Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Nos. 1207 of 1983, 784 of 1985 and 253, 442, 252 of 1986

Attorney(S)

Himangshu De
A.Bose
Amicus Curiae
D.K.Dutta
D.K.Sengupta
S.K.Mahto
D.P.Sengupta
R.B.Mahto
Sachidananda Mitra
T.K.Dutta Gupta
P.K.Giri
P.Roy

Judges

Shamsuddin Ahmed, J.

Acts

provision of the Special Provision Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act.
S. 12AA of the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981
7. Amending S. 3A to S. 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952
provision of the Special Provision Act S. 12AC Special Judges
S. 339 and 339A of the Cr. P.C In sub-s. (3) of the said section
Provision Act. Section 12AC of the Special Provision Act
Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981.
clause (f) of S. 12AA of the Special Provision Act.
S. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act,
CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT
ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT
S. 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952
Court Sub-section (3) of the said section
CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT
S. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the E.C Act
S. 7(1)(a)(i) of the E.C Act
Section 7 of the E.C Act
Provision Act, 1981.
S. 7 of the E.C Act.

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Smart Summary

Concise Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Five Revisional Applications were taken up together because they raised the same point of law: whether Section 167(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P.C.) applies to prosecutions for offences under the Essential Commodities Act (E.C. Act), specifically offences under S. 7(1)(a)(ii). A learned Special Judge had earlier concluded that S. 167(5) did not apply because an offence under S. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the E.C. Act was not a "summons case" and because learned Special Judges are not magistrates as contemplated by S. 167 Cr. P.C. The petitioners (before the revisional court) challenged that position.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Section 167(5) Cr. P.C. applies to offences triable under the Essential Commodities Act, particularly to offences under S. 7(1)(a)(ii).
Whether S.12AA(1) of the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981 (particularly clauses (c) and (f)) makes offences under the E.C. Act "summons cases" by applying the summary-trial procedure (S.262–265 Cr. P.C.) and thereby renders S.167(5) applicable.
Whether a Special Judge constituted under the Special Provision Act is to be treated as a Magistrate (for the purposes of S.167(5)) or as a Court of Sessions, and how sub‑sections (5) and (6) of S.167 Cr. P.C. can operate together in that statutory framework.
Who (which judicial officer or court) has jurisdiction to entertain an application under S.167(6) to vacate an order made under S.167(5) where the order was made by a Special Judge under the Special Provision Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners (Mr. Roy and Mr. Sen Gupta)

Section 12AA(1) of the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981 makes all offences under the E.C. Act triable only by the Special Court constituted under that Act.
Clause (c) of S.12AA(1) empowers the Special Court, subject to clause (d), to exercise in relation to a person forwarded to it the same power which a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under S.167 of the Cr. P.C.; therefore the Special Judge is vested with S.167 powers (including S.167(5)).
Clause (f) of S.12AA(1) makes all offences triable in a summary way and makes S.262–265 Cr. P.C. applicable “as far as may be”; therefore (they argued) the application of S.262 (which incorporates the procedure for summons cases) renders E.C. Act offences effectively summons cases.
Because S.2(w) and S.2(x) of the Cr. P.C. define summons and warrant cases by reference to maximum punishment, and clause (f) and its proviso limit summary-trial sentences to 2 years, offences under the E.C. Act (including S.7(1)(a)(ii)) should be treated as summons cases so that S.167(5) applies.
Relying on pre‑Special‑Provision Act decisions (Ram Brijesh Jadav and Ram Kumar Keshori), they submitted that S.167(5) rules on extension and timing of investigation are applicable and relevant.

Argument by reliance on analogy to the Criminal Law Amendment Act (Mr. Sen Gupta)

Section 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (and related provisions) treats Special Judges—by statutory deeming—as Sessions Judges for some purposes and as Magistrates for other purposes; the Supreme Court decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. V. Krishnaswami Naidu (AIR 1979 SC 1255) was relied on to show that a Special Judge can be deemed a Magistrate for some powers and a Sessions Judge for others.
By analogy, Mr. Sen Gupta argued that a Special Judge under the Special Provision Act can exercise powers under S.167(5) (as a Magistrate) and that S.167(6) (vested in the Sessions Judge) could still operate without being rendered nugatory.
A further reliance was placed on a 1978 CHN p. 841 decision (referred to without a party name) to support the jurisdictional point about the Sessions Judge entertaining original jurisdiction after orders by other judges.

