Judgement

SATYANARAYANA RAJU, J. :- This is an appeal against the judgment of our learned brother, Umamaheswaram, J., dismissing a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, for the issue of a writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Government of Andhra, in G. O. Nt. No. 131, Public Works and Transport Department, dated 14-2-1955.

2. The appellant is a transport operator. There was a vacancy consequent on the cancellation of the permit of a bus on the route Kunavaram to Dummegudem in the Agency area of the East Godavari District. The Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, East Godavari, called for applications. The appellant was one of the nine applicants for the grant of a permit on the said route.

The Regional Transport Authority of East Godavari selected the appellant in preference to the other applicants. The reasons for his selection are stated in the proceedings of the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority, East Godavari, held on 26-5-1954, thus :

"...No. 3 is actually on the route on a temporary permit operating efficiently without any complaint. He is a fleet owner with a workshop at Rajahmundry with 2 idle buses. This is an agency route requiting an operator with a spare or idle bus to keep the service uninterrupted. Therefore he is preferred to the rest and is given a permit. No. 2 (respondent) who is the only agency operator has no spare bus and has no workshop facilities. Therefore his case is rejected along with the remaining applicants."

3. Against this order of the Regional Transport Authority, three of the applicants for the grant of a permit on the route in question, including the respondent, preferred appeals to the Central Board Traffic Board, Andhra, at Guntur. The Central Road Traffic Board by its proceedings dated 27-10-1954 set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the permit to the appellant and directed the permit to be given to the respondent. The reasons given by the Board for its order are as follows :

"There are three applicants in this case A-1 and A-2 reside in places away from the route in question and normally a person residing in the Agency area and operating other services there could have been preferred. A-3 is such a person residing at Bhadrachalam and is an existing operator covering a sector of 17 miles on the route in question whereas respondent resides at Rajahmundry. A-3s record is also clean. He has only 2 permits. The respondent is residing at Rajahmundry and he is not anywhere near the route in question. In the circumstances it would appear that A-3 has the best claims among all for the grant of the permit and further the grant of this permit would enable him to build up an economic fleet."

4. Against the order of the Central Road Traffic Board, the appellant preferred a revision to the Government under S. 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act. In G. O. Rt. No. 131 dated 14-2-1955, the Government rejected the revision petition filed by the appellant. The material portion of the order of the Government in question runs thus :

"2. The Government have examined the case with reference to the revision petition cited the representation of the respondent, the connected records and the history sheets of the operators. Sri M. Ramayya states that the Central Road Traffic Board failed to recognise his claims for the permit which were duly taken into account by the Regional Transport Authority. He contends that for operating this route in an agency tract which is fit for traffic for six months in a year, a fleet owner like him with spare buses is better suited, than Sri K. Kondala Rao who has neither a spare bus nor a workshop. He has also urged that he had operated on the route already on a temporary permit efficiently and therefore he should be preferred.

Mere running a vehicle on the route on a temporary permit does not by itself constitute a sufficient justification for the grant of a pucca permit. The petitioner is living at Rajahmundry far away from the route and the fact that he has a workshop and spare buses at Rajahmundry does not make for efficiency of operation on this route which is in the agency area. Further he is already an operator of fleet of five buses.

The reasons which weighed with the Central Road Traffic Board in preferring Sri Kondala Rao arc, that he is an operator covering a sector of 17 miles of the route in question with his residence at Bhadrachalam which is on the route and has clean record and that as he was having only two permits, the grant of a third permit to him would go towards building up an economic fleet

The Government therefore consider that the respondent was preferred to the petitioner by the Central Road Traffic Board for good and sufficient reasons and that there is no case for interference with the orders of the Central Road Traffic Board in granting permit to the respondent. The revision petition is therefore rejected."

5. It is this order of the Government that was the subject-matter of the Writ Petn. No. 76 of 1955 (Andhra) (A), which was dismissed by Umamaheswaram, J., on 23-8-1955. The learned Judge held that the authorities considered the rival claims of the appellant and the respondent and came to the conclusion that in the interests of the public it was advisable to grant the permit to the respondent and that there is no error on the face of the record which warrants an interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

6. Before dealing with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant, it will be useful to notice the decided cases which have considered the scope of the powers of the Government under S. 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act and the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

7. Section 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act reads thus :

"The Provincial Government may, of its own motion or on application made to it, call for the records of any order passed or proceedings taken under this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and after examining such records, may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit."

