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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Second Amendment) Act, 1980.12. Reading clause (b)
  • West Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, incorporating S. 15(2)
  • provisions of the West Bengal Subsistance Allowance Act, 1969,
  • West Bengal Industrial Disputes (Second Amendment) Act, 1980.
  • WEST BENGAL PAYMENT OF SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE ACT
  • S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Second Amendment) Act, 1980.12. Reading clause (b)
  • West Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, incorporating S. 15(2)
  • provisions of the West Bengal Subsistance Allowance Act, 1969,
  • West Bengal Industrial Disputes (Second Amendment) Act, 1980.
  • WEST BENGAL PAYMENT OF SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE ACT
  • S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Anil K. Sen, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenges an order dated 17 September 1984 of a Single Judge dismissing a writ petition (Matter No. 222 of 1984) and affirming an interim relief order dated 7 November 1983 made by the 7th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. VIII-282/1982. The appellants are Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees' Co-operative Society Limited and its Assistant Secretary (the management). The respondent (workman) is Sushil Kumar Giri.

Relevant factual chronology and procedural steps (as stated in the opinion):

  • Sushil Kumar Giri was employed as "In charge of raw material stores" and drew Rs. 1,038 per month.
  • His services were terminated with effect from 3 October 1981 by a notice of discharge that gave no reasons, raising an industrial dispute.
  • The Government of West Bengal referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 6 September 1982: "whether the termination of service of Sri Sushil Kumar Giri is justified? To what relief, if any, is he entitled?"
  • The tribunal received the reference on 21 September 1982 and fixed 26 November 1982 for appearance. The workman filed his written statement on 10 December 1982; the management filed its written statement on 15 February 1983.
  • On 7 September 1983 the workman applied to the tribunal for interim relief (payment of half his salary from date of termination) under S.15(2) as inserted by the West Bengal amendment.
  • The management opposed the application inter alia on grounds of limitation (claimed bar by 60 days in S.15(2)(b)), that the claimant was not a "workman" under the Act, and that the termination was justified (post abolished / financial inability to retain).
  • The tribunal allowed interim relief by order dated 7 November 1983, directing payment of 50% of salary (Rs.1,038 p.m.) in accordance with the West Bengal Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969, effective from 7.9.83 until disposal of the case, conditional on an undertaking to repay if the workman lost the case.
  • The Single Judge (order of 17 September 1984) dismissed the writ challenge to the tribunal's interlocutory order and affirmed the tribunal's rulings on the objections raised by the management.
  • The management appealed to this court. The appeal raises two principal legal points about the scope and limits of S.15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (West Bengal amendment): (1) whether the 60-day provision is a mandatory limitation ousting jurisdiction; and (2) whether the tribunal must record a strong prima facie finding on merits before granting interim relief.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S.15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (as amended by the West Bengal Act) imposes a mandatory statutory time-bar (60 days from date of reference) which, if not complied with, deprives the tribunal of jurisdiction to grant interim relief thereafter.
  2. Whether, in granting interim relief, the tribunal is required to conduct a preliminary adjudication on the merits and record a strong prima facie case in favour of the applicant (i.e., whether the same tests as for interim relief in civil proceedings must be applied).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Management / Mr. Sengupta) Arguments

  • S.15(2)(b) imposes a mandatory 60-day time limit from the date of reference within which any interim relief must be granted; if not granted within that period the tribunal lacks jurisdiction and any later order is ultra vires.
  • No order for interim relief should be made without a preliminary adjudication on the merits and a recorded strong prima facie case in favour of the applicant; the tribunal must apply the same principle as civil courts do when granting interim reliefs.
  • At the tribunal stage the management also contended (as facts relied upon): the claim was barred by limitation (application not within 60 days), the claimant was not a 'workman' under the Act, and the termination was justified due to abolition of the post and financial inability to retain the employee.

