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  • provision of section 134, clause (2), and section 69, clause (3), of Criminal Procedure Code, and section 89, clause of the City of Bombay Police Act,
  • clause (3) of section 141 of the Indian Penal Code. Under section 40 the Indian Penal Code,
  • sub-section (3) of section 23 of the City of Bombay Police Act IV of 1902
  • section 23, sub-section (3) of the Bombay City Police Act IV of 1902
  • section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act, Bombay V of 1902,
  • sub-section (3) of section 2 Section 23, sub-section (1), clause
  • section 23, sub-section (3), of the City of Bombay Police act,
  • section 23, sub-section (3), of the Bombay City Police Act
  • SECTION 195 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 3, clause (i) of the Bombay Act IV of 1902.
  • section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • Section 131 of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • section 33 of the Interpretation Act of 1889
  • section 137 of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • section 127 of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • sub-section 3 of section 23 of Act IV 1902,
  • SECTION 242 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 127 of the Bombay Act IV of 1902
  • SECTION 3 POLICE ACT
  • section 143 of Indian Penal Code.Rule
  • section 188 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • section 143 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 23, sub-Section (3). If the Act
  • section 23 refers in sub-section (1)
  • section 23, sub-section (2), clause (e),
  • section 143 the Indian Penal Code
  • section 127 of the Bombay Act IV
  • section 23(3) because section 137
  • section 188 of the Indian Penal
  • section 127 of the Police Act
  • section 188, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 143, Indian Penal Code,
  • sub-section (3) of section 23
  • sub-section (4) of section 23.
  • sub-section (1) of section 23
  • SECTION 12 POLICE ACT
  • Section 24, sub-section (1),
  • section 23, sub-section (3),
  • BOMBAY POLICE ACT
  • section 23(2)(b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provision of section 134, clause (2), and section 69, clause (3), of Criminal Procedure Code, and section 89, clause of the City of Bombay Police Act,
  • clause (3) of section 141 of the Indian Penal Code. Under section 40 the Indian Penal Code,
  • sub-section (3) of section 23 of the City of Bombay Police Act IV of 1902
  • section 23, sub-section (3) of the Bombay City Police Act IV of 1902
  • section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act, Bombay V of 1902,
  • sub-section (3) of section 2 Section 23, sub-section (1), clause
  • section 23, sub-section (3), of the City of Bombay Police act,
  • section 23, sub-section (3), of the Bombay City Police Act
  • SECTION 195 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 3, clause (i) of the Bombay Act IV of 1902.
  • section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • Section 131 of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • section 33 of the Interpretation Act of 1889
  • section 137 of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • section 127 of the City of Bombay Police Act
  • sub-section 3 of section 23 of Act IV 1902,
  • SECTION 242 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 127 of the Bombay Act IV of 1902
  • SECTION 3 POLICE ACT
  • section 143 of Indian Penal Code.Rule
  • section 188 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • section 143 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 23, sub-Section (3). If the Act
  • section 23 refers in sub-section (1)
  • section 23, sub-section (2), clause (e),
  • section 143 the Indian Penal Code
  • section 127 of the Bombay Act IV
  • section 23(3) because section 137
  • section 188 of the Indian Penal
  • section 127 of the Police Act
  • section 188, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 143, Indian Penal Code,
  • sub-section (3) of section 23
  • sub-section (4) of section 23.
  • sub-section (1) of section 23
  • SECTION 12 POLICE ACT
  • Section 24, sub-section (1),
  • section 23, sub-section (3),
  • BOMBAY POLICE ACT
  • section 23(2)(b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two accused, both members of the Managing Committee of the Girni Kamgar Union (one also a secretary and editor of the union organ), were charged and convicted for being members of an unlawful assembly under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code. On or about 12–13 July 1929 the Commissioner of Police issued a written order (Exhibit A) under section 23, sub-section (3), of the City of Bombay Police Act IV of 1902, prohibiting specified office-bearers and members of the union from convening assemblies of mill hands for one week. The notification was publicly promulgated in the mill area on the evening of 12 July and copies were posted the next morning.

On 13 July a handbill (Exhibit C) inviting strikers to private meetings at Kumbhar Chawl was produced; the accused admitted convening the meeting. The Commissioner of Police and the Chief Presidency Magistrate attended, told the accused the meeting contravened the prohibition, and the accused initially stated they considered the order illegal. The Chief Presidency Magistrate advised the accused to submit to the order and seek judicial determination; they agreed and were arrested under the orders of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, later placed before the Presidency Magistrate, Fifth Court, and convicted under section 143 IPC. The Magistrate sentenced them to six weeks' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 each.

The case reached the court whose opinions are reported here (Patkar, J. and Wild, J.). The judges examined, among other matters, (1) the legality and scope of the Commissioner's order under section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act, (2) adequacy of promulgation/service of the order and the accused's knowledge, (3) whether disobedience of that order could constitute an offence under section 188 IPC (and so be the common object of an unlawful assembly under section 143 IPC), and (4) whether prosecution under the Indian Penal Code was permissible where the Police Act also created a penal provision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order issued by the Commissioner of Police under section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act (prohibiting assemblies) is a lawful order capable of being a "lawful promulgation" within the meaning of section 188 of the Indian Penal Code.
  2. Whether an order under section 23(3) can validly extend to assemblies held in private places (as opposed to being confined to public streets or places).
  3. Whether the promulgation and service of Exhibit A (the prohibition order) was sufficient to charge the accused with knowledge of the order, or whether individual service was required.
  4. Whether disobedience of the Commissioner's order, as alleged in this case, satisfied the elements of section 188 IPC (i.e., knowledge of the order and the disobedience producing or being likely to produce harm such as obstruction or danger to human life, safety or health).
  5. Whether the existence of a penal provision in the Police Act (section 127) for disobedience of an order under section 23(3) prevents prosecution under the Indian Penal Code (i.e., whether the Police Act created a new, exclusive offence or merely enlarged the ambit of existing offences such that prosecution under IPC remains permissible).
  6. Whether the Court could take cognizance of the offence in the absence of a complaint by the public servant under section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, where the substantive charge relied upon was section 143 IPC (unlawful assembly).

