Rangnekar, J.:— (After stating the facts of the case and the contentions of the parties, his Lordship proceeded.) It is clear that on the pleadings the material questions which arise are: first, what amount is due to the plaintiff under the mortgage of 1879; secondly, whether the suit is barred either under Article 142 or under Article 144, Limitation Act, 1908; and, thirdly, whether the plaintiffs to the counterclaim are entitled to their counterclaim. The plaintiff has led no oral evidence, nor has she gone into the box, and I think it is open to me to draw the strongest inference against her from that fact. On behalf of the plaintiff, the mortgage, the sale deed, the alleged rent note and one or two documents have been put in. The defendants, on the other hand, have examined defendant 1 and a witness, who actually was living in the property from 1901 to 1927 or 1928. On the first question as to the amount due to the plaintiff, there is no dispute left between the parties, as it is admitted by the plaintiff that the amount, which is brought into Court, is the correct amount due under the mortgage.
2. The main question is, whether the suit is barred under the law of limitation. The plaintiff's contention is that the case, if at all, would be governed by Article 144; so that the burden of establishing adverse possession would be on the defendants. This is not disputed on behalf of the defendants, but it is contended on their behalf that before they can be called upon to establish their adverse possession against the plaintiff, the plaintiff's suit is barred on the allegations made in the plaint itself under Article 142, and that the plaintiff on these allegations must first prove that she was in possession and has been dispossessed or has discontinued her possession within 12 years of the institution of the suit. In answer to the latter contention, it is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that Balkrishna Bapuji, by reason of the sale in his favour in 1882, became a tenant-in-common with the other members of the joint family, and therefore it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that she or her predecessor-in-title was in possession and dispossessed within 12 years of the suit, but that the defendants must prove ousted within the meaning of Article 144. The case therefore has to be considered from two points of view: first, whether an alienee from a Hindu coparcener becomes automatically, as the result of the alienation in his favour, a tenant-in-common with the rest of the joint family. If that contention is correct, then it is clear that no bar under Article 142 would arise. But if that contention is not correct, then it is not disputed that the burden of proving possession and dispossession within 12 years, having regard to the allegations made in the plaint, must rest upon the plaintiff. I shall first direct myself to that question.
3. Now, it cannot be disputed that alienation by a member of a joint family or a coparcener was not known to Hindu law. The theory of the Mitakshara is clearly against such a right in any individual coparcener of a joint and undivided Hindu family, except perhaps in the case of a Hindu father or a Hindu manager. The restriction upon the power of an individual member of a joint family to alienate his right, title and interest in the joint family property, or his undivided share in the joint family property, was relaxed in course of time, first in favour of execution creditors. The earlier cases in Bombay—and I shall confine myself as far as possible to the law as obtains in this Presidency— appear to be opposed to the right of alienation by a coparcener, and it was actually laid down in (1839) Bom Sel Rep 2431 and in (1849) SDAC 932 that a sale or mortgage by one of two undivided brothers was invalid, even for his own share of the undivided property. The right however gradually came to be recognized, presum ably for the purpose of protecting the creditors of the joint family, and in particular execution creditors and purchasers at court-sales. The whole of the previous case-law was examined by Westropp C.J in 1873; and the learned Chief Justice, whilst admitting that the strict law of the Mitakshara was in accordance with the law laid down in Bengal, stated that the opposite practice had prevailed in Western India. He therefore held that he was compelled to depart from the law laid down in Bengal in so far as it denied the right of a Hindu coparcener for valuable consideration to sell, incumber, or otherwise alienate his share in the undivided family property: see, 10 BHCR 139.3
4. The next question which confronted the Courts was as to how the right in favour of an alienee from an individual member of a joint and undivided Hindu family was to be enforced or given effect to. Now, under the Mitakshara law, no individual member of a joint family has a right to say that any specific portion of the property is exclusively his own, and it was held by the Courts therefore that the purchaser at a court-sale was not entitled to claim to be put in possession of any definite piece of property sold to him. This was laid down so far back as in 22 WR 2144 and 2 Bom 676.5 It is not necessary to refer to the course taken by the Courts since then for the purpose of enforcing an alienation made by an individual member of a joint family in favour of the alienee, but since 1875 it may be taken that the view of the Courts in this Presidency was that the only mode by which the Court could enforce the right of the purchaser was by a decree for partition and account. But in actually effecting partition the Courts on equitable considerations adjusted the rights of the dividing members, including the stranger purchaser, in such a manner as to, as far as possible, allot to the stranger purchaser the identical property sold to him, or, if that was not possible, as much of that property as fell to the share of his vendor, and failing that, property of an equivalent value out of the properties coming to the share of the vendor and this principle of equity was for the first time given effect to in the well-known cases in 11 BHCR 726 and 11 BHCR 76.7. Now, it is well established in this Court that a purchaser of the undivided share of a Hindu coparcener is not entitled to possession and cannot obtain possession of any specific property, or, even the portion representing the undivided share of his vendor in any specific property. Nor is he entitled to joint possession with the other coparceners, but his only remedy is to sue for a general partition. On the other hand, it is equally well established that if the alienee has gone into possession of any specific property belonging to the joint family as the result of the court sale in his favour, the other members of the family are entitled, if they so choose, to be put into joint possession without being driven to a suit for partition. In 1875 however a question arose whether that was the only remedy left to the non-alienating members of the family as against the stranger purchaser, and in 12 BHCR 1388 it was held by West J. that a purchaser of the right, title and interest of a member of a joint family cannot be ejected from any specific property in his possession or of which he has obtained possession. The judgment is very short. The suit was instituted by Mahabalaya and his brother Ramaya to set aside the sale of certain immovable property made in execution of a decree obtained by defendant 3 against defendant 1, who was the plaintiff's cousin and joint with them, and to recover possession of a moiety of the property from the execution purchaser, who was defendant 2. The lower Courts dismissed the plaintiffs' suit holding that the sale was a proper sale and made for a debt which was binding on the joint family. West J. observed that defendant 3, who was the decree-holder, took only the interest of his debtor, and what that interest was and how the transaction could be made good, if at all, for the benefit of the purchaser of a coparcener's interest in a particular piece of land forming but a part of the common property, would have to be disposed of, if he were seeking possession, according to the principles laid down in 11 BHCR 72. Then the learned Judge pointed out that the purchaser had got into possession, and that he was holding it with an accompanying right as the judgment-debtor, Timaya, could have transferred to him. Then follow the following observations (page 140):
He is in, therefore, as a tenant-in-common with Timaya's coparceners, the plaintiffs. They are entitled to possession in common with the purchaser, and if this is refused, they may enforce their right by a suit for a share of the enjoyment or for a definition in specie of the portions in which each party is to have for the future a sole interest; but they are not entitled to eject the purchaser wholly from a defined moiety of the land. It may turn out on inquiry that, on an equitable adjustment of the several rights of the members of the joint family and on a marshalling of the elements of its estate, so as to give effect, so far as may be, to the execution sale of land as included in Timaya's share, the whole of the land in dispute or more than a moiety of it may be left in the hands of the defendants. In the meantime, we cannot say that the plaintiffs are entitled to separate exclusive possession of any particular portion.