Respondent's (Workman / Mr. Dasgupta) Arguments

  • S.15(2)(b) enjoins a statutory obligation on the tribunal to grant any interim relief admissible on a reference; the 60-day time specification is not a rule of limitation which bars a workman's claim made beyond that period.
  • The tribunal is not required to conduct a preliminary merits adjudication or record a strong prima facie case before granting interim relief; given the object and terms of the West Bengal amendment, such a requirement is not mandated.
  • The statutory provision was enacted to protect indigent workmen; interpreting the 60-day requirement as jurisdictional would frustrate that object.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, 1917 AC 170 Principle that statutory prescriptions relating to performance of public duties are generally directory (not necessarily jurisdictional) where treating them as mandatory would produce injustice; neglect may be penal but does not invalidate acts done in disregard of them. The court applied this principle to hold that S.15(2)(b)'s 60-day specification is directory (an obligation on the tribunal) rather than a rule of limitation that ousts jurisdiction; thus failure to act within 60 days does not necessarily invalidate subsequent interim relief orders.
Management Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union, AIR 1959 SC 1342 Explained that interim reliefs must be correlated to the main dispute; interim relief can be incidental to the main reference and need not be separately referred. The court relied on the Supreme Court's observations to define "admissible" interim reliefs as those proximately correlated to the main dispute and not foreign to it; used this to limit admissibility inquiry to relevance/relationship to the main reference rather than full merits adjudication.
Bihar Khadi Gramodyog Sangh v. State of Bihar, 1977 L & I C 166 Patna High Court decision construing S.10(4) (granting interim relief under tribunal's discretionary power) and holding that an applicant for interim relief must make out a strong prima facie case on merits. The court distinguished these Patna High Court decisions: they applied to the discretionary S.10(4) regime and its allowance for full judicial discretion; S.15(2)(b) creates a statutory obligation of a different shape, so the strict "strong prima facie" test from those decisions is not automatically applicable.
Management of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Workman of Bihar State Electricity Board, 1971 (2) LLJ 389 Patna High Court decision (under S.10(4)) endorsing the requirement of a strong prima facie case for interim relief under the tribunal's discretionary power. The court treated this authority as relevant to the S.10(4) discretionary context but held it distinguishable from the statutory scheme under S.15(2)(b); thus the strict prima facie requirement was not imposed under the West Bengal provision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the two legal issues in turn and anchored its analysis in the text and purpose of S.15(2)(b) (introduced by the West Bengal Second Amendment) and relevant authorities.

1) Construction of S.15(2)(b) — time limit:

  • The court read clause (b) as imposing an obligation on the tribunal to determine, within 60 days from date of reference, the quantum of interim relief admissible (if any). The phrase prescribes timing for the tribunal's performance of its duty.
  • Relying on the principle in Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin, the court held that statutory prescriptions about performance of public duties are generally directory rather than jurisdictional when treating them as mandatory would cause injustice or frustrate legislative purpose. The court applied that reasoning to S.15(2)(b).
  • The court observed that the object of S.15(2)(b) was to protect indigent workmen; a rigid rule depriving tribunals of jurisdiction after 60 days would thwart that object.
  • The court accepted that the legislature intended substantial compliance with the 60-day mandate (citing the idea of "substantial" compliance), but rejected the submission that any breach of the duty would ipso facto oust jurisdiction and render later interim relief ultra vires. The court emphasized that the breach, if any, is of the tribunal's duty and not of the claimant's action in seeking relief.
  • Conclusion on point (1): S.15(2)(b) does not operate as a rule of limitation depriving the tribunal of jurisdiction to grant interim relief after 60 days; the tribunal's failure to meet the time limit does not necessarily invalidate a later grant of interim relief.