8. In the Post-Constitution era, applications under Art, 226 of the Constitution with regard to the grant of transport permits have frequently come up both before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. One of us (My Lord, the Chief Justice), as a Judge of the Madras High Court considered the scope of S. 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act and the limits of interference of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution with the orders of the Government under the said section in innumerable writs and evolved certain principles.

9. In - Thiruvengadam v. State of Madras, 1951-2 Mad LJ (SN) 31 (Al), he considered the scope of the words "legality, regularity or propriety", used in S. 64-A of the Act and held as follows :

"The word legality is a well-known term which does not require elucidation. Orders of Subordinate Tribunals contravening express provisions of law, their legal conclusions on proved facts, their constructions of documents which are the foundations of claims, their findings based upon no evidence or irrelevant evidence and similar other errors of law can be rectified by the superior tribunal under that head.

The meaning to be attached to the word regularity is also free from any doubt. It deals with the procedure prescribed. If a Tribunals finding is vitiated by any irregular procedure, it is liable to be set aside by the authority exercising revisional jurisdiction. But the word propriety is not susceptible of exact definition. It is something which is neither illegal nor irregular.

An order contravening the principles of natural justice is vitiated by impropriety. An order of an inferior Tribunal may be set aside on the ground of impropriety if it contravenes the principles of natural justice, or is otherwise inequitable or manifestly unjust...... The Government in exercising revisional jurisdiction must act judicially and cannot take extraneous circumstances into consideration."

10. In - Maruthanayagam v. The State of Madras, 1951-2 Mad LJ (SN) 36 (B) he observed as follows :

"Where the order of the Government setting aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board on the ground that it was not proper and that there was little justification for the Central Road Traffic Board to interfere with the discretion of the Regional Road Transport Authority, such order ex facie does not disclose the reasons that operated on the mind of the Government in setting aside the order of the inferior Tribunal"

, and that the High Court can interfere under Art. 226.

11. In - Natesa Pillai v. Central Road Traffic Board, Egmore, Madras, 1951-2 Mad LJ 406 : (AIR 1952 Mad 39) (C) he held that the Regional Transport Authority, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction and the Central Road Traffic Board and the Government in discharge of their appellate and revisional jurisdictions are bound to act judicially.

12. In - Vedachala Mudaliar v. State of Madras, 1951-2 Mad LJ 411 : (AIR 1952 Mad 276) (D) he held that the order of a tribunal exercising judicial functions should ex facie show reasons in a succinct form for setting aside the orders of the subordinate tribunals, and that to say that an order is illegal or improper or irregular is a mechanical repetition of the words in S. 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act and is not a judicial disposal of the Revision Petition.

13. In - Thathathiri Mudaliar v. State of Madras, 1952-1 Mad LJ (SN) 17 (E) he held that the Government has no power under S. 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act to set aside an order without calling for the records and examining them.

14. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar C.J., and Venkatarama Aiyar, J., affirmed these principles in - C. S. S. Motor Service v. State of Madras, 1952-2 Mad LJ 894: 1952 Mad WN 913 at p. 931: (AIR 1953 Mad 279 at p. 294) (F). They held that the grant or refusal of permits by the transport authorities in all its stages including S. 64-A is a judicial Act. After an exhaustive review of the authorities, the learned Judges summed up their conclusions at page 914 (of Mad LJ) (at p. 294 of AIR) as follows :

"1. The citizens have a right to ply motor vehicles on public pathways and that is a business which is protected by Art. 19(g). 2. Any infringement of that right can be justified only if it falls within the scope of Art. 19(6). 3. Sections 42, 43-A, S. 47(1), cls. (a), (b), (d) and (f), S. 4S(a) and (b) and S. 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act are valid. Section 47(1)(c) is in part valid and S. 47(l)(c) is wholly void. 4. The grant or refusal of permits by the transport authorities in all its stages including S. 64-A is a judicial act. 5. The Provincial Government should frame rules laying down the principles on which the selection from among the applicants is to be made and such rules must he, as required by Art. 19(6), reasonable and in the interests of the public. 6. The rules so laid down should be followed by all transport authorities including the Government acting under S. 64-A without any discrimination. 7. The decisions of the transport authorities granting or refusing to grant permits are liable to be reviewed by the Courts and set aside if they are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory."

15. In - Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., 1952 SCJ 261 : 1952-1 Mad LJ 806 : (AIR 1952 SC 192) (G), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have stated the principles relating to the powers of the Government under S. 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act and the powers of interference by the High Court under Art, 226 of the Constitution with the orders of the Government under S. 64-A. Their Lordships stated as follows :

"Such writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice.

However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made."

