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  • provisions in rule 3 (C) of West Bengal Service Rules, Part I, and Rule 27 of West Bengal Government Servants' Conduct Rules.By Order
  • 1 2 3 4 5 6 1. Shri Timir Baran Dasgupta, UDC 1.1.80 1.1.83 Tax section
  • rule 5 of Andhra Pradesh Registration Sub-division Service Rules
  • section 23(2) of the Government of India (Construction of Orissa)
  • ARTICLE 226 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 309 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 162 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Article 14 of Articles 16(1) and (2). A rule
  • U.D.C 1.7.80 Section 1.7.83 R.T.A
  • Articles 14, 16(1) and (2). A rule
  • provisions of Rule 6
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions in rule 3 (C) of West Bengal Service Rules, Part I, and Rule 27 of West Bengal Government Servants' Conduct Rules.By Order
  • 1 2 3 4 5 6 1. Shri Timir Baran Dasgupta, UDC 1.1.80 1.1.83 Tax section
  • rule 5 of Andhra Pradesh Registration Sub-division Service Rules
  • section 23(2) of the Government of India (Construction of Orissa)
  • ARTICLE 226 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 309 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 162 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Article 14 of Articles 16(1) and (2). A rule
  • U.D.C 1.7.80 Section 1.7.83 R.T.A
  • Articles 14, 16(1) and (2). A rule
  • provisions of Rule 6
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Satya Brata Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 10 June 1987 of a Learned Single Judge in C.O. No. 7489 (W) of 1986. The Single Judge had allowed the writ application filed by the writ petitioner (respondent No. 1 in this appeal) and set aside the impugned promotion of respondent No. 4 on the ground that the respondents had shown "conscious non-consideration of the cases including the petitioner."

The material facts are confined in compass. At the relevant time both the writ petitioner and respondent No. 4 were Upper Division Clerks (UDCs) in the Public Vehicles Department, West Bengal. Sri Timir Baran Dasgupta (Dasgupta) was the senior-most of the concerned employees. A gradation/position list referred to in the trial judge's judgment showed the relative seniority of the employees. Roy Chowdhury (the writ petitioner) had earlier worked as Head Clerk on an officiating/ad hoc basis and claimed he was the most meritorious candidate for substantive promotion.

By order dated 29 January 1986 the Director of Public Vehicles Department promoted Dasgupta to the post of Head Clerk. Roy Chowdhury filed a writ petition challenging that promotion, alleging that he (Roy) should have been considered and promoted on merits. Roy did not implead several other employees whom he alleged were superseded, but he impleaded one Hiralal Das (respondent No. 5), said to have earlier been promoted on merit rather than seniority.

The Single Judge allowed Roy's writ petition and set aside Dasgupta's promotion. The State (appellant) appealed to the Division Bench (this opinion). The Division Bench heard submissions about the State's promotional policy, various circulars, and several precedents addressing seniority-cum-merit principles and the scope of judicial review.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the promotion of Sri Timir Baran Dasgupta to the post of Head Clerk (by order dated 29.1.1986) was lawful, having regard to the State's promotional policy (seniority-cum-merit) and the comparative records of the candidates.
  2. Whether the Single Judge erred in judicially considering the comparative merits of candidates and in setting aside the promotion on the ground of "conscious non-consideration" when the promotion decision followed seniority-cum-merit and the promoted employee was not shown to be unfit.
  3. Whether the writ petitioner was required to implead all affected employees (those allegedly superseded) and whether failure to do so was a fatal procedural defect warranting dismissal of the writ petition.
  4. Whether earlier executive circulars (notably the circular dated 1.12.1972) continued to bind the State despite later circulars and memoranda, and whether the executive policy can be challenged in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / State (Advocate General)

  • Submitted that the promotional policy of the State of West Bengal is seniority-cum-merit (referred to memoranda including the memorandum dated 11 June 1980 and later circulars), and Dasgupta was senior to the writ petitioner as per the gradation list (Annexure B).
  • Argued that Dasgupta was not unfit for promotion and had satisfactory service; therefore no illegality was committed in promoting him.
  • Contended that the executive policy adopted by the State (seniority-cum-merit) cannot be the subject of challenge under Article 226 (relying in part on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sadanandam).

Respondent No. 4 (Dasgupta) / his Counsel

  • Adopted the Advocate General's submissions.
  • Pointed out both UDC and Head Clerk posts are in Grade 'C' and submitted the post of Head Clerk is not a selection post; promotion can be granted on seniority-cum-merit basis.
  • Argued that although the writ petitioner may have a better performance report, Dasgupta's performance was also satisfactory and therefore no illegality in promoting him.
  • Relied upon a statement of promotional policy (dated 5 August 1981) and cited Sant Ram Sharma (AIR 1967 SC 1910) in support of the position (citation recorded in the opinion).