2) Requirement of preliminary adjudication / strong prima facie case:

  • The court noted the distinction between interim awards (which decide part of dispute and require adjudication of merits to the extent necessary) and interim reliefs (which are protective measures to support a party, typically the workman, pending final adjudication).
  • The court observed that S.15(2)(b) changed the regime by creating a statutory obligation to grant the quantum of interim relief admissible and that the sole pre-requisite expressly stated is hearing the parties. The tribunal is required to determine within the prescribed time the admissibility and quantum of any interim relief.
  • The court declined to import the civil court standard (and the strict Patna High Court "strong prima facie" test developed under S.10(4)) into S.15(2)(b) proceedings. It held the Patna decisions were decided under a different statutory context (S.10(4)) and therefore distinguishable.
  • On the scope of inquiry when considering admissibility the court concluded that "admissible" should be read in the sense used by the Supreme Court in Management Hotel Imperial: interim relief must be proximate and closely connected to the main dispute (i.e., relevant and not foreign). The court explained that admissibility is a limited test — essentially one of relevance and proximate relation to the main reference — and is not equivalent to a full merits adjudication.
  • The court set out the matters that should enter the tribunal's consideration when adjudicating a claim for interim relief under S.15(2)(b): (1) admissibility (relevance / proximate connection to main dispute), (2) any objection as to the sustainability of the reference, and (3) the effect of granting or refusing the relief on the employer or the workman.
  • The court held that requiring adjudication of the merits or a finding of a strong prima facie case at the interim stage would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme aimed at securing an early protective relief for the workman.

Application to the present case:

  • The tribunal had dealt with the management's objections (including prima facie questions of status under S.2(s) and the limitation point) and recorded prima facie findings in favour of the workman.
  • Even if the tribunal had not adjudged merits to the extent of recording a prima facie case, that omission would not have vitiated the interim relief order under S.15(2)(b), given the legislative design and the limited admissibility inquiry required.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Additional explicit orders in the opinion:

  • "All interim orders stand vacated." (as stated in the opinion).
  • Prayer for stay of the order was refused.

Implications (as stated or necessarily confined to the opinion's text):

  • The 60-day specification in S.15(2)(b) is an obligation on the tribunal to act within the time but is not a limitation period which automatically deprives the tribunal of jurisdiction if exceeded; substantial compliance with the timing requirement is intended by the legislature.
  • Tribunals adjudicating interim relief under S.15(2)(b) are not required to undertake a full preliminary merits adjudication or record a "strong prima facie" case as a precondition to granting interim relief. The tribunal's inquiry is more limited and focused on admissibility (proximity to main dispute), sustainability of the reference, and effect on the parties.
  • Interim reliefs remain a protective mechanism distinct from interim awards; their grant is to be guided by statutory design favouring early relief for workmen where appropriate, not by importing the civil interlocutory standards in full.
  • No new broader principle beyond the statutory construction and the three-part consideration (admissibility, sustainability of reference, effect on parties) is claimed to be laid down beyond the court's interpretation of S.15(2)(b) in the West Bengal context.

Signed: Anil K. Sen, J. (with concurrence by S.K. Mookherjee, J.)

    Ganges Printing Ink. Factory Employees Industrial Co-Operative Society Ltd. & Ors. v. The 7Th Industrial Tribunal & Ors.

    Anil K. Sen, J.:— This appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent raises a short point as to the scope of an adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal of a claim for interim relief under S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended by the West Bengal Industrial Disputes (Second Amendment) Act, 1980. The appeal is directed against an order dated September 17, 1984, passed by a learned Single Judge of this court in a writ proceeding which was registered as Matter No. 222 of 1984. By the order impugned, the learned Judge had dismissed the writ application and had affirmed the order of interim relief dated November 7, 1983, passed by the 7th Industrial Tribunal, Wast Bengal in Case No. VIII-282/1982. The appellant is Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees' Co-operative Society Limited and its Assistant Secretary representing the management.

