunity and breach natural justice. This establishes that non-payment can, in a proper context, vitiate proceedings.
  3. The pivotal analytical anchor was the Supreme Court's exposition in Ravi S. Naik (AIR 1994 SC 1558): principles of natural justice are important but flexible; mere procedural breach does not automatically entitle relief unless it has caused "some real prejudice" to the affected party. The Court reproduced and relied on paragraphs 20–24 of Ravi Naik which emphasize that there must be substantive loss or prejudice for a court to grant relief for procedural infirmity.
  4. The Court distilled the precedents (including Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava and Capt. M. Paul Anthony) to the proposition that where non-payment of subsistence allowance demonstrably caused prejudice (for example, preventing attendance at an inquiry due to lack of funds), the inquiry is vitiated. Such cases turn on proof of prejudice (inability to participate) caused by non-payment.
  5. Applying those principles to the facts at hand, the Court observed that respondent No. 2 did not plead or produce material showing that he was prevented from attending the inquiry because of non-payment of subsistence allowance. The record showed he attended the inquiry throughout and was afforded full opportunity to defend. Therefore, there was no proof of the required prejudice.
  6. Because the Tribunal allowed the review solely on the basis of non-payment of subsistence allowance without a finding of prejudice and by reliance on an inapplicable authority, the Tribunal's order could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed and the impugned judgment of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal dated 30-9-1992 is quashed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Tribunal's review allowance and consequent setting aside of the earlier judgments/orders (including the order of removal dated 27-8-1974 and the order dismissing the appeal dated 11-5-1977) have been quashed by the High Court. The petitioners succeed. The Court ordered that there will be no order as to costs.
  • Legal principle reiterated: Non-payment of subsistence allowance during suspension does not automatically invalidate an inquiry or consequent disciplinary order; such a breach must be coupled with demonstrable prejudice to the employee (for example, inability to attend or effectively defend due to lack of funds) for relief to be granted. The Court relied on and applied the Ravi Naik exposition to reach this conclusion.
  • Broader implications: The opinion applies existing Supreme Court principles to the facts but does not articulate or establish a novel legal precedent beyond re-affirming that a showing of real prejudice is required before relief is granted for violations of natural justice arising from non-payment of subsistence allowance. The opinion does not discuss any broader change in law beyond this application.

Note: All summaries and attributions above are derived exclusively from the provided opinion and do not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Municipal Board, Amroha, And Another v. Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal No. 1 And Another

    By the Court.-

    Heard Sri Vinod Sinha, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri B.N. Asthana, the learned senior Advocate, appearing for respondent No. 2, and Sri Sandeep Mookerji, the learned standing Counsel of the State of U.P. appearing for the respondent No. 1.

    2. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 30-9-1992 passed by respondent No. 1, a copy whereof is Annexure-4 to the writ petition.

    3. The facts, emerging from the pleadings of the parties and the impugned judgment, are that respondent No. 2 was a confirmed Meter reader in Water Works Department of Nagar Palika, Amroha. On 13-5-1974, the Executive Officer submitted a report that the work of respondent No. 2 was not satisfactory. On the said report the respondent No. 2 was suspended on 14-5-1974 and the Water Works Engineer was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. On the same day, charge-sheet was served on the respondent No. 2. After completing the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 24-6-1974, a copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition. On 16-7-1974, a show cause notice was issued to respondent No. 2 along with the copy of the inquiry report. On 30-7-1974 the respondent No. 2 appeared and sought time to file his reply. On 8-8-1974, he submitted his reply. On 27-8-1974, the Administrator passed an order removing respondent No. 2 from the service of the Nagar Palika, a copy of which is Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The respondent No. 2 filed an appeal against the aforesaid order which was dismissed by order dated 11-5-1977. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 filed a claim petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal which was dismissed by it by order dated the 28-12-1985. The respondent No. 2 thereafter, filed a review application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by its impugned judgment dated 30-9-1992 has allowed the review application, set aside its judgment dated 28-12-1985 and quashed the order of removal dated 27-8-1974 and the order of dismissal of the appeal dated 11-5-1977. Aggrieved, the Municipal Board has filed the instant petition.

    4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Tribunal committed an illegality in placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan, AIR 1983 SC 803, as the same was not applicable to the facts of the case and that the Tribunal erred in allowing the review application. His submission was that in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the case, mere non-payment of subsistence allowance by itself was not sufficient to invalidate the inquiry proceeding and the consequential order of punishment. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgments rendered in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and others, (1999) 2 UPLBEC 1280 and Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State Of Madhya Pradesh ., AIR 1973 SC 1183.

    5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 contended that mere non-payment of subsistence allowance was sufficient to invalidate the order of removal. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment rendered in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma, JT 1996 (3) SC 722.

    6. The learned standing Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that non-payment of subsistence allowance amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice and he, accordingly, submitted that the Tribunal has rightly allowed the review application and rightly set aside the order of removal dated 27-8-1974 as well as the order of dismissal of appeal dated 11-5-1977. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a Supreme Court judgment rendered in Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer and another, AIR 1986 SC 1168.

