Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 26 of the Small Cause Court Act
  • section 20 (4) of U. P. Act XIII
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 26 of the Small Cause Court Act
  • section 20 (4) of U. P. Act XIII
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.N. Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants for recovery of arrears of rent and for ejectment. The defendants raised two primary defenses before the trial court: (1) that they had deposited the entire rent in court and so were entitled to protection under section 20(4) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972; and (2) that no notice as contemplated by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act demanding rent and terminating their tenancy had been served prior to filing the suit.

The trial court resolved the first issue in favour of the defendants, granting them benefit under section 20(4), and found that the notice under section 106 had been served; accordingly it decreed the suit for arrears of rent but dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for ejectment. The plaintiffs filed a revision under section 26 of the Small Cause Court Act. The Additional District Judge, Saharanpur allowed the plaintiffs' revision and decreed the suit for defendants' ejectment, holding that the defendants had failed to deposit the entire arrears with interest and costs on the first hearing date as required by section 20(4) and thus were not entitled to that protection; the Additional District Judge affirmed the trial court's finding that the notice under section 106 had been served.

The defendants filed this defendants' revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge. In this revision the defendants did not challenge the lower court's finding on section 20(4) but confined their attack to the second question — whether the notice under section 106 was served on them.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the defendants' tenancy was duly served on the defendants.
  2. Whether, having regard to the evidence and surrounding circumstances, a presumption of service arising from dispatch of a registered envelope returned with a postman's endorsement of refusal can be rebutted by the addressee's denial on oath, and if so by what standard (i.e., whether a bare denial suffices or whether credibility must be assessed).
  3. Procedural foundation: whether the courts below committed jurisdictional or legal error in holding that service of notice had been proved.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments (Appellants)

  • The defendants contended that the notice under section 106 was not served on them and that the presumption of service arising from a registered cover returned with an endorsement of refusal was rebutted by the defendants' denial on oath.
  • They argued that once they denied service on oath the onus shifted to the plaintiffs to prove service, which the plaintiffs failed to do because they did not produce the postman or witnesses to corroborate the endorsement of refusal.
  • In the revision they confined their attack only to the finding on service of notice; they did not challenge the finding on applicability of section 20(4) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.

Plaintiffs' Position (Respondents)

  • The plaintiffs relied on the registered dispatch of the notice to the correct address and on the postman's endorsement on the registered envelope indicating that the defendant refused to accept the notice; they treated the endorsement as proof of service or, at least, as raising a presumption of service.
  • Before the trial court both parties' counsel agreed that no oral evidence was to be produced and that the documents filed required no proof; pursuant to that agreement the envelope containing the endorsement and the notice were exhibited and read in evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gana Ram v. Phoolwati (A.I.R. 1970 Alld. 446) (Full Bench) Where a registered envelope addressed correctly is sent and returned with a postman's endorsement of refusal, the court is entitled to raise a presumption that the notice was duly served. Used to support the proposition that a presumption of service arises from a registered envelope returned with refusal endorsement.
Asa Ram v. Ravi Prakash (1966 A.L.J. 421) Held that a tenant's denial of receipt is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt unless the tenant is believed by the court. Cited as authority for the view that denial alone does not automatically rebut the presumption; credibility must be assessed.
Nirmala Bala v. Provat Kumar Basu (1946 52 C.W.N. 659) Supported the view that a denial by the addressee is not enough to rebut the presumption of service of a registered communication. Relied upon as part of the body of decisions that treat mere denial as insufficient without credibility assessment.
Ramnath v. Angan (1978 U.P. R.C.C. 170) (Division Bench) Relied on the presumption of service despite the defendants' denial of service. Showed that some courts accept presumption notwithstanding denial; used to demonstrate judicial approaches favouring the presumption.
Mushiyat Ullah v. Abdul Wahab (A.I.R. 1972 Alld. 539) Held that the presumption under section 27 General Clauses Act and section 114 Evidence Act on refusal endorsement does not stand rebutted on a bare denial. Cited to support the proposition that bare denial ordinarily does not rebut the statutory presumption of service.
Wasu Ram v. R. L. Sethi (1963 A.W.R. 472) S. S. Dhavan, J. held that while refusal endorsement raises a presumption, the court must assess the denial's credibility in light of surrounding circumstances and conduct. Adopted for the principle that the question whether the presumption is rebutted is one of fact and requires assessment of surrounding circumstances and party conduct.
Meghji Kanji Patel v. Kundaamal Chaman Lal (A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 387) Held that a defendant's oath denying service is sufficient to rebut the presumption and that the plaintiff must produce the postman to prove service. Cited as authority for the contrary view (that denial on oath rebuts the presumption), illustrating the divergence of authority.
Ram August v. Bindeshwari Tewari (Patna High Court) Observed that the presumption of service of a registered postcard stood rebutted on the denial of the addressee when the endorsement of refusal was not proved. Used to illustrate decisions where denial on oath and lack of proof of endorsement led to rejection of the presumption.
Jugat Ram Khullar v. Sam/ Mai (Delhi High Court) Held that posting by registered post raises a presumption, but a statement on oath by the addressee denying service would rebut that presumption and shift the burden to the plaintiff. Cited as an authority taking the view that denial on oath rebuts the presumption and imposes a duty on the plaintiff to prove service.
Amarnath v. Smt. Champa Devi (M. P. Saxena, J.) Held that a defendant's statement on oath that he never refused the notice was sufficient to rebut the presumption; noted the defendant was not cross-examined and there were no circumstances to discredit him. Used to show that a credible, uncontradicted denial can rebut the presumption; emphasis on credibility and cross-examination (or lack thereof).
Puwada Venkateshwar Rao v. C. V. Ramana (Supreme Court) Resolved the conflict: the presumption may stand rebutted by the defendant's statement on oath so that the plaintiff needs further evidence; denial may nonetheless be found incorrect from admissions or conduct and it is not always necessary to produce the postman. Relied upon as the controlling authority reconciling divergent views and establishing that rebuttal is possible but depends on factual assessment; the court followed the Supreme Court's guidance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first set out the factual matrix and the procedural posture: that the defendants limited their revision challenge to the finding on service of the section 106 notice. It then reviewed the authorities that present two divergent lines of decisions — one line holding that an endorsement of refusal on a registered cover raises a presumption of service that is not rebutted by a mere denial, and another line holding that a sworn denial by the addressee rebuts the presumption and shifts the onus to the plaintiff to produce further evidence (for example, the postman).