Writ Petitioner / Respondent No. 1 (Roy Chowdhury)

  • Contended that having officiated as Head Clerk and being most meritorious he should have been considered for promotion; alleged conscious non-consideration by respondents.
  • Relied on the earlier circular letter dated 1.12.1972 (which directed merit-cum-seniority), asserting that the 1.12.72 circular still held the field and therefore the State could not rely solely on later circulars or seniority alone.
  • Argued that subsequent circulars (including the circular dated 20.5.1980 issued pursuant to 28.3.1978) should not be followed because an earlier Division Bench had struck down the 28.3.1978 circular in Biplab Bhusan Mazumdar v. State of West Bengal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) Application by the Court (how the precedent was used in this opinion)
Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910 The opinion records that reliance was placed on this case by respondent's counsel; the opinion does not elaborate the specific principle from this case. The citation is recorded as relied upon by counsel for Dasgupta; the Court's analysis does not explicate or base a specific ruling on this authority in the text provided.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sadanandam, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 574 : AIR 1989 SC 2060 Cited for the proposition (as submitted by counsel) that the executive policy of the State cannot be the subject matter of challenge in proceedings under Article 226. Recorded as a reliance by respondents' counsel to support non-justiciability of executive policy in writ proceedings; the Court considered the broader submissions on justiciability in its reasoning.
Biplab Bhusan Mazumdar v. State Of West Bengal, 1982 (1) CLJ 77 : [1981 (3) SLR 368 (Cal.)] Held by Division Bench that the circular dated 28.3.78 did not have retrospective effect; addressed limits on giving retrospective effect to executive circulars and that executive instructions cannot vary rules framed under proviso to Article 309. The Court noted this decision and distinguished it as not dealing with the 1980 or 1981 circulars; the present opinion states the questions decided in that case are not relevant to the present application.
D.P. Singh v. Ranchi Kshetriya Gramin Bank, 1992 (1) BUR 689 I The opinion records that this case, having relied upon several Supreme Court decisions, discussed principles relating to selection posts and seniority-cum-merit (introductory reference to State of Orissa v. Durga Charan Das). Used in the opinion to introduce and contextualize the Supreme Court authority on selection posts; the Court in this opinion said the Orissa decision (as discussed in D.P. Singh) had no application to the facts of the present case.
State Of Orissa v. Durga Charan Das, AIR 1966 SC 1547 Stated in the opinion: promotion to a selection post depends on several relevant factors (number of vacancies, number eligible, seniority, past record and merits); selection involves consideration of seniority coupled with merit (seniority-cum-merit). The Court observed that this decision concerned a selection post and concluded that it had no application in the facts of the present case (where the post was not a selection post under State policy).
State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood, AIR 1968 SC 113 Where promotion is based on seniority-cum-merit, a senior officer cannot claim promotion as a matter of right: if found unfit he may be passed over and a junior promoted. The Court relied on this principle to affirm that seniority is not absolute but that where the criteria is seniority-cum-merit, seniors prevail unless unfit; applied to conclude Dasgupta (senior) was not shown to be unfit.
State of Mysore v. P.N. Manjudiah, 1969 NSC 38 Discussed in the opinion in the context of deputation and that satisfactory service in the post occupied should be deemed service in the parent department; the Court cited it for procedural propriety regarding reliefs. The opinion references this case for the proposition that High Court should compel State to consider promotion having regard to seniority and fitness rather than directly issuing a writ of mandamus for retrospective promotion; the present Court applied the cautionary approach.
State of Mysore v. C.R. Seshadri, (1974) 4 SCC 308 : AIR 1974 SC 460 The opinion records this decision as following Syed Mahmood and holding that where seniority-cum-merit governs promotion, it is hazardous for a Court to speculate what would have happened in the past and to order retrospective promotion and back pay. The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that courts should not speculate on retrospective promotions and should be cautious in granting back pay or retrospective elevation where seniority-cum-merit is the criterion.
