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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion (Neeladri Rao, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter concerns a fatal motor accident in which the deceased, Nimmala Linga Reddy (a P.W.D. supervisor), died instantaneously when a lorry (no. APA 3373) driven by R-1 collided with the scooter (no. ATY 8822) on 15-8-1980 at about 2:30 p.m. The deceased was travelling from Karimnagar to Bejjanki with a pillion rider.

The deceased's mother, widow and four minor children filed Original Petition No. 110/80 before the Motor Accidents Tribunal, Karimnagar under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming Rs. 3,74,700 as compensation. The claim was resisted by R-1 (driver), R-2 (owner of the lorry) and R-3 (insurance company). The Motor Accidents Tribunal found the accident attributable to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry by R-1 and awarded Rs. 20,000 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of application. That finding of negligence was not seriously challenged before this Court.

The present appeal principally raises the question of adequacy of the compensation awarded by the lower tribunal; the appeal was heard on that basis and the court addressed both the quantum and the methodology to be followed in assessing compensation in fatal motor accident cases.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amount of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Tribunal was adequate (i.e., the proper quantum of compensation payable to the dependants under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act).
  2. What method should be followed by courts in India to assess compensation for loss of dependency — specifically, whether annuity/multiplier tables prepared using Indian mortality and a chosen real interest rate (as in Bhagawan Das vs. Mohd. Arif) should be adopted to bring uniformity and predictability.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (Lord Campbell's Act) (statute) Historical origin for dependants' claims for loss due to wrongful death; allows damages proportionate to injury to dependants. Used to trace historical development of compensation law and the principle that dependants are entitled to compensation for pecuniary loss.
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 (statute) Historical legislative development regarding awards for fatal accidents in England. Cited as part of the comparative background about how fatal-death compensation developed in England.
McGregor on Damages (authoritative text) Explains that dependants are entitled to full compensation; notes the difficulty of making lump-sum awards accurately (paras cited: 1551, 1552, 1557, 1558, 1530 references in opinion). Court relied on the text to highlight the compensatory principle, the acknowledged difficulties in accuracy, and cited its observations on approaches and adjustments (inflation, actuarial evidence permissibility).
Harris v. Empress Motors Ltd. Describes modern practice of deducting a percentage from net income to allow for what deceased would have spent on himself; use of convenient conventional percentages unless striking evidence suggests otherwise. Cited to support the notion that courts use conventional deductions for personal expenses unless facts justify deviation.
Taylor v. O'Connor (Lord Pearson speech) Set out three stages in calculation: estimate lost earnings; estimate pecuniary benefit to dependants expressed as an annual sum; choose multiplier to convert annual loss into lump sum. Adopted as a concise articulation of the normal calculation stages which the Court employs in analysis of compensation computation.
Keizer v. Hanna (Supreme Court of Canada) Approach: determine present value of a lump sum which, if invested, would provide required payments over future years, extinguishing the fund. Cited to justify use of statistical and actuarial evidence to compute present value; the Court used this to support annuity-table methodology as an accepted means of approximating probabilities.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation v. Pfeifer (U.S. Supreme Court) Three conclusions: (1) award for lost earnings is a rough approximation; (2) inflation affects precision; (3) lost earnings questions arise in varied contexts making evidence more or less readily assembled. Cited for the proposition that lump-sum awards are inherently approximations and to note issues like inflation and evidentiary difficulty in predicting future earnings.
Smith v. Middleton Quoted observations stressing that discretion must be exercised selectively and not idiosyncratically. Used (via Cookson v. Knowles) to support the desirability of laying down guidelines for judicial discretion in choosing multipliers.
