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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority made a reference under Section 54 of the Mysore Stamp Act, 1957 regarding whether a letter dated 30 January 1965 (sent by Murugharajendra Company as managing agents of Sree Shankara Textile Mills Ltd.) was liable to stamp duty under Article 6 of the Schedule to the Act.

Relevant facts: The mortgagors had earlier borrowed Rs. 6,00,000 under an equitable mortgage dated 10 October 1960 and had deposited title deeds with the State Bank of Mysore. In January 1965 the mortgagors sought an additional advance of Rs. 5,00,000, and the company's Board of Directors passed a resolution on 29 January 1965 authorising the managing agents to borrow this further sum under an equitable mortgage on the same title deeds. On 30 January 1965 Murugharajendra Company wrote a letter to the bank acknowledging the title deeds and agreeing that the bank may continue to hold them as security for the additional advance.

Procedural history: The Registrar of Companies, on examining the documents filed for registration under Section 125 of the Companies Act, impounded the letter and forwarded it for recovery of stamp duty and penalty. The subordinate revenue officers and the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority held the document liable to duty under Article 6, and the Assistant Commissioner communicated that duty of Rs. 2,025 and penalty of Rs. 10 were recoverable. The mortgagors paid the amounts under protest and filed writ petition W.P. No. 1585 of 1967. This Court directed a reference under Section 54(1) of the Stamp Act, leading to the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the letter dated 30 January 1965 is liable to stamp duty under Article 6 of the Schedule to the Mysore Stamp Act, 1957.
  2. Whether the letter constitutes an "instrument" evidencing an agreement relating to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds (i.e., whether it was intended to be the sole repository of the terms of the equitable mortgage).
  3. Whether the facts amount to constructive delivery of title deeds already in the mortgagee's possession so as to constitute an equitable mortgage for the additional advance.

Arguments of the Parties

Mortgagors' Arguments

  • The letter of 30 January 1965 was not an instrument creating a mortgage by deposit of title deeds and hence not chargeable to duty under Article 6; it was merely a record or acknowledgement of a mortgage already effected by delivery of title deeds.
  • It was not intended that the letter be the sole repository of the terms of the equitable mortgage; the mortgage had been completed by delivery (actual or constructive) of title deeds.

Revenue / Government Advocate's Argument

  • Relying on the Board resolution, the learned Government Advocate contended that the parties intended to conclude the bargain by execution of a document and that the letter dated 30 January 1965 was that document (i.e., intended to be the operative instrument creating the mortgage).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United Bank of India Limited v. Lekharam Sonaram and Company (Supreme Court) Explains the nature of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds: delivery of title deeds with intent creates an equitable mortgage; if parties reduce contract to writing the written document becomes the sole evidence and then requires registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act; such a document also becomes liable for stamp duty as an instrument creating an interest in immovable property. The Court used this authority to frame the legal test: intention of parties determines whether a document is an instrument creating a mortgage (and thereby chargeable to stamp duty). The Court applied the principle that if the parties intended the document to be the sole evidence, it would require registration and be chargeable; otherwise the deposit (actual or constructive) is the operative act.
K.J. Nathan v. S.V. Maruthi Rao (Supreme Court) Discusses delivery of title deeds and endorses the doctrine of constructive delivery; reproduces and applies observations in Whitbread Ex-Parte to emphasise substance over form for subsequent advances. The Court relied on this decision to accept that where title deeds are already in the creditor's possession an advance may be secured by constructive delivery without formal re-delivery; this supported the conclusion that constructive delivery occurred for the additional advance of Rs. 5 lakhs.
Whitbread, Ex-Parte ((1812) 34 ER 496) Chancellor's observation that, for subsequent advances, formal re-delivery of deeds is not necessary if there is clear evidence the documents were intended as security for the further advance — emphasises substance over form. Quoted (via K.J. Nathan) to illustrate and justify the doctrine of constructive delivery; used to support the view that subsequent advances can be charged on already deposited deeds without formal re-delivery.
Obla Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyer (Privy Council) Held that a memorandum which listed title deeds with words "as agreed upon in person, I have delivered..." was merely a written record of an agreement effected by deposit and payment, and did not itself purport to create rights requiring registration. The Court treated this decision as directly analogous: it supported the conclusion that the letter in the present case was a record/acknowledgement of an already concluded equitable mortgage and did not create or declare any right in the property, and thus did not require registration or attract stamp duty under Article 6.
Rajamma v. Mahant P. Krishnanandagiri Goswamy (This Court) Followed the Privy Council view that a memorandum listing deeds may be only a record of deposit and not an instrument creating interests requiring registration. The Court noted that this Court had followed the Privy Council's approach and relied on that established local precedent to support its conclusion that the letter was not an instrument creating rights in immovable property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis grounded in statutory definitions and precedent:

  1. Definition and legal test: The Court began with the statutory definition of "instrument" in Section 2(1)(j) of the Mysore Stamp Act which includes any document by which a right or liability is created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. The Court observed that whether a document is an instrument creating an equitable mortgage depends on the intention of the parties.
  2. Principles from precedents: The Court relied upon United Bank of India v. Lekharam Sonaram to explain that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds may arise by delivery of deeds with intent, and that if the parties reduce their bargain to a written document the document can become the exclusive evidence and thus require registration (and implicate stamp liability). The Court also relied upon K.J. Nathan (and the Whitbread observation quoted therein) to articulate the doctrine of constructive delivery — that where documents are already in creditor's possession a further advance may be secured without formal re-delivery if it is clear the deeds were also intended as security for the later advance.
  3. Application to facts — delivery: On examining the letter dated 30 January 1965, the Court found it was not "happily worded" and contained grammatical defects, but more importantly it did not show an actual physical re-delivery of title deeds on that date with the intention of creating an equitable mortgage. Instead, the letter acknowledged title deeds already in the bank's possession and recorded that those deeds would continue to serve as security for the additional advance. The Court held that constructive delivery (not actual) was sufficient to conclude an equitable mortgage for the additional loan.
  4. Application to facts — whether the document was intended as sole evidence: The Court then considered whether the parties intended the letter itself to be the sole repository of the mortgage terms. The letter's language referred to prior agreement ("as agreed upon in person") and acknowledged previously deposited deeds; it did not state that an equitable mortgage was being created by the execution of the letter. The Court contrasted this with the Board resolution which authorised the managing agents to execute a formal mortgage "as and when the Bank demands" and noted there was no such demand. Therefore, the resolution did not establish that the parties intended the letter to be the formal instrument creating the mortgage.
  5. Reliance on analogous authorities: The Court found Obla Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyer analogous, where a memorandum listing title deeds was held to be a record of a deposit already effected and not a document creating or declaring an interest. This reinforced the Court's interpretation that the letter was an acknowledgement/record rather than the operative instrument creating rights in immovable property.
  6. Conclusion from analysis: Combining the statutory definition, the precedents on constructive delivery and the textual analysis of the letter and the corporate resolution, the Court concluded that the letter was not intended to be the sole evidence of the equitable mortgage and did not itself create any right or liability in respect of immovable property that would attract stamp duty under Article 6.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The document dated 30th January, 1965 is not an instrument evidencing an agreement relating to the deposit of title deeds and is not liable for stamp duty under Article 6 of the Schedule to the Mysore Stamp Act, 1957.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The letter of 30 January 1965 was held to be only an acknowledgement or record of an equitable mortgage already constituted by delivery (constructive or actual) of title deeds; it is therefore not chargeable to stamp duty under Article 6 as an instrument creating an interest in immovable property.
  • Broader precedent: The Court's decision applies the existing doctrinal principles (intention of parties; constructive delivery; distinction between a document as sole evidence and a record of an earlier transaction) but the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel or wider rule beyond the application of established authorities cited in the text.