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310 : AIR 1976 SC 490 Explained principles of equality and promotion: normal principles are merit-cum-seniority or seniority-cum-merit; seniority-cum-merit gives priority to senior so long as minimum requisite merit is satisfied; such rules do not violate Articles 14 & 16(1) & (2) where applied appropriately. The Court used this authority to reinforce the correct understanding of seniority-cum-merit and to underline that seniority prevails subject to minimum merit—supporting the view that Dasgupta, being senior and meeting requisite merit, could validly be promoted.
Md Usman v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) 2 SCC 188 The opinion records the case as holding selection on seniority-cum-merit subjects seniors to suitability; selection on seniority-cum-merit means seniors selected subject to suitability. The Court cited it for the general proposition that seniors are selected subject to suitability—applied in concluding that Dasgupta was not shown to be unsuitable.
Secretary of State for the Environment v. Nottinghamshire County Council & Secretary of State for the Environment v. City of Bradford Metropolitan Council, (1986) LRC (Const) 762 Cited by the Single Judge (as quoted in the opinion) for observations on limits of judicial review in a parliamentary system (recorded as part of the Single Judge's reasoning). The present Court noted the Single Judge's reliance on this authority but criticized the Single Judge for overstepping by considering merits (which the appellate court regarded as inappropriate in the circumstances).
Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil Service (the GCHQ case), (1985) IRC (Const) 948 (Lord Diplock's analysis) Referenced by the Single Judge (as quoted) for the classical analysis of judicial review grounds: illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The Court recorded the Single Judge's reference but held that none of these grounds (illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety) were available to interfere with the administrative action in the present case.
Patrioti Frontjapu v. Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, 1986 IRC (Const) p.672 Cited by the Single Judge (as part of his quoted reasoning) in the context of judicial review limits (the opinion records the Single Judge's use of this authority). The appellate Court noted the Single Judge's reliance on this authority but found his approach improper insofar as the Single Judge considered comparative merits and failed to dismiss the petition for non-impleading necessary parties.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench's analysis proceeded in these main steps (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Identification of the applicable policy: The Court examined the State's promotional policy and various circulars (including memoranda dated 11.6.1980 and a statement dated 5.8.1981). The Court concluded that, in the State's policy, the post of Head Clerk was not a selection post and that the prevailing rule was seniority-cum-merit (seniority prevails provided the senior is not unfit).
  2. Assessment of factual fitness: The Court noted that although the writ petitioner may have had a better performance record, the promoted employee (Dasgupta) had satisfactory service records and had officiated as a Public Relations Officer (a post higher than Head Clerk). Thus Dasgupta was not shown to be unfit for promotion.
  3. Limitations on the Single Judge's approach: The Court emphasised the doctrine that judicial review focuses on the decision-making process (legality, rationality, procedural propriety) and is not a forum for reassessing administrative merits. The Single Judge, it noted, impermissibly compared merits of candidates and thereby considered matters of administrative discretion which the court should not adjudicate when no procedural or substantive illegality is shown.
  4. Procedural defect in the writ petition: The Court held that the Single Judge erred in not dismissing the writ petition for failure to implead all affected employees (those whom the petitioner sought to supersede). The appellate Court found this failure significant because the policy decision was not in issue and all employees sought to be superseded were necessary parties.
  5. Application of precedents: The Court surveyed several Supreme Court decisions and relevant authorities to restate the law on seniority-cum-merit and the proper limits of judicial relief (including that courts should not speculate to give retrospective promotions or back pay where seniority-cum-merit governs). It applied those principles to conclude that none of the classic grounds for interference (illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety) were shown in this case.
  6. Absence of mala fides or unauthorised purpose alleged: The Court observed that the writ petitioner did not allege mala fide or that the promotion order was passed for an unauthorised purpose; such omissions weighed against judicial interference.