Cookson v. Knowles Endorses the desirability of laying down guidelines for matters where judge must exercise discretion (here applied to selection of multiplier and similar discretions). Cited to justify the Court's decision to provide guidance (i.e., prefer annuity tables) to reduce arbitrary divergence in awards.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwati An instance where the traditional multiplier system was adopted by courts in India. Cited as an example of earlier Indian adoption of the traditional multiplier method for computing compensation.
United India F. & G. I. Co. v. Pallamparthi Indira Mmal Referenced as an instance where the interest method was not followed by this Court. Used to show that the interest method had been rejected in prior decisions of this Court.
Chairman, A.P.S.R.T.C., Hyderabad v. Safiya Khatoon (Division Bench) Held that tables in Kemp & Kemp ('Quantum of Damages', 1967 edn.) can be followed to adopt multipliers for awards under Section 110. Cited to show earlier support within this High Court for use of annuity/multiplier tables to attain uniformity.
A.P.S.R.T.C., Hyderabad v. Narasavva & Others (Full Bench) Observed that Kemp & Kemp annuity tables were not prepared for use in India and thus could not be used; indicated that if Indian annuity tables are prepared, the matter could be revived. Referred to as authority explaining why foreign annuity tables are inappropriate for India and as background to accept Indian-prepared tables if properly formulated.
Bhagawan Das v. Mohd. Arif (Judgment referenced for annuity tables) Judgment in which annuity tables were prepared using Indian mortality tables and 4% as the real interest rate (reverse of compound interest rate) to produce multipliers. The Court expressly adopted and endorsed the preference for choosing multipliers from these tables (with adjustments in special cases) and used the multiplier of 12.79 from those tables for the deceased aged 40 in this case.
N. Sivammal v. Managing Director, Pandian Roadways Corporation Held that there is no justification for reducing compensation merely because widow is entitled to a pension for a limited period (seven years) after which it tapers. The Court applied this precedent to direct that the widow's pension be disregarded in computing compensation for loss of dependency.
Flint v. Lovell Recognized damages for shortening of expectation of life (loss of expectation of life) as a head of damages. Cited as authority for awarding a conventional sum for loss of expectation of life as part of non-pecuniary damages.
Rose v. Ford Expressed that taking loss of expectation of life into account is neither novel nor unusual; supports awarding such damages. Cited to support the award of conventional non-pecuniary damages for loss of expectation of life and pain and suffering.
Fletcher v. Autocar & Transporters Held that claimants should be treated alike in awarding damages for pain and suffering. Cited to support the conventional approach to non-pecuniary damages (equal treatment principle for such awards).
Gorald Motor Service Ltd. & Another v. R. M. K. Velluswamy & Others Discussed allocation between pecuniary loss to dependants and loss to the estate; explained relationship between components (income, amounts for dependants, savings, personal expenses) to avoid double recovery. Applied to explain that non-pecuniary damages (to the estate) and pecuniary damages (to dependants) can both be awarded without double recovery, because different components of income are taken into account for each head.
Y. Varalakshmi & Others v. M. Nageswara Rao & Others Conventional awards for pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life — noted that an award of Rs. 7,500 for each head was reasonable. Cited as supporting authority; the Court agreed that Rs. 7,500 per head (total Rs. 15,000) for non-pecuniary damages was appropriate and not excessive.
Bishan Devi v. Sirhuksh Singh Held that interest may be awarded from the date of claim. Used to support the Court's decision to award interest from the date of petition (combined with the other authority selecting rate).
Narcinva v. Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Marlins (as cited) Example of Supreme Court awarding 12% per annum interest in motor accident claims. Applied to justify awarding interest at 12% per annum on the compensation amount from the date of petition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Acceptance of negligence finding: The Court noted that the lower tribunal and the District Judge correctly found that the accident resulted from the rash and negligent driving of the lorry by R-1, and that finding was not seriously challenged. Thus liability was established and only quantum required consideration.
  2. Survey of methods: The Court reviewed historically used methods of assessing compensation — the "interest method" (now generally rejected as leading to overcompensation), the "lump-sum" (simple summation) approach (which lost favour), and the "traditional multiplier system" (commonly adopted). The Court emphasized that whatever method is adopted, assessment is inherently difficult and necessitates logical and principled approaches.