    M/S. Murugharajendra Co. v. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority In Mysore And Others

    Venkataramiah, J.:— The above case arises out of a reference made by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under Section 54 of the Mysore Stamp Act, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The question for consideration in this case is whether a document addressed by Murugharajendra Company for and on behalf of itself and Sri Shankara Textile Mills Limited, Davangere (hereinafter referred to as the mortgagors) in favour of the Manager, State Bank of Mysore (hereinafter referred to as the mortgagee), is liable for stamp duty under Article 6 of the Schedule of the Act.

    The facts leading to the above reference are these:

    (2) The mortgagors had borrowed from the mortgagee a sum of Rupees six lakhs under an equitable mortgage dated 10th October 1960. In that connection they had deposited with the mortgagee, the title deeds relating to certain immovable properties. In January 1965, the mortgagors approached the mortgagee to advance an additional sum of Rupees five lakhs under an equitable mortgage on the security of the title deeds already deposited by them under the first mortgage. The mortgagee having agreed to advance the sum the mortgagors got a resolution passed on 29th January, 1965 of the Board of Directors of Sri Shankara Textile Mills Limited authorising its Managing Agents Murugharajendra Co., to borrow an additional sum of Rupees five lakhs under an equitable mortgage on the security of the title deeds already deposited with the mortgagee under the first mortgage. On 30th January, 1965 they wrote a letter to the mortgagee which reads as follows:

    “We Murugharajendra Company, a registered firm, the duly appointed Managing Agents of Sree Shankara Textile mills Ltd., Davangere, as agreed upon in person and being duly authorised by Resolution No. (10)(ii) passed by the Board of Directors of the Company on 29th January, 1965, true copy whereof is enclosed herewith, have deposited, this day, the title deeds, is enclosed hereto, have deposited this day, the title deeds relating to the fixed assets of the said Company, consisting of lands, buildings and installed machinery, as per list enclosed to the memorandum of Mortgage by deposit of title deeds, for the repayment of Rupees six lakhs with interest thereon, executed by us on 10th October, 1960, and agreed that your bank may continue to hold the said title deeds as security by way of equitable mortgage for the due repayment on demand with interest at 3½ per cent more than the Reserve Bank of India rate with a minimum of 8½ per cent of the additional sums further advanced, and to be advanced to the extent of Rs. 5 lakhs.

    “List of title deeds:

    for Sree Shankara Textile Mills,

    for Murugharajendra Company,

    Partner,

    Managing Agents.”

    (3) After the above letter was written Registrar of Companies was requested to register the mortgage under Section 125 of the Companies Act. Along with the documents filed before him, a copy of the letter dated 30th January, 1965 extracted above was also filed. On going through the said letter, the Registrar of Companies, being of the opinion that the letter was liable for stamp duty under Article 6 of the Act, impounded the same and forwarded it to the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, for recovery of duty and penalty. The Deputy Commissioner in his turn referred the matter to the Assistant Commissioner, Davanagere. The Assistant Commissioner having felt doubt as to the stamp duty with which the document was chargeable, drew up a statement of the case and referred it with his own opinion for the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under Section 53(2) of the Act. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority held that the document was liable to stamp duty under Article 6 of the Act, as according to him the document was an instrument evidencing an agreement relating to the deposit of title deeds. Thereafter, the Assistant Commissioner intimated the Registrar of Companies that stamp duty of Rs. 2,025 together with a penalty of Rs. 10 was recoverable from the mortgagors. The mortgagors having credited, under protest, the duty and penalty referred to above, filed a writ petition in W.P No. 1585 of 1967 on the file of this Court, questioning the correctness of the above order. This Court by its order passed in the writ petition, directed the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to make a reference under Section 54(1) of the Act. Pursuant to the said direction the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority has made the above reference.

    (4) The contention of the mortgagors before us was that the document in question was not chargeable to duty under Article 6 of the Schedule to the Act as it was not an instrument evidencing an agreement relating to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds, but it was only a letter containing a reference to a completed mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It was argued that it was not the intention of the parties that the letter in question should be considered as the sole repository of the terms, of the equitable mortgage, but in fact the mortgage had been completed by the delivery of the title deeds to the mortgage.