The court identified the Supreme Court decision in Puwada Venkateshwar Rao v. C. V. Ramana as resolving the conflict by holding that the presumption may be rebutted by the defendant's statement on oath but that the court must examine the veracity of that denial in the light of surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the party; it further observed that production of the postman is not an absolute requirement in every case because the denial may be shown to be incorrect from other admissions or conduct.

Applying these principles to the present record, the court noted key facts: counsel for both parties agreed before the trial court on 25 July 1974 that no oral evidence would be produced and that the documents filed required no proof; on that basis the registered notice and the envelope with the postman's endorsement of refusal were exhibited and read in evidence. Given that the document containing the endorsement was admitted in evidence, the court held it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to call the postman to prove the endorsement.

The court further relied on other circumstances in the record that affected the credibility of the defendants' denial: the plaint expressly stated (paragraph 3) that the notice dated 11 August 1972 had been sent and refused; the defendants did not deny service in terms in their written statement (they made only a vague non-admission in paragraph 7); the plea of non-service was first raised by amendment two years after filing the suit, suggesting it was an afterthought and not an immediate defence. Considering these factors, the court concluded that the courts below were entitled to accept the documentary endorsement and to reject the bare denial of the defendants.

The court emphasized the controlling principle that whether the presumption of service is rebutted is a question of fact dependent on credibility and surrounding circumstances. On the facts of this case the court found no merit in the defendants' contention that the presumption had been rebutted by their denial on oath.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is dismissed. The court refused to interfere with the Additional District Judge's decree which had allowed the plaintiffs' revision and decreed the suit for defendants' ejectment.

DISMISSED

Implications:

  • The decision leaves in place the decree of the Additional District Judge in favour of the plaintiffs for ejectment of the defendants (i.e., the plaintiffs succeeded on the ejectment claim as upheld by the Additional District Judge).
  • On the particular procedural question of proof of service, the court applied settled principles (including the Supreme Court's guidance) that a presumption of service arising from a registered cover returned with an endorsement of refusal can be rebutted by a defendant's sworn denial, but rebuttal depends on the credibility of that denial and the surrounding circumstances; courts may rely on documentary endorsement admitted in evidence and need not always produce the postman.
  • No broader or novel legal principle was announced; the court applied existing authorities and factual reasoning to uphold the lower courts' findings. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond its factual application of established law.
  • As to costs, the court ordered that there would be no order as to costs.


Note: This summary is restricted to and derived exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

    Jamal Khan And Another v. Haji Yusuf Ali And Another

    K.N. Singh, J.-

    This is a defendants' revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, decreeing in plaintiffs' suit for defen­dants ejectment.