Amicus Curiae (Mr. Dilip Kr. Dutta)

Mr. Dutta supported the contentions of Mr. Sen Gupta (as noted by the court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ram Brijesh Jadav v. The State (1981 (2) Calcutta High Court Notes, p. 173)	Held that an offence punishable under S.7(1)(a)(i) of the E.C. Act is triable as a summons case; continuation of investigation beyond 180 days was illegal and Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance on a challan submitted after six months from arrest.	The court observed this decision was rendered before the Special Provision Act came into force and that it concerned S.7(1)(a)(i) (maximum punishment one year). The court regarded its relevance as limited to S.7(1)(a)(i) facts and not determinative for S.7(1)(a)(ii).
Ram Kumar Keshori v. State (81 Cr. L.J. p. 1288)	Held that an extension of investigation time under S.167(5) must be obtained before expiry of the statutory six‑month period from the date of arrest.	The court accepted the rule about timing of a prayer for extension but noted that this precedent predated the Special Provision Act and did not resolve the central question in these cases.
State of Tamil Nadu v. V. Krishnaswami Naidu (AIR 1979 SC 1255)	Interpreted provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act to hold that a Special Judge may be deemed a Sessions Judge for some purposes and a Magistrate for others; some magisterial powers may be conferred on the Special Judge where context requires.	The court acknowledged this principle but distinguished the Criminal Law Amendment Act's deeming provisions from the Special Provision Act (S.12AC), concluding the analogy was not decisive in the present statutory scheme.
Decision reported in 1978 CHN p. 841 (unnamed)	Relied upon by counsel to support the proposition that a Sessions Judge presiding over a Sessions Division may entertain original jurisdiction in matters arising from orders passed by other Sessions Judges.	The court noted reliance on this decision but treated it as insufficient to resolve the statutory incompatibility it identified between S.167(5)/(6) and the Special Provision Act's deeming of the Special Judge as a Court of Sessions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis, constrained strictly by the statutory text and by the limited role of summary‑trial procedural provisions:

The court agreed that clause (c) of S.12AA(1) of the Special Provision Act vests a Special Judge with the powers of Section 167 Cr. P.C. in relation to a person forwarded to it; there is no express restriction in that clause on the power to be exercised.
The pivotal question, however, is classification: whether all offences triable by the Special Court under the E.C. Act are rendered "summons cases" (as defined in the Cr. P.C.) by virtue of clause (f) of S.12AA(1) and the application of S.262–265 Cr. P.C.
Examination of S.7 of the E.C. Act showed distinct maximum punishments: S.7(1)(a)(i) carries a maximum of one year (clearly a summons case per Cr. P.C. definitions), whereas contraventions under the other parts of S.7 (including S.7(1)(a)(ii)) attract sentences which may extend to seven years. Consequently, offences under S.7(1)(a)(ii) cannot be treated as summons cases simply because summary‑trial procedure is made available.
The court emphasized the limited nature of clause (f): it made E.C. Act offences triable "in a summary way" and made the procedures in S.262 applicable "for the purposes of determining the procedure to be applied and for no other purpose." Thus, S.262's import is procedural, not classificatory; it prescribes which trial procedure to follow before the Special Judges but does not alter the statutory classification of the substantive offence or amend S.7 itself.
The proviso to clause (f), which limits sentences in summary trials under the clause to two years, was held not to have the effect of amending the substantive maximum punishment in S.7 of the E.C. Act; summary‑trial limits do not convert warrant cases into summons cases. The court pointed out that Chapter XXI of the Cr. P.C. allows summary trial of certain warrant cases without changing their classification as warrant cases.
The court then considered the interaction of sub‑sections (5) and (6) of S.167 Cr. P.C.: S.167(5) requires investigation to stop if it cannot be completed within six months of arrest; S.167(6) empowers the Sessions Judge to vacate an order made under S.167(5) and direct further investigation. The difficulty identified was reconciling these provisions where a Special Judge (deemed a Court of Sessions under S.12AC of the Special Provision Act) exercises S.167(5).
Counsel relied on the Criminal Law Amendment Act framework and the Supreme Court decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. V. Krishnaswami Naidu to argue that a Special Judge can be a Magistrate for some powers and a Sessions Judge for others; therefore sub‑sections (5) and (6) could operate together. The court analyzed the Special Provision Act's deeming provision (S.12AC) and concluded that under that Act the Special Judge is to be treated as a Court of Sessions for the purposes of the Code's provisions and thus is not a Magistrate in the sense required to make S.167(5) operate in respect of offences punishable as warrant cases under S.7(1)(a)(ii).
Because of this statutory framing, the court found the analogy to the Criminal Law Amendment Act to be inapposite and the contention that S.167(6) would operate in a complementary fashion to S.167(5) when orders are made by a Special Judge under the Special Provision Act to be untenable.
The court therefore concluded that, while clause (c) does vest the Special Judge with powers under S.167 generally, S.167(5) can only apply in cases that are in law "summons cases" (e.g., offences under S.7(1)(a)(i)). Offences under S.7(1)(a)(ii), which attract higher maximum punishment, do not become summons cases merely because the Special Provision Act prescribes summary procedure (S.262) for trial; the procedure does not alter substantive classification.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: S.167(5) Cr. P.C. does not apply to offences punishable under S.7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act; S.167(5) may apply to offences under S.7(1)(a)(i).

