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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Five appellants (writ petitioners), originally members of the provincial police force, were placed on deputation from 1.3.1985 to serve as vigilance watchers under the first respondent (port authority). The deputation was initially for three years, but the appellants continued on a de facto deputation from 1.3.1988 for about one and a half years. The second respondent (the secretary of the port) sent a request to the home department on 17.9.1988 for extension of the appellants' deputation for a further year from 1.3.1988, which did not produce the desired result. Instead, the chairman of the port caused another request to be made and the appellants were conditionally released by order of the Governor permitting permanent absorption in the port service (release orders dated 5.11.1988 and another referred to in a letter dated 5.8.1988). The appellants had made written requests to be absorbed in the port service.

Shortly before permanent absorption could occur, the appellants were repatriated. The third respondent gave two reasons for repatriation: (i) no extension order of deputation was in place after expiry on 1.3.1988; and (ii) the appellants were not suitable given their present performance (letter dated 11.9.1989). The second respondent's communication of 29.8.1989 contained no reasons. The chairman (who had initiated the absorption request) did not himself seek repatriation.

Procedurally, a writ petition in the court below failed in limine on 5.10.1989. Affidavits of the first three respondents were considered in the appeal court's stay proceedings; the fourth respondent (State of West Bengal) filed no affidavit but its counsel stated the appellants had been released for the purpose of absorption. By two protective orders (5.10.1989 and 27.2.1990) the appeal court directed the port authorities to keep five vigilance watcher posts vacant and permitted the appellants to join police duty without prejudice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person on deputation has a legal right to be absorbed in the deputation post (i.e., whether deputation gives rise to a right of permanent absorption).
  2. Whether repatriation orders can be judicially reviewed and quashed where a public body's decision to repatriate a deputationist is vitiated by irrelevant considerations or irrationality, even though the deputationist has no proprietary right to absorption.
  3. Whether, when repatriation or recall is based on alleged fault or unsuitability, the deputationist is entitled to reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations (procedural fairness / right to be heard).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contended they should be absorbed in the port service: they had requested absorption in writing and found the port service terms to be better.
  • They pointed to the fact that two of their colleagues had actually been absorbed, suggesting inconsistent treatment (see paras cited at pp. 37-41).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Counsel for the respondents (Mr. Ajoy Kumar Mitra) relied on the proposition—grounded in authority (Soni's case, AIR 1990 SC 1132)—that a deputationist has no right to be absorbed in the deputation post.
  • The third respondent gave two reasons for repatriation: absence of an extension of deputation after 1.3.1988, and unsuitability based on present performance (letter dated 11.9.1989). The second respondent's communication of 29.8.1989 offered no reasons.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Soni's case, AIR 1990 SC 1132 Affirms that a person on deputation does not have a right to be absorbed in the deputation post. The court acknowledged the proposition but held that the absence of a proprietary right does not preclude judicial review where refusal to absorb is irrational or based on irrelevant considerations; Soni's rule therefore did not end the inquiry.
Neelima's case, AIR 1990 SC 1402 Examines situations of a "privilege" (no-right) and states that even where a public body has discretion, irrelevant considerations and irrational actions are forbidden and may lead to quashing of administrative action. The court used Neelima's reasoning to support the proposition that a public body's privilege to choose can be reviewed when exercised irrationally or on irrelevant grounds; it applied this principle to quash the repatriation orders.
Parsottam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 25 Establishes that a deputationist has no right to the deputation post and clarifies the legal position regarding deputation and release. Justice A. M. Bhattacharjee relied on this leading decision to explain that deputationists have no justiciable right to substantive appointment while still under substantive employment elsewhere, though they may be considered if released by their employer.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two complementary strands of analysis.

First, the court acknowledged established authority (Soni and Parsottam Lal Dhingra) that a deputationist does not possess an inherent legal right to absorption in the deputation post. However, the court emphasized that absence of a right does not render a public body's exercise of discretion immune from judicial review. Drawing on the distinction between "duty/right" and "privilege/no-right" (and referencing Neelima), the court reasoned that where a public body enjoys a mere privilege to confer a benefit, it must exercise that privilege without resort to irrelevant considerations or irrationality; otherwise the administrative action is susceptible to quashing.