"The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Transport Authority are entrusted under S. 42 with this power. They may be described as administrative bodies"

exercising quasi-judicial functions in the matter of the grant of permits.

Under R. 3 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Regional Transport Authority is called the Road Traffic Board and the Provincial Transport Authority is called the Central Road Traffic Board. These bodies or authorities are constituted by the Provincial Government. The matters which are to be taken into account in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit are specified in S. 47. By delegation under R. 134-A the Secretary of the Road Traffic Board may exercise certain powers as regards the grant or refusal of stage carriage permits and under R. 136 there is an appeal to the Board from these orders.

Similar powers of delegation are vested in the Secretary to the Central Board and an appeal lies to the Central Board under R. 148(1). From an original order of the Road Traffic Board there is an appeal to the Central Board and from the original order of the Central Board to the Government, vide Rr. 147 and 148. An amendment introduced by the Madras Act 20 of 1948 and found as S. 64-A in the Act vests a power of revision in the Provincial Government.

Besides this specific provision, there is a general provision in S. 43-A that the Provincial Government may issue such orders and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary to the Provincial Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority in respect of any matter relating To road transport; and such transport authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions. There is, therefore, the regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with the regulation of transport by means of motor vehicles.

"Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right."

16. In the High Court of Andhra this question has been recently considered by Viswanatha Sastri and Bhimasankaram, JJ., in - Kesawa Rao v. Subba Raju, Writ Appeal No. 71 of 1954 (Andhra) (H), considering the words "legality, regularity or propriety", in S. 64-A of the Act, the learned Judges stated thus :

"Legality and regularity are well-understood terms and well-recognised grounds of judicial interference on an appeal or revision, An order is illegal if it is opposed to any enactment or any rule having the force of law. It is irregular if the procedure followed is in violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play.

The term propriety is, however, of wide import and there might be honest differences of opinion about the propriety of an order even though it is in conformity with law and within the powers of the authority making the order .... If, after due consideration, the Government has taken a decision on this matter it is not for us to investigate the relative merits or soundness of one point of view as against the other."

17. Relying on the observations of Frankfurter, J., in - Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co., (1940) 84 Law Ed 1368 (I), they proceeded to state thus :

"If the Government in coming to its conclusion in a revision under S. 64-A of the Act had taken into account facts or circumstances irrelevant for a consideration of the question before it or had been influenced by extraneous considerations in reaching its decision or if the order of the Government was mala fide or biased in any manner, it would be the duty of this Court to quash the order of the Government. So long as the Government exercises its power under S. 64-A bona fide and for the purpose for which the power has been conferred, we cannot substitute our own notions and opinions for the policies or opinions on which the Government acted and quash the order of the Government as being in excess of its powers."

18. We are in entire agreement with the observations of the learned Judges.

19. The principles which have emerged from a consideration of decided cases of the Madras High Court, the Supreme Court and our own High Court may be stated thus : The considerations which should weigh with the transport authorities in the grant or refusal of a stage carriage permit must be germane to the matters mentioned in S. 47, Motor Vehicles Act. They cannot take into consideration anything which is extraneous or irrelevant or not germane to the matters mentioned in S. 47,

The exercise of the power by the Government must be bona fide and unbiased. The orders of the tribunals must ex facie disclose the reasons which operated on them in granting or refusing a permit. The orders must be passed alter due notice to the parties affected thereby. If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied and the Government exercises its power under S. 64-A bona fide, the High Court will not substitute its own notions and opinions for the policies or opinions of the Government.

20. We will deal with the contentions of the counsel for the appellant in the light of the foregoing well-established principles. The order of the Central Road Traffic Board has been confirmed by the Government. The Central Road Traffic Board on appeal, and the Government on revision, have given the following reasons for granting the permit in favour of the respondent : (1) He is an operator covering a sector of 17 miles on the route in question. (2) He is a resident of Bhadrachalam which is on the route. (3) He has a clean record. (4) The grant of a third permit would enable him to build tip an economic fleet.

21. Counsel for the appellant contends that the first and the last reasons are bad in law. He submits that in 1952-2 Mad LJ 894 : 1952 Mad WN 913 : (AIR 1953 Mad 279) (F) Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Aiyar, J., held that with reference to S. 47(1)(c) the factor to be considered is not whether the existing operators will suffer by competition but whether the extension of the service will be in interests of the public, and therefore S. 47(1)(c) in so far as it provides that the effect of the service proposed upon the existing service should be taken into account, will not be legal. They further held that cl. (c) of S. 47(1) is invalid as not being in the interests of the public but of permit-holder. Those two clauses provide as follows :

"47(1). A Regional Transport Authority shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely :

* * *

"(c) the adequacy of existing road passenger transport service between the places to be served, the fares charged by those services and the effect upon those services of the service proposed;

* * *

"(e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services and in particular of unremunerative services in conjunction with remunerative services ....."