Arguments of the Parties

Accused (Appellants) — Principal Arguments

  • The Commissioner's order under section 23(3) was not a lawful order within the meaning of section 188 IPC because it did not fall within the powers lawfully exercisable by a public servant under that section.
  • Section 23(3) was argued to apply only to assemblies or processions in public streets or places; the meeting here was in a private place and therefore outside the section's scope.
  • The prohibition (Exhibit A) was not individually served on the accused; therefore they lacked the necessary knowledge of the order to sustain a conviction under section 188 IPC.
  • The factual condition required by section 23(3) (necessity for preservation of public peace or safety) was not fulfilled; the order was allegedly made for ulterior motives (e.g., because the accused objected to police reporters at union meetings).
  • The disobedience did not produce or was not shown to be likely to produce obstruction, danger to life, health or safety — the prosecution's evidence on increase of crime and danger was inadequate.
  • The Police Act created a new, specific statutory offence for disobedience (punishable under section 127 of the Police Act) and that special procedure and remedy was intended to be exclusive; accordingly, conviction under the Indian Penal Code (section 188/143) was impermissible (reliance on King-Emperor v. Abdul Hamid and related principles).

Prosecution / Crown — Principal Arguments

  • The Commissioner of Police validly exercised his statutory discretion under section 23(3) and the order (Exhibit A) was lawfully promulgated and therefore could constitute a "lawful order" for the purposes of section 188 IPC.
  • Section 23(3) is not confined to public streets or places; its language is wide enough to include assemblies at the place where the meeting occurred (the open space between chawls), and other provisions of the Act show intentional omission of such a restriction.
  • The manner in which Exhibit A was promulgated (beat of drum, posting in mill area, service on the union secretary, copies pasted at conspicuous places) and other proved circumstances entitled the court to infer knowledge by the accused; individual personal service was not necessary in the circumstances.
  • Evidence (handbill Exhibit C, Superintendent Spiers' testimony, and crime statistics exhibits) supported an inference that disobedience would produce obstruction, annoyance, or danger and thus met the tendency/likelihood elements of section 188 IPC.
  • The Police Act did not oust prosecution under the Indian Penal Code: the disobedience could constitute an offence under both section 127 of the Police Act and, if conditions of section 188 were met, under section 188 IPC; statutory saving/provisions (section 131 of the City of Bombay Police Act and analogous statutory provisions) permit cumulative remedies.
  • The charge actually proceeded under section 143 IPC (unlawful assembly) and not directly under section 188; consequently the requirement of a complaint under section 195 CrPC (for direct prosecution under section 188) did not apply to the present proceeding under section 143.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Raja Bahadur Shivlal Motilal Illustration that the Commissioner has a discretion in issuing such orders; relied upon for principle that the Commissioner's view is material. Cited to support the proposition that the Commissioner’s discretion as to necessity for public peace or safety is a primary consideration, though subject to judicial review for manifest abuse.
Nagar Valab Narsi v. The Municipality Dhandhuka Principle that public authorities, even acting within defined powers, must not act arbitrarily. Used to frame judicial review limits on the Commissioner's discretion — discretion must not be arbitrary.
Duke of Bedford v. Dawson (Sir George Jessel, M.R.) Public bodies are to be judges of matters but courts will intervene if powers are manifestly abused. Applied to indicate courts will not substitute their view unless discretion is shown to be abused; supported acceptance of Commissioner's order absent manifest abuse.
Sharp v. Wakefield Definition of 'discretion' — must be exercised according to law, reason and justice, not arbitrarily or whimsically. Invoked to assess whether the Commissioner exercised his statutory discretion properly; court found the discretion in this case was exercised on public peace/safety grounds, not arbitrarily.
Bhagchand v. Secretary of State Authority cited on limits of discretion of public officers (context: reviewability). Used to reinforce limits on arbitrary exercise of public power; supported the view that the Commissioner's action could be lawful if reasonably exercised.
Reg. v. Sukar Budhia Principle regarding service/promulgation of orders and proof of accused's knowledge — actual service is conclusive of knowledge but knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. Cited when discussing whether individual service was required; court applied the principle that knowledge can be inferred from proved circumstances (posting, drum-beating, service on secretary).
Queen-Empress v. Anant Shitaram Kulkarni Related to requirement or sufficiency of service/knowledge for conviction under provisions penalizing disobedience. Relied upon in the argument about necessity of evidence of knowledge; court considered these authorities when concluding knowledge could be inferred.
Ramdas Singh v. Emperor Authority that knowledge of an order may be inferred from circumstances, including publication where accused resides or being a member of a body on which order was served. Applied to support inference that accused had knowledge of Exhibit A given the manner of promulgation and the accused's association with the union.
Emperor v. Bhure Mal Cited in relation to inferring that disobedience of a prohibition order may result in conflict with police and satisfy tendency requirements under section 188. Used to support the court's inference that the accused knew disobedience would likely lead to conflict with police and thereby satisfy section 188 conditions.
King-Emperor v. Abdul Hamid Authority addressing whether an offence created by a special statute can be prosecuted under general criminal law (one judge held conviction under IPC was impermissible in that case). Cited and discussed at length; court distinguished the present case on facts and on statutory procedure grounds, concluding the Police Act did not preclude prosecution under IPC here.
Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood Principle that legislative prescription of particular penalties and procedures for newly created offences indicates legislative intent about remedies and punishment. Referred to in the discussion on whether creation of penal provisions in a special Act excludes prosecution under general law; used to analyze legislative intent regarding remedies.
The Queen v. Hall Charles Consideration whether a statutory offence with a particular remedy excludes other remedies (inquiring whether statute prescribes exclusive remedy). Quoted to frame the legal inquiry whether the Police Act's penalties/procedure exclude prosecution under IPC; court relied on the principle to analyze exclusivity of remedy.
Rex v. Wright Authority concerning the distinction between statutes creating new offences and statutes enlarging the ambit of existing offences. Used in the court's analysis to distinguish whether Police Act created a wholly new exclusive offence or merely added acts within the ambit of existing offences (section 188 IPC).
Lowe v. Darling & Son (Farwell L.J.) Discussion of the distinction between new statutory offences with exclusive remedial procedure and statutes that enlarge an existing offence (and thus leave prior remedies intact). Applied to conclude that the Police Act did not create an exclusive remedy; the disobedience could be punishable under both the Police Act and the Indian Penal Code where conditions of the latter are satisfied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of legal questions grounded in the facts proved in evidence:

  1. Validity and scope of the Commissioner's order (section 23(3) Police Act):
    • Both judges considered whether section 23(3) was confined to public streets/places. They analyzed the Act's language and other sub-sections and concluded the omission of a public-place restriction in sub-section (3) was intentional; other clauses expressly refer to "streets" or "public places" where relevant.
    • The court observed that other powers in the Act (e.g., temporary closing or taking possession of buildings under section 24(1)) demonstrated that the statute could lawfully regulate or interfere with private premises in the interests of public peace or safety. On this basis the judges held that an order under section 23(3) can extend to an assembly in a private place when the Commissioner considers it necessary for public peace or safety.
  2. Proper exercise of discretion by the Commissioner:
    • The court accepted that the Commissioner must exercise discretion according to law and not arbitrarily (drawing on authorities such as Sharp v. Wakefield and Duke of Bedford v. Dawson), but found on the evidence that the Commissioner did not act arbitrarily in this instance. The Commissioner addressed public peace and safety concerns, and the court refused to overturn his judgment in the absence of manifest abuse.
  3. Promulgation/service and the accused's knowledge:
    • The court examined how Exhibit A was promulgated: beat of drum (bataki), pasting of copies at many locations in the mill area, service on the union's general secretary, and other postings. The court referred to statutory provisions (sections cited in the opinion) and to precedents about the sufficiency of promulgation.
    • Applying Reg. v. Sukar Budhia and Ramdas Singh, the court held that knowledge of the order could be inferred from the proved circumstances (widespread publication and service on the union office). Thus individual personal service was not necessary in the particular circumstances; the accused could reasonably be inferred to have had knowledge of Exhibit A.
  4. Whether the disobedience satisfied section 188 IPC (tendency to produce harm):
    • The court considered the content of Exhibit C (handbill), admissions by the accused that they had convened the meeting, Superintendent Spiers' evidence about the slogan encouraging non-attendance at work and the alleged increase in crime since the union started private meetings, and statistical exhibits showing increased reported cases in the mill area.
    • While acknowledging some evidential gaps and that certain assertions (e.g., stones thrown at Kumbhar Chawl) were not supported by the record, the judges concluded that there was sufficient evidence to infer that disobedience of the Commissioner's order would at least result in a conflict with the police and would tend to cause obstruction, annoyance, or danger within the meaning of section 188's explanatory note.
    • Therefore, the court held that the disobedience of the Commissioner's order could fulfill the conditions necessary for an offence under section 188 IPC.
  5. Whether the Police Act's penal provision precludes prosecution under the IPC:
    • The court analysed the distinction between (a) a statute that creates a wholly new offence and prescribes a particular exclusive remedy/procedure, and (b) a statute that includes certain acts within the ambit of existing offences while prescribing additional penalties. Drawing on authorities (e.g., The Queen v. Hall Charles, Rex v. Wright, Lowe v. Darling) and statutory provisions (section 131 of the City of Bombay Police Act, analogous General Clauses Act provisions), the court concluded that the Police Act did not create an exclusive remedy preventing prosecution under the IPC in this case.
    • The judges reasoned that where the conditions of section 188 IPC are satisfied, disobedience of the Commissioner's order falls within the ambit of that existing Penal Code provision; the Police Act's provision (section 127) is therefore cumulative rather than exclusive so long as no special procedure in the Police Act excludes ordinary criminal procedure (none was found here).
  6. Requirement of a complaint under section 195 CrPC:
    • The court distinguished the present charge (section 143 IPC for unlawful assembly) from a direct charge under section 188 IPC. It held that the requirement of a complaint under section 195 CrPC applies where the court is taking cognizance of an offence under section 188 IPC directly; because the prosecution proceeded under section 143 IPC, section 195 CrPC did not bar the present proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court upheld the conviction of the accused for being members of an unlawful assembly under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code.

Sentencing outcome and immediate effect on the parties:

  • The lower court had sentenced each accused to six weeks' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200. The appellate court agreed that the conviction was correct.
  • The opinion records that the sentence was reduced by the court below (Patkar, J. indicates a reduction and directs refund of any excess fine), but the specific numeric details of the reduced sentence and certain parts of the sentencing order in the provided text are illegible/omitted. Therefore the precise reduced term and conditions could not be unambiguously reproduced from the supplied document.
  • This information was not available in the provided opinion in a complete and legible form: the exact reduced imprisonment term and associated default terms as stated in the opinion text were partly missing and therefore are not stated here.

Broader legal implications (as articulated by the court in this opinion):

  • The court held that an order under section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act may validly extend to assemblies in private places when the Commissioner reasonably considers such prohibition necessary for the preservation of public peace or public safety.
  • The court held that disobedience of a lawfully promulgated order under that provision can, if the factual conditions of section 188 IPC are met (knowledge of the order and disobedience producing or likely to produce harm), be prosecuted under section 188 IPC and thus be the unlawful-object offence in a section 143 IPC prosecution.
  • The court concluded that the existence of a penal provision in the Police Act (section 127) does not automatically preclude prosecution under the Indian Penal Code where (i) the act falls within the ambit of an existing Penal Code offence and (ii) the special Act does not prescribe an exclusive remedy or special procedure that displaces ordinary criminal procedure (section 131 of the Police Act and analogous interpretive provisions permit cumulative remedies in such circumstances).

Final procedural disposition recorded in the provided opinion: the court discharged the rule (i.e., the revision was refused) and the convictions were held to be correct subject to the sentencing adjustment referenced above.


Note on sources and fidelity: This summary is strictly limited to and derived from the text of the provided opinion. No facts, figures, or legal conclusions have been invented or inferred beyond what appears in the supplied document. Where the supplied text was incomplete or partially illegible with respect to sentencing details, that limitation is explicitly noted above.

    Emperor v. Bhalchandra Trimbak Ranadive

    Patkar, J.:—

    In this case the two accused are ??? of the Managing Committee of the Girni Kamgar Union. Accused No. 2 is also a secretary of the ??? and the editor of the newspaper Kranti, which ??? the organ of the Girni Kamgar Union. On July ??? 1929, the Commissioner of Police issued a notification, Exhibit A, under sub-section (3) of section 23 of the City of Bombay Police Act IV of 1902 prohibiting the president, the secretary, the members of the Managing Committee, and the members of the Girni Kamgar Union from holding, convening or calling together any assembly of mill hands or employees of the Textile mills of Bombay for one week from the date of the order. The notification was duly published in the mill area in the evening of the 12th. On July 13 in the morning Superintendent, Mr. Spiers, ??? a copy of the hand-bill, Exhibit C, purporting to ??? signed by six persons including the accused inviting the strikers to attend the meeting for women at 3 p.m ??? for men at 5 p.m and directing that the meeting should not be stopped even if the Police or anybody else made any illegal attempts to break the meeting, and the ??? of the meeting should be carried on even if any ??? were made. Mr. Spiers went to the Kumbhar Chawl ??? about 3-30 p.m with the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the Commissioner of Police. A number of ??? were collected in the open space between the ??? The Commissioner of Police, Mr. Kelly, asked both the accused whether they had convened the meeting and both of them admitted that they had convened the meeting. The Commissioner then told them that the meeting ??? illegal and in contravention of the order issued by ??? They said they had taken the best legal advice as regard the order and considered it illegal. Mr. Dastur, ??? Chief Presidency Magistrate, then intervened ??? informed them that as long as they did not get a decision from the Court they were defying the order by holding the meeting, and that the Police were determined ??? disperse the meeting if they did not disperse themselves. The Chief Presidency Magistrate suggested that the proper course for them would be to get themselves ??? and get the case decided in Court. The accused after some hesitation agreed to the suggestion of Mr. Dastur. They were then arrested under the orders of the Chief Presidency Magistrate. Accused No. 1 then addressed the meeting and informed the Commissioner that he had advised the members to disperse and not to hold any meeting till the case was decided. The audience dispersed and both the accused were released on their own recognizances. The accused were placed before the Presidency Magistrate, Fifth Court, Mr. Jungalwala, and tried for an offence under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code of being members of an unlawful assembly. The learned Magistrate, after considering the whole evidence, convicted the accused under section 143, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced them to six weeks' rigorous imprisonment and a, fine of Rs. 200 each.