Implications and direct effects:

The court concluded that offences under S.7(1)(a)(ii) remain warrant cases in classification and are not converted into summons cases by the Special Provision Act's summary‑trial procedures or by the application of S.262 Cr. P.C.; accordingly S.167(5) is not applicable to such offences.
For offences under S.7(1)(a)(i) (where maximum punishment is one year), the Special Judge is competent to pass an order under S.167(5) Cr. P.C.
The court observed that S.482 Cr. P.C. would address issues arising under S.167(6) in appropriate cases (i.e., the supervisory jurisdiction under inherent powers may be available where necessary), but it did not expand S.167(6) beyond the statutory scheme.
Disposition in the present proceedings: the five Criminal Revision applications were disposed of as indicated by the court (Cr. Rev. No.1207 of 1983 and the rest — rule discharged; applications rejected).
The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader new precedent beyond the statutory construction applied here; the decision's effect is stated in direct terms for the parties and the offences specified in the opinion.

Outcome / Orders Made

The applications were disposed of in accordance with the court's reasoning:

Cr. Rev. No. 1207 of 1983 — (text indicates disposal as per court's conclusion).
The remaining four Criminal Revisions — Rule discharged; Applications rejected.

Note: This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion. No facts, reasoning, or citations have been added beyond those present in the opinion text.

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Lakshmi Kanta Dey v. State Of West Bengal

1. These five Revisional Applications taken up together for consideration as the same point of law is involved in all the cases. In all these cases, a point that required determination is it S. 167(5) Cr. P.C applied to cases for prosecution of offences under the provision of Essential Commodities Act. Learned Special Judge has found that S. 167(5) does not apply as offence under S. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the E.C Act is not a summons case and learned Special Judges are not Magistrates as contemplated in S. 167 Cr. P.C