5. This case was followed in 1 Bom 95, 2 Bom 676 and 10 Bom 363,10 and since then it seems to have been assumed that an alienee of the right, title and interest of an individual coparcener is a tenant-in-common with the rest of the family. Two years after this, the case in 3 Cal 19811 was decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council, and the decision in that case was followed, first, in 5 Cal 148,12 and again in 10 Cal 626.13 In 3 Cal 198 and in the later case in 10 Cal 626, their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down the form of the decree which is to be made in such cases. In the first case their Lordships passed a decree directing the purchaser to deliver possession of the whole property to the sons and declaring that the purchaser had acquired the interest of the father and was entitled to take proceedings to have that interest ascertained by partition. The same decree was made in 10 Cal 626. In 5 Cal 148 the facts were that a Hindu father had mortgaged certain property and the mortgagee had obtained a decree for the sale of the property. The property was put up for sale and purchased by a stranger. The objection raised by the sons was overruled, and the sons therefore brought a substantive suit. It appears that in this case the purchaser had not entered into possession of the property as in 3 Cal 198 and 10 Cal 626. It was found that the debt incurred by the father was for immoral purposes. The Privy Council held that the proper decree to be passed was an order declaring that the purchaser acquired the undivided interest of the father in the property with such power of ascertaining the extent of that interest by means of a partition as, the judgment-debtor himself possessed before the sale and an order confirming the possession of the sons subject to such proceedings to enforce his right as the purchaser might take. All these cases were no doubt in Bengal, but they were under the Mitakshara law.
6. The Madras High Court has understood these Privy Council decisions as laying down broadly that the purchaser in possession is liable to be ejected at the instance of the non alienating coparceners and that such a purchaser does not become a tenant, in-common with the other members: see, 39 Mad 265.14 In 41 Bom 34715 the suit was instituted by certain coparceners to set aside a sale of a specific property made by defendant 2 in favour of defendant 1, and the main question which arose was: what was the interest in the property which passed to the purchaser? The learned Judges, dissenting from 21 Bom 797,16 held that an alienee acquires the fraction of the share to which the alienor was entitled at the date of the alienation, that share is not liable to be either increased or decreased by the death of the other coparceners even if he stands by and does not insist on partition, and their Lordships passed a partition decree on that footing. Heaton J. observed as follows (page 356).
I agree that by the sale defendant 2 acquired a share of one-half, not of one-third only in the land sold. But he acquired a right to partition, not a right to possession prior to partition. As their Lordships of the Privy Council stated in 11 IA 2617 at p. 30: ‘According to the judgment of their Lordships in 4 IA 247 the decree which ought properly to have been made would have been that the plaintiff…… should recover possession of the whole of the property, with a declaration that the appellant, as purchaser at the execution sale, had acquired the share and interest of Shib Perkash Misser, and was entitled to take proceedings to have it ascertained by partition’.