    2. It is not in dispute that Sushil Kumar Giri (hereinafter referred to as the workman) was an employee under the Ganges Printing Ink Factory Employees' Industrial Co-operative Society Limited (hereinafter referred to as the management). He was designated as an. “In charge of raw material stores” and drawing a total salary of Rs. 1038/- per month. His services were terminated with effect from October 3, 1981, when he was served with a notice of discharge such notice assigning no reasons whatsoever for such discharge. Such discharge raised an industrial dispute. The Government of West Bengal by an order dated September 6, 1982, made a reference to the tribunal for adjudication of the dispute as to “whether the termination of service of Sri Sushil Kumar Giri is justified? To what relief, if any, is he entitled?” The tribunal received the reference on September 21, 1982, and fixed November 26, 1982, as the date for appearance of the parties. The parties appeared. While the workman filed his written statement on December 10, 1982, the management filed their written statement on February 15, 1983. In course of the adjudication proceeding, on September 7, 1983, the workman filed an application for an order for payment of half his salary at the date of his termination by way of interim relief. Such a prayer was made on the ground that for a pretty long time he had been kept unemployed by the management and he not having any other source of income, had been living on other's charity and was about to starve. Obviously the application for interim relief was made in the light of the West Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, incorporating S. 15(2) of the said Act.

    3. This application was opposed on behalf of the management on various grounds. The first objection raised was to the effect that such a prayer not having been made within 60 days from the date of reference, was barred by limitation. Secondly, it was contended on behalf of the management that the applicant not being a workman within the meaning of the said Act, the reference itself was incompetent and, as such, no interim relief could be granted. Lastly, it was pleaded that the applicant was discharged because the post held by him was abolished and the Society was not in a financial position to retain him in service by offering him any alternative post. Such termination being fully justified, no interim relief should be granted which, if granted, would increase the financial hardship of the management.

    4. The tribunal by an order dated November 7, 1983, allowed the prayer for interim relief. Such relief was granted on the following terms:

    “The Society is directed to make payment of 50% of the salary Rs. 1038/- per month in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Subsistance Allowance Act, 1969, with effect from the date of filing this application, that is, from 7.9.83 till disposal of this case. The petitioner workman is hereby directed to give an undertaking supported by an affidavit stating therein that the amount to be received by him on account of interim relief would be repaid to the Society if the case is ultimately decided against him, within 7 days”

    5. In granting the aforesaid interim relief, the tribunal overruled the plea raised by the management that S. 15(2)(b) lays down any rule of limitation which could bar the claim of any interim relief made beyond 60 days from the date of reference. The tribunal further found that the applicant had been able to make out a prima facie case that he was a workman within the definition of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the mere fact that he was drawing a salary of more than Rs. 1,000/- would not detract from the said position when it had not been established prima facie that the applicant was being employed in any supervisory capacity.

    6. This was the order though interlocutory in nature, which was the subject matter of challenge in a writ proceedings before this court registered as Matter No. 222 of 1984. The learned trial Judge upheld the order of the tribunal by upholding the decision of the tribunal with regard to the points of objection raised by the management and overruled by the tribunal. That is the order dated September 17, 1984. Feeling aggrieved, the Society and its Assistant Secretary representing the management has preferred the present appeal.

    7. Mr. Sengupta appearing in support of this appeal has raised two points. In the first place, it has been contended by Mr. Sengupta that S. 15(2)(b) imposes a mandatory time limit of 60 days from the date of reference for grant of any interim relief so that if no such relief is granted within the said time, giving of such relief would be ultra vires the power of the tribunal. According to Mr. Sengupta, both the tribunal and the learned trial Judge had misconstrued S. 15(2)(b) of the Act to hold it otherwise so that in the present case the prayer for interim relief itself having been made beyond 60 days from the date of reference, the tribunal had not any jurisdiction to grant any such relief. The second point raised by Mr. Sengupta is to the effect that no order for interim relief should be made by a tribunal without a preliminary adjudication with regard to the merit of the dispute and without finding a strong prima facie case on the merits of the dispute in favour of the applicant for the interim relief. According to Mr. Sengupta, in the present case though the tribunal as also the learned trial Judge were quite conscious of the aforesaid requirement, both had failed to consider the merits even for the purpose of recording a prima facie case in favour of the applicant.

