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citation codes
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Acts
  • section 417 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and under Article 114 of the Limitation Act
  • provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure-sections 154 and 155 (2),
  • section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 182, Indian Penal Code
  • sub-clause (4) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • sections 154 and 155 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sections 154 or 155 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • SECTION 155 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 417 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Article 114 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • Article 114 of the Limitation Act, 19633
  • provisions of section 155 sub-section (1)
  • section 182 of the Indian Penal Code
  • SECTION 162 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 624 B COMPANIES ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (5),
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 417 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and under Article 114 of the Limitation Act
  • provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure-sections 154 and 155 (2),
  • section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 182, Indian Penal Code
  • sub-clause (4) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • sections 154 and 155 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sections 154 or 155 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • SECTION 155 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 417 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Article 114 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • Article 114 of the Limitation Act, 19633
  • provisions of section 155 sub-section (1)
  • section 182 of the Indian Penal Code
  • SECTION 162 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 624 B COMPANIES ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (5),
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (High Court) — Criminal Appeal from Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehkar

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (State of Maharashtra) appealed an order of acquittal recorded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehkar, in Criminal Case No. 135 of 1972. The respondent (the accused) was tried for an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code.

Facts (as found in the opinion): On 3-2-1972 Murlidhar suffered severe injuries while working on a sugarcane crusher and was taken to the local dispensary/Primary Health Centre unconscious; he died at about 6:15 p.m. Dr. Vithaldas concluded the death was accidental and refused to hand over the body until the police were informed. A police out-post constable attended; the Police Sub-Inspector (P.S.I.) Vasant Patil (at Kingaon Raja police station) registered the matter as an accidental death and later proceeded to investigate under section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The accused (Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Sindkhed Raja) acted as a panch for the inquest. A dispute arose when the accused removed two persons (material witnesses) from the hospital to the Gram Panchayat office, delaying examination of those witnesses and the completion of the inquest/panchanama. A crowd gathered demanding release of the dead body. The accused telephoned the District Superintendent of Police (S. P.) M. R. Reddy and conveyed that a murder had occurred, that the P.S.I. had come late and was not acting according to law, and that the P.S.I. was demanding Rs. 1,000 to "hush up" the murder. S. P. Reddy sent the S. D. P. O. Shankar Mahajan, who arrived, directed production of the two witnesses (who were produced) and then the dead body was handed over. Applications/exhibits (Exhs. 14 and 15) were also presented to Mahajan alleging the P.S.I.'s misconduct.

A complaint was filed by S. P. Reddy in the Magistrate's Court under section 182 IPC alleging the accused gave false information by telephone. At trial the Magistrate acquitted the accused, reasoning (inter alia) that the telephone information should have been reduced to writing and treating some of the statements as falling under section 162 CrPC. The State appealed. The High Court (SHIMPI A.R., J.) heard the appeal and ultimately set aside the acquittal, convicted the accused under section 182 IPC, and sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 300 (with an in-default imprisonment term and time granted to pay the fine).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate requires interference by the High Court.
  2. Whether the ingredients of section 182 of the Indian Penal Code were proved: (a) that the information was given to a public servant; (b) that the information was false; (c) that the accused knew or believed it to be false; and (d) that the accused intended or knew it likely that the public servant would thereby act (or omit to act) improperly or use lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person.
  3. Whether a telephone/oral information given to a senior public servant (the D.S.P.) had to be reduced to writing under the Criminal Procedure Code provisions relied upon by the Magistrate (specifically sections 154 and 155(2) and whether statements amounted to section 162 CrPC material).
  4. Whether the appeal by the State is barred or incompetent because the complainant (a public servant) did not seek special leave under section 417(3) CrPC, and whether the time limits in subsection (4) of section 417 or Article 114 of the Limitation Act affected the competence or limitation of the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution / Appellant (as presented in the opinion)

  • The prosecution relied on testimony (including Dr. Vithaldas, P.S.I. Patil, S.D.P.O. Mahajan and S.P. Reddy) that an accidental death had occurred and that the accused telephoned the S.P. alleging murder and bribery demand by the P.S.I.
  • The prosecution relied on the legal principle (cited from Fakirapa Ninguppa Chikkabagawadi v. The State) that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove that allegations were false and false to the knowledge of the accused; the prosecution contended it had met that burden on the facts.
  • The State argued the appeal by the State under section 417(1) CrPC was competent and within the statutory limitation period, distinguishing the Supreme Court authority relied on by the defence.