  3. Comparative authorities and practical considerations: The Court drew upon English, Canadian, Australian and American authorities to identify principles: measure of compensation is loss of dependency; lump-sum awards are approximations; actuarial and statistical evidence can assist; conventional deductions for personal expenditure are commonly applied absent striking evidence.
  4. Problem of divergence and need for uniformity: The Court explained that the major practical difficulty is the choice of multiplier. With multipliers ranging up to 20 and with little guidance in prior decisions, similar cases could lead to widely divergent awards. To reduce arbitrariness and judicial whim, the Court favored a rational, replicable method.
  5. Assessment of annuity tables prepared in Bhagawan Das v. Mohd. Arif: The Court considered whether to adopt the annuity tables prepared by Justice Jagannadha Rao (Bhagawan Das). The Court noted that the Full Bench had previously said foreign tables (Kemp & Kemp) were inappropriate for India but did not preclude the use of properly prepared Indian annuity tables. The Court found no criticism in the record of the methodology or the 4% real interest rate used to construct the Bhagawan Das tables and observed that the judge who formulated them had explained how they were prepared. The Court thus found a rational basis for those tables.
  6. Endorsement with flexibility: The Court endorsed choosing the multiplier from the Bhagawan Das tables as preferable because it (a) produces uniformity across tribunals for the same age, (b) is simple to adopt, (c) reduces scope for arbitrary divergence, and (d) is usable by tribunals, claimants, insurance companies and Lok Adalats. The Court, however, allowed for enhancement of the chosen multiplier by one or two points in specified circumstances (e.g., clear evidence of bright prospects of promotion or appreciable increase in earnings).
  7. Application to facts and specific computations:
    • The deceased was a 40-year-old government employee with a monthly salary of Rs. 1,100.
    • The Court found it reasonable that the deceased spent Rs. 400 per month on personal and household expenses and contributed Rs. 700 per month to the family; annual loss of dependency was therefore fixed at Rs. 8,400 (Rs. 700 x 12).
    • Using the Bhagawan Das table multiplier for age 40 (12.79), the Court computed loss of dependency as Rs. 8,400 x 12.79 = Rs. 1,07,436, rounded to Rs. 1,07,500.
    • Regarding pension: relying on N. Sivammal, the Court held that the widow's pension entitlement should be disregarded in computing compensation.
    • Non-pecuniary damages: Reviewing authorities on loss of expectation of life and pain and suffering, the Court adopted a conventional award of Rs. 7,500 for pain and suffering and Rs. 7,500 for loss of expectation of life (total Rs. 15,000), referencing Y. Varalakshmi and text support in McGregor.
    • Loss of consortium: The lower tribunal had awarded Rs. 5,000 to the widow for loss of consortium; the Court found this not unreasonable and retained it.
  8. Aggregation and interest: The Court totaled the awards — pecuniary (Rs. 1,07,500) plus non-pecuniary (Rs. 15,000) plus loss of consortium (Rs. 5,000) — arriving at Rs. 1,27,500. Relying on Bishan Devi and the other cited Supreme Court authority, the Court directed that the total carry interest at 12% per annum from the date of the petition.
  9. Distribution and protective directions: The Court directed the distribution of the awarded sum: appellants 3 to 6 (four daughters) were to receive Rs. 20,000 each (with interest to be deposited in banks in their names and FDs as described), and the balance (Rs. 47,500) to the 2nd appellant (the widow), who was to maintain the first appellant. The Court gave directions concerning deposit, withdrawal for marriage and maintenance, and how periodical interest on fixed deposits may be used by the widow for maintenance.
  10. Costs and fees: The appeal was allowed in part with proportionate costs and advocate's fee assessed at Rs. 500.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the appeal in part and adjusted the quantum of compensation. The Court awarded a total of Rs. 1,27,500 as compensation (breakdown: Rs. 1,07,500 for pecuniary loss of dependency; Rs. 15,000 for non-pecuniary damages — Rs. 7,500 for pain and suffering and Rs. 7,500 for loss of expectation of life; and Rs. 5,000 for loss of consortium). The Court directed that the amount carry interest at 12% per annum from the date of petition. The Court also directed distribution of the award among the claimants (appellants 3–6: Rs. 20,000 each; balance to the widow) with banking and withdrawal directions, and fixed advocate's fee at Rs. 500.