    It is urged on behalf of the accused that assuming that ??? common object of the assembly was unlawful on the ??? that it was to commit an offence under section 127 of the Bombay Act IV of 1902 of breach or disobedience of an order of the Commissioner, under section 23, sub-section (3), the offence under section 188 ??? as not referred to in the charge. The present is a ??? case and under section 242 of the Criminal Procedure Code it is not necessary to frame a charge. ??? trend of the examination and cross-examination of eye witnesses on behalf of the prosecution clearly shows ??? the common object of the assembly alleged against the accused was an offence under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Spiers in his evidence stated ??? he had attended meetings held by the strikers and ??? burden of the speeches was: “Don't go to work, don't ??? others go to work;” and the result was, obstruction, ??? and serious injury to workmen going to work ??? the mill area as well as on other work, and this ??? in danger to life and human safety, e.g, the safety of the shopkeepers and others.

    It is urged on behalf of the accused that the order passed by the Commissioner of Police under section 23 sub-section (3), was not an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order within the meaning of section 188, and that any assembly or procession referred to in sub-section (3) of section ??? referred to an assembly in a public street or place where the public have a right to go, and reliance is placed ??? the sub-section (1) of section 23 where the procession and assemblies in public streets are referred to. The words “any assembly or procession” are very wide ??? are not restricted to an assembly or procession in a public place or street. Though processions and assemblies ??? streets are referred to in clause (a) of sub-section ??? of section 23, there is no limitation placed on “any assembly or procession” in sub-section (3) of section 2 Section 23, sub-section (1), clause (f), refers to a ??? in any place including a private place, and gives ??? Commissioner power to summarily stop the ??? caused by the continuance of music or other such ??? on account of the serious illness of, or because it serious interferes with the reasonable occupation of, any ??? resident or lawfully engaged in the neighbourhood Similarly, section 23, sub-section (2), clause (e), would include anything, prohibited by the clause, being ??? in a private place. Section 24, sub-section (1), gives ??? Commissioner of Police power to temporarily close ??? take possession of any building or place and to ??? all or any persons therefrom in certain ??? Section 26, sub-section (1), may also in certain ??? refer to the exercise of the power of the Commissioner in a private place. The special orders prescribed ??? Chapter III of the Police Act are not confined to public streets or places. It is urged on behalf of the ??? that the place where the meeting was held was an ??? space between two chawls and fell within the definition of a “street” in section 3, clause (i) of the Bombay Act IV of 1902. But Mr. Spiers has admitted in cross-examination that the place where the meeting was held was a private place. It is urged on behalf of the accused that section 23 was taken from the Madras Act which referred to an assembly in a public place. We have to construe the words as they appear in the section, and think that the words used in sub-section (3) of section 23 ??? wide enough to include an assembly at the place where the meeting was held on July 13, 1929. ??? is a question for the Legislature to consider whether ??? Commissioner of Police should have the power to prohibit any assembly or procession, whether in a public ??? private place.

    It is further urged on behalf of the accused that the condition prescribed by sub-section (3) of section 23 was ??? fulfilled and that the prohibition was not necessary ??? the preservation of the public peace or public safety, ??? that the order was passed by the Commissioner of police as the accused objected to the presence of the police reporters at the meetings of the Girni Kamgar Union. It is urged on behalf of the Crown and it has ??? been held by the Magistrate that the sole discretion be exercised in such cases is that of the Commissioner of Police and that the only condition precedent to the ??? issue of such an order is that it shall appear, not ??? the Magistrate but to the Commissioner of Police, ??? such prohibition is necessary for the preservation ??? the public peace or public safety, and reliance is ??? on the decision in Emperor v. Raja Bahadur Shivlal Motilal*. Public authorities even acting within the defined limits ??? powers must not conduct themselves arbitrarily ???: Nagar Valab Narsi v. The Municipality Dhandhuka. In the case of Duke of Bedford v. Dawson. Sir George Jessel, M.R, held that the public body are to be the judges subject to this that if they are manifestly abusing their powers, the Court will say that it is not a fair and honest judgment and will not allow it. In Sharp v. Wakefield it was held that (p. 179):—

    “…..‘discretion’ means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion … according to law, and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, an fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought ??? confine himself.”

    See Bhagchand v. Secretary of State. In the ??? case on the evidence, I think the discretion was exercised by the Commissioner of Police not merely on the ground of the objection to the presence of the Police reporters at the Girni Kamgar Union meetings, but ??? the preservation of the public peace and public safety I think, therefore, that the order passed by the Commissioner of Police under section 23, sub-section (3) of the Bombay City Police Act IV of 1902 was lawful promulgated within the meaning of section 188 of ??? Indian Penal Code.