Second, the court applied those principles to the facts before it. It examined the reasons given for repatriation and found both defective:

  • The first reason (absence of any extension order of deputation post 1.3.1988) was held to be irrelevant in the face of prior release orders and the context of absorption: an extension of deputation, even if issued later, would have been ineffective for the period in question and therefore could not justify repatriation in August/September 1989. The court characterized reliance on this ground as being guided by an irrelevant consideration.
  • The second reason (unsuitability based on present performance) was found to be irrational and perverse because there was no material on record to support it. The appellants' service record showed they had performed well and even received cash awards (pp. 23–24). The court rejected unspecified references to "secret reports" as insufficient to sustain repatriation.

On procedural fairness, Justice Bhattacharjee added that while a deputationist may be called back without reasons, if the recall is premised on alleged fault, the deputationist must be afforded reasonable opportunity to meet the allegation; otherwise the order cannot stand.

Because the decision to repatriate was vitiated by an irrelevant consideration and by irrationality (and lacked supporting material), the court quashed the repatriation orders/requests of the second and third respondents (pages 35 and 89 of the paper book) and directed the chairman of the port authority to reconsider the question of absorption in a lawful manner.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court quashed the repatriation orders dated 29.8.1989 and 11.9.1989 (pp. 35 and 89 of the paper book) and ordered that the chairman of the first respondent reconsider and decide the question of absorption of the appellants as vigilance watchers in accordance with law and with reasons recorded in writing if absorption is refused.

Specific consequential directions given by the court:

  • The chairman must take a decision and either order absorption or record written reasons for refusing absorption; the process of absorption or refusal must be completed within eight weeks from the date of the judgment.
  • The interim orders of the appeal court dated 5.10.1989 and 27.2.1990 shall continue for a period of twelve weeks from the date of this judgment.
  • Liberty to mention after the chairman's decision, if necessary.
  • The appeal and the writ petition were allowed to the extent described; no order as to costs was made. The opinion records the appeal as "allowed in part."

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by quashing the specific repatriation orders and directing reconsideration of absorption with procedural safeguards. The court applied existing precedents to clarify that although deputationists have no automatic right to absorption, public authorities' discretionary actions remain subject to review when tainted by irrelevant considerations or irrationality. The opinion does not purport to establish a new general rule beyond the application of those principles to the facts before the court.

    Kamal Kanti Chatterjee v. Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Calcutta

    Ajoy Nath Ray, J.:-

    (1) Five (writ petitioners) appellants, who were on deputation from 1. 3. 1985 serving as vigilance watches under the first respondent. Are originally of (he provincial police farce. The deputation was initially for 3 years, but the appellants continued on de facto deputation from 1. 3. 1988 for about a year and a half; the request of the second respondent, who the secretary of the port, made, a little belated though it was, to the home deapartment (police) (paper book. P. 33) on 17. 9. 88, for extension of the appellants" period of deputation by a further year from 1. 3. 88 did not produce the desired result. Instead, on the order of the chairman, port, another request as made and granted: this was the conditional release, by order of the governor, permitting the appellants (o be absorbed permanently in the port service. One of these release orders dated 5. 11. 88 is at p. 31 of the paper book, and the other is referred to in the letter of the - third respondent, who is the chief vigilance officer) dated 5. 8. 88 (p. 129). The appellants wanted to be absorbed in port service and made written requests to the third respondent to that effect (pp. 121 - 128).

    (2) On the brink of permanent absorption, the appellants were repatriated. Why ? the third respondent has given two reasons - (i) no extension order of deputation came on expiry of 1. 3. 88; (ii) in view of the appellants' present performance, they are not suitable; letter of 11. 9. 89 at p. 89. The second respondent's communication of 29. 8. 89 (p. 35) contains no reasons for repatriation. There is no repatriation sought for by the chairman himself, who initiated the absorption possibility.

    (3) On 5. 10. 89 the writ failed in limine in the court below but we have looked into the affidavit of the first three respondents filed in the appeal court stay proceedings. The fourth respondent, the state of west bengal, has filed no affidavit, but has stated through counsel that the appellants were released for the express purpose of absorption in the port services. By two protective orders of the appeal court, dated 5. 10. 89 and 27. 2. 90. , (he port authorities have been directed to keep five ports of vigilance watchers vacant and the appellants have been permitted to join police duty without prejudice.