Implications:

  • The Court formally endorsed the use of the annuity/multiplier tables prepared in Bhagawan Das v. Mohd. Arif (based on Indian mortality data and a 4% real interest rate) as the preferable, simple and rational method for choosing multipliers in fatal motor accident cases, with liberty to adjust multipliers upward by one or two points in clear cases showing bright prospects of promotion or appreciable income increases.
  • By adopting such tables, the Court sought to promote uniformity, reduce divergence in awards for similar cases across tribunals, and make determination of quantum more predictable for tribunals, claimants, insurers and Lok Adalats.
  • The Court reiterated established principles from cited authorities: compensation is to be assessed on the value of loss of dependency; lump-sum awards are approximations; actuarial/statistical evidence and conventionally applied deductions are acceptable tools; and non-pecuniary damages can be awarded in addition to pecuniary loss without leading to double recovery when components are properly accounted for.
  • If there are no broader unique legal principles announced beyond these applications, the direct operative effects are the adjusted quantum, interest, distribution directions and the Court's preference for using Bhagawan Das annuity tables (subject to specified adjustments). The opinion therefore both resolves the instant quantum dispute and gives guidance to tribunals on a preferred, replicable method for future cases.

This summary is strictly confined to the materials and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

    Nimmala Narsavva v. Vilas Ramachandra Shangde

    Neeladri Rao, J.:-

    (1) This is yet another unfortunate motor accident resulting in the instantaneous death of nimmala linga reddy (hereinalter referred to as 'the deceased') a supervisor in p. W. D. (i and b) sultanabad. The accident had taken place when the lorry bearitig no. Apa 3373 driven by k - 1 dashed against the scooter bearing no. Aty 8822 at 2 - 30 p. M. On 15 - 8 - 1980 on which the deceased was going with another as pillion rider, from karimnagar to bejjanki. His mother, widow and four minor children filed 0. P. 110/80 on the file of the motor accidents tribunal, karimnagar under section 110 - a of the motor vehicles act (hereinafter referred to as 'the act') claiming an amount of rs. 3,74,700/ - as compensation. The said claim was resisted by r - 1 the driver, r - 2 the owner of the lorry, and r - 3 the insurance company. The lower tribunal held that the accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry by r - 1. An amount of rs. 20,000/ - was awarded as compensation with interest at 6% per annum from the date of application. In view of the material on record, the learned district judge, karimnagar rightly held that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry by r - 1. The said finding was not seriously challenged. So, the only other point for consideration in this appeal is in regard to the adequacy of the amount awarded as compensation.

    (2) The amount of compensation which appears to the tribunal to bejust has to be awarded under sec. 110 of the act. When there was a spate of rail accidents, in england, fatal accident act, 1846 popularly known as lord campbell's act was brought into existence. As per the provisions of the said act, such damages may be awarded as are proportionate to the injury resulting from such death to the dependants respectively. When road accidents were on the increase in england. Law reform (miscellaneous provisions) act, 1934 was brought into live statute book. While referring to the various decisions of the courts in england, it was observed in mc gregor on damages in para 1551 that the dependant is entitled by clear principle of law to full compensation for the loss of pecuniary benefit due to the death of the deceased in motor accident. The various provinces in canada adopted lord campbell's act. The courts in canada followed the compensatory principle in awarding damages to dependants in fatal accidents cases. What is recoverable by the dependants as per courts in canada must be calculated on the basis of restitution integrum ; the goal is to restore the dependant to the financial position he or she would have occupied but for the death.

    (3) In earlier years the courts in india assessed the compensationpayable under section 110 of the act, by following interest method. As per the said method the annual loss of dependency as on the date of the death was first ascertained, then a sum was determined the interest on which is equivalent to the annual loss of dependency. Such sum was granted as compensation towards future loss of dependency. When such a sum is awarded, the dependent enjoys the periodical interest which is equivalent to the loss of dependency. But the lumpsum amount which was paid did not extinguish. So it is a case of over compensation. Thus it was rejected by various courts in india. Even this court has not chosen to follow the interest method in united india f. And. G. I. Company vs. Pallamparthi indira mmal.

    (4) Later lumpsum method was adopted. As per that method, theannual loss for each of the future years of expected life of deceased is first ascertained. The sum is totalled up. While some cour ts felt that the said entire amount has to be paid as compensation without any deduction for uncertainities and accelerated payment, other courts felt that some deduction had to be made in regard to the two factors referred to. Any how, the said method did not find favour in the later vears.

    (5) The various courts in india including the supreme court followedthe traditional multiplier system for assessing the compensation. There is no need to refer to the various decisions of the supreme court wherein traditional multiplier system is adopted. Suffice it to refer to the case municipal corporation of delhi vs. Subhagwati 2 which is one such decision. In traditional multiplier system, the annual value of the dependency at the time of the death of the deceased is multiplied by a multiplier depending upon the age of the deceased and the various other factors.

    (6) Whatever is the method that has to be adopted for assessing justor full compensation payable to the dependants of the deceased in motor accidents cases, it is realised that such assessment is difficult and complicated. But at the same time the approach has to be made upon logical basis. In harris vs. Empress motors ltd. 3 it was observed as follows :

    "in the course of time the courts have worked out a simple solution to the similar problem of calculating the net dependency under the fatal accidents acts in cases where the dependants are wife and children. In times past calculation called for a tedious enquiry into how much house keeping money was paid to the wife, who paid how much for the childrens's shoes etc. This has all been swept away and the modern practice is to deduct a percentage from the net income figure represent what the deceased would have spent exclusivelyon himself. The percentages have become convenient in the sense that they are used unless there is striking evidence to make the conventional figure inappropriate because there is no departure from the principle that each case must be decided upon its own facts."

    (7) In para 1552 of mc gregor on damages (15th edition) it wasrightly observed that the claims for wrongful death are second only to clainas for personal injury in providing evidence of the difficulty of making lumpsum damages awards with any degree of accuracy.