Respondent / Defence (Shri R.D. Saranjame)

  • The defence contended that the telephone information communicated to the D.S.P. was a complaint of a cognizable offence (murder) and therefore should have been reduced to writing; reliance was placed on the Gujarat High Court decision (Kantilal v. State).
  • The defence argued that the accused provided information in good faith, supported by Exhs. 14 and 15 (applications signed by villagers), and that further witnesses (e.g., the father of the deceased and persons who wrote those applications) should have been examined by the prosecution.
  • The defence contended that because the complaint was filed by the Superintendent of Police, special leave under section 417(3) CrPC should have been sought and, absent such special leave within the prescribed time in subsection (4), the appeal is time-barred; reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision (The Assistant Registrar of Companies v. Standard Paint Works (Pvt) Ltd).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fakirapa Ninguppa Chikkabagawadi v. The State, A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 2081 Establishes that under section 182 IPC the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the information was false and false to the accused's knowledge; a mere wrong belief of the accused is not sufficient for conviction. The Court accepted this principle and applied it: it held the prosecution had discharged the burden on the evidence and therefore could sustain a conviction under section 182 IPC.
Kantilal v. State, A.I.R. 1970 Guj. 218 Addresses whether a statement recorded during an enquiry can fall within section 162 CrPC and the consequences for using such a statement in prosecution; in that case a recorded statement in the course of an enquiry was treated as section 162 material. The High Court held that the Gujarat case was not applicable on the facts: here the accused himself gave an oral telephone information to the D.S.P., and the case did not involve prosecution based on a statement recorded during the course of another enquiry under section 162 CrPC.
The Assistant Registrar of Companies v. Standard Paint Works (Pvt) Ltd, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1115 Explains that a complainant seeking to appeal an acquittal (under section 417 CrPC) must apply for special leave under section 417(3) and, without such leave, appeals may be incompetent and barred by limitation; noted that appeals by complainants require special leave. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court decision and held it inapplicable: that case concerned appeals by the complainant and the need for special leave; here the appeal was filed by the State under section 417(1) CrPC and was properly before the Court and within the time allowed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps (as reflected in the opinion):

  1. Identification of the statutory ingredients of section 182 IPC: the Court set out the section's text and stated the prosecution must prove (a) the recipient was a public servant; (b) the information was false; (c) the accused knew or believed it to be false; and (d) the accused intended or knew it likely that the public servant would act (or omit to act) in consequence to the injury or annoyance of any person.
  2. Evidence appraisal: the Court accepted that the accused made a trunk telephone call to S. P. Reddy (a public servant) and accepted Reddy's evidence as credible. The Court also accepted medical and police evidence establishing that the death was accidental and that the P.S.I. Patil was undertaking investigation under section 174 CrPC.
  3. Assessment of falsity and knowledge: the Court found the message conveyed to the S.P. — that a murder had taken place and that the P.S.I. demanded Rs. 1,000 to hush up the murder — to be false on the record. The Court concluded that the accused did not, in his statement under section 342 CrPC, assert that the P.S.I. had in fact demanded Rs. 1,000 or that a murder had occurred; consequently the Court held the falsehood was to the accused's knowledge.
  4. Inference of intention: the Court reasoned that intention need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the circumstances. The Court considered the circumstances (accused removing witnesses, the content and recipient of the telephone message requesting the S.P. to come and inquire) to support an inference that the accused intended the public servant to take steps against the P.S.I. or to cause the use of lawful power to the annoyance or injury of a person — an element of section 182.
  5. On procedural objections: the Court rejected the Magistrate's view that the information should have been reduced to writing. The Court explained that sections 154 and 155(2) CrPC (referred to by the Magistrate) relate to information given to an officer in charge of a police station and to non-cognizable offences; the informant in this case gave oral information to the D.S.P., who was not then an officer in charge of a police station in relation to that information, and section 182 does not require information to be in writing.
  6. The Court also rejected the Magistrate's apparent treatment of the accused's statements as falling under section 162 CrPC, reasoning that the accused's telephone information was not a statement recorded during another enquiry that would fall within section 162; the matter was a direct information to the D.S.P.
  7. Concerning limitation and competence of the appeal, the Court distinguished the Standard Paint Works authority: that decision concerned appeals by complainants who must seek special leave under section 417(3) CrPC and the time limits in subsection (4). Here the appeal was by the State under section 417(1) CrPC; therefore, the requirement relied upon by the defence did not apply and the appeal was within time.
  8. Overall conclusion of analysis: the Court held that the Magistrate had erred in law and in appreciation of the evidence, that the prosecution had discharged its burden under section 182 IPC, and that the accused was guilty.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court's final ruling (expressed by SHIMPI A.R., J.) is that the appeal is allowed and the order of acquittal is set aside. The Court held the accused guilty under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code.