7. In 43 Bom 1718 the facts were as follows: Defendant 5 and the plaintiff, his minor son, constituted an undivided Hindu family. Defendants 6 and 7 obtained a money decree against defendant 5, and in execution of the decree, defendants 1 to 4 became purchasers at the court sale of two of the properties belonging to the joint family. The plaintiff, thereupon, brought a suit against his father (defendant 5) and the decree-holders as well as against the auction purchasers for a declaration that the plaintiff's half share in the two properties did not pass to the auction-purchasers and for possession of his half share on equitable partition. The lower Court decreed the plaintiff's claim. On appeal to the High Court it was contended (1) that the son's interest in the property did pass at the court sale, and (2) that the suit for a partial partition of the family properties was bad. The following observations made by Batchelor J. at pages 24-25 are pertinent:
On the whole, therefore, it was contended that this suit could not succeed, and that the Court should direct the plaintiff, if so advised, to amend his plaint so as to convert the suit into one for general partition, so that on such general partition if made, the equities between the parties might be adjusted in the manner which I have indicated. It is unnecessary, however, to consider what the Court's view would be upon this argument if the point were res integra, open to determination now without reference to pronouncements by a higher Court and with reference only to the decisions of Sir Michael Westropp and Sir Raymond West. Those decisions were delivered in 1875, and in 1877 in 3 Cal 198 their Lordships of the Privy Council have, I think, indicated their preference for another course of procedure in such litigation. In considering this decision of the Privy Council's in contrast with the judgments of Sir Raymond West and Sir Michael Westropp, it is, I think, of some materiality to point out that in the Bombay suits the plaintiff was not the coparcener but the purchaser, whereas before the Privy Council the converse was the case. In 3 Cal 198 their Lordships at the end of their judgment say that they are of opinion that they ought not to interfere with the decree under appeal so far as it directs the possession of the property, all of which appears to have been finally and properly found to be joint family property, to be restored to the respondent (that is, the plaintiff, the son of the judgment-debtor). But they think that the decree should be varied by adding a declaration that the appellant, as purchaser at the execution sale, has acquired the share and interest of Toofani Singh in that property and is entitled to take such proceedings as he shall be advised to have that share and interest ascertained by partition.
8. Kemp J. observed as follows (page 27):
Now an auotion-purchaser of the share of a coparcener sold in execution of a decree against the coparcener, in order to separate the share of the coparcener from the joint family property, must bring a suit for partition.
9. The question which I am considering, directly arose in 43 Bom 47219 and it was held there by Heatson and Hayward JJ. relying on the decision in 3 Cal 198 and 10 Cal 626 that joint possession cannot be given in such a case to the purchaser, but merely a declaration that he has acquired the interest of the vendor, whatever that may be, in the particular property, and a direction that he be left to recover that interest by separate suit for partition in which all necessary parties and properties should be joined. The plaintiffs' case in the suit, which gave rise to the appeal, was that they obtained possession of the fields which they thought they had bought and they were afterwards dispossessed, and so they brought the suit against the non-alienating member of the family and an other person to recover possession. The lower Courts passed a decree for joint possession as to which Heaton J. observed as follows (page 475):
To me personally, it is an extraordinary thing that any stranger should ever be placed in joint possession of joint Hindu family property, sharing the possession with the coparceners in the joint family. If one stranger can be so put in possession then another can. You may have a Mahomedan, a Parsi or a European put into joint possession with the members of a Hindu family of their joint family property. So great an anomaly or as I should say, absurdity, as this is not supported by the highest authority. The matter was dealt with by the Privy Council. In 8 Cal 198 and their decision was afterwards followed in 10 Cal 626. I think myself I cannot do better than follow the very words used in framing the decree of the Privy Council. The plaintiff obviously cannot obtain full possession of the property which is what he sues for, for he is not entitled to such possession. He ought not to be allowed to have joint possession for, that, as I have explained, is contrary to reason and authority. The most that he can get is a, declaration. We made the declaration in this form. The respondents, as purchasers at the sale by Vithu, have acquired the share and interest of the said Vithu in the property sold and are entitled to take such proceedings as they may be advised, to have that share and interest ascertained by partition. Claim to recover possession is dismissed. Both parties should bear their own costs throughout.
10. As pointed out in Mayne's Hindu Law (9th Edn.) at p. 496, f.n (1), the case in 43 Bom 472 is inconsistent with the cases in 12 BHCR 138, 1 Bom 95,9 2 Bom 676 and 10 Bom 363, and there can be no doubt that is so. The same question arose in 50 Bom 20420 in which the three Privy Council cases, to which I have referred, as well as 41 Bom 347 and 43 Bom 17 were discussed. The leading judgment was delivered by Fawcett J. who held that if a purchaser was already in possession and a suit for recovery of possession was brought by an excluded coparcener, the purchaser need not necessarily be ejected but the Court has discretion to declare him entitled to hold (pending a partition) as a tenant-in-common with the other coparceners. It may be, as the learned Judge says, that the observations made in 42 Bom 472 and 41 Bom 347 as well as in 43 Bom 17 were obiter dicta, but it is clear that the decision in 42 Bom 472 was dearly inconsistent with the decision in 12 BHCR 138, and in all the three cases the Privy Council decisions in 3 Cal 198 and 10 Cal 626 were carefully considered, and the effect of the decisions expressed. It appears that an application that the question may be referred to a Full Bench was made but rejected, but the learned Judge held that the principle of the two Privy Council decisions did not apply in Bombay, as they were cases from Bengal and that the law of Bengal as regards the power of a coparcener to alienate his share was different from the law obtaining in this Presidency. That undoubtedly is true so far as a private alienation by a member of a joint family is concerned but both the cases were cases of court sales, and as observed by Mull a in his Hindu Law (Edn. 8), at p. 294:
The Mitakshara law as administered in all the Provinces allows the sale of the undivided interest of a coparcener in execution of a decree against him.
11. In this respect there is no distinction, as the authorities show, between voluntary sale and involuntary sale. But with all respect to the learned Judge it is difficult to appreciate the distinction which he has made. What the decision amounts to really is this, that when a purchaser from a member of a joint family is in possession of the property sold to him, if the non alienating members of the family bring a suit to eject him, then in a proper case the Court may eject him, but in other cases the Court should refuse to eject him and either put the non-alienating members in possession or ask them to file a suit for partition.