    (8) Thus though it is clear that just or full compensation has to beawarded, it is cow well settled that the basis should be the value of loss of dependency for assessing compensation payable towards pecuniary loss. In such a case the award could in theory take the form of periodic payments. But in our country, england, canada, australia and america, it had traditionally taken the form of a lumpsum payment. At the conclusion of the litigation. As the various factors which have been taken into consideration in arriving at such lumpsum are neither accurate nor precise, some conjectures have to be necessarily made.

    (9) The various facets of the method of the assessment used by thecourts are set out conscisely by lord pearson in his speach in taylor vs. O'connor 4 and it reads as follows :

    "there arc three stages in the normal calculation, namely : (i) to estimate the lost earnings, i. E. , the sums which the deceased probably would have earned but for fatal accident ; (ii) to estimate the lost benefit, i. E. The pecuniary benefit which the dependants probably would have derived from the lost earnings and to express the the lost benefit as an annual sum over the period the lost earnings ; and (iii) to choose the appropriate multiplier which, when applied to the lost benefit expressed as an annual sum, gives the amount of the damages which is a lumpsum."

    (10) In keizer vs. Hanna 5 it was observed by the supreme court ofcanada as follows :

    "the proper metho d of calculating the amount of a damage award under the fatal accidents act is similar to that used in calculating the amount of an award for loss of future earnings, or for fu:urc care, in cases of serious personal injury. In each, the court is faced with the task of determining the present value of a lampsum which. If in vested, would provide payments of the appropriate size over a given number of the years in the future, extinguishing the fund in the process"
    .

    (11) In jones and laughlin steel corporation vs. P feifer 6 the supremecourt of america held as follows :

    "for our review of the foregoing cases leads us to draw three conclusions. First, by its very nature the calculation of an award for lost earnings must te a rough approximation. Because the lost stream can never be predicted with complete confidence, any lump sum represents only a "rough and ready effort to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had he not been injured. Second, sustained price inflation can make the award substantially less precise. Inflation's current magnitude and unpredictability create substantial risk that the damages will prove to have little relation to the lost wages it purports to replace. Third, the question of lost earnings can arise in many different contexts. In some sectors of the economy, it is for easier to assemble evidence of an individual's most likely career path than in others. "

    (12) It was also observed at para (6a) in the above case as follows

    "the lost stream's length cannot be known with certainty ; the worker could have been disabled or even killed in a different, non - work - related accident at any time. The probability that he would still be working at a given date is constantly diminishing. Given the complexity of trying to make an exact calculation, litigants frequently follow the relatively simple course of assuming that the worker would have continued to work up until a specific date certain."

    (13) The observations in the various judgments of other countriesreferred to above, clearly elucidate the various factors that have to be taken into consideration in assessing the loss of dependency. They further disclose the ditficulties and complexities involved in assessing the compensation. As it will be tedious and time consuming to lead evidence in regard to various factors, the litigants preferred to have assumptions in regard to various aspects. The courts follows the rules of thumb unless there is striking evidence to deviate from the same. Even if lengthly and tidious evidence is going to be adduced in regard to the various aspects, still conjectures have to be made in regard to some of the factors. Even then, the courts are not in a position to assess the amount payable by way of compensation with exactness or precision.

    (14) Even in yarious courts in our country also, followed traditionalmultiplier system for assessing the damages. In such a method the value of the dependency is calculated by taking the annual figure of dependency as on the date of the death of the deceased (called as 'multiplicand') and multiply it by figure, which while based upon the number of years that the dependency might reasonably be expected to last, is discounted so as to allow for the fact that a lump sum is being given now instead of periodical payments over the years, and the latter figure has been called the multiplier.

    (15) Generally there is not much difficulty in calculating the annualfigure of the dependency as on the death of the deceased. It is ascertained by deducting the amount that has to be spent for the personal expenses and expensts for his food, clothing etc. From his annual income but difficulty arises in choosing the multiplier. The maximum that is adopted as a multiplier is 20. But the various guidelines for choosing such a multiplier are not discernable from the various decisions. It is obvious that in the absence of sufficient guidelines for choosing the appropriate multiplier, award of varying amounts by different tribunals in regard to cases of similar circumstances is not ruled out. If in one case a multiplier of 15 is taken and if in similar circumstances another tribunal had taken 20, there will be wide divergence in the compensation awarded. As it is for the trial judge to choose the multiplier after the entire trial is over, neither the parties nor their counsel will be in a position to know as to what multiplier will be chosen, as there are no sufficient guidelines for choosing the multiplier.