    It is further urged that the order promulgated under section 23, sub-section (3), ought to have been individually served on the accused, and reliance is placed on decisions in the cases of Reg. v. Sukar Budhia and Queen-Empress v. Anant Shitaram Kulkarni. The learned Magistrate held that the manner in which ??? orders should be promulgated is laid down in section ??? of the Act. It appears that section 23 refers in sub-section (1) to orders either orally or in writing, in sub-section (2) to a notification publicly promulgated addressed to individuals, in sub-section (3) to an order writing prohibiting any assembly or procession, and in sub-section (4) to a public notice. The distinction between a notification, an order in writing, and a public notice has been emphasized in section 38 of the Act. Section 137 refers only to a public notice mentioned in sub-section (4) of section 23. It is conceded on behalf of the Crown that section 137 would not apply to an order ??? writing under sub-section (3) of section 23. Exhibit A is described as a notification but it is really an order in writing within the meaning of sub-section (3) ??? section 23 of the City of Bombay Police Act. There ??? no provision in the Act as to the mode of serving such ??? order in writing. Under section 134 no order shall deemed illegal, void, invalid or insufficient by reason any defect of form or publication or any irregularity procedure. The order in writing is not, therefore, ??? by the description as a notification. The order writing has been proved under section 133 of the ??? by the Commissioner of Police who proved that he ??? the order and sent it to the Times Press to be ??? and that order was Exhibit A, and that the original was signed by him. The learned Magistrate ??? in his judgment that both Mr. Kelly and Spiers proved that the accused discussed the order Exhibit A with the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Dastur, and admitted that they were aware of the ???. The evidence on this point is not free from doubt, the admission referred to by the learned Magistrate ??? be with reference to the order Exhibit 1 which was ??? to be, but was not in fact, issued. It appears, ??? that the accused were in possession of Exhibit 1 which was intended to be, but was not in fact, ??? by the Police Commissioner. The accused No. 1 ??? that Exhibit 1 was obtained by him from an on the Ferguson Road. The Commissioner of ??? is of opinion that as Exhibit 1 was not circulated, the copy of the order reached the accused in a manner in which it ought not to have reached. Exhibit A, on the other hand, was notified in a public manner. The Police Constable, Gangaram Bhawoo, proves that it was promulgated by beating the Bataki from Dadar to ??? chowki from 8 p.m to 8-45 p.m on the 12th, and ??? beating the Bataki he read out the order Exhibit A ??? Marathi. The Bataki was beaten at the foot of the Currey Road Bridge about 200 yards from the Kumbhar Chawl where the meeting was held, and also at the office of the Girni Kamgar Union at Naigaum and ??? Mr. Cooper proves that the English and vernacular ??? of Exhibit A were pasted at conspicuous places in ??? Cinema, Lalwadi, Sewree and Poibawdi, and on ??? morning of the 13th he accompanied Mr. Spiers to the Girni Kamgar Union Office at Poibawdi when Mr. Spiers served Exhibit A on the general secretary of the Union who signed Exhibit B, a copy of Exhibit A, on the reverse. The copies of the order ??? pasted on the doors of the office of the Girni Kamgar Union and also on either side of the entrance. ??? is, therefore, considerable force in the remark of learned Magistrate that accused No. 1 who had ??? to obtain a copy of the order, Exhibit 1, of which no ??? in Bombay was aware, could not be ignorant about order, Exhibit A, which had been widely broadcasted the 12th and the 13th. Having regard to the provision of section 134, clause (2), and section 69, clause (3), of Criminal Procedure Code, and section 89, clause of the City of Bombay Police Act, the service on president, the secretary, the members of the Management Committee and the members of the Girni Kamgar Union of the order, Exhibit A, in the way in which it was ??? in the present case was not irregular. In Reg. v. Sukar Budhia the place where the order was stuck up ??? burial place. If the order was actually served on the accused, there would be conclusive evidence of the knowledge of the order. But the knowledge can be ??? home to the accused either by actual service of he notice or may be proved by circumstances which would clearly show or give rise to an inference that the accused had such knowledge. It is permissible for a court to draw an inference as to knowledge from he proved circumstances in the case including the fact ??? the accused's residence at the place where the order as published, or the accused being members of an incorporated body on which such an order was served. See Ramdas Singh v. Emperor. Having regard to the ??? and circumstances proved in this case, I think that were are no adequate grounds to differ from the view the learned Magistrate that the accused had knowledge of the order, Exhibit A.

    It is further urged that it is not proved in the case at the disobedience of the order of the Commissioner Police would cause or tend to cause danger to human ??? health or safety, or cause or tend to cause a riot an affray. The statement in the judgment of the learned Magistrate with reference to the incident of the ??? July that both the accused were arrested, and ???, stones and all sorts of missiles were thrown ??? Kumbhar Chawl is not supported by any evidence the record of this case. It appears that in the ??? of July 13, 1929, Superintendent Spiers ??? a copy of a handbill, Exhibit C, purporting to signed by both the accused and other persons, inviting strikers to attend the meetings at Kumbhar Chawl, ??? Road, and directing that the meeting should not stopped even if the Police or anybody else made any legal attempts to break the meeting, and that the work he meeting should be carried on even if arrests were made. There is no evidence that the accused got Exhibit C printed, but it is clear from the evidence of the Commissioner of Police, Mr. Kelly, that both the accused admitted that they had convened the meeting. It would not, therefore, be unreasonable to assume that the accused were some of the persons who issued the ??? Exhibit C. There was sufficient time since the morning for the accused, if they intended, to stop the meeting. It appears from the evidence of the Commissioner Police that the meeting was dispersed after the accuse addressed the meeting. Mr. Spiers in his evidence state that since the advent of the private meetings of the Girni Kamgar Union there had been an increase in crime ??? produced a list, Exhibit H, showing the number of case as they stood at the Bhoiwada Police Station 17 ??? before June 26, 1929, from which date the Girni Kamgar Union held private meetings, and another ??? Exhibit I, which showed the number of cases at ??? same Police Station for 17 days since the advent of the private meetings, in order to invite the Court to ??? an inference that there was an increase of cases ??? assault, intimidation, stone throwing and other ??? cases during the latter period. The prosecution a put in Exhibit D, a list of cognizable cases in the mill area from the 1st of May till the 11th of July, a another list, Exhibit F, showing the complaints ??? in the non-cognizable register in the mill area during ??? same period, and according to the view of the Magistrate, crime had considerably increased since the ??? of the private meetings. There is some force in contention on behalf of the accused that it may be ??? that the crime increased after the hold of private meetings by the Girni Kamgar Union, ??? the learned Magistrate has not gone into the ??? as to whether the charges were real or false and ??? in acquittals. Having regard to the circular, Exhibit and the admission of the accused that they convened the meetings, there is adequate ground for drawing the inference that the accused knew that the disobedience of the order of the Commissioner of Police would at least result in a conflict with the Police. See Emperor v. Bhure Mal.

    The explanation to section 188 says that it is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys and that his disobedience produces or is likely to produce harm. We think, therefore, that the disobedience of the Police Commissioner's order under section 23, sub-section (3), of the City of Bombay Police act, in this case fulfilled all the conditions necessary to constitute an offence under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code.

    It is further urged on behalf of the accused that the offence created by the disobedience of the order under section 23, sub-section (3), constituted a new offence, and ??? have been dealt with as an offence under section 127 of the Police Act and not as an offence under ??? Indian Penal Code, and reliance is placed on the decision of Das, J. in King-Emperor v. Abdul Hamid. The common object of the assembly in this case was to ??? an offence within the meaning of clause (3) of section 141 of the Indian Penal Code. Under section 40 the Indian Penal Code, the word “offence” in section 141 means the thing punishable under the special local law if it is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards ??? with or without fine. The offence of ??? of an order under section 23, sub-section (3), of Police Act is punishable under section 127 with imprisonment which may extend to one month or with fine and would not, therefore, be included in the word “offence” in the third clause of section 141. The offence which is alleged to be the common object of the assembly in the present case to commit is an offend under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, and would come within the 1st clause of section 40. In King-Emperor v. Abdul Hamid Mullick and Coutts JJ. declined to interfere with the order of acquittal of the lower Court on the ground that there was no evidence on which it could be held that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to disobey a lawful order contemplated by section 188 of the Indian Penal Code Das, J., however, on a consideration of the authorities came to the conclusion that the accused could not convicted under the Indian Penal Code for an offer committed under the Police Act.