    7. The Tribunal by its impugned order and judgment has allowed the review application filed by respondent No. 2 merely on the ground that no subsistence allowance was paid to him and has founded its order and judgment on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan, AIR 1983 SC 803. In the said case, the question of vires of the second proviso to Rule 151 (1)(ii)(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959, providing for payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of rupee one per month to a Government servant who was convicted by competent Court and sentenced to imprisonment and whose appeal against conviction and sentence was pending, was raised. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering various judgments held that the second proviso was unreasonable and void. Thus, the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not applicable to the facts of the present case and as such the reliance placed on it by the Tribunal is misplaced.

    8. Now the question that arises for determination is as to whether non-payment of subsistence allowance to the respondent No. 2, during the period of suspension, ipso facto rendered the order of removal invalid.

    9. In the case of Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer and another, AIR 1986 SC 1168, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that non-payment of subsistence allowance to the workman during the pendency of an application under Section 33 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity to defend in the proceedings before the Tribunal and such denial led to violation of principles of natural justice vitiating the proceedings before the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, according to the said judgment, the denial of payment of subsistence allowance to the workman placed under suspension during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 33 (3) amounts to violation of principles of natural justice

    10. Here the question is whether mere violation of principles of natural justice is sufficient to invalidate the inquiry proceedings and the consequent order of dismissal/removal.

    11. Discussion in paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India and others, AIR 1994 SC 1558, provides complete answer to the question. The said paragraphs are reproduced below :

    “(20) Principles of natural justice have an important places in modern Administrative Law. They have been defined to mean “fair play in action”. See : Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621 at 676 : AIR 1978 SC 597 at 625, Bhagwati, J. As laid down by this Court “they constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men” Union of India v. Tulsi Ram, 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131 at 225 : AIR 1985 SC 1416 at 1456. An order of an authority exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions passed in violation of principles of natural justice is proceedurally ultra vires and, therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional error. That is the reason why in spite of the finality imparted to the decision of the Speakers/Chairman by paragraph 6 (1) of the Tenth Schedule, such a decision is subject to judicial review on the ground of non-compliance with rules of natural justice. But while applying the principles of natural justice, it must be borne in mind that “they are not immutable but flexible” and they are not cast in a rigid mould and they cannot be put in a legal strait-jacket. Whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with or not has to be considered in the context of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”

    (21) The approach of the English Courts has been thus summed up by Prof. Wade :

    “The Judges, anxious as always to preserve some freedom of manoeuvre, emphasise that `it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter. The so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. Their application, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject-matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice.”

    [H.W.R. Wade : Administrative Law, 6th Edn., p. 530]”

    (22) Similarly Clive Lewis has stated :

    “The fact that the applicant has suffered no prejudice as a result of the error complained of may be a reason for refusing him relief. It is necessary to keep in mind the purpose of the public law principle that has technically been violated, and ask whether that underlying purpose has in any event been achieved in the circumstances of the case. If so, the Courts may decide that the breach has caused no injustice or prejudice and there is no need to grant relief.

    The Courts may, for example, refuse relief if there has been a breach of natural justice but where the breach has in fact not prevented the individual from having a fair hearing.”

    [Civil Lewis : Judicial Remedies in Public Law (1992) p.290]

    (23) In the words of Lord Wilber Force:

    ”A breach of procedure whether called a failure of natural justice, or an essential administrative fault, cannot given him a remedy in the Courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The Court does not act in vain”.

    [Malloc v. Alberdeen Corporation, (1971) 2 All ER 1278 at 1294]

    (24) The approach of the Courts in India is no different. In A.M Allison & H.P Brigg v. B.L Sen & Others, 1957 SCR 359 : AIR 1957 SC 227, it has been laid down that while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court has the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there has no failure of justice.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    According to the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, mere violation of principles of natural justice is not enough and apart from the violation of principles of natural justice, some real prejudice has to be shown.

    12. In the judgments rendered in Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State Of Madhya Pradesh . (supra) and Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and others (supra), the employees concerned could not attend the inquiry proceedings because of paucity of funds and financial stringencies on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance. In these circumstances, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the inquiry proceedings were vitiated.

    13. The proposition that is culled out from the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that apart from the violation of the principles of natural justice because of non-payment of subsistence allowance, some prejudice must be shown to have been caused to the employee. Prejudice may be the inability of the employee to attend the inquiry proceedings for want of funds because of non-payment of subsistence allowance.

    Therefore, it is clear that mere non-payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension will not ipso facto render the order of removal invalid. It must be coupled with real prejudice.

    14. In the judgment rendered in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma, (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2, the question of non-payment of subsistence allowance was not raised and considered. The judgment, therefore, is of no help to the respondent No. 2.

    15. In the instant case, respondent No. 2 has not pleaded that he was prevented from attending the inquiry proceedings because of non-payment of subsistence allowance. No material has been placed by him before the Court to show that any prejudice was caused to him on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance. It is not in dispute that he attended the inquiry proceedings throughout and was afforded full opportunity. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the review application and in setting aside the order of removal dated 27-8-1974 and the order of dismissal of appeal dated 11-5-1977. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is liable to be quashed.

    16. In view of the discussion made above, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment of the Tribunal dated 30-9-1992 is quashed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

    Petition allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Municipal Board, Amroha, And Another v. Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal No. 1 And Another
    (May 23, 2001)