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF ACQUITTAL SET ASIDE; ACCUSED CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 182 IPC.

Sentence and immediate consequences (as ordered by the Court in the opinion):

  • The accused is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 300.
  • In default of payment of the fine the accused is to suffer "1? months rigorous imprisonment" (the text of the order records this phrase as provided in the judgment).
  • One month's time is granted to the accused to pay the amount of the fine upon executing a bond as required under the Code of Criminal Procedure within a week from the date of the order; failing which the accused is to surrender to bail.

Implications: The decision directly overturns the trial Magistrate's acquittal and results in conviction and sentence for the accused. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond application and clarification of the existing provisions of section 182 IPC and relevant CrPC provisions (notably distinguishing the facts from the precedents cited). The opinion explicitly distinguishes earlier authorities and confines its ruling to the facts and legal application in this case.

    State Of Maharashtra v. Limbaji Sayaji Mhaske, Sarpanch Gram Panchayat,

    Cases reffered:

    1. Fakirapa Ninguppa Chikkabagawadi v. The State. A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 2081

    2. Kantilal v. State. A.I.R. 1970 Guj. 218.

    3. The Assistant Registrar of Companies v. Standard Paint Works (Pvt) Ltd. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1115.

    Advocates appeared:

    V.S. Sohoni, for appellant.

    R.D. Saranjame, for respondents.

    SHIMPI A.R., J.:- The State of Maharashtra has filed this appeal challenging the order of acquittal recorded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehkar, in Criminal Case No. 135 of 1972, wherein the present respondent was tried for an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. The facts in brief are as under:-

    2. The accused respondent is the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat of village known as Sindkhed Raja in Taluq Mehkar. There was an accidental death of one Murlidhar on 3-2-1972. It appears that Murlidhar while working on sugarcane crusher got entangled in the engine and got serious injuries, which ultimately took his death. The persons who were then present and his relatives brought him in the hospital before Murlidhar was actually dead for treatment. The treatment started. At that time Murlidhar was unconscious. Dr. Vithaldas (P. W. 4) was treating him after examining him but it appears that he died immediately at about 6.15 p. m. After his death, the relatives of Murlidhar requested the doctor to hand over the dead body for cremation. The doctor found that it was an accidental death. It was not natural death. Therefore, he told them that he would not hand over the dead body till information was given to the police. It appears that the relatives tried to force Dr. Vithaldas but he did not listen and he made a report to the police out-post and as per his report two police constables came at the hospital. One remained at the hospital and the other went to the Police Station of Kingaon Raja.. Kingaon Raja is at a distance of 8 to 10 miles from Sindkhed Raja where Vasant Rajaram Patil was working as a Police Sub-Inspector. Shri Patil received the information at about 11.15 p. m. on 3-2-1972 itself that Murlidhar met an accidental death. Accordingly, he registered the crime as accidental death bearing No. 5/72 at his Police Station. There was no conveyance for him to go to Sindkhed Raja that time. Therefore, he directed constable Jagannath to proceed along with the diary to Head Constable Vishwanath who was in charge of the out post. He also reached Sindkhed Raja at about 10 a. m. on the next day morning. Thereafter he took charge of the investigation under section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and he was investigating into the cause of an accidental death and was examining the witnesses. At that time, he noticed that several relatives of Murlidhar had surrounded the dispensary and they were demanding the dead body. In the opinion of the relatives, the dead body was lying since evening in the hospital and they wanted it early for cremation. Before the investigation of the accidental death was taken in hand, in-quest was held. The accused had acted as a panch to the inquest panch-nama drawn by the Sub-Inspector. At that time, it appears that there was a casual talk between the Police Sub-Inspector Shri Patil and accused in which Patil, P. S. I. told the accused that he was a responsible person as a Sarpanch and as such he should not stand surety to those persons who are accused in prohibition cases. This particular reference by the P. S. I. aggrieved the accused and he told him that he was at liberty to stand surety to any person he likes. It appears that the accused was not satisfied with this reply but had taken away two persons who were present at the time of accidental death of Murlidhar from the hospital to the Office of the Gram Panchayat. Those two persons were necessary to be examined by the P. S. I. and it appears that the trouble started on account of this fact. As those two persons could not be examined by the P. S. I. he could not complete his report of accidental death and, therefore, could not hand over the dead body. The relatives were enraged with the P. S. I. because he was delaying in handing over the dead body of Murlidhar. By 12 or 12.30 noon a large crowed collected in front of the hospital and one of their leaders approached the P. S. I. to hand over the dead body to which the P. S. I. replied that they should not gather in large crowd around the hospital and the dead body would not be handed over till the investigation was complete and the two witnesses were examined.