    8. Both the points thus raised by Mr. Sengupta have been strongly controverted by Mr. Dasgupta, who is appearing for the workman. According to Mr. Dasgupta, S. 15(2)(b) imposes a statutory obligation on the tribunal to grant such relief as would be admissible on a reference being made of an industrial dispute. The time limit prescribed for discharge of such an obligation cannot be read as rule of limitation barring the claim of an aggrieved workman for such interim relief. So far as the second point raised by Mr. Sengupta is concerned, it has been contended by Mr. Dasgupta that having regard to the object and terms of the West Bengal Amendment, it cannot be said that the tribunal is required at that stage to hold any preliminary adjudication with regard to the merits of the dispute end record any finding of a prima facie case, far less a strong prima facie case on the merits of the dispute in favour of the party claiming the interim relief.

    9. Both the points thus raised before us, are points of law and are of some importance. In that view we propose to deal with both the points thus raised before us by Mr. Sengupta in spite of our views that it was not just and proper for this court to entertain the writ petition wherein the subject matter of challenge was an interlocutory order. Entertainment of such a writ petition has resulted in this unfortunate situation, namely, the main dispute which was under the process of adjudication, could not be decided finally between the parties and the adjudication itself had been delayed by nearly 4 years. We should remind ourselves that the Supreme Court had deprecated times without number such intervention by the High Court with an industrial adjudication at the interlocutory stage. Such intervention in the present case has been a matter of prejudice not only for the workman but also for the management because by paying a sum of Rs. 500/- per month for a few months the management could have obtained its final decision with regard to the dispute itself.

    10. For deciding the two points raised before us, it would be necessary for us to refer to the terms of Section 15(2) of the said Act S. 15(2) is set out hereunder:—

    “15(2). Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a labour court or tribunal, it shall—

    a) after filing of statements and taking of evidence give day to day hearing and give its award, upon determination or decision in the manner specified in 17B without any delay;

    b) upon hearing the parties to the dispute, determine within a period of 60 days, from the date of reference under sub-s. (1) of S. 10 or within such shorter period as specified in the order of reference under sub-s. (1) of S. 10, the quantum of interim relief admissible, if any;

    Provided that the quantum of interim relief relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service of workman shall be equivalent to subsistence allowance as may be admissible under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969”

    11. This provision cams into force on November 30, 1981, and was brought about by the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Second Amendment) Act, 1980.

    12. Reading clause (b) as aforesaid, on its terms, we find ample substance in the contention of Mr. Dasgupta that it enjoins the tribunal to grant such interim relief as would be admissible end that within 60 days from the date of reference. The time specified is with regard to discharge of the obligation imposed on the statutory tribunal. On its terms, it cannot be read as a rule of limitation for preferring of any claim for interim relief. It is well settled now that “Where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of the act done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them.” (vide Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin 1917 AC 170 and Chapter XII S. 3 Maxwell). In our opinion, the above quotation fully answers the point raised by Mr. Sengupta. It cannot be disputed that S. 15(2)(b) was introduced by the legislature for protecting the interest of indigent workmen when fighting a cause against the management where always the right is between two unequals. This object can hardly be fulfilled or advanced by interpreting the clause in the manner suggested by Mr. Sengupta, namely, once 60 days expires from the date of reference, the tribunal loses all its jurisdiction to make any order of interim relief. In our opinion, the learned trial Judge has rightly pointed out various circumstances which may intervene rendering it not possible for the tribunal to abide by the time limit. If we interpret the time limit to be so absolute, as suggested by Mr. Sengupta, then, in many cases, the whole object behind this provision may be totally frustrated Mr. Sengupta relied on “Wade on Administrative Law” in contending incidentally that even if we interpret the time limit to be directory as for its precise compliance, still we would interpret it as mandatory for its substantial compliance. We feel no hesitation in accepting this contention of Mr. Sengupta because in our opinion the legislature intended and enjoined the tribunal to comply with the time limit substantially. But that, in our opinion, does not support the other part of the contention of Mr. Sengupta that any breach of the said obligation would take away the jurisdiction of the tribunal to make any order of interim relief any further so that any order made in such breach would necessarily be an invalid or ultra vires act on the part of the tribunal. It is true that in the present case the application for the interim relief was made beyond 6 months from the date of reference but that in our opinion is not of much consequence when sub-s. (2) of S. 15 does not enjoin making of an application nor provides for any limitation therefor. By the application made, the workman in the present case called upon the tribunal to do what the tribunal was otherwise required to do in law. Breach, if any, therefore was not of the workman but of the tribunal. In that view, we must override the first point raised by Mr. Sengupta and we affirm the view expressed by the learned trial Judge that since S. 15(2)(b) does not provide for any rule of limitation, the order impugned cannot be challenged on a point of limitation.