12. But it is clear law that the members of a joint family are not under any compulsion to come to any partition. It is a right which the law gives them, which they can exercise at their pleasure, and why in some cases, if one of the members of a joint family sells his share to a stranger, the other members should be compelled to file a suit for partition, if they do not want joint possession with the purchaser in possession, and in other cases a decree in ejectment should be made against the stranger purchaser, it is difficult to appreciate. This case is strongly, relied upon by the learned counsel on behalf of the plaintiff. But assuming that the decision is correct the result is that an alienee from a coparcener becomes a tenant in common in certain cases but ceases to be a tenant-in-common in other cases, and whether he should be treated as a tenant-in-common and allowed to remain in possession of the property of which he is in possession remains at the discretion of the Court as to which no rigid rule can ever be laid down. In this state of authorities, I think it is open to me to consider the question as to whether by mere alienation a stranger becomes a tenant-in-common with, the rest of the family, or whether even if the stranger purchaser goes into possession he can be treated as a tenant-in-common. The decisions are that where the alienee is entitled to recover the share which would come to his alienor on partition, it is open to him in a suit brought by the other coparceners for restitution of the specific property alienated, to insist that any relief which may be granted to the plaintiffs should be conditional or their assenting to a partition so far as regarded the alienor's interest in the joint family property to give effect to his right: see, 40 Cal 966.21
13. In Bombay it has been consistently held that the only mode in which an execution purchaser can enforce his rights is by a suit for a partition of the debtor's share in the whole estate to which, of course, all the members of the joint family are necessary parties. In carrying out the decree for partition the Court will, as far as it can, with regard to the interests of others, award to the purchaser any specific portion to which the debtor may have been entitled. This discussion will show that it is only on equitable grounds, and not on any principles of Hindu law, that a purchaser's right to realize his sale has been recognized by the Courts. But is there any justification for the view that because a purchaser is put in possession of a specific property belonging to the joint family, he becomes a tenant-in-common with the other members of the family. It was in 12 BHCR 138 that the expression “tenant-in-common” in connexion with a purchaser from a coparcener in a joint family was for the first time introduced. No reasons were given in that case for that view. It was not necessary to describe the tenure of such a person as that of a tenant-in-common. It would have been sufficient to state that a purchaser from a member of a joint family, if in possession, is entitled to remain in possession. The discussion of the cases to which I have refer, red clearly shows that all the while the Courts have been engaged upon the task of enforcing the rights of a purchaser from a member of a joint family and they acted on equitable considerations so as to sanction such alienations, and to say the least, I am unable, with the greatest respect to the learned Judges in 12 BHCR 138, to take the view that it is necessary to introduce complicated notions applicable to the peculiar law appertaining to real property in England nor is it necessary to start a further innovation as, with respect, seems to me to have been done in 50 Bom 204. Under the Mitakshara law in any case it is clear that no such thing as tenancy-in-common is known or was ever known.
14. The main incidents of this particular tenure are that a tenant-in-common is entitled to go into possession which is held in common at any time he pleases. But it has been held over and over again by our Courts that a stranger purchaser is not entitled to be put in possession of any portion of the joint family property which he has purchased; nor because he is kept out of the joint family property he has purchased, is he entitled to any mesne profits against the joint family in possession as a tenant-in-common in English law would be. This is beyond doubt having regard to the decisions in this Court. I have pointed out that the theory of the Mitakshara law is against alienation. Under that law all the coparceners are joint owners of the property but only as members of a corporation, in which, although there may be share-holders, it could not be said that they had any definite shares until at any rate partition is effected. The family corporation remains unchanged, though the individual members may either increase or diminish, and no member of such a family can predicate that he, that particular member, at any particular moment is entitled to a definite share, and although, as the latest decision shows that the share which passes to a stranger purchaser as a result of the alienation made by a member of a joint family must be taken as at the date of the alienation, it is quite clear that in working out that share at the time of partition he may gain nothing, for, before partition can be effected, an account has to be taken, and it may well happen that in taking such an account nothing might remain to the share of the alienating member, and consequently nothing would come to the hands of the alienee.
15. On a careful consideration of the authorities, I am inclined to agree with the view taken in 39 Mad 265 and the observations of Heaton J. in 43 Bom 472, to which I have referred. In my opinion, the authority of the decision in 12 BHCR 13 is shaken by the Privy Council decisions to which I have referred. But even taking the extreme view that an alienee is in possession of a portion of the property sold to him, and he should be treated as a tenant, in-common, can it be said that his possession must be treated as the possession of the whole of the family, or the possession of the latter must be treated as the possession of the stranger purchaser for the purpose of limitation, because that is precisely the point which arises in this case. In my opinion, it is difficult to hold that in certain cases and in certain circumstances an alienee is to be treated as a tenant-in-common and therefore the possession of the rest of the family against him can never be adverse and in this respect, I am in agreement with the view taken by Muttusami Ayyar J. in 12 Mad 292.22 The learned Judge there observed as follows (p. 293):
coparcenary as recognized by Hindu law, can only subsist between the members of a joint Hindu family, and the contention that the possession of one coparcener is the possession of all for purposes of limitation can have no application as between a purchaser from one of the coparceners and the other members of the family. This view is also in accordance with the case in 11 Cal 680.23
16. Then, again, if, as our Courts have held, an alienee from an individual member of the family can successfully set up a case of adverse possession against the rest of the family, it is difficult to see why the non alienating members cannot set up adverse possession against such an alienee; and if they can, as I think they can, on principle, the theory of an alienee being a tenant in common falls to the ground. In 23 Bom 13724 it was held by the Full Bench that where coparceners have alienated their shares in the joint property by sale and mortgage, and the alienees have been in possession for more than 12 years, a claim for partition is, as against such alienees, barred by limitation under Article 144, Limitation Act (15 of 1877). The same view is taken in 37 Bom 84.25 But if such an alienee is a tenant-in-common, surely it would follow that he would be a tenant-in-common in all cases and under all circumstances, and yet, if Fawcett J. is right, in certain cases he may be ejected, which is inconsistent with his being a tenant-in-common, and in certain cases he may be allowed to be in possession, in which case he gets the rights of a tenant-in common. In my view therefore it is wrong to say that an alienee from a member of a joint family, whether he has gone into possession or not, is a tenant-in-common at any rate within the meaning of Article 142 or Article 144, Limitation Act, and it is not open to him to contend for the purpose of that Act that the possession of the non-alienating members is his possession so as to avoid the bar of limitation pleaded against him. If so, it seems to me that the claim under the sale deed of 1882 is clearly barred under Article 142, Limitation Act.