    (16) To have uniformity and to obviate divergence in regard to theamount to be awarded as compensation in similar cases, in chairman a. P. S. R. T. C. Hyd. Vs. Safiya khatoon 7 a division bench of this court, to which one of us (jecvan reddy, j.) is a party, held that the tables provided in kemp and kempt on 'quantum of damages' (1967 edition) can be followed to adopt the multiplier to arrive at just compensation to be awarded under section 110 of the act. But in a. P. S. R. T. C. , hyderabad vs narasavva and others 8 a full bench of this court observed that the annuity tables provided in kemp and kempt on 'quantum of damages' (1967 edition) were not prepared for use in india and so we cannot use such tables prepared on the basis ot mortality rates of other countries. But in the same decision it was also observed that if in future the annuity tables are prepared in india, they may rtvive the discussion.

    (17) After the above full bench judgment was delivered, a caseunder. Sec. 110 of the act had come up before our learned brother, jagannadha rao, j. In bhagawan das vs. Mohd. Arif jagamnadha rao, j. , relying on thc basis of mortality tables prepared in india and by adopting the reverse of the compound interest rate by taking 4% as real interest, prepared annuity tables. We did not come across any decision or any article commenting that the above annuity tables were not properly prepared or that in view of the circumstances existing in our country, the rate of interest should be taken either more or less than 4% in preparing such tables.

    (18) The question that naturally arises for consideration is as towhether it is preferable to follow the annuity tables prepared by jagannadha rao, j. , or to leave it to the various tribunals to choose the appropriate multiplier. On the basis of the tables referred to in bhagwan das vs. Mohd. Arif (9 supra) the multiplier relevant to the year can be chosen. Some of the circumstances where such a multiplier can be enhanced were referred to therein. If one has to choose a multiplier from such a table, every tribunal had to choose the same multiplier for the same age and there can't be any variance in multiplier in regard to the same age, except in the special circumstances in which can be onhanced. Even the enhancement suggested in the said case is only by one or two points and hence there cannot be much divergence in choosing a multiplier. But if the tribunals are allowed to choose the multiplier which may vary to an extent of five or more even in regard to the same age, there will be much divergence. In the absence of sufficient guidelines in choosing a multiplier the variance in the compensation to be awarded in similar circumstances may be to u large extent.

    (19) In ttis context it is apposite to refer to the observations in smithvs. Middleton 10 of lord emslie which were referred to with approval in cookson vs. Knowles 11 while dealing with the discretion to be exercised in awarding interest, a discretion which has to be exercised judicially. The said observations are as follows :

    "in a selective and discriminating manner, not arbitrarily or idiosyncratically - for otherwise the rights of parties to litigation would become dependent upon judicial whim"
    . So, in cookson vs. Knowles (11 supra) the desirability of laying down the guidelines as to what matters it is proper for the judge to take into account in deciding how to exercise a discretion confined to him was referred to. So we feel that it is just and proper to lay down guidelines in choosing a multiplier.

    (20) It may be further noted that any rational method which is easyto adopt can be preferred to a method where a discretion had to be exercised without any proper guidelines.

    (21) In formulating the tables in bhagwan das vs. Mohd. Arif (9 surra) , acturial system was followed. We already observed that even the full bench of this court in a. P. S. R. T. C. , hyderabad vs. Narasavva and others (8 supra) expressed that if in future annuity tables are prepared in india, they may revive the discussion. Thus the full bench is not of the opinion that the adoption of annuity tables, if prepared for india cannot be the proper basis. After referring to the various decisions of the house of lords, it was observed at para 1558 in mc gregor on damages as follows :

    "however, although the courts have stated that there are sufficient objections to the actuarial method for it not to be accepted as controlling, they are still prepared to accept that acturial evidence may be helpful ; its status today is therefore that it is permissible but not required."

    (22) The courts in canada held that in each case the court is facedwith the task of determining the present value of a lumpsum which, if invented would provide payments of the appropriate size over a given number of years in the future, extinguishing fund in the process vide keizer vs. Hanna (5 supra). The said aspect encouraged the use of statistical data and other expert evidence to produce premises from it the mathematical calculation can proceed. It was recognised in canada that a statistical evidence is often the best available means of assessing probability and possibility rather than the actuality vide page 412 of personal injury damages in canada in cooper - stephenson and saunders. So when annuity tables are prepared on the basis of the mortality tables prepared in the country, it can be held that it is best available means ot" assessing the probability and possibility though it cannot be actuality. It may be noted that actuality cannot be achieved in such cases, whatever method is adopted.