    13. The second paint raised by Mr. Sengupta raises a difficult issue. That issue is what is the scope of an adjudication for grant of an interim relief and what are the matters which should go in for consideration by the tribunal in making an order for interim relief. According to Mr. Sengupta in making an order for interim relief, the tribunal must follow the same principle as is followed by a civil court while dealing with an application for interim relief. It is contended by Mr. Sengupta that it is necessary for the tribunal to hold a preliminary adjudication with regard to the merit of the dispute and record a strong prima facie case on such merits in favour of the applicant since no interim relief should be admissible save and except where such a case is made out.

    14. It may be pointed out that S. 15(2)(b) is applicable to West Bengal and was introduced only in the year 1981. But it is now well settled by the Supreme Court that even in the absence of a specific provision like S. 15(2)(b) the tribunal possesses the authority to grant interim relief—such power emanating from S. 10(4) of the said Act. It has been held that granting such relief if appropriately related to the main dispute, would be a matter incidental and, as such, would come within the scope of the authority of the tribunal. Section 10(4) of the Act, however, imposes no specific obligation in regard to the grant of interim relief but has been construed to confer an authority to grant such relief if it is incidental leaving the entire matter to the discretion of the tribunal. Reference has been made by Mr. Sengupta to two decisions of the Patna High Court in the cases of Bihar Khadi Gramodyog Sangh v. State of Bihar 1977 Labour and Industrial Cases 166 and Management of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Workman of Bihar State Electricity Board 1971 (2) LLJ 389, both decided on the basis of S. 10(4) and laying down a proposition that whoever claims any interim relief before the tribunal must make out a strong prima facie case with regard to the merit of the dispute. That was a principle enunciated with reference to S. 10(4) which had left the matter entirely to the discretion of the tribunal. In the present case, however, we are concerned with S. 15(2)(b) which has introduced some changes. This new provisions now makes out a statutory obligation for the tribunal to grant such quantum of interim relief as would be admissible and that again within 60 days from the dote of reference. The proviso further lays down that in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment of termination of service the quantum of interim relief should be as prescribed by the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969. The only pre-requisite to the making of the order under this provision is to hear the parties to the dispute.

    15. Adjudication of an industrial dispute does not follow the procedure of a suit. It is not initiated upon a plaint or an application in which the party is to make out his case, even an application for interim relief is not a condition precedent for grant of interim relief under S. 15(2). Adjudication starts on a reference being made to the tribunal which reference again merely sets out the dispute. Once such a reference is received by the tribunal it fixes a date of appearance and then requires the parties to file their respective cases. Until such time the respective cases are not before the tribunal, yet the provision enjoins that within 60 days from the date of reference the tribunal is required to mike the necessary order for interim relief. It is quite clear, therefore, that the legislature was intending that the issue with regard to the interim relief should be adjudicated irrespective of and even before cases of the parties touching the merit of the dispute go to the tribunal. In such a situation, it would be difficult to contemplate that S. 15(2)(b) requires the tribunal to hold a preliminary adjudication with regard to the merit of the dispute and record a strong prima facie case in favour of the applicant before any order for interim relief could be made.