17. I have considered the effect of Article 142 recently in 40 Bom LR 16626 and I have pointed out there the distinction between Article 142 and Article 144, to which I still adhere. Article 142 applies in cases where a plaintiff sues to recover possession on the allegation that he was in possession and that his prior possession is lost by dispossession or discontinuance. The sole question under that Article is, has the plaintiff alleged that he was in possession and that he has been dispossessed, whereas the sole question under Article 144 is, is the plaintiff owner of the property in question? In other words, has the plaintiff set up his title to the property, leaving it open to the defendant to say that although the plaintiff is the owner, the defendant is in possession which is adverse to him? Under Article 142 there must be an allegation of prior possession and subsequent dispossession or discontinuance, and it is for the plaintiff to prove that such dispossession or discontinuance has taken place within the period of limitation provided in that Article. It does not matter whether he is dispossessed by the defendant or any one else, for Article 142 does not mention the word “defendant” as Article 144 does. If it is the plaintiff's case that he was in possession of certain property but that possession is lost by dispossession or discontinuance, then if the dispossession or discontinuance took place more than 12 years prior to the suit, the suit would be barred. All that is necessary is the actual possession of a stranger beyond the minimum period of 12 years.
18. Now, here, the defendants' case is, that since 1882 they were in possession of the property having been related to the vendor Jagannath. 14 years after that, that tenancy was confirmed by a writing passed in their favour. Then, even construing the pleading, which is somewhat confused, most favourably to the plaintiff, since the death of Jagannath the plaintiff was dispossessed and that dispossession or discontinuance continued until 1928. Now Jagannath died, according to the plaintiff, in 1896, so that, for 42 years the plaintiff was out of possession of this property. In my opinion there, fore the suit as regards the sale of 1882 is clearly barred under Article 142, Limitation Act.
19. But assuming that I am wrong in holding that the case falls under Article 142 and that the Article applicable to the case is Article 144, even so, I hold that the suit is barred under that Article. Now, if Article 144 applies, it is clear that the burden of proving adverse possession is on the defendants, and, in my opinion, they have discharged that burden successfully. I have pointed out that there is no evidence on behalf of the plaintiff on this point, nor has he examined anybody in rebuttal. On the other hand, the defendants' evidence is clear, and it shows that since 1901, at any rate, originally the small house, consisting of a ground floor and an attic, was treated and enjoyed by Baghunath in the first instance, and thereafter by defendant 1 and his brothers, as if it belonged absolutely to them. The property was repaired from time to time, the expenses for which were defrayed by them. The property was let out and the rents were received by them. On the death of their ancestor, the property was publicly transferred to their name. It stood in their name both in the Collector's record as well as in the Municipal record. And, finally, the whole property was practically rebuilt, and in any case, considerably improved, and in place of a small property, which originally consisted of a ground floor and an attic, worth hardly Rs. 2000 even after repairs in 1906, we have a property consisting of a ground floor and four upper floors, valued at over Rs. 35,000. According to the evidence, the rent originally was about Rs. 20. Subsequently it was increased by a few rupees more, and the present rate is Rs. 375 per month. If Balkrishna, the mortgagee, or any of his heirs, had the ghost of a claim in this property, I have not the least doubt they would have come forward to assert it. As they say, the defendants re-entered into possession in 1928, and for nearly nine or ten years even after that they took no step. Not even the daughter of Harisehandra had made any claim to this property. Surely, it cannot be said that though during all this time the defendants were in possession and enjoyment of the property, their possession was not open, continuous and uninterrupted, and that is all that Article 144 requires. In my opinion, the evidence in this case satisfies the well-known test of adverse possession laid down by Markby J. in 4 Cal 32727 at page 329 which had been followed by the Courts in this country, in these words:
By adverse possession, I understand to be meant possession by a person holding the land, on his own behalf, or some person other than the true owner, the true owner having a right to immediate possession.
20. The evidence in this case discloses that the possession of the defendants has been against the whole world, including the plaintiff and the plaintiff's ancestors, assuming they were the true owners. It is argued that the alienee being a tenant in-common, under Article 144 it is necessary to prove a hostile assertion and an open denial of the title of the alienee, and the exclusive possession of the claimant must be such possession that it can be said that the alienee has been excluded from the property to his knowledge. I do not find any warrant in the words of Article 144 for such a proposition. The only Article which requires exclusion to the knowledge of the plaintiff is Article 127; but even assuming that the defendants have to prove that there was an ouster in this sense, in my opinion they have done so. It has been pointed out in decisions of this Court that it is open to the Court to presume from a long, continuous and uninterrupted user that the true owner has been ousted from the property, and in the circumstances of this case there is no reason why I should not draw the inference against the plaintiff. If so, it was open to the plaintiff to rebut that presumption, but no such evidence was led, and, therefore, the presumption, which arises, must be given effect to. I must therefore hold that if it was necessary under Article 144 for the defendant to prove the case of ouster in the same way as the case of ouster which Article 127 requires, they have succeeded in doing so. Mr. Jhaveri relies upon 61 Cal 37728 where the head-note is as follows:
There can be no adverse possession by one co-sharer as against others until there is ouster or exclusion. The possession of a co-sharer becomes adverse to another co-sharer from the moment when there is an ouster, i.e after there is an assertion of a hostile title by one co-sharer against the other and to the knowledge of the latter.