    In Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood it ??? held that the offence of practising as a patent ??? without being on the register was a new offence ??? punishable with a liability to £20 penalty, and that mode of procedure and the amount of penalty are of regarded by the Legislature as of the utmost important when they are creating new offences, and the law would contrary to their intention, be most seriously modified it were held that the party committing a breach of ??? which for the first time is made an offence were to sub himself by so doing to proceedings of this ??? which might result in committal to prison.

    In the present case the offence of disobedience of order of the Commissioner of Police under section sub-section (3), is made an offence under section 12 the Police Act and is punishable with imprisonment Section 131 of the City of Bombay Police Act says that:—

    “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent any person from being prosecuted and punished under any other enactment for any offence made punishable by this Act, or from being prosecuted and punished under this Act, for an offence punishable under any other enactment: Provided that ??? such cases shall be subject to the provisions of section 403 of the Code “Criminal Procedure.”

    ??? the General Clauses Act X of 1897, section 26—

    “where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished ??? either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be ??? twice for the same offence.”

    In The Queen v. Hall Charles, J. observed 754):—

    “The inquiry to which I have to address myself is—first, whether the ??? charged is a statutory offence simply; secondly, whether, if it be so, ??? statute creating the offence has prescribed a particular remedy in such ??? as to exclude either expressly or by implication the remedy by ???.”

    All the offences under a special law or under the Indian Penal Code are tried in accordance with the Criminal procedure Code, and there is no special procedure described for an offence under section 127 of the Police Act for disobedience of an order under section 23, sub-Section (3). If the Act had provided a special procedure ??? recovery of the penalty by a special tribunal set up under the Act, the matter would have been different.

    In Craies on Statute Law, 3rd Edn. (1923), it is laid down as follows (p. 205):

    Also where a statute makes a new offence which was in no way prohibited the common law, and appoints a peculiar manner of proceeding against the under, as by commitment, or action of debt, or information, etc., without ??? an indictment, it seems to be settled to this day that it would maintain an indictment, because the mentioning the other methods of ??? seems impliedly to exclude that of indictment. Yet it hath been ??? that if such statute give a recovery by action of debt, bill, plaint, formation, or otherwise, it authorises a proceeding by way of indictment. ??? where a statute adds a further penalty for an offence prohibited by the common law, there can be no doubt but that the offender may still be ??? if the prosecutor think fit, at the common law.”

    Reference is then made to section 33 of the Interpretation Act of 1889 which corresponds to section 131 ??? the Police Act and section 26 of the General Clause Act X of 1897, and it is observed (p. 206):—

    “Where new created offences are only prohibited by the general prohibitory clause of an Act of Parliament, an indictment will lie; but ??? there is a prohibitory particular clause specifying only particular remedies then such particular remedy must be pursued, for otherwise the defendant would be liable to a double prosecution: one upon the general prohibition and the other upon the particular specific remedy.”

    The law on this point is enunciated in Halsbury Laws of England, Vol. XXVII, pp. 188 to 190, paragraphs 370 to 373.

    The disobedience of an order under section 23, sub-section (3), is an offence under section 127 of the Police Act. It is not an offence under the Indian Penal Code. It would be an offence under section 188, Indian Penal Code, only if it satisfied the conditions laid down section 188.

    The distinction between a statute creating a ??? offence with a particular penalty and a statute ??? the ambit of an existing offence by including new a within it with a particular penalty, is well settled. ??? the former case the new offence is punishable by the ??? penalty only; in the latter it is punishable also by such penalties as were applicable before the Act to offence in which it is included. See Bonnerjee's Interpretation of Deeds, Wills and Statutes in British ??? Tagore Law Lectures 1901, page 219.

    In Lowe v. Darling & Son, Farwell L.J ??? (p. 784): “Now, the distinction between a statute ??? a new offence with a particular penalty and statute enlarging the ambit of an existing offence including new acts within it with a particular ??? is well settled. In the former case the new offence punishable by the new penalty only; in the latter it is punishable also by all such penalties as were applicable before the Act to the offence in which it is included. The rule was recognised by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Wright, and in a note to 2 Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown (1824 Ed.) p. 290, is thus stated:—

    “The true rule seems to be this: Where the offence was punishable before the statute prescribing a particular method of punishing it, then such particular remedy is cumulative, and does not take away the former remedy; ??? where the statute only enacts, ‘that the doing an act, not punishable before, shall for the future be punishable in such and such a particular ???,’ there it is necessary to pursue such particular method, and not the common law method of indictment.”

    In the present case, the offence of disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant under certain prescribed conditions was an offence under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code; and section 23, sub-section (3), ??? the ambit of the existing offence under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code by including an act prohibited by section 23, sub-section (3), of the Bombay City Police Act within it. I think, therefore, that ??? the disobedience of the order of the Police Commissioner under section 23, sub-section (3), is an offence punishable under section 127 of the Police Act, it would equally punishable under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code if all the conditions laid down by that section ??? fulfilled, and it is the commission of the latter offence which is proved to be the common object of the assembly the present case.

    Lastly, it is urged that a complaint by the Commissioner of Police would be necessary under, section 195 the Criminal Procedure Code, for an offence under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, and therefore, the ??? under section 143 cannot be sustained in the ??? of a complaint by the Commissioner of Police. ??? offence of which the Magistrate has taken ??? is an offence under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code which does not require a complaint under section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

    I think, therefore, that the conviction of the accused is correct.

    With regard to the sentence it appears that the accused on being told by the Chief Presidency Magistrate to desist from holding the meeting and get the question of the validity of the order decided by a Court of law, went and addressed the meeting and asked the audience to disperse. This is the first offence of the accused. The question whether the Commissioner ??? Police has the power to prohibit an assembly in a ??? place under section 23, sub-section (3), of the Police A has not been so far adjudicated in a Court of law. We think that the punishment to be inflicted on the accused in the first case of its kind under section 143, Indian Penal Code, ought not to have exceeded the punishment prescribed by section 127 of the Bombay Act IV of ??? We would, therefore, reduce the sentence in the case each of the accused to rigorous imprisonment for ??? month and a fine of Rs. 100 in default one ??? rigorous imprisonment. The excess of the fine, if ??? should be refunded.