    The expression ‘instrument’ is defined in Section 2(1)(j) of the Act as follows:

    “Instrument” includes every document by which any right’ or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited extended extinguished or recorded.”

    (5) The manner in which a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be created has been explained by the Supreme Court in United Bank of India Limited v. Lekharam Sonaram and Company(1) as follows:

    ‘A mortgage by deposit of title deeds is a form of mortgage recognised by Section 58(1) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that it may be effected in certain towns (including Calcutta) where a person delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property with intent to create a security thereon in other words, when the debtor deposits with the creditor title deeds of his property with an intent to create a security the law implies a contract between the parties to create a mortgage and no registered instrument is required under Section 59 as in other classes of mortgage. It is essential to bear in mind that the essence of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is the actual handing over by a borrower to the lender of documents of title to immovable property with the intention that those documents shall constitute a security which will enable the creditor ultimately to recover the money which he has lent. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, this implication of law is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage. It follows that in such a case the document which constitutes the bargain regarding security requires registration under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest in immovable property, where the value of such property is one hundred rupees and upwards. If a document of this character is not registered it cannot be used in the evidence at all and the transaction itself cannot be proved by oral evidence either.”

    (6) It is clear from the opinion of the Supreme Court extracted above that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be created by handing over the title deeds by the borrower to the lender with the intention that these documents shall constitute the security for the debt. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, that document alone would be the sole evidence of its terms. In the latter case, the document shall have to be treated as an instrument creating a right in favour of the mortgagee to recover the loan from the properties to which the title deeds relate. Such an instrument requires to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards in immovable property. It would also become liable for stamp duty under Article 6 of the Schedule to the Act. Hence, the essential factor which determines whether a document is one by which an equitable mortgage is credited is the intention of the parties. The existence or otherwise of such intention can be established either by the documents produced by the parties or by oral evidence or by both.

    (7) We shall now proceed to consider whether the parties intended to create an equitable mortgage by the letter dated 30th January, 1965 or whether the said letter is a mere record of an equitable mortgage which had already been created by delivery of title deeds. On going through the said letter which is extracted above, we feel that it is not happily worded. There are one or two grammatical mistakes also in it. A fair reading of the letter shows that there was no physical delivery of title deeds by the mortgagors to the mortgagee on 30th January, 1965 with the intention of creating an equitable mortgage. What was actually done was that the title deeds which were already in the possession of the mortgagee under the earlier mortgage for Rupees six lakhs, were acknowledged by both the parties as being held by the mortgagee as security for the additional sum of Rupees five lakhs lent on 30th January, 1965. It has to be presumed that in the instant case, there has been constructive delivery of title deeds on 30th January, 1965, though not actual, and such constructive delivery is sufficient in the eye of law to conclude an equitable mortgage. The above view receives support from the following passage extracted from the following decision of the Supreme Court in K.J Nathan v. S.V Maruthi Rao(2).

    “The decision in Whitbread, Ex-Parte, (1812) 34 ER 496 throws some light on the legal requirements of delivery of title-deeds. There, the petitioner claimed a lien, as an equitable mortgage, by deposit-in 1808 of the leasse of a public-house as a collateral security for £ 1,000, lent to the leasee on his promissory note, and a subsequent advance of £. 100 made in January 1810. One of the points mooted was whether the subsequent advance of £ 100 was also charged on the property covered by the document. The learned Chancellor in the context made the following observation:

    “If the original bargain did not look to future advances, no subsequent advance can be a charge, unless the subsequent transaction is equivalent to a re-delivery of the deed, receiving it back as a security for both sums, that will do; as it cannot depend upon that mere form; but I shall require them to swear expressly, that when the sum of £ 100 was advanced, it was upon the security of the deposit.”