21. In the first place, it may be stated that the learned Judges in that case do not refer to any specific article in the limitation act, and it is difficult to gather from the facts under what Article the case was considered. But, assuming that the case arose under Article 144, there is no warrant for the proposition laid down here. The learned Judges rely inter alia on 46 IA 285,29 but it seems to me that the observations on which they rely are to the same effect as the observations of Sir Norman Maoleod in 23 Bom LR 967.30 In 46 IA 285 their Lordships of the Privy Council cite with approval a passage from the judgment in (1840) 11 A & E 100831 in which, after pointing out that generally speaking one tenant-in-common cannot maintain an ejectment against another tenant-in-common, it was observed as follows (p. 1014): But, where the claimant, tenant-in-common, has not been in the participation of the rents and profits for a considerable length of time, and other circumstances concur, the Judge will direct the jury to take into consideration whether they will presume that there has been an ouster… And, if the jury find an ouster, then the rights of the lessor of the plaintiff to an undivided share will be decided exactly in the same way as if he had brought his ejectment for an entirety.
22. In this case the claimant not only has not been in participation of the rents and profits for nearly half a centnry, but apparently knows nothing about the pro perty. I here pointed out that the description of the property given in the plaint is wrong. The evidence shows further how the property grew up from a small beginning. I have further pointed out how disbursements were made and how the property was publicly transferred from time to time in the Municipal and Government records. These circumstances, which are in addition to the circumstance of the non-participation of rents and profits, have to be given effect to, and, sitting here as a jury, I shall certainly presume that the plaintiff has been ousted within the meaning of Article 144, and there is no evidence on behalf of the plaintiff in rebuttal. The suit as to the sale of 1882 is barred even under Article 144. This leaves the last question covered by issue 6 and raised by the defendants' counterclaim. In view of the conclusion to which I have come, it is not necessary to express a definite finding on this; but since the case may go further, I should like to deal with it as briefly as I can. Now, it is settled law in Bombay that the share to which an alienee is entitled on partition is the share to which the alienor was entitled at the date of the alienation, and not at the date when the alienee seeks to reduce his interest into possession: see, 35 Mad 4732 and 41 Bom 347.
23. Mr. Jhaveri relied upon 56 Mad 53433 in which it was held that the fraction of the share is to be ascertained as at the date of the alienation, but as to the actual items of property in which the purchaser is entitled to participate in accordance with that fraction, the family property as it stands at the date of the partition is to be taken into consideration. In my opinion, this decision really does not support the point taken on behalf of the plaintiff. The defendants' case is that if the plaintiff is entitled to partition as representing an alienee from one of the members of the family, then no partition should be ordered in his favour until he is willing to pay for the improvements effected in the property, the result of which has been to enhance considerably the value of the property, or that he should be ordered to sell his interest in the property to the defendants at the market rate irrespective of the value of the improvements, upon principles analogous to the principle under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. All that the Madras case points out is that in working out partition, you must take the property as it stands at the date of the partition, that is to say, you must take the items of the property. The question which I have to decide here was not raised in that case. On general principles, there is no reason why a Court of Equity should not intervene in a case like this, and give the benefit of the principles laid down in Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, to the party entitled thereto. I have already pointed out that the rights of the alienee are based on equitable principles. If these rights depend upon equity and have to be adjusted on equitable considerations, there is no reason why a further equity should not be introduced; and in a case like this, where the value of the property has gone up by improvements on the property, I do not see why the stranger should be allowed to take, the benefit of the improvements without being made liable for the value of those improvements.
24. There is another point, which was raised by Mr. Purshottam, which also seems to me to be important. I have already pointed out that the mode of effecting partition is first to take an account, and in taking an account you have first to pay the debts due by the family. Now, in this case, improvements were effected and the property rebuilt with the help of moneys borrowed, and borrowed on the mortgage, from defendants 8 and 9. This is a liability, which the defendants have to discharge to the extent of about Rs. 15,000. Surely these debts, in any event, have to be discharged before it can be said that the one-sixth share of the plaintiff can be reduced into possession. From this point of view also, I think the defendants are entitled to succeed on their counterclaim. (After recording findings on issues the judgment concluded.) That leaves the question of costs. The whole of time occupied by this case was taken up by the question of limitation. So far as the claim for mortgage was concerned, as I have said the defendants brought in Rs. 175 in November 1937. The suit was filed in August; 1937, and at the outset Mr. Daphtary, who then appeared, conceded that the amount, which was brought in by the defendants, was the only amount due under the mortgage. I have referred to the claim made in respect of the mortgage. If the plaintiff had succeeded in that claim, there would have been a decree for about two lacs of rupees against the defendants. In the correspondence prior to the suit the plaintiff by his very first letter stated that the defendants were not connected with the joint family but had usurped the property wrongfully, and that the plaintiff was taking proceedings against them to enforce his rights. No demand for the payment due under the mortgage was made, nor for any partition.