    Wild, J.:— The applicants, who are members of ??? managing committee of the Girni Kamgar Union, ??? convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, Fifth ??? Bombay, under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code, being members of an unlawful assembly the ??? object of which was to disobey the order passed by Commissioner of Police, Bombay. They were sentence to six weeks' rigorous imprisonment and a fine Rs. 200 each, in default they were directed to ??? further rigorous imprisonment for six weeks.

    The prosecution case is that on July 12 a written order which is styled “Notification,” Exhibit A, under section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act, Bombay V of 1902, was made by the Commissioner of Police, Bombay. The notification is to the following effect:—

    Whereas rioting of a very serious nature had recently occurred in several parts of the City of Bombay resulting in murder, grievous hurt and injuries ??? the citizens lawfully employed and whereas there have been serious ??? and dissensions among the mill hands and employees of the textile mills of Bombay resulting in grievous hurt and other injuries to the mill ??? and other employees of the textile mills of Bombay I, P.A Kelly, Commissioner of Police, Bombay, under sub-section 3 of section 23 of Act IV 1902, prohibit for one week from the date of this order the President, ??? Secretary, the Members of the Managing Committee and the Members of the Girni Kamgar Union from holding, convening or calling together any ??? of mill hands or employees of the textile mills of Bombay.”

    This notification was published by beat of drum in the ??? of July 12 and also by pasting copies of the notification in various places in the mill area. The following morning a copy of the notification, Exhibit B, ??? given to one Tavde, the Secretary of the Girni kamgar Union, and copies were pasted on the walls of the office of the Union. That day, that is to say, July at 10 a.m Superintendent Spiers received a copy a handbill, Exhibit C, headed “A Private Meeting the Textile Labourers on Strike in Bombay.” The ??? of the handbill were as follows:—

    To consider the question of strike we have decided to hold a private meeting of the mill-employees on strike at Kumbhar Chawl, Currey Road, ???, Saturday the 13th July at 3 in the afternoon for women and at 5 the evening for men. No one excepting a striker should attend the meeting. Mrs. Ushabai Dange will preside over the meeting. The meeting ??? not be stopped even if the police or anybody else make any illegal ??? to break the meeting and the work of the meeting should be ??? on even if any arrests are made.”

    ??? handbill bore the names of the two accused, of ??? and of three others. At 3-30 p.m on that day, ??? is to say on the day of the meeting, the Commissioner of Police with the Chief Presidency Magistrate Superintendent Spiers went to the place mentioned the handbill. They found a meeting of three or four ??? people was being held at a place between two chawls by the accused who are members of the managing committee of the Girni Kamgar Union and who admitted that they had convened the meeting. The accused ??? first announced their intention of going on with the meeting as the order of the Commissioner of Police prohibiting it was illegal. Then the Chief President Magistrate suggested that as the accused were ??? that the order was illegal and the Commissioner of Police was advised that it was legal they should submit to the order and have the legality of the order tested Court. The accused agreed to this course and told ??? members of the meeting to disperse and at the order the Chief Presidency Magistrate they were arrested ??? contravening the order of the Commissioner of Police.

    The accused have been convicted under section 143 the Indian Penal Code for being members of an unlawful assembly the common object of which was to commit offence and the offence in question is the offence under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code of disobeying order of the Commissioner of Police. The first question for consideration is, therefore, whether the order of Commissioner of Police under section 23(3) of the ??? of Bombay Police Act is a legal order.

    The argument on that point is that as there can be procession in a house or other private place section 23 cannot apply to an order to prohibit an assembly procession in a private place. But obviously members of a procession may assemble in a private ??? and the procession may be marshalled in the ??? of such a house and may start out from there and ??? disturbance outside. It is further pointed out ??? under section 23(1)(a) and (b) the Commissioner Police is given power to direct the conduct of behaviour or action of persons constituting process and assemblies in streets and to prescribe the route which and the times at which any such procession may, ??? may not pass. And it is argued that if the Commissioner of Police has power to regulate processions and assemblies in private places it would have been so stated in section 23(1)(a) and (b). The difference between these two parts ??? section 23 is that section 23(1)(a) and (b) are ??? with the conduct of processions and assemblies streets at all times, and orders with reference to them may be given by a Police officer not inferior in rank an Inspector; but an order under section 23, sub-section 3, may only be made by the Commissioner of Police when he considers such order to be necessary for ??? preservation of public peace or public safety. The ??? also has to be in writing and is not to remain in ??? for more than seven days. It is obvious that it may be necessary for the legislature to encroach on the ??? of the subject when this is necessary for the preservation of public peace or public safety and this is accordance with the maxim salus populi suprema lex. ??? power given to the Commissioner of Police under section 24(1) of the Act is an instance of this kind. For, accordance with that he may temporarily close or take session of any building or place which obviously includes private houses. sub-section (3) of section 23 ??? not confine the order of the Commissioner of Police public streets or places, and this omission is not due inadvertence because in other parts of section 23 the ??? “streets” and “public place” are to be found. ??? omission is clearly intentional and founded on ???. For instance, in section 23(2)(a) the Commissioner of Police is given power to prohibit the carrying swords, spears, etc., in any public place, but in section 23(2)(b) there is no restriction as to ??? Clause (b) of section 23(2) refers the carrying, collection, and preparation of stones or other missiles or instruments or mean of casting or impelling missiles and it is obvious ??? this refers to stones which may be collected on the ??? of a house or at an open door or window. If there was no prohibition of the collection of these missiles in private place such as a house, they could be thrown from there on to the streets, and no object would be ??? by merely prohibiting the carrying of weapons in a ??? or public place. It may be noted that the power give to the Commissioner of Police under section 23(3) subject to safeguards to ensure that the rights of subject should be interfered with as little as possible. The order has to be passed personally by the Commissioner Police and must be in writing. It can only be made he considers such order to be necessary for the preservation of public peace or public safety and the order ??? only remain in force for seven days. I have no ??? then, that an order passed by the Commissioner of Police prohibiting an assembly even in a private place under section 23(3) is perfectly valid provided that he ??? the order to be necessary for the preservation public peace or public safety.

    It has been suggested that the condition of affairs July 12 was not such that it was necessary for preservation of public peace that the order, Exhibit should be made. But on this point the Commissioner Police has not been cross-examined and he was the person who was best able to judge what were the ??? of the case. It was also hinted that the Commissioner of Police issued this order because the Girni Kamgar Union had begun to hold private meetings and did admit police reporters to them. I decline, however believe that an officer of the standing of the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, would use his powers out of ???