    3. The accused was infuriated with this conduct and at about 1.30 noon he telephoned Shri M. R. Reddy, the complainant in this case who was working as Superintendent of Police, Buldana at the material time. At about that time Shri Reddy had gone to his bungalow for taking lunch. He learnt on the telephone which he received that the accused was making the telephone in his capacity as the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat Sindkhed Raja. The accused told Reddy that there was murder on 3-2-1972 at Sindkhed. P. S. I. came to Sindkhed Raja quite late. The P. S. I. was not taking steps according to law but he was demanding Rs. 1000 from him to hush up the murder. The accused, therefore, wanted Mr. Reddy to come personally to Sindkhed Raja and to enquire into the matter. Hearing this telephonic message, Shri Reddy felt the gravity of it as there was a serious charge of corruption against the P. S. I. who wanted Rs. 1000 as hush-money to suppress the offence of a murder. He, therefore, immediately sent his immediate subordinate S. D. P. O. Shri Shankar Mahajan, who reached Sindkhed Raja at about 5.45 p. m. He paid visit to the Primary Health Centre where he found mob of 400 to 500 persons gathered. The mob was demanding the return of the dead body from the medical officer. Shri Mahajan also saw the accused as well as the P. S. I. and asked both of them about the matter. The P. S. I. told him that the accused had prevented two material witnesses from coming forward to tell the truth, and, therefore, the dead body could not be returned. The Sub-Inspector further told him that it was not a case of murder but it was a case of an accidental death of one Murlidhar Sakharam Mate. Shri Mahajan then directed the accused to produce those two witnesses before him. Accused obeyed the orders of Mahajan, produced those two witnesses. The P. S. I. then recorded the statements and thereafter the dead body was handed over to the relatives. At this stage, the accused presented two reports before Shri Mahajan. One is Exh. 14 signed by him and some persons and the other is Exh. 15 which is signed by several other villagers. They are common in contents and the allegations made in those applications were that the P. S. I. deliberately began to ask questions to the accused which had no connection with the panchanama and he demanded Rs. 1000 for handing over the dead body and took 4 to 5 hours for completing panchanama. There-after it appears that Shri Jadhao made some enquiry and found the allegations false. He accordingly submitted a report which is also filed in this case as Exh. 16 but I propose to exclude it from my consideration. The prosecution cannot rely on a compendious report which incorporates the statements of several persons in the absence of their evidence recorded in the Court. I would, therefore, consider the evidence for the purposes of the appeal as recorded by the trial Magistrate. After the report of Shri Jadhao was received, a complaint was filed by Shri M. R. Reddy in the Court of the Magistrate, First Class, Mehkar against the accused under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code incorporating the false information given by the accused to him on the telephone and requesting to take steps against the accused.

    4. In the trial Court, the prosecution examined Shankar Mahajan as P. W. I who was working as a Sub Divisional Police Officer at Buldana. The prosecution also examined Shri Madho Kakde who was working as Sub-Post Master at village Sindkhed Raja on 4-2-1972 to show that a trunk telephone to Buldana was made from Sindkhed at about 13 20 p. m. The third witness is Muri Rajaram Reddy, the Superintendent of Police who corroborated his complaint and deposed about the telephone message received by him and which I have reproduced while narrating the prosecution case. In addition, Dr. Vithaldas who had received Murlidhar in an unconscious condition and who found that Murlidhar died at 6.15 p.m. was examined. Vasant Patil, the P. S. I. who was also present and about whom the information was given was also examined. The accused in a statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated that he contacted the D. S. P. on telephone on 4-2-1972 but did not convey to him what is deposed to by Shri Reddy but he reported to Shri Reddy on phone that the investigation of accidental death of Murlidhar was over and the statements of witnesses were also recorded but P. W. 6 Patil was demanding Rs. 1,000 for the return of the dead body. He denied that he had given any false information which he knew to be false. He denied that he gave it with an intention that the public servant should take any steps. The witnesses deposed false against him because the Grampanchayat passed a resolution against the doctor as well as the P. S. I. and he was working as Sarpanch then. The learned Magistrate on appraisal of this evidence has accepted the position that a trunk call was made by the accused to the complainant but curiously enough he came to the conclusion that the trunk call ought to have been reduced to writing because an information was given to the public servant. In para 7 he has referred to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure-sections 154 and 155 (2), which deal with registration of cognizable and non-cognizable cases at the Police Station and thereafter curiously enough comes to the conclusion that the allegations made by the accused must be treated as statement under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has also held that the accused entertained the plea that Shri Patil was demanding Rs. 1,000 for the return of the dead body and though it turned out to be a wrong belief it could not be said that it was false to his knowledge. In that view, he acquitted the accused. Feeling aggrieved, the State has filed this appeal.