2. Mr. Roy and Mr. Sen Gupta appearing for petitioners have submitted that S. 12AA of the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981 has provided in sub-s. 1(a) that all offences under the Act meaning E.C Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted according to the provisions of the said Act. Clause (c) of the said sub-section has provided that the Special Court may subject to the provisions of clause (d) of the section, exercise in relation to the person forwarded to it under clause (b), same power which a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under S. 167 of the Code in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that section. Clause (d) deals with release of the accused on bail Clause (e) authorises the Special Court to take cognizance of an offence on perusal of the police report of the facts constituting an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. Clause (f) has made all offences under the E.C Act triable in a summary way and has made the provisions of S. 262 to 265 of the Cr. P.C applicable as far as may be. Proviso to this clause states that any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. Placing their reliance on the provisions stated above both Mr. Sen Gupta and Mr. Roy submitted that it will appear from clause (f) that all offences under this Act has to be tried in a summary way and S. 262 to 265 of the Cr. P.C shall apply as far as may be Section 262 appears in Chapter XXI of the Cr. P.C under the heading “Summary Trial”. Section 262 provides for proceeding for summary trials. Procedures specified in the Cr. P.C for the trial of summons case shall be followed in a summary trial. It has also provided that no sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months shall be passed in the case of any conviction under the said chapter. The learned Advocates argued that by virtue of clause (f) of S. 12AA all offences under the E.C Act have been rendered to be summons case. They further submitted that clause (f) has determined the maximum term of imprisonment to be not exceeding two years According to S. 2(w) of the Cr. P.C summons case means a case relating to offence not being a warrant case and according to the clause 2(x) warrant case means a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. According to them because of this provision referred to be above all the cases triable by the Special Judge has become a summons case and accordingly S. 167(5) of the Cr. P.C applies in all force. Mr. Roy also submitted that clause (c) of S. 12AA(1) has made S. 167 of the Cr. P.C applicable in such case without any reservation. Therefore a Special Judge under the Act is bound to apply S. 167(5) of the Cr. P.C in appropriate case pending before him. He also submitted that the fact that he is a Special Judge has no bearing in exercising powers under S. 167 of the Code as he has been specifically vested with such power under clause (c) of S. 12AA. Learned Advocate has relied on 1981 (2) Calcutta High Court Notes page 173 Ram Brijesh Jadav v. The State (?) and 81 Cr. L.J page 1288 Ram Kumar Keshori v. State. These two cases were before the coming into operation of the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981. In the first case it was held that an offence punishable under S. 7(1)(a)(i) is triable as a summons case and the continuation of investigation beyond the period of 180 days was illegal and the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance on the challan submitted on completion of investigation beyond the period of six months after the arrest of the accused persons. In the latter case the Court held that the extension of time under S. 167(5) has to be obtained before the expiry of the period of six months from the date of arrest. These two decisions have little relevance in the facts of this case. Firstly, because in the Rambrikhs Jadav case it was held that a case under S. 7(1)(a)(i) of the E.C Act is summons case. This decision is strictly according to the provision of the Cr. P.C The maximum punishment under this section is one year. Obviously offences triable under S. 7(1)(a)(i) is a summons case as defined by the Cr. P.C I may mention again that the decision was arrived at when the Special Provision Act did not come into force. With regard to Ram Kumar Keshori's case there is no dispute that the period can be extended beyond six months only if a prayer is made before the statutory period of six months has expired. As it appears the contentions raised by the learned Advocate in this case have to be decided on the merits of their submissions.

3. I have no hesitation in my mind to agree with the submission of Mr. Roy that clause (c) of S. 12AA(1) has vested the learned Special Judge with all the powers of S. 167 of the Cr. P.C Such power is not in any way restricted by the provision contained in this particular clause or any where in the Special Provision Act, 1981. Therefore there is no restriction on the Special Judge to exercise this power under S. 167(5) in appropriate cases namely, a summons case. The question is if all the offences triable by the Special Court under the E.C Act has been rendered summons case because of the Special Provision made in S. 12AA is the direct question which I am required to deal with Section 7 of the E.C Act provides for punishment for contravention of any order made under S. 3 of the said Act. Under clause (a)(i) maximum sentence is one year which can be imposed on contravention of an order made with reference to clause (h) or clause (i) of sub-s. 2 of S. 3 of the said Act. Clause (h) provides for making an order for collecting any information or statistics for regulation of prohibition of the matter referred to earlier and clause (i) provides for making an order for an incidental or supplementary matters Contravention of the rest of the orders under S. 3 is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years and shall also be liable to fine. As it stands offences punishable under S. 7(1)(a)(ii) cannot be treated as a summons case. The argument that S. 262 of the Cr. P.C having been made applicable to all the cases under the E.C Act before the Special Judge has made cases under the E.C Act a summons case is not tenable. Clause (f) of S. 12AA has made all the offences under the E.C Act triable in a summary way. In trial of such cases application of S. 262 has been made for the purposes of determining the procedure to be applied and for no other purpose. Offences triable under the E.C Act has become triable in a summary way not because of application of S. 262 Cr. P.C but because of clause (f) of S. 12AA of the Special Provision Act. Therefore application of S. 262 does not make the offences under the E.C Act a summons case. It only provides that even though such offences may not be a summons case even then the procedure specified in the case for the trial of summons cases shall be applicable to them before the Special Judges.