    It is next argued that a copy of the order should ??? been served on the accused and reliance is placed Reg v. Sukar Budhia, Queen-Empress v. Anant Shitaram Kulkarni, and Ramdas Singh v. Emperor. The ??? two, however, merely lay down that there must be evidence that the accused had knowledge of the order ??? order to sustain a conviction under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. It is true that in the first case the ??? note states that it was held that the order not having ??? served individually upon the accused, the conviction ??? illegal. But though the Court annulled the conviction it did not state that individual service was in every ??? necessary. In this case it is not clear from the evidence whether the accused admitted at the time when the Commissioner of Police intervened at the meeting ??? they had knowledge of the order, Exhibit A, but the circumstances of the case that they had knowledge ??? be inferred. A copy of the order had been that ??? given to Tavde, the general secretary of the ??? and copies of the order had been pasted both at ??? office of the Union and in the whole of the mill area. ??? previous evening also the order had been proclaimed ??? beat of drum. At the meeting it is in evidence at accused No. 1 discussed a notice, Exhibit 1, of ??? 10 which the Commissioner of Police had intended to issue. This notice was nearly to the same effect the order, Exhibit A, but as a matter of fact it was never issued. If accused No. 1 had obtained in some ??? way a copy of this notice, a notice which ??? never issued, it is clear that the accused must have ??? of the order which was not only issued but was ??? promulgated in the mill area. The order, Exhibit A, was promulgated in the manner described in section 137 of the City of Bombay Police Act and it is ??? that section does not apply to an order in meeting passed under section 23(3). It is correct to say that in terms section 137 does not apply to an order under section 23(3) because section 137 refers to a public notice. If that be so, no manner for the promulgation of an order in writing under section 23(3) is provided in the City of Bombay Police Act. But the ??? adopted was one which in my opinion was suitable considering that it had to be addressed to a large number of people and it is sufficiently clear that the accused must have known of it.

    It is urged that the object of the accused in holding the meeting was as stated in the handbill, Exhibit C, consider the question of the strike and that therefor their object was not to disobey the order of the Commissioner of Police. The contents of the handbill, Exhibit C, however, show the frame of mind of the accused as it advises that the meeting should be carried on ??? if illegal attempts to break it up are made by the Police. As the accused were admittedly the conveners of meeting it is reasonable to suppose that they ??? the publication of the handbill, Exhibit C, of which ??? are the signatories. If the accused knew that the meeting was prohibited, one of their objects in holding meeting was obviously to disobey the order. That ??? also have been the object of the other members of meeting who equally had knowledge of the ??? Superintendent Spiers states that at first the ??? announced their intention to go on with the meeting. It is, therefore, obvious that at first their intention ??? to disobey the order. Their subsequent conduct in meeting the members of the meeting to disperse might in mitigation of the offence but does not show that ??? had no intention of disobeying the police order ??? common object of the assembly was clearly then to obey the order of the Commissioner of Police prohibition the meeting.

    It is next argued that it is not proved that the obedience of the accused caused or tended to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, etc., or danger to human life, health or safety, etc. On this point Superintendent Spiers says that private meetings were held by the Girni Kamgar Union from June 26 and there was an increase of crime from that date. He further states that the slogan at these private meetings was that the strikers should not go to work themselves nor allow others to go to work. Obviously the result of such meetings with such doctrines would be that there would be obstruction to those who wanted to work by the strikers. Superintendent Spiers says that since the advent of the private meetings there has been an increase of crime ??? as rioting, criminal intimidation, unlawful assembly, obstruction, etc., in his division. These meetings, and necessarily disobedience of the prohibition of them, he states, cause obstruction, annoyance and serious ??? to workmen going to work in the mill area and so danger to life and human safety. This no doubt his opinion but as he is a police officer in charge of the division, he is the person who is best qualified to ??? what will be the result of these private meetings the Girni Kamgar Union. The learned Presidency Magistrate has accepted the view of Superintendent ??? and has held that the disobedience of the accused ??? the tendencies mentioned in section 188. This is finding of fact and one which cannot be lightly discarded in revision. The ingredients of the offence under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code are therefore to be found in the case of the accused.

    ??? was argued that the Court was not empowered to the cognizance of the offence by reason of section 195 the Criminal Procedure Code. It is no doubt the ??? that if the accused had been charged for an offence under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code the Court could not have taken cognizance of it except on the complaint of the public servant whose order was disobeyed. But the offence in this case is not an offence under section 188 but an offence under section 143. Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code has, therefore, no application.

    Lastly, it is contended that the accused cannot ??? convicted under the Indian Penal Code for an offence committed under the Police Act as the offence was really one of disobeying the order under section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act which is punishable under section 127 of that act. Reliance is placed on the case of King-Emperor v. Abdul Hamid. In that case the facts are somewhat similar to those of the present case and one of the three Judges who decided the ??? held that the respondent could not be convicted under the Indian Penal Code for an offence committed under the Police Act. He based that opinion on the principle enunciated in 2 Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown which as follows (p. 289):—

    “Also, where a statute makes a new offence, which was no way prohibition by the common law, and appoints a particular manner or proceeding again the offender, as by commitment, or action of debt, or information, ??? without mentioning an indictment, it seems to be settled at this day, ??? it will not maintain an indictment, because the mentioning the other ??? of proceeding only, seems impliedly to exclude that of indictment.”

    It is argued that section 23(3) read with section ??? of the City of Bombay Police Act makes a new offence and that therefore there can be no conviction under Indian Penal Code as the penalty is provided by statute which makes the new offence. What however the real nature of the principle enunciated in ??? Pleas of the Crown is obvious from the cases quoted King-Emperor v. Abdul Hamid, and particular from the first two cases. In the first case the offence was ??? by the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1843 which provided as penalty a fine by the revising barrister ??? an action of debt by the party aggrieved. It was held therefore, that there was no remedy by indictment and he indictment was quashed. In the second case the ??? was brought before the Sessions Court whereas ??? penalty provided was a fine to be recovered by ??? conviction in a summary Court. The principle ??? is that where a new offence is created and the particular manner in which proceedings should be taken laid down, then proceedings cannot be taken in any ??? way. In this case, however, the procedure is the ??? whether the accused are prosecuted for an offence under section 127 of the City of Bombay Police Act or under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code and no ??? procedure is laid down in the Police Act in ??? with the new offence. The principle, therefore, ??? in Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown does not ??? to the present case. It seems anomalous that the ??? should be convicted under the general law rather then under section 127 of the City of Bombay Police Act ??? applies more particularly to the case. But this allowable under section 131 of the City of Bombay ??? Act as also under section 27 of the Bombay ??? Clauses Act, Bombay I of 1904.

    For the above reasons I am of opinion that the accused ??? rightly convicted of offences under section 143 of Indian Penal Code.

    Rule discharged.
    B.G.R
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