On this basis the Court concluded the Single Judge had committed errors both of law and procedure (improperly considering comparative merits and failing to dismiss for non-impleading necessary parties) and that the promotion could not be set aside on the grounds advanced.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the judgment and order of the Learned Single Judge dated 10 June 1987 are set aside and the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 (Roy Chowdhury) is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The Single Judge's order setting aside the promotion of Sri Timir Baran Dasgupta is reversed by the Division Bench.
  • The writ petition seeking to set aside Dasgupta's promotion is dismissed, so the administrative promotion decision stands in the absence of proven illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, mala fides or unauthorised purpose.

Broader implications: The opinion reiterates established principles about seniority-cum-merit and the limited scope of judicial review (the Court declined to re-evaluate comparative merits or to grant retrospective promotions where policy prescribes seniority-cum-merit). The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying existing authorities; no broader new rule was declared in this judgment.


Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information outside the opinion has been introduced.

    State Of West Bengal And Ors. v. Sri Ashok Roy Chowdhury .

    Satya Brata Sinha, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 10th June, 1987 passed by a Learned Single Judge of this Court in C.O No. 7489 (W) of 1986 whereby and whereunder the Writ application filed by the writ petitioner, respondent No. 1 has been allowed holding that the act of the respondents in promoting respondent No. 4 was not justified by a reason of ‘conscious non-consideration of the cases including the petitioner’ and the impugned promotion of respondent No. 4 was set aside.

    2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. The petitioner as also the respondent No. 4 were at the relevant time working as Upper Division Clerk in the Public Vehicles Department of the State of West Bengal. Admittedly Sri Timir Baran Dasgupta (hereinafter referred to as Dasgupta) was the senior-most amongst the concerned employees. In between Dasgupta and Roy Chowdhury, there were three other employees in order of seniority. The respective position of the parties would appear from a chart which has been referred to by the learned Trial Judge in the judgment under appeal, which is as follows:—

    Government of West Bengal

    Office of the Director, Public Vehicles Department,

    38, Beltola road, Calcutta-700020.

    SI. No. Name date of last promotion. Date of confirmation as U.D.C Place of posting. O.P.R Remarks of sectional officers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1. Shri Timir Baran Dasgupta, UDC 1.1.80 1.1.83 Tax section Good. 2. Shri Sai Jendra Nath Bhattacharyya U.D.C 1.7.80 1.7.83 R.T.A He is one of the ablest and most efficient workers of the office. He is dependable. 3. Shri Subhas Chandra Bose. U.D.C 1.7.80 1.7.80 General (Accident Cell) O.P.R attached for persual satisfactory. 4. Shri Sunil Kumar Mukherjee, U.D.C 1.7.80 Section 1.7.83 R.T.A Sri Mukherjee is very sincere, efficient andf highly amendable to discipline. 5. Shri Asoke Kr. Chawdhury 1.7.80: 1.7.83 Licence He officiated Roy as H.C for considerable period. He is a regular and dependable U.D Assistant performing heavy load of work with precision and commendable speed. Deserves promotion as H.C on term.

    3. It is stated that Roy Chowdhury was promoted as a Head Clerk on an Ad hoc basis and he was recommended for promotion to the post of Head Clerk.

    4. Das Gupta, however, was promoted to the said post by an order dated 29.1.1986 issued by the Director of Public Vehicles Department, Calcutta.

    5. Roy Chowdhury filed a writ application questioning the said order, inter alia, on the ground that he having worked as a Head Clerk and being most meritorious candidate, his case should have been considered for promotion. In the writ application, the writ petitioner did not implead that Sri Sailendra Nath Bhattacharyya, Sri Subhas Chandra Bose and Sri Sunil Kumar Mukherjee as party respondents. He, however, impleaded one Sri Hiralal Das, respondent No. 5 in the writ application allegedly on the ground that he had earlier been promoted as Head Clerk on merit and not on the basis of seniority.

    6. The case of the respondents, on the other hand, was that promotion has been granted to Das Gupta keeping in view of the promotional policy of the State of West Bengal which is seniority-cum-merit. It was stated that Das Gupta admittedly was senior to Roy Chowdhury as would be evident from the gradation list. The said gradation list is contained in Annexure ‘B’ to the writ application.

    7. It was further contended on behalf of the respondents that Das Gupta has also worked as Public Relation Officer for sometime, which post is higher than the post of Head Clerk.

    8. As indicated hereinbefore the learned Trial Judge held that the promotion given to Das Gupta was illegal as Roy Chowdhury was the most meritorious candidate.

    9. The learned Advocate General in support of this appeal inter alia, submitted that keeping in view of the policy decision adopted by the State of West Bengal as would appear from the memorandum dated 11th June, 1980, it would be evident that the seniority-cum-merit was the criteria for grant of promotion and in view of the fact that Das Gupta was not unfit for being granted promotion; no illegality can be said to have been committed by the State in promoting him to the post of Head Clerk.

    10. Mr. Roy appearing on behalf of Das Gupta adopted the submission of learned Advocate General. He further pointed out that both Upper Division Clerk and the Head Clerk have been placed in Grade ‘C’. According to the learned Counsel the post of Head Clerk is not a selection post. The learned counsel further submitted that although the writ petitioner might have a better performance report but keeping in view of the fact that Dasgupta's performance was also satisfactory, no illegality has been committed by this concerned respondent in granting promotion to Dasgupta. It was submitted that the legality of the policy adopted by the State of West Bengal has not been questioned and thus the writ petition was not maintainable.

    11. My attention was further drawn to a statement of the promotional policy dated 5th August, 1981 issued by the Finance Department, State of West Bengal.

    12. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that as the post of Head Clerk was not a selection post, promotion could be given also on seniority-cum-merit basis.

    13. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon in the case of Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1967 SC 1910.