25. It is true that the defendants in their reply denied that Balkrishna Bapuji, the mortgagee, was the plaintiff's ancestor. I have already pointed out that one of the ancestors of the defendants was Balkrishna Bapuji. The eldest of the defendants is about 43 years of age, and naturally he could not know exactly as to who this Balkrishna Bapuji ‘was, though he had some idea that one of his ancestors was Balkrishna Bapuji. It seems to me that in denying that Balkrishna Bapuji was the grandfather of the plaintiff, the defendants were influenced by this fact. But without prejudice to this case, the defendants called upon the plaintiff to inform them of the amount she was claiming as being due under the mortgage. The plaintiff in reply to that not only refused to answer the question, and when later on she was requested by the defendants to give them inspection of the mortgage deed, she declined to com ply with that request. It is said by Mr. Jhaveri that at that time the original mortgage was not in her possession, but a certified copy was in her possession. It was easy for the plaintiff to answer the question and to give a copy of the certified copy to the defendants. If she had done so, then present suit on the claim under the mortgage would not have been filed, as the defendants were advised to pay under the mortgage a small sum of Rs. 175. I am therefore unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that in any event the plaintiff is entitled to claim the general costs of the suit up to the date of the deposit.
26. In my opinion, the suit is a speculative suit and should never have been filed, at any rate, so far as the claim under the mortgage is concerned. Apart from the fact that the claim made under the mortgage was grossly in excess of the claim due, it seems to me that the conduct of the plaintiff has been such that in the exercise of my discretion I do not think that I can show her any indulgence.
27. There will be a decree for Rs. 350 in respect of the mortgage claim. The suit as to the claim based on the sale of 1882 is dismissed. The plaintiff to pay the whole costs of the suit to the defendants, and there will be two sets of costs, one in favour of defendants 1, 2, 8, 5, 6 and 7 and one in favour of defendants 8 and 9. Costs to include the costs of the counterclaim. Defendant 10 must bear her own costs. Mr. Poonawala asks that he should be allowed to recover Rupees 175 out of the amount of Rs. 350 brought in by the plain, tiff. Mr. Jhaveri has no objection. Liberty to Mr. Poonawala's client to recover Rupees 175 out of the deposit made by the plaintiff. As regards the balance of Rupees 175, the defendants will have a right to set off as regards their costs against that amount.
Judgment on appeal.
Beaumont, C.J:— This is an appeal from a judgment of Bangnekar J. and the only question raised is as to limitation. That question arises in this way. In 1879, there was a mortgage to the plaintiff's predecessor-in-title by two brothers, Jagannath and Harischandra who were members of a joint Hindu family and were two of the coparceners. They were entitled together to a third of the estate. They mortgaged their share in the estate. In 1882, one of the brothers, Jagannath, sold his share to the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff, so that such predecessor became entitled absolutely to one-sixth of the joint family property and was mortgagee of another one-sixth. Jagannath died in the year 1896, and Harischandra died in 1898, and neither of them had any male issue, so that their branch of the family ceased to be represented in the coparcenary. The plaintiff is now suing for partition of the joint family property and to have allotted to her the share which she purchased from Jagannath, and she also seeks to enforce the mortgage. The learned Judge held that the suit was time-barred, and I entirely agree with him.
28. The first question to consider, before deciding the question of limitation, is as to what interest the plaintiff acquired. It is, in my opinion, dearly established that a purchaser from a member of a Hindu joint family does not; acquire a right to be considered himself a member of the joint family in place of the vendor, or a right to have joint possession of the family property in place of the vendor, nor, of course, does he acquire any right to possession of any specific part of the property, that being a right which the vendor himself did not possess. The only right which the purchaser has in such a case is a right to sue for partition and procure to be allotted to himself the share which would have gone to his vendor. I think that is the result of the three Privy Council cases, 3 Cal 198, 5 Cal 148 and 10 Cal 626, and the decisions of this Court in 41 Bom 347 and in 43 Bom 472, all of which cases are discussed by the learned Judge. It seems to me unnecessary to consider a decision of a Bench of this Court in 50 Bom 204 which is discussed by the learned Judge and relied on by the appellant. The effect of that decision is that although a purchaser from a member of a joint family is not entitled to possession of any part of the joint family property, except after obtaining partition, nevertheless if he in fact gets possession of a part of the property, the Court is not bound to disturb his possession pending a partition suit. I do not think that the decision went beyond that. It is unnecessary to consider whether that decision was right or wrong, because there is no suggestion here that the plaintiff did obtain possession of any part of the joint family property.