    5. In view of the submissions advanced before me the only question that arises for my consideration is whether the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate requires interference at my hands. The complaint is filed under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused. Therefore, before I deal with the submissions of the learned Advocate for the accused, respondent it would be necessary to understand what are the ingredients of section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 182, Indian Penal Code reads, as under:-

    Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant-fa) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or

    (b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

    In order to prove the offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution has to prove that the person to whom the information was given was a public servant; that such information was false; that the accused knew or believed such information to be false when giving it. Therefore, the prosecution has to establish in the instant case that the accused gave the information as deposed by Reddi and as stated in his complaint which is filed in the Court and that such information was false and the accused knew or believed such information to be false and the prosecution has further to show that the accused intended thereby to cause or knew that it was likely that he would thereby cause such public servant to do or Omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts were known to him or that he intended thereby to cause or knew that it was likely that he would thereby cause such public servant to use his lawful powers to the injury or annoyance of any person. In the instant case, the fact that the accused made a trunk call to Mr. Reddi is not denied at all. It is also not denied that Mr. Reddi is a public servant. The dispute starts on what information has been given by the accused. It is not admitted by the accused that he gave a false information or he gave it with an intention that the public servant should do something in respect of that information. Reliance was placed to show that the burden is on the prosecution in such a case on an authority of the Mysore High Court reported in (Fakirapa Ninguppa Chikkabagawadi v. The State)1, A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 2081. The relevant head note is, therefore, reproduced:-

    Under section 182 it is not the law that the accused must prove that the information given by him is true or that be believed it to be true. On the other hand, it is for the prosecution to prove satisfactorily that the allegations made by the accused were false and were false to his knowledge or, at any rate, he did not believe them to be true at the time when he made those allegations. The fact that belief of the accused turns out to be a wrong belief, is not sufficient to bring home a conviction under section. 182.

    With respect, I agree with these observations because I also hold that the burden is on the prosecution and the prosecution has to prove the ingredients referred to above. The prosecution in the instant case established from the evidence of Dr. Vithaldas as well as from the evidence of the P. S. I. that an accidental death of Murlidhar had taken place. This was not disputed also at the stage of the trial on behalf of the accused. Murlidhar was working on a sugar cane crusher in his field and he got entangled and injured and was brought in the dispensary where he succumbed to his injuries. I have given the substance of the evidence of some of the witnesses while narrating the prosecution case and as there is no dispute about the facts, I again need not reproduce it. It is established from the evidence of Dr. Vithaldas, P. S. I. Patil and S. D. P. O. Mahajan that on 4-2-1972 in the evening when Mahajan came there and enquired with the accused as well as the P. S. I. he learnt about it and told the accused to produce those two persons. They were examined and thereafter the dead body was given in the custody of the relatives. Allegations of Rs. 1,000 demanded by the P. S. I. for handing over the dead body were then made and those allegations were to be found in applications Exhs. 14 and 15. However, the information given to Shri Reddi by the accused was that a murder had taken place on 3 2 1972 at Sindkhed Raja. To investigate into that murder case, P. S. I. came to Sindkhed Raja but he came quite late and P. S. I. was demanding Rs. 1,000 for hushing up the murder. Shri Reddi has made the statement on oath while giving evidence that the accused did give the above mentioned message while telephoning to him. I have carefully gone through the evidence of Reddi and cross-examination of Shri Reddi and I find that Shri Reddi has no axe to grind against the accused to make any incorrect statement. He has given a consistent version as to the information received from the accused by him. The only allegation made in the cross-examination was and which appears to have appealed to the learned Magistrate was that he has not reduced it to writing. He is not a police officer in charge of a Police Station who is enjoined according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to record information under sections 154 or 155 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was not necessary because the ingredients of section 182 of the Indian Penal Code do not state that an information given to a public servant must be in writing or must be reduced to writing by a public servant. Therefore, an oral information given could be deposed to by the person receiving it that a particular person gave him such an information. Shri Reddi who is a public servant in the instant case has deposed to the telephonic conversation that has taken place between him and the accused in which the accused gave him the information mentioned above. I have already stated that the accused admits that he had made a telephone but according to him he conveyed the message as stated in the earlier part of the judgment. There is no reason for Shri Reddi to prevaricate I, therefore, do not see any reason to disbelieve Shri Reddi and I hold relying on the word of Shri Reddi that he received the information about which he deposed.