    The said observations emphasise the substance of the transaction rather than the form. It implies that a debtor, who has already effected a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds in respect of an earlier advance, need not go through the formality of receiving back the said documents from the creditor and formally re-delivering them to the creditor as security for further advances taken by him. It would comply with the requirements of law if there was clear evidence that the documents already deposited with the creditor would also be charged by way of deposit of title-deeds in respect of the further advances. The doctrine accepted by this decision may, for convenience of reference, be described as the doctrine of constructive delivery. Learned counsel for the respondent attempted to confine the scope of this decision to a case of further advances on the basis of documents already deposited with the creditor in respect of earlier advances. It is true that the principle was enunciated in the context of the said facts, but it is of wider, application. In our view, the same principle will have to be invoked wherever documents of title have already been in the possession of creditor at the time when the debtor seeks to creat a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds……”

    We, therefore, hold that there was constructive delivery of title deeds which were already in the possession of the mortgagee as security for the additional loan of Rupees five lakhs.

    (8) The next question is whether the parties intended that the document dated 30th January, 1965 should be considered as the sole evdience of the equitable mortgage. The document refers to an earlier oral agreement when it recites “as agreed upon in person”. Later on it refers to a deposit of title deeds already made when it recites “have deposited this day the title deeds and an earlier agreement regarding the loan and the rate of interest payable thereon when it recites “(have) agreed that your bank may continue to hold the said title deeds as security by way of equitable mortgage for the due payment on demand with interest……” The document does not state that an equitable mortgage was being created by the execution of the same by the mortgagors. It is in the nature of a record of what had been done earlier by the constructive delivery of title deeds with the intention to create an equitable mortgage.

    In Obla Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyer(3) the Privy Council was concerned with a document almost similar to the one in question in this case. The facts of that case are these A person in Madras gave a promissory note and on the same day gave a memorandum which contained a list of the title deeds with the introductory words “as agreed upon in person, I have delivered to you the under mentioned documents as security.” The Privy Council was of the view that the memorandum was only a written record of the particulars of the deeds which were the subject of an agreement constituted in fact by the act of deposit and the payment of the money and that it neither purported nor operated to create or declare any right, title or interest in the property included in the deeds with the result that it did not require registration. The Privy Council took the said view notwithstanding the fact that there was a condition that the loan had to be given only after the said memorandum was delivered to the mortgagee. It was held that the memorandum remained a list of the documents deposited and nothing more. The above view of the Privy Council has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India Limited(4) and is followed by this Court in Rajamma v. Mahant P. Krishnanandagiri Goswamy(5).

    (9) But it was argued by Sri M.P Chandrakanta Raj Urs, learned Government Advocate, relying upon the resolution of the Board of Directors of Sree Shankara Textile Mills Limited that the parties intended to conclude the bargain by the execution of a document and that the letter dated 30th January, 1965 was the said document. The relevant part of the resolution reads as follows:

    “It was further resolved to give an undertaking to the said Bank, undertaking to execute a regular mortgage deed in respect thereof on the requisite stamp paper and get the same executed under Company's seal and in conformity with the Company's Articles of Association and get the same registered as and when the said Bank demands.”

    We do not think that the learned Government Advocate is right in his contention. The portion of the resolution extracted above only states that as and when the mortgagee demands, a regular mortgage deed could be executed. There was no such demand made by the mortgagee in this case. In any event the letter dated 30th January, 1965 cannot be considered as the regular mortgage which the parties intended to execute. The resolution was only intended to clothe the Managing Agents of the Company to conclude the loan transaction and, if necessary, to execute a formal deed. The resolution however did not prohibit the conclusion of the deal without the execution of a formal deed, if it was possible to do so.

    (10) We, therefore, hold that the letter dated 30th January, 1965 was not intended by the mortgagees to be the sole repository of the terms of the equitable mortgage, but it was only a letter containing an acknowledgement of an already concluded equitable mortgage. It is, therefore, not an instrument by which any right or liability was created in respect of immovable property.

    (11) In the result, we hold that the document dated 30th January, 1965 is not an instrument evidencing an agreement relating to deposit of title deeds and is not liable for stamp duty under Article 6 of the Schedule to the Mysore Stamp Act, 1957.

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    M/S. Murugharajendra Co. v. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority In Mysore And Others
    (Nov 22, 1973)