    The plaintiff-opposite parties filed a suit against the defendant-applicants for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment. The defendants raised two pleas, firstly, they contended before the courts below that since they had de­posited the entire rent in the court they were entitled to the protection of section 20 (4) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. The second plea raised by them was that no notice as contemplated by section 106 of the Transfer of property Act demanding rent and terminating their tenancy had been served on them prior to the filing of the suit. The trial court decided the first question in favour of the defendants and granted benefit of section 20 (4) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. On the second question the trial court held that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act had been served on the defendants. On these findings the trial court decreed the suit for arrears of rent but it dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for ejectment of the defendants. The plaintiffs filed revision application under section 26 of the Small Cause Court Act against the decree of the trial court. The Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, allowed the plaintiffs' revision and decreed the suit for defendants ejectment. The Addi­tional District Judge held that the defendants had failed to deposit the entire arrears of rent along with interest at the rate of 9% thereon and the costs of the suit on the first date of hearing of the suit as required by section 20 (4) of the Act, therefore, the defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the said section. On the question of service of notice the findings of the trial court were affirmed. Aggrieved, the defendants have preferred this revision against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge.

    Learned counsel for the defendants-applicants did not challenge the finding of the court below on the first question relating to the applicability of section 20 (4) of the Act. He confined his attack on the second question only. He urged that the courts below exercised their jurisdiction with material illegality in holding that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act determining the defendants' tenancy was served on them. It appears that a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act was lent by the plaintiffs through registered post of the defendants' correct address on 1-8-1962. The endorsement on the registered envelope made by the postman indicated that the defendants refused to accept the notice on 12.8. 1972. The courts below held that the personal service of the notice was not necessary and as the registered envelope containing the correct address of the defendant had been posted to them and the endorsement made by the postman indicated that the defendants refused to accept the same, therefore the notice must be deemed to have been properly served on the defendants. Learned, counsel for the defendants-applicants urged that the presumption of service of notice stood rebutted on the defendant's denial of the service of the notice on oath. Thereafter onus to prove service of notice shifted on the plaintiffs. Since the plaintiffs failed to discharge that onus by producing the postman of the witnesses in whose presence the defendants were alleged to have refused to accept the notice, the plaintiffs failed to prove service of notice on the defendants-applicants. This question has been considered by this court and other Courts on a number of occasions. There appears to be two divergent views. However, there is unanimity on the question of raising presumption. The consensus of the various decisions in that where a regis­tered envelope containing correct address of the addressee is sent to him by registered post and if the same is received back with the endorsement of refusal, in such a case the Court would be entitled to raise a presumption that the notice was duly served on the addressee. This principle was laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Gana Ram v. Phoolwati.(A.I.R. 1970 Alld. 446) But the question whether the presumption stood rebutted on a mere denial by addressee was not considered by the Full Bench and there appears to be divergence of opinion on this question.

    In Asa Ram v. Ravi Prakash (1966 A.L.J. 421) S. S. Dhavan J. held that where the land­lords sent a notice terminating the tenancy by registered post and it was returned back by the post office with the endorsement of refusal and the tenant denied receipt of the notice, the denial of the tenant was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt unless he was believed by the Court. In Nirmala Bala v. Provat Kumar Basu, (1946 52 C.W.N. 659) similar view was taken. In Ramnath v. Angan,(1978 U.P. R.C.C. 170) a Division Bench of this Court relied on the presumption of service of notice in spite of the defendants denial of service of notice. In Mushiyat Ullah v. Abdul Wahab, (A.I.R. 1972 Alld. 539) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the presumption relating to service of notice under section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act on the refusal of the addressee does not stand rebutted on a bare denial of service by the defendant-tenant.

    Contrary view has, however, been taken in a number of decisions where it has been held that once there is denial by the addressee on oath relating to the service of notice, the presumption of service would stand rebutted and the burden to prove the service would again shift on the party who may be relying the service of notice. This view is supported by the decisions in Wasu Ram v. R. L. Sethi, (1963 A.W.R. 472) Meghji Kanji Patel v. Kundaamal Chaman Lal (A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 387) Ram August v. Bindeshwari Tewari, (8) Jagat Ram Khullar v. Sam/ Mai, (9) and A marnath v.Smt. Champa Devi (10).