    6. After having so held from the facts discussed above, it would be clear that there was no murder on 3-7-1972 at Sindkhed Raja P.S.I. had come but P. S. I. according to the evidence of Dr. Vithaldas was taking steps of investigation in an accidental death but the information said that he was not taking such steps according to law and he was demanding Rs. 1,000 from the accused for hushing up the murder. This was certainly a false information. This was certainly a false information to the knowledge of the accused because in his statement the accused does not state that the P. S. I. ever demanded Rs. 1,000 to hush up an offence of murder or that an offence of murder had taken place. This telephonic message was given by an accused to the superior of Shri Patil namely the District Superintendent of Police Shri Reddi with an intention that he should take some steps against Shri Patil. He wanted Shri Reddi to personally come to Sindkhed Raja to enquire into the matter. There cannot be any direct evidence to prove intention but intention has to be gathered from the circumstances of the case. Here the circumstances go to positively establish that the accused did have an intention that the public servant to whom he was giving an information should take steps either against the person against whom the information was given. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that the facts as disclosed in the instant case do go to show that the accused has committed an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code.

    7. Shri Saranjame, the learned Advocate for the respondent accused submitted that in the instant case an information of murder having taken place on 3-2-1972 at Sindkhed Raja was given to the D. S. P., Shri Reddi on his own saying by the accused. Therefore, it was a complaint of a cognizable offence and as such it should have been reduced to writing. In support of his proposition, he relied upon the judgment in (Kantilal v. State)2, A.I.R. 1970 Guj. 218. In my opinion, the submission is void of any substance. What was the information given by the accused which according to prosecution is false? It is to the effect that an offence of murder had taken place on 3-2-1972 and the P. S. I. was demanding Rs. 1,000 from the accused to hush up that murder. Therefore, the complaint which the accused wanted to communicate to a public servant against the P. S. I. was that the P. S. I. was not doing proper investigation in a murder case which was his duty to investigate. On the contrary, he was demanding hush-money of Rs. 1,000 to suppress it. It was not that an information was given that a murder has taken place and if the murder has taken place in Sindkhed Raja the information of it could be given either at the out-post of Sindkhed Raja which is in charge of a Head Constable or may be given at Police Station of Kingaon Raja and which is at a distance of 9 miles where P. S. I., Patil was then working. Moreover, the reference made by Mr. Saranjame of the Gujarat case (cited supra) does not support his contention. The facts of the Gujarat case show that on 13-10-1962 one Ishwarlal Chotubhai Desai, raided the premises of Rajkamal Stores owned by the accused. Mr. Ishwarlal Desai was the Superintendent of Prohibition and Excise at that time and in that raid he had seized certain articles which were in the nature of bottles containing Eau-de-cologne, tincture Hemidesni, Kawath etc. One Chaturbhuj B. Acharya who had nothing to do with the accused had given an application to Shri Medh, D. S. P. Anti Corruption Bureau inter alia stating that Shri Desai had colluded with the accused and had deliberately not given samples to the accused in contravention of the circular issued by the Director of Prohibition and Excise so as to enable the accused to escape from the consequences of his being in unlawful possession of alcoholic preparations. It appears that after this application was received, Shri Medh directed one Shri Erulkar, P. S. I. to make an enquiry. While making an inquiry into the application of Chaturbhuj B. Acharya, Shri Erulkar recorded a statement Exh. 13 in that case of the accused wherein the accused is alleged to have stated that he gave a bribe of Rs. 200 to Shri Desai on his assurance that he would not harass him in future. It appears that on the basis of this statement Exh. 13, the accused was prosecuted under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code and the question arose whether this statement fell within the ambit of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and if so whether the same can be made the basis of the complaint against him for an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. His Lordship Shelat J. has held that the statement Exh. 13 amounted to a statement under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because it was recorded during an enquiry of an application made by Chaturbhuj B. Acharya to Shri Medh and reference to sections 154 and 155 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are made in respect of that particular application. There fore, on the facts the present case is not applicable to the facts of the case cited. In the instant case, the prosecution says that the accused himself on telephone gave information to the public servant. It is not that the accused is prosecuted in a case upon a statement which is made in some other enquiry. I have already stated that I am not relying upon the report made by Shri Mahajan. If the accused had made a statement during the enquiry and if the accused would have been prosecuted, then something could have been said about the statement but here there is a positive statement on which an action has been taken by a public servant.