    16. In our opinion, there is one more reason to support the above view of ours. The Supreme Court had distinguished interim reliefs from interim awards. In a case where the tribunal goes to make any interim award obviously that would be with regard to a part of the dispute and as such based upon a part adjudication of the dispute itself. In such a case undisputedly the tribunal is required to adjudicate the merit of the dispute under reference to the extent it is necessary to be adjudicated for the purpose of making the interim award. Interim relief, on the other hand, is an interim assistance or protection extended to a party and primarily the workman to support him in fighting the cause involved in the dispute. If we accept the contention of Mr. Sengurta and hold that even for the purpose of granting such an interim relief there should be a preliminary adjudication of the merit of the dispute and the tribunal must come to a finding that there being a strong prima facie case in favour of the party claiming the relief, he has got a good chance of success in the ultimate adjudication, then in that event that would enlarge the field of adjudication at the interim relief stage to an extent which would not be consistent with the scheme of the new provision which requires granting of an early relief.

    17. According to Mr. Sengupta when S. 15(2)(b) speaks of “quantum of interim relief admissible, if any, “it enjoins that the tribunal must not only decide the quantum but also the admissibility of the interim relief claimed. According to Mr. Sengupta, the admissibility is not limited to quantum only but relates to the interim relief itself. In our opinion, Mr. Sengupta is right with regard to this part of his contention because the provision speaks of interim relief, admissible, if any. Therefore, the tribunal is required not only to determine the admissible quantum but also to determine the admissibility of the interim relief itself. The test of admissibility, however, has not been specified. Therefore, Mr. Sengupta is emboldened to contend that in determining the admissibility the tribunal is required to consider all the circumstances including the prima facie merit of the dispute under reference. We are not in a position to accept such a wide connotation for the term ‘Admissble’. We find that the word ‘admissible’ in this provision has been incorporated in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Management Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union AIR 1959 SC 1342. In paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed: “There can be no doubt that if, for example, question of reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a tribunal for adjudication, the question of granting interim relief till the decision of the tribunal with respect to the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto under S. 10(4) and need not be specifically referred to in terms to the tribunal. This interim relief where it is admissible can be granted as a matter Incidental to the main question referred to the tribunal without being itself referred in the express terms.” In our reading, the Supreme Court indicated the test of admissibility by pointing out that the interim relief must be corelated to and must have a close bearing with the principal matter in dispute. The term ‘admissible’ has a definite and well recognised meaning as a legal concept used primarily with regard to evidence. It means matters which are relevant and not otherwise excluded by law. Tested in that light, when S. 15(2)(b) speaks of admissible interim relief, it speaks of such reliefs which are proximately corelated to the main relief and not foreign to the dispute under adjudication or is not otherwise saved by any regulation. Admissibility may be one of the considerations in the process of adjudication of an interim relief but all the considerations which guide the tribunal in exercising its power in that regard are not tests of admissibility. The question, therefore, still remains as to what are the matters which must enter into the consideration of the tribunal in adjudicating a claim for interim relief. In our opinion rules governing similar adjudication in a suit cannot be invoked but matters to be considered by the tribunal should be (1) admissibility, (2) any objection as to the sustainability of the reference and (3) effect of the grant or its refusal on the employer or the workman. But for reasons given hereinbefore, we find it difficult to reconcile the consideration of the merits and/or adjudication of the prima facie case at the stage of granting the interim relief with the scheme prescribed by the statute in S. 15(2)(b).

    18. In this case, we find the tribunal had dealt with all the objections raised on behalf of the management and recorded its prima facie findings on such issues in favour of the workman and even if the tribunal had not adjudged the merits of the dispute for arriving at any finding of a prima facie case in favour of the workman, that had not vitiated the order made by the tribunal grunting the interim relief. Hence, the appeal fails and is dismissed. All interim orders stand vacated.

    19. Prayer for the stay of the order is refused.

    20. S.K Mookherjee, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Ganges Printing Ink.... v. The 7Th Industrial T...
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