    (23) In jones and laughlin steel corporation vs p feifer (6 supra) afterreferring to the various judgments of the various countries it was observed as follows : "in england, lord diplock has suggested that it would be appropriate to allow for future inflation in a rough and ready way" by discounting at a rate of 4 3/4%. The supreme court of canada has recommended discounting at a rate of 7%, a rate equal to market rates on long - term investments mitus a government expert's prediction of the long - term rate of price inflation. And in australia, the high court has adopted a 2% rate, on theory that it represents a good approximation of the long - term "real interest rate. " in america some courts have taken the same real interest rate in australia.

    (24) In view of the various interest rates adopted by various countriesas referred to above, the choosing of 4% as real interest rate for our country cannot be held as inappropriate. Any how as we have already observed, till now no court or academician commented that the real interest rate chosen for formulating tables in bhagwan das vs. Mohd. Arif (9 supra) as unrealistic. There is nothing to indicate that the method adopted in formulating such tables in not sound the learned judge who formulated the above tables, has good knowledge of mathematics. He explained as to how the tables were formulated. Though it may be difficult for a layman to understand or appreciate the said calculations, still it is open to the statisticians ard mathematicians to find out whether they were correctly tabulated or whether any error crept in. So we feel that there is a rational basis in formulating the 'tables. By following such tables, we may be near to the probability though we may not reach the actuality. Till now no method is broached or suggested to attain such actuality.

    (25) The choosing of a multiplier from the tables referred to inbhagwan das vs. Moh arif (9 supra) is easy and thus the method is simple. There will not be scope for much divergence if a multiplier is chosen from such tables. Be that it tray, experts are rarely available to help court in choosing proper multiplier, and even if available, they are not within easy reach of many claimants. By adapting such system, even the claimant can know about the amount that may be allowed as compensation if multiplicand is ascertained. In simple cases, there will not be much difficulty in ascertaining the multiplicand. Experience as trial judge shows that in majority ot cases the multiplicand can be ascertained easily.

    (26) Due to spate of road accidents on account of taster communication,hundreds of petitions under section 110 - a of the act arc filed in each tribunal in the state every year. As the courts are over - burdened, the desirability of having such claims settled before lok adalats is felt. If there is a simple and rational method to ascertain the amount payable as compensation in such cases, it is easy for the lok adalats to settle such claims. If simple system having rational basis is available, even the insurance companies and the undertakings like a. P. S. R. T. C. Which do not insure their vehicles will come forward with such settlements before lok adaiats. We already observed that by choosing the multiplier from the tables referred to in bhagwan das vs. Mohd. Arif (9 supra) , one can roughly assess the amount payable by way of compensation. So we feel that the choosing of a multiplier from the tables referred to in the above judgment is preferable to the practice of leaving it to the tribunal to choose a multiplier.

    (27) We already adverted to some of the circumstances referred to inbhagwan das vs. Mohd. Arif (9 supra) which warrant increase of the multiplier to be chosen on the basis of the tables referred to. We may add that such a multiplier can be enhanced even in case where there is clear evidence to show that there were bright prospects of promotion in case of employee or increase in income of wage earners or a professional or others. In england it was found necessary for the courts to call for adjustment in relation to hike in taxation, while awarding compensation under fatal accidents act. After referring to the various judgments, it was observed in para 1557 of mcgregor on damages (15th edition) that there was no unanimity as to whether multiplicand has to be increased or multiplier has to be increased to make such adjustment. So it was observed therein that within the framework of the general method of assessment established by the courts, it does not seem to matter which of the two factors in the computation bears the increase. So we feel that it there is clear evidence about the possibility of appreciable increase of earnings in future, the multiplier can be suitably increased by one or two.

    (28) Hence we feel that out of the various methods which arc beingfollowed, the choosing of the multiplier on the basis of the age of the deceased at the time of his death from the annuity tables referred to in bhagwan das vs. Mohd. Arif (9 supra) with the necessary adjustment is preferable and so we agree with the said method.

    (29) In this case the 2nd appellant i. E. Widow of the deceased wasgetting rs. 500/ - p. M. As pension. As per stale government rules she is entitled to receive pension at that rate for only seven years or till the date of retirement of the deceased if survived and later it gets reduced. In n. Sivaminal vs managing director, pandian roadways corporation 12 it was held that there is no justification for reducing the amount which may be justly awarded as compensation in a motor accident case merely because the widow is entitled to pension at a particular rate for a period of seven years where after the amount will taper down. In view of the above decision of the supreme court, the pension received by the 2nd petitioner, the widow of the deceased, has to be disregarded in computing the amount payable as compensation.

    (30) The deceased was a government employee aged 40 years at thetime of fatal accident. As per multiplier table in bhagwan das vs. Mohd. Arif (9 supra) , multiplier of 12. 79 has to be adopted.