    8. Shri Saranjame then urged that the accused gave an information regarding certain facts. He gave that information in good faith. This would be evidenced by the two applications Exhs 14 and 15 which he gave to S. D. P. O. Mahajan. He submitted that there was no doubt a delay in handing over the dead body and, therefore, it was natural for the accused to feel that something prevented the Police Sub-Inspector from handing over the dead body and that reason has been given not only by him but by several villagers who have signed the application. He, therefore, urged that it was incumbent on the prosecution to examine the father of the deceased as well as some of the persons who have scribed those applications. After having considered the submissions of Shri Saranjame I find that they merit no substance at all. Shri Saranjame presumes that the statements made by the accused in the Court as regards the information supplied to the D. S. P. were true and on that basis the further submissions are made by Shri Saranjame. I have already stated what information was given by the accused to Shri Reddi. It was not an information that an accidental death had taken place and that the P. S. I. was simply delaying the delivery of the dead body because he wanted Rs. 1000. I have believed the evidence of Shri Reddi and I hold that the subsequent statement of the accused is a mere eye-wash and even that statement does not appear to be true because the evidence of Mahajan shows that it was the accused who had kept two material witnesses whom Patil, the P. S. I. required for examination. Under section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of an enquiry of an accidental death, the police officer in charge of a police station has to make an investigation and draw up a report of the apparent cause of death and stating in what manner or by what weapon the injuries found on the body were made. That would go to show that the police officer has to investigate and for investigation, Patil wanted to record the statement of the two witnesses. The accused was enraged with him because the P. S. I. while drawing an inquest panchanama made a casual remark that he was standing surety to bootleggers and the persons dealing or trafficking in illicit liquor. In view of what I have stated above, I hold that the prosecution has discharged its burden and it was not necessary in the instant case to examine the father of the deceased or the members or persons who have scribed the application. The complaint made by the accused was not only false but was false to the knowledge of the accused and was given by him with an intention that the public servant should take some steps as provided under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code.

    9. It was then contended that in the instant case, the complaint is filed by the Superintendent of Police. Therefore, an application under section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was necessary to be made to the High Court for obtaining special leave and as no such application has been made within the prescribed time as laid down in sub-clause (4) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the present appeal filed by the State is time barred. Reliance is placed on an authority of the Supreme Court reported in (The Assistant Registrar of Companies v. Standard Paint Works (Pvt) Ltd)3, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1115. The facts of that case showed that the Assistant Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, filed petitions of complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta alleging that certain officers/directors of the Standard Paint Works (P) Ltd. of 44 Beadon Row, Calcutta mentioned therein were guilty of offence for non-compliance with provisions contained in the Companies Act, 1956 by reason of default in filing Annual Return of the Company together with the Annual Accounts and Balance sheet. The Presidency Magistrate acquitted the accused in all those cases. It appears that the Assistant Registrar of Companies aggrieved by that order filed appeal in the High Court of Bengal and the High Court held that the memorandum of appeals from an order of acquittal were barred by Article 114 of the Indian Limitation Act. Aggrieved by that order, the appeals were filed to the Supreme Court. Three principal contentions were raised before the, Supreme Court. First was that the appeals were filed under the authority given under the provisions of companies act and reference was made to section 624 (B) of the Companies Act. The Supreme Court negatived that contention and held that the right of appeal is granted under section 417, Criminal Procedure Code being a creature of statute. The Supreme Court further held that the appeals were rightly not entertained by the High Court because first there was no application for grant of special leave under section 417 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; secondly, the appeals were incompetent without grant of special leave, and thirdly, these were barred by limitation. The Supreme Court further held An appeal under section 417 (3) against acquittal is competent only when there is special leave granted by the High Court. On obtaining special leave the appeal is thereafter filed within 30 days of the grant of leave to escape the mischief of the period of limitation under Article 114 of the Limitation Act, 19633 . On these grounds the Supreme Court rejected the appeals. In my opinion, the facts of the Supreme Court case are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. Reading section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, it would be clear that the State Government has a right to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. This would follow that if a complaint was lodged by a private person in the Court of the Magistrate and if on hearing the complaint, the Magistrate acquitted the accused, that acquittal can also be challenged by the State. By the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the year 1955, it appears that a further right to a complainant has been given under sub-section (3), that he can seek special leave by making an application to the High Court and after obtaining such a special leave he may file the appeal within the stipulated period of limitation. Sub-section (4) was added for the complainant to take a prompt step and he should not at any stage come to the High Court and seek special leave. Therefore, it was specifically stated that the application for grant of special leave has to be made within 60 days from the date of the order of acquittal. If special leave was not granted, then the State was also not entitled to file an appeal. This would show that the right to file an appeal to challenge the order of acquittal given to the State is not curtailed but is supplemented and if the complainant wants to have the advantage of his own right, he may take resort to it. In the instant case, Shri Reddi who is the complainant has not filed this appeal. Therefore, the question of making application for special leave does not arise in the instant case. It is the State who has filed this appeal under section 417 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and under Article 114 of the Limitation Act such an appeal can be filed by the State within a stipulated period of 90 days from the date of the order appealed from. Therefore, the appeal is filed within time. The office has computed the days of the copies and has made an endorsement that the appeal is within time. Therefore, there is also no substance in that contention.