29. Now, two things seem to me necessarily to follow from the proposition that the plaintiff is not entitled to joint possession of the family property first, that she can not rely on the ordinary rule that the possession of one cotenant is the possession of all the plaintiff not being entitled to possession, the possession of the other oo-owners cannot help her. Secondly, that the possession of other parties cannot be adverse to the plaintiff, because adverse possession denotes exclusion of somebody entitled to possession, and if the plaintiff is not entitled to possession, she cannot be excluded. Therefore, I am not prepared to agree with the learned Judge's view that the plaintiff's case is barred under Article 144, Limitation Act. It might possibly be held to be barred under Article 142, because in para. 10 of the plaint she pleads that the vendor, after the date of the sale, remained in possession as her tenant. She failed to prove that, but if that plea were accepted, it would seem to bring the case under Article 142. But if no Article relating to adverse possession of the immovable property applies, it seems to me clear that the residuary Article 120 must apply, and at the date of suit far more than six years had elapsed since the date of the sale or the date of the death of the vendor, whichever date be the proper starting point for limitation. This is not like the case in 11 Cal 680, on which Mr. Desai relied, because in that case the vendor had been in possession of the property within twelve years from the date of the suit, and in such a case it might perhaps be held that the purchaser is enforcing the right of partition which the vendor possessed. In this case, as I have said, the vendor died in 1896, and therefore there is no question of enforcing any right to possession which he possessed. I think therefore the learned Judge was right in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation. With regard to the claim under the mortgage, the only question is as to costs. The plaintiff claimed arrears of interest which increased the original capital sum of Rs. 350 to about rupees two lacs, but she admits that the rule of damdupat applies, and that she cannot get more than twice the amount of the principal, and the defendants paid that amount into Court. So that, in any case, the plaintiff could not get any costs in relation to the mortgage beyond the date of payment. The learned Judge dismissed the suit against the plaintiff with costs throughout, and I think he was right in so doing. It is, no doubt, a well-established rule that a mortgagee is entitled by contract to all proper costs, and that includes costs properly incurred in enforcing his mortgage. But, in this case, the mortgage had never been acted upon, as far as we know, since 1879, and when the mortgagee was asked before the suit to produce the mortgage deed and state what amount was due under it, she refused to assist in any way and filed this suit, and the suit has only resulted in the payment of very much less than the plaintiff claimed. In my opinion, it cannot be said that the costs in this suit were costs properly incurred by the mortgagee, and in the result I think the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. There will be two sets of costs, one for defendants 1 to 7 and another for defendants 8 and 9.
B.J Wadia, J.:— I am of the same opinion. The appeal involves a consideration of the old question as to what are the rights of an alienee of the undivided interest of a Hindu coparcener in joint family property, as the result of an alienation in his favour, and whether he is, as has been stated in some cases, a tenant-in-common with the other members of the joint family. The expression “tenant-in-common was first used by West J. in 12 Bom HCR 138. Tenants-in-common hold land generally by several titles and not by one joint title, but their occupation or possession is by law in common between them. They hold by unity of possession, and there need not be necessarily any unity of interest of title. It has been held in numerous cases that an alienee from a Hindu coparcener is not entitled to possession on behalf of himself separately or jointly with the other members of the coparcenary. His only remedy is to get a declaration that he is entitled to all the interest of his alienor, and he may enforce his right under that declaration by bringing a suit for partition. Strictly speaking, according to the doctrine of Hindu law as expounded in the Mitakshara, a member of a coparcenary cannot alienate his undivided interest in the joint family property, because it cannot be said at any time that he has a definite share in it, until partition. But this strict rule of the Hindu law has been gradually relaxed, and it has now been held generally that a coparcener can sell, encumber, or otherwise alienate his undivided interest in joint family property, or his undivided interest in a specific property, forming part of the joint family property, for valuable consideration, though in no case can he dispose of his interest by will.
30. The rights of such an alienee have been discussed in various cases, and these cases have been considered by the learned Judge in the Court below. Counsel for the appellant mainly relied on 12 BHCR 138, 1 Bom 95, 21 Bom 797 and lastly 50 Bom 204, in order to show that an alienee is in the position of a tenant-in-common. In Madras it has been clearly laid down that the alienee or purchaser does not get joint possession with the other members, but only a right to enforce partition. Fawcett J. in 50 Bom 204 only went to the length of saying that a purchaser in possession need not be ejected in a suit for recovery of possession brought by an excluded coparcener, but can be declared to be entitled to hold (pending a partition) as a tenant-in-common with the other coparceners, Under the facts and cir oumstances of the case he held that there were no grounds for evicting the party who was in possession, because he was a bhau-band or relation and had been in long possession himself. It follows therefore in Bombay that if a purchaser is a stranger, and has not gone into possession, he does not get anything more than the remedy which is left to him to enforce his right by partition. If he is not a stranger, and has obtained possession, as in 50 Bom 204, the Court is not bound necessarily to eject him, as is held by the Madras High Court, but may, in its discretion, and in a proper case, hold him to be a tenant-in-common with the coparceners pending partition, that is to say, admissible as such tenant, in-common to his distributive share when a partition actually takes place. Each case, therefore, according to the decision in 50 Bom 204, has to be decided on its own merits, and that decision goes no further than what I have indicated. The alienee never acquires the status of an undivided Hindu member of the coparcenary. All that he generally acquires is the undivided interest of his alienor, and a right to ascertain that interest by partition: see, 43 Bom 472 which is also a decision of the Appeal Court. Calling him therefore a tenant-in-common by borrowing a technical expression of the English law of property is to lay down a very broad proposition which is not in accordance with any known principle or text of the Hindu law.
31. The other question is whether the suit to enforce partition is barred by limitation. I do not think the case falls within Article 127, because that clearly refers to a claim made by the plaintiff as a member of the coparcenary, and the words “when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff” refer to the plaintiff as the member of the coparcenary, and not to the purchaser from that member. I do not think that the case falls within Articles 136,137 and 138 either. Nor does it fall within Article 142, though the allegations in para. 10 of the plaint seem to point to it. Article 144 also does not apply. Both these Articles are Articles applicable to suits for possession, and it is admitted that an alienee of the undivided interest of a Hindu coparcener is not entitled to possession. It cannot be said that the possession of any person is adverse to that of a person who is not entitled to any possession at all. The only other Article, therefore is the residuary Article 120, and that gives six years as the period of limitation from the time the cause of action arose. The cause of action in this case at the latest would arise from the death of the vendor when he lost his right to possession by reason of his death, and that was more than six years before the suit. I therefore agree that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
N.S/R.K
32. Appeal dismissed.