    (31) The deceased was getting a monthly salary of rs. 1,100/ -. Inview of the number of members of the family and the job which the deceased was attending to, it is reasonable to hold that the deceased was spending rs. 400/ - p. M. For his personal and household expenses and he was contributing rs. 700/ - p. M. For the family. Thus the annual loss of dependency can be estimated at rs. 8,400/ - per annum. By adopting the multiplier of 12. 79, the total loss of dependency comes to rs. 1,07,436/ - (rs. 8,400 x 12. 79) which can be rounded of to rs. 1,07,500/.

    (32) In flint vs. Lovell 13 it was stated that where the injury to theplaintiff shortened his expectation of life he was entitled to damages in respect of this shortening, thus establishing a head of damages since known as loss of expectation of life. In rose vs. Fored 14 lord atkin and lord wright expressed the view that there was nothing novel or unusual in the idea of taking this element of damage into calculation. Besides damages for loss of expectation of life damages are being awarded for pain and suffering of deceased. The damages under those two heads and damages for loss of amenities of life wherever they occur constitute damages towards non - pecuniary loss. In fletcher vs. Autocar and transporters it was held that rich and poor great and humble, should be treated alike, receiving similar amounts for pain and suffering. We feel that the same view can be taken even in regard to damages towards loss of expectation of life as conventional amount is being paid towards the same. In n. Sivammal vs. Managing director, pandian roadways corporation (12 supra) an amount of rs. 3,000/ - was awarded towards non - pecuniary damages and it was styled as conventional amount.

    (33) It may be noted that damages towards non - pecuniary loss arcawarded to the estate, while compensation towards loss of dependency is awarded to the dependents whether the non - pecuniary damages have to be awarded if the claimants entitled to the compensation for loss of dependency arc also entitled to the non - pecuniary damages, is a matter for consideration. This aspect was considered in gorald motor service limited and another vs. R m. K. Velluswamy and others 16. If x is the income, and y out of it is the amount spent for the dependents and z out of it is the savings, and r is the amount spent towards personal and household expenses of the deceased, then x - y+z+ r. When y is taken for computing the loss of dependency, z is icckoned for computing loss to the estale. So when z is not taken into consideration in computing the loss of dependency, then even if the damages towards loss of dependency and less to the estate go to the same claimants, it will not be a case rf permitting the claimants to recover twice over for the same loss. Thus though in this case the petitioners are entitled to both pecuniary and non - pecuniary damages, it will not be a case of permitting them to take the compensation for the same loss twice. Hence non - pecuniary damages to be awarded have to be added up to the pecuniary damages.

    (34) It can be seen from para 1530 of mc gregor on damages (15thedition) that in view of the fall in the real value of money, the conventional sum awarded is raised to 1750 pounds by 1985. Hence when our learned brother justice jagannadha rao, j. , fixed the conventional award under pain and suffieirg, and loss of expectation of life at rs. 7,500/ - for each in y. Varalakshmi and athers vs. M. Nageswara rao and others 17, the same cannot be held as excessive. We fully agree with the same. Hence an amount of rs. 15,000/ - is awarded towards non - pecuniary damages.

    (35) The lower tribunal awarded an amount of rs. 5,000/ - ascompensation to the 2nd petitioner towards loss of consortium. In view of her age, we do not find the same as unreasonable. Hence a total amount of rs. 1,27,500/ - (rs. 1,07,500+ 5,000+5,000) has to be awarded as compensation.

    (36) In bishan devi vs. Sirhuksh singh 18 the supreme court awardedinterest from the date of claim. In narcinva v. Kamat vs. Al fredo antonio doe marlins 19 the supreme court granted interest at 12% per annum for motor accident claims. Hence we direct that this amount of rs. 1,27,500/ - should carry interest at 12%, from the date of petition.

    (37) Out of the total amount of rs. 1,27,500/ - , the appellant 3 to 6arc awarded rs. 20,000/ - each and the balance amount of rs. 47,500/ - is awarded to the 2nd appellant who has to maintain the 1st appellant also. The amounts payable to appellants 3 to 6 including the interest that accrues up to the date of payment have to be deposited in bank in their respective names and the same can be withdrawn as and when the alliance of each of the daughters is fixed. But the periodical interest on the f. D. Rs. As and when the f. D. Rs. Are taken in the names of appellants 3 to 6 can be withdrawn by the 2nd appellant for their maintenance.

    (38) Thus the appeal is allowed in part accordingly with proportionate costs. Advocate's fees is fixed at rs. 500/ -.

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