4. Proviso to clause (f) of this sub-section has limited the maximum sentence that can be awarded to two years. According to learned Advocate that in effect maximum sentence for offence under S. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, is two years and accordingly these cases are summons cases as defined by the Code. If I am to accept the submission I am also required to accept that this particular proviso has in fact amended S. 7 of the E.C Act. From the scheme of summary trial in Chapter XXI of the Cr. P.C it is clear that warrant cases can also be tried in a summary way and maximum sentence that can be awarded is 3 months. These provisions certainly has not rendered warrant cases to a summons case. Classification of cases into warrant cases remained unaffected. In spite of provision of Chapter XXI of the Cr. P.C effect of clause (f) of S. 12AA of the Special Provision Act cannot go any further. These are only special proceedure laid down with certain object in view and does not affect any provision of the Essential Commodities Act unless specifically amended by this Special Provision Act. I accordingly conclude that offences punishable under S. 7(1)(a)(ii) are not summons cases.

5. I also intend to consider sub-ss. of (5) and (6) of S. 167 Cr. P.C in this context Sub-section (6) of this section provides that where an order has been made under S. 167(5) the Sessions Judge may if he is satisfied on an application made to him or otherwise that further investigation into the offence ought to be made to vacate the order made under sub-s. (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offences subject to such direction with regard to bail and other matters, as he may be satisfied. According to the provision of the Special Provision Act S. 12AC Special Judges are also Sessions Judges. It has been held that the Special Judge has the powers of granting anticipatory bail under S. 438 of the Cr. P.C as they are Sessions Judges. How this position can be reconciled if it is found that S. 167(5) Cr. P.C applies with the provisions of S. 167(6). An order passed under these two sub-sections will be difficult to reconcile. Sub-section 5 imposes an obligation on the court to stop investigation if it cannot be concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested. Whereas sub-s. (6) provides vacating the order passed under sub-s. (5). It cannot be conceived that legislature intended to make a provision which will make any provision nugatory.

6. Mr. Sen Gupta has argued that S. 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 is substantially the same as the procedure laid down in S. 12AA. He has particularly stressed that Special Judge contemplated under the said Act has been given power to take cognizance of offence without the accused being committed to him. He has also been vested with powers under S. 339 and 339A of the Cr. P.C In sub-s. (3) of the said section it has also been provided that save as provided in sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) provision of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge and for the purpose of the said provisions a court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a court of Sessions trying cases without the jury or without the said of the assessor and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. Thereafter Mr. Sen Gupta laid stress on a decision State of Tamil Nadu v. V. Krishnaswami Naidu reported in AIR 1979 SC 1255 where a provision of the Criminal Law Amendment Act has been considered. It was held on analysis of S. 8 that the Special Judge in the Criminal Law Amendment Act is for some purposes deemed to be a Sessions Judge and for some other purposes deemed to be a Magistrate and some powers exercisable by the Magistrate has been conferred on him. It also held that if the context otherwise requires the word Magistrate may include Magistrates who are not specified in S. 3 Cr. P.C On the provision of the said Act it was held that the Special Judge in the Criminal Law Amendment is thus for some purpose deemed to be a Sessions Judge and for some other purpose deemed to be a Magistrate and some powers exercised by a Magistrate are conferred on him. Mr. Sen Gupta relying on this decision submits that there is no conflict between sub-s. (5) and sub-s. (6) when a Special Judge under the Special Provisions Act exercises power under sub-s. (5). He exercises a power vested in a Magistrate. Therefore sub-s. (6) will not be nugatory. Elaborating on this Mr. Sen Gupta submitted that under S. 9 of the Cr. P.C there shall be a Court of Sessions for every Sessions Division which is to be presided over by a Judge to be appointed by the High Court Sub-section (3) of the said section provided that the High Court may also appoint Addl. District Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Sessions. According to Mr. Sen Gupta office of a Judge presiding over in the Sessions Court is a distinct office Original Jurisdiction conferred on the Sessions Judge rests with him. Therefore in matters which are original in nature can be tackled by him in accordance with law. If such matter arises out of an order passed by any Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge or other Sessions Judge not presiding over the Sessions Court of a Sessions Division can easily be entertained by him. Reading S. 167(6) the jurisdiction for allowing further investigation after it has been stopped by a Magistrate is an original jurisdiction vested in the Sessions Judge presiding over the Sessions Division. He can therefore exercise such power even if the order is passed by the learned Special Judge who is deemed to be a Sessions Judge. On this point Mr. Sen Gupta relied on a decision reported in 1978 CHN p. 841.