    14. It was further submitted that the executive policy of the State cannot be subject matter of challenge in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    15. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sadanandam reported in 1989 Supp (1) SCC 574 : AIR 1989 SC 2060.

    16. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Writ petitioner/respondent however did not make endeavour to support the judgment under appeal in reasonings adopted by the learned trial Judge.

    17. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent has raised two contentions in this appeal. Firstly our attention was drawn to the Circular Letter dated 1.12.72 whereby the State Government directed that in the matter of promotion the merit-cum-seniority should be followed. According to the learned Counsel in view of the aforementioned circular which still holds the field, State Government cannot grant promotion on the basis of the seniority alone relying on or on the basis of the circular letter dated 6.5.1978 It was pointed out that the Circular letter dated 20th May, 1980 having been issued pursuant to the earlier circular letter dated 28.3.78 which has been struck down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Biplab Bhusan Mazumdar v. State Of West Bengal reported in 1982 (1) CJ LJ., 77 : [1981 (3) SLR 368 (Cal.)], the said Circular Letter should not also be followed.

    18. I The learned Counsel contended that in this view of the matter, the circular letter dated 20.5.1980 referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant will also have no application in the facts and circumstances of this case, inasmuch as, the afore-mentioned circular letter dated 1.12.72 is still in force.

    19. The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellants had not controverted the statements made in paragraph 8 of the writ petition. It was further submitted that Hiralal Das who was impleaded as respondent No. 5 in the writ application was also promoted on the basis of merits and thus the writ petitioner should not have been discriminated.

    20. There cannot be any doubt that if the Promotion Policy of State is seniority-cum-merits, seniority will prevail subject to the condition that the employee shall not be found unfit to hold this higher post.

    21. In the case of D.P Singh v. Ranchi Kshetriya Gramin Bank reported in 1992 (1) BUR, 689 I, having relied upon several Supreme Court decisions held as follows:

    In State Of Orissa v. Durga Charan Das reported in AIR 1966 SC 1547, upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. P.K Sinha, the post was a selection post and the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Rule 6 framed under section 23(2) of the Government of India (Construction of Orissa) Order, 1936 held:—

    “As we have already indicated, promotion to a selection post depends upon several relevant factors the number of vacancies in the posts of Registrars is one factor, the number of persons eligible for the said promotions is another factor; and the seniority of the said competitors along with their past record and their merits as judged by the Public Service Commission, is yet another factor”.

    22. The Supreme court, therefore, held:—

    “The very concept of selection involves the consideration of seniority coupled with merit, which is generally described as the seniority-cum-merit”.

    This decision, therefore, has no application in the facts of this case.

    23. In State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood reported in AIR 1968 SC 113 : [1968 SLR 333 (SC)], the supreme Court held:—

    Where the promotion is based on seniority-cum-merit, the officer cannot claim promotion as a matter of right by virtue of his seniority alone. If he is found unfit to discharge the duties of the higher post, he may be passed over and an officer junior to him may be promoted.”

    24. In State of Mysore v. P.N Manjudiah reported in 1969 NSC 38 : [1969 SLR 346 (SC)], the Supreme Court was considering a case of deputation and held:

    So long as the service of the employee in the new Department is satisfactory and he is obtaining the increments and promotions in that Department, it stands to reason that the satisfactory service and the manner of its discharge in the post he actually fulls should be deemed to be rendered in the parent Department.”

    25. The Supreme court, however, following the decision of Syed Mahmood's case (supra) held that the High Court not have issued a writ of mandamus to promote the officer with retrospective effect stating:—

    “The correct procedure for the High Court was to issue a writ to the State Government compelling it to perform its duty and to consider whether having regard to his seniority and fitness the 1st respondent should have been promoted on the relevant date and so what consequential benefits should be allowed to him.”

    26. The decision of the Supreme Court in Syed Mahmood's case (supra) as also in P.M Manjundiah's case (supra) were followed by it in State of Mysore v. C.R Seshadri reported in (1974) 4 SCC 308 : AIR 1974 SC 460 wherein it was held:—

    “On the other hand if seniority-cum-merit is the rule as the Supreme Court decisions cited before us promotion is problematical. In the absence of positive proof of the relevant service rule, it is hazardous to assume that by efflux of time the petitioner would have spiralled up to Deputy Secretaryship. How could we speculate in retrospect what the rule was and whether the petitioner would have been selected on merit and on the strength of such dubious hypothesis directoractive promotion and back pay.”

    27. The Supreme Court also observed:—

    “Nothing has been suggested against the petitioner in his career to disentitle