    (4) The third respondent has repeated his two reasons in another letter of his, dated 12. 10. 89 (p. 133). ; but he says here wrongly that the. W. B. Government conveyed (heir no objection to the absorption in the port service, on (he prayers of the appellants: the second respondent's letter of 5. 8. 88 (p. 129) clarifies that, on the other hand, it was the chairman who had cause the request to be sent. In fact, the appellants had not petitioned the state, but the third respondent himself.

    (5) Do we then say, following sonis case (air 1990 sc 1132) and as suggested by mr. Ajoy kumar mitler appearing for the respondents that there is no right of a deputationist to be absorbed, and that is an end of the story ? or do we examine further the matter, as, appearing for the appellants mr. Nirmal mitler said we should, on the unassailed basis that the appellants found their port service lobe ion berterterms. And that two of their colleagues have actually been absorbed ? (pp. 37 - 41. Esp. Paras 13. 15).

    (6) The short one page judgment of son is case no doubt affirms the position that a person on deputation has no right to be absorbed in the deputation post but that gets us nowhere. A person also does not have a right to be awarded a government contract; yet, under today's law government contracts may have to be awarded to the lowest bidder, so that the government may not be held guilty of arbitrary action. So also, a depulationist may have to be absorbed in the deputation post, not because he has; any right to it, but because a non - absorption on the part of the government would be unsustainable as, being say, irrational and wholly unreasonable.

    (7) As soon as the appellants were released by order of the governor, the port authorities were placed in a position of privilege, to absorb, or not to absorb, the appellants in port service.

    (8) Today public body may be successfully sued not only in a duty -. Right situation, but also, under appropriate circumstances in a privilege - no - right situation as well. This is because the courts enjoin equality in a myriad situations, and thus, though the person aggrieved has no classical right, yet the public body is so ordered as to raise the impression as if a right is being enforced. The highest tenderer has no right to be awarded the contract; the state has a privilege to choose its contracting partner; but even there, ceteris paribus, the lowest tenderer must be chosam. See neelima's case, air 1990 sc 1402 at 1409 para 23 and at 1411 para 29 where the mere privilege situation is examined, and it is said that even in such a situation, irrelevant considerations and irrational actions are forbidden, on paid of the administrative action being quashed.

    (9) For these words, duty, right, privilege, no - right, we can usefully refer to the fundamental legal conceptions of hohfeld, and especially to the useful chart given in the beginning of part - iii. A person is commonly said to have a privilege, or a mere privilege, when, very stirictly, he should perhaps be said to have reached the possibility of receiving the benefit of a privilege of granting the benefit or not, really reposes, not with the prospective recipient, but with the grantor, usually a public body.

    (10) On this principle, we must quash the repatriation orders/requests (pp. 35, 89 of the paper book) of the second and the third respondents, reading them together. The two reasons for repatriation are bad on the face. When absorption parmanently is, in issue, and when release orders for absorption have come from the parent service, of what use or necessity can an extension of the deputation order be ? even that extension order of deputation would have expired 1. 3. 89 had it come at all; so, oil what use would it be in august or september '89 when repatriation was ordered ? it is a clear case of being guided by an irrelevant consideration.

    (11) The second reason is irrational and perverse there is no material fore it. The appellants service was not only balms, but they earned cash awards (pp. 23,24). No report, complaint or proposed action against them is seen anywhere. Secret imports against the appellants are mentioned in the affidavit of the third responded (p. 107, at para 12). Our administrative law has no friendship with vague allegations of secret reports.

    (12) If no reasons had been given for repatriatlion, the same order might have been less assailable in a court. But what of that? more often than not, truth will out and justice vindicate itself even in this very imperfect world of the law.