7. Amending S. 3A to S. 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 provides that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provision contained in sub-s. (3), the provision of Ss. 350, 549 of the Cr. P.C, 1898 shall so far as may be applied to the proceeding before a Special Judge and for the purpose of the said provision Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. On reading of this section it appears that there are ind cations in S. 8 itself that a Special Judge under a Criminal Law Amendment Act is a Magistrate when he acts under certain sections of the Cr. P.C and is a Sessions Judge in respect of other provisions of the Cr. P.C Therefore his status is different from that of Special Judge under Special Provision Act. Section 12AC of the Special Provision Act has provided that save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provision of the Code (including provision as to bail and bond) shall apply to the proceeding before a Special Court and for the purpose of the said provision, the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor. This provision clearly indicates that in spite of exercise of power under S. 167 the Special Judge is a Court of Sessions and therefore not a Magistrate. Even if the submission of Mr. Sen Gupta that provision of S. 167(6) the Sessions Judge means a Sessions Judge presiding over the Sessions Division, it will not be possible for such a Sessions Judge to entertain any application which arises for an order passed under sub-s. (5) of the said section. The Sessions Judge is competent to deal with an application in respect of a matter in which the powers under sub-s. (5) has been exercised by a Magistrate. That is precisely the terms of sub-s. (5) and sub-s. (6) Mr. Dilip Kr. Dutta Senior Advocate who appeared as amicus curiae in this case supported the contention made by Mr. Sen Gupta. I appreciate the ingenuity of Mr. Sen Gupta in advancing the argument with force but I am unable to accept his contentions in view of specific provision of the Special Provision Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act. In this connection I express my sincere appreciation of the valuable service rendered by Mr. Dutta.

8. Mr. Roy, on the other hand, argued that any order passed under sub-s. (5) by the Special Judge can be altered directing further investigation by the High Court as the Sessions Judge of the Sessions Division cannot pass an order which in effect set aside an order passed by another Sessions Judge. If this contention is accepted we shall have to read the High Court in sub-s. (6) instead of Sessions Judge. This is not permissible by any rule of interpretation. Considering what has already been stated above I conclude that provision of S. 167(5) does not apply to cases which are initiated for an offence punishable under S. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. In respect of offences under S. 7(1)(a)(i) the Special Judge is competent to pass an order under sub-s. (5) of S. 167 Cr. P.C In such case S. 482 Cr. P.C will take care of sub-s. (6) of S. 167 Cr. P.C These applications are accordingly disposed of as under:—

Cr. Rev No. 1207 of 1983….

The rest 4 Criminal Revisions….

Rule discharged.

Applications rejected.

Lakshmi Kanta Dey v. State Of West Bengal

Concise Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners (Mr. Roy and Mr. Sen Gupta)

Argument by reliance on analogy to the Criminal Law Amendment Act (Mr. Sen Gupta)

Amicus Curiae (Mr. Dilip Kr. Dutta)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Outcome / Orders Made

Lakshmi Kanta Dey v. State Of West Bengal

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