.

22. He therefore contends that the reason No. (4) which gives preference to the respondent is not based on the preferred operator rendering better service to the public but that the grant of a permit would be in his interest and that therefore the said reason cannot be sustained. He relied upon a decision of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in W. P. No. 893 of 1952 (Mad) (J) on the file of the Madras High Court in support of this contention.

Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., followed the decision in 1952-2 Mad LJ 894 : (AIR 1953 Mad 279) (F) which laid down that the preference between operators ought to be grounded on the preferred operator rendering better service to the public and not for the reason that the grant of permit would be in his interests. We do not think that the reason given in the instant case, namely, that the grant of the third permit to the respondent would help him in building up of an economic fleet is conceived in the interests of the operator and not in the public interests. A person who can build up an economic fleet will be in a position to render better and satisfactory service to the public and therefore it may be in the public interests to help him to build up an economic fleet.

23. Coming to reason No. (2), counsel for the appellant contended that the fact that the person is an existing operator having a permit in respect of a portion of the route in question is not a ground to the grant of permits and should not be taken into account and that therefore the order of the Government is vitiated. We consider that the fact that the respondent is an existing operator in respect of a part of the route in question is not an extraneous or irrelevant consideration.

We are supported in this view by a decision of Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in - Veerappa Pillai v. Rathnaswami Nadar, 1953-1 Mad LJ (SN) 46 (K). There the learned Judge held that it should be a material consideration to take into account that the appellant has experience of a particular route over which the stage carriage has to be run and that such a consideration is not out of place in deciding to whom, in the interest of the public, the stage carnage permit should be granted; that S. 47 does not prescribe rules for selection when there are several applicants for the grant of a stage carriage permit, and that therefore, in making the selection the authorities ought to be guided by what is for the benefit of the public.

24. Counsel for the appellant concedes that the reason that the respondent has a clean record is a material ground for preferring him to the other applicants. We are of opinion that the further reason in awarding the permit in favour of the respondent, that he is a resident of Bhadrachalam, which is on the route in question, while the appellant is a resident of Rajahmundry, a place far away from the route in question, is neither an irrelevant nor an improper consideration.

25. Mr. Babul Reddy contends that where Tribunals gave several reasons, some of which are bad, and it is impossible to predicate which reason effectively operated on the mind of the Tribunals the order must be set aside. In support of this contention he relied upon a decision of Rajamannar, C.J., and Somasundaram J., in - Tanjore Motor Traders Ltd. v. Narayanaswami Naidu, 68 Mad LW (SN) 58 (WA No 35 of 1955) (L). In this case we have come to the conclusion that the reasons given by the Central Road Traffic Board in preferring the respondent, which were confirmed by the Government in revision, are none of them bad.

Even if one of such reasons is bad, it does not necessarily follow in all cases that the order is vitiated. If several reasons are given in support of an order, some of which are bad and some of which are good, it depends upon the facts of each case whether the order can be sustained on the reasons which are good. It does not necessarily follow that because the order contains some bad reasons, the entire order must be set aside.

26. Lastly, Mr. Babul Reddy contended that a perusal of the several orders passed by the transport authorities which are the subject matters of writ petitions filed in the High Court, disclose an absolute lack of consistency on the part of the transport authorities, that there is no fixity in the principles adopted and uniformity in their application. In several cases the same reasons are given, so the argument proceeds, in reaching contrary conclusions.

It is not proper for the Tribunals to apply two different and opposing principles at the same time, one to one applicant, and the other to another, without assigning proper and convincing reasons for such differentiation. Whatever principles are adopted as the criterion for making the selection among the applicants, it is necessary that they should apply them uniformly and without differentiation. This, of course, does not prevent the State from altering its rules from time to time when as a result of experience it discovers that they require to be altered in the interests of the public.

As has been pointed out in C. S. S. Motor Service v. State of Madras (F) what is necessary is that at any given time there should be one set of rules and regulations governing the disposal of all applications. There should not be two different and opposing principles both in operation at the same time, one being applied to one applicant and the other to the other. In other words, the criteria that are applied must not be with reference to particular applicants but generally with reference to all applicants.

27. In the view we have taken, the order of Umamaheswaram, J., must be confirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 100/-.

Appeal dismissed.