    (13) The port authorities thus had a privilege to absorb or not to absorb the appellants, who, in their turn, could either become the recepients of that privilege or not the sit nation founds the basis 'which,, in today's legal context, is sufficiently firm to support a constitutional action. The matter of conferment of the privilege being vitiated by an irrelevancy and an irrationality, the port authorities must reconsider the matter in a proper way. Since think that the repatriation orders dated 29. 8. 89 and 11. 9. 89 respectively at pages 35 and 89 of the paper book are bad in law, the same are quashed and thus the question of absorption is still open. The chairman, of the first - respondents, shall take a decision in this matter, and order absorption of the appellants as vigilance watches, unless, for grounds to be recorded in writing, there are good reasons to the contrary; the process of absorption or appointment, or refusal of absorption, must be completed within eight weeks hereof. The interim orders of the appeal court dated 5. 10. 89 and 27. 2. 9) 3 shall continue for a period of twelve weeks from date. Liberty to mention after the chairman's decision, in case of necessity.

    (14) The appeal and the writ petition succeed to the above extent. No order as to costs. A. M. Bhattacharjee, j. :

    (15) As the presiding judge in this bench. I have virtually overruled brother ray when he insisted that as a matter of formal propriety and judicial decorum. This note of mine should precede his judgement. His is the governing judgment in this case arid i am only adding few words while concurring in the order proposed by him. We have, of late, and rightly too, started discarding m: e formalities, as in our view, it is the substance that must count and must take precedence over mere form. Since it is brother ray's judgment which is disposing of the appeals, i would require much stronger reasons that what could be advanced by brother ray to pursuade me: to agree with him that a note of mine invariably precede. In fact, my decision tctcome out with my note after ray, j. , is lo demonstrate my whole - hearted disagreement with the so called rule of convention or practice, to which ray, j. , has very emphatically advised me to adhere.

    (16) Recall or repatriation simpliciter of a deputationist to his substantive post is obviously not dismissal or removal within the meaning of article 311 and cannot also, in law, amount to reduction in rank within in the meaning of that article. It is merely an order of reversion back, which again, in law, cannot involve him in any adverse civil consequence, even though. In fact, he may lose some privileges or - benefits available to him during deputation. However comfortable, attractive and alluring the terms and conditions of the deputation may be, the deputationist has no right to the post or any justiciable claim to be absorbed therein. This position emerges clearly from the leading decision in parsottam lal dhingra (air 1958 sc 25) , rendered more than three decades ago, and the decision in soni (air 1990 sc 1132) , referred to by brother ray and relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents, also affirms that position.

    (17) While no one has any right to any post, until appointed, every one, if otherwise qualified, has a right to be considered therefore and any unreasonable exclusion of such a one consideration, may vitiate the appointment. But a deputationist, however until released or agreed to be released by the authority under whom he holds his substantive appointment, may not have any right in law, to be considered for substantive appointment to the post he holds on deputation. He may, be considered and, if found suitable, may also be appointed to the post held on deputation, provided the employer of his substantive appointment chooses to release him. But otherwise, a deputationist, while on deputation "with his substantive appointment elsewhere, has no justiciable right even for consideration for substantive appointment to the post held on deputation. The leading employer must have the right to recall, and the borrowing authority must have also the authority to move for repatriation of the deputationist and unless this much is conceded, smooth running of the administration would receive a serious joint.

    (18) But temporary civil servants also have no right to the post, and yet the law is settled beyond all doubts that their services also cannot be terminated on the ground of any misbehaviour or incapacity, without giving them reasonable opportunity of being heard. By parity of reasons, therefore, it has got to be accepted that while a deputationist may be called back without assigning any reason, yet once it appears that such recall or repatriation is on the ground of any alleged fault or the like, the deputationist must also be given all reasonable opportunities to meet the allegation as otherwise the order shall fail.

    (19) That apart, brother ray has also clearly demonstrated that while the first ground of recall appears to be irrelevant, the second one does not appear to have any foundation on me matenals now on record. The order of recall must accordingly be set aside, as direected by brothser ray and as directed further, the chairman must consider the question of the appellants being absorbed in accordance with law in the light of the observations contained in the judgment of ray j. , law apart, it would be unjust and even immoral not to consider their cases, when the lending government have agreed to release them for such consideration and absorption. By the way, how i wish that i could unreservedly agree with brother ray that "truth will out and justice vindicate itself', satyameva jayate nanritam", and "yato dharmastato jaya". But i would only that we must endeavour to ensure that law co - exists, wherever and whenever possible, with justice and morality. Appeal allowed in part.

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    Kamal Kanti Chatterjee v. Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Calcutta
    (Aug 2, 1991)