    In Warn Ram's case, S. S. Dhavan, J. held that in case of refusal of the money order by the landlord, received back with the endorsement of refusal, it would be sufficient to raise the presumption that it was truly delivered or tendered to the landlord. The learned Judge however observed that if the addressee stated on oath before the court that he never received the communication the court must decide after considering all the surrounding circumstances whether he should be believed. The question is always one of fact for a denial which is not only but bare faced made by a person who stood to profit by the denial, therefore, he may have all the motive to deny, should also be considered by the Court. In Meghji Kanfi Patel's case a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court held that if the defendant stated on oath that the summons or notice was not served on him, it was sufficient to rebut the presumption and if the plaintiff failed to summon the postman to prove the service of the summons or notice the service would be insufficient. In Ram August's case a Division Bench of the Patna High Court observed that the presumption of service of a registered postcard, stood rebutted on the denial of the addressee in the witness-box. The Banch observed that the endorsement of refusal was not proved. In Jugat Ran Khuller's case, a learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court held that if the postal cover con­taining the correct address is sent by registered post a presumption would arise with regard to service and the evidence of actual tender of notice and delivery is not necessary to bring about the presumption. The learned Judge further held that a statement on oath by the Addressee denying the service of the notice would however rebut the presumption so raised and therefore the burden to prove service of notice would shift on the plaintiff, In Amarnath v. Smt. Champa Devi, M. P. Saxena, J. held that the defendant's statement on oath that he never refused the notice was sufficient to rebut the presumption with regard to service of notice. The learned Judge, however, noted that the defendant was not at all cross-examined nor there existed any circumstance on the basis of which the defendants' statement could be discarded.

    The conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court in Puwada Venkateshwar Rao v. C. V. Ramana (11). The Supreme Court noticed the Bombay High Court decision in Meghji Kanji Patel Kundanmal Chanan Lal, (12) and Culcutta High Court decision in Nirmala Bala v. Provat Kumar Basil, (13) and observed that the two decisions are reconcilable. The Supreme Court observed that the presumption may stand rebutted by the statement of defen­dant on oath so that the plaintiff could not succeed without further, evidence. Thereafter the Court observed:

    "It may be that, on a close examination of evidence on record, the court could have reached the conclusion that the defendant had full knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly. It is not always necessary to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct."

    In view of the above discussion the conspectous of opinion appears to be that the presumption would stand rebutted on the denial by the addressee oath, but the veracity of the statement must be considered by the court in the light of the evidence available on record having regard to the conduct of the party concerned. No exhaustive principles can be laid down, each case roust be considered on the facts and circumstances of the case as available on the record. It is open to the Court to Judge the veracity of the denial of the party against whom the presumption of service of notice is raised. In a particular case a mere denial of service of notice may be sufficient to rebut the presump­tion, while in other case such denial may not be worthy of credence having regard to the conduct of the party and the circumstances of the case. I am in respectful agreement with the view of S. D. Dhavan, J. in Wasu Rana's case that the question whether the presumption is rebutted is always a question of fact and the court should consider it having regard to all the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the party concerned. In Amarnath's case, M.O.P. Saxena, J. followed this principle and he pointed out that the defen­dant's denial on oath was worthy of credence as he was not cross-examined and there existed no other circumstances to discredit his testimony.

    In the instant case, counsel for both the parties made a statement before the trial court on 25th July, 1974, that the parties will not produce any oral evidence and the documents filed in support of their case required no proof and the same may be read in evidence. In pursuance of this statement made by the counsel for the parties, the notice sent to the defendant applicants as well as the envelop containing the endorsement were exhibited and read into evidence. In the circumstances, it was not at all necessary for the plaintiff to examine the postman or to prove the endorsement of refusal. Once the document containing the endorsement of refusal was exhibited and admitted as evidence the courts below were entitled to rely on that document and to discard the bare denial of the defendant-applicant. There is yet another circumstance available on the record which shows that the plea of non-service of the notice was an after-thought. The respondent-plaintiffs had clearly stated in paragraph 3 of their plaint that the notice dated llth August, 1972, was sent to the defendant which was refused by him and as such the notice stood served on him. In the written statement the defendant applicants did not deny service notice nor they set up any case that notice was never tendered to them. In paragraph 7 of the written statement a vague assertion was made that the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint are not admitted in the manner they have been stated. The plea of non-service of the notice was raised by the defendants for the first time by means of an amendment application after two years of the filing of the suit. If the notice had not been served on the defendants, the plea of non-service would have been at once raised, at the first available opportunity and the plaintiffs' case as stated in paragraph 3 of the plaint would have been denied, but this was not done. These circumstances support the finding of the court below that the notice was served on the defendants. It is therefore not possible to hold that the courts below have committed any error of jurisdiction or law in decreeing the plain­tiffs' suit on the assumption that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act was served on the defendants.

    In the result, the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Jamal Khan And Another v. Haji Yusuf Ali And Another
    (Aug 7, 1978)