    10. The learned Magistrate has not properly appreciated the evidence in this case. In my opinion, he has failed to appreciate the ingredients of section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. He first refers to the fact that Reddi should have reduced the information to writing. The reason given by him was that this was mandatory because provisions of section 155 sub-section (1) make so. In my opinion, the Magistrate ought to have read the provisions little more carefully before observing to the above effect. First of all, as I have stated earlier, section 182 of the Indian Penal Code does not require that the information given to a public servant must be in writing or must be reduced to writing irrespective of the fact whether the information given to the public servant relates to a cognizable offence or to a non-cognizable offence. Section 155, Criminal Procedure Code referred to by the Magistrate relates to an information given to an officer of a Police Station of the commission within the limits of such Station of a non-cognizable offence. In the instant case, informant was of Sindkhed Raja. The informant gave an information of what took place at Sindkhed Raja to D. S. P. of Buldana who was not in charge of a Police Station at the material time when information was given by the accused. Therefore, the question of reducing to writing the information did not arise in this case. The learned Judge curiously in para 8 observes that the allegations made by the accused must be treated to be the statement falling under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. With respect to him, one fails to understand how he came to such a curious reasoning and whether he really understood what he meant to observe. Before making those observations he has referred to the report made by S. D. P. O. Shri Mahajan and held that that report had no bearing in order to bring the offence home to the accused. The information given to (Shri Reddy) the public servant in the instant case was not given while Shri Mahajan had gone for investigation. The information in the instant case was given to Shri Reddi and it was not given during investigation which Shri Reddy was carrying of a certain offence. Therefore, this statement referred to. above by the Magistrate is obviously wrong and incorrect. The learned Magistrate presumes that the accused entertained the belief. From what circumstances he has come to this conclusion he has not enumerated them in his judgment. Such kind of presumptions not discussed are mere conjectures. The learned Magistrate then proceeds to observe that the P. S. I. Patil should have been more careful in completing the investigation as soon as possible. Instead of making such observations it would have been better for the learned Magistrate to have gone through the ingredients of section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. With respect to him, the findings of the learned Magistrate, in my opinion, are manifestly wrong. Hence for the reasons which I have stated above the order of acquittal is required to be set aside. I, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate and on facts established hold accused guilty under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code.

    11. The next question that arises for my consideration is as to what sentence I should award to the accused. Accused is a Sarpanch. He is a responsible officer, he should not have given such a false information. However, considering the circumstances of the instant case, I find that a sentence of fine of Rs. 300 would meet the ends of justice. I, therefore, pass the following order.

    12. The appeal is allowed. The order of acquittal is set aside. Accused is held guilty and convicted under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. He is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 300 or in default to suffer 1? months rigorous imprisonment. One months time is granted to the accused to pay the amount of fine on his executing a bond as required under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure within a week from today failing which the accused to surrender to bail.

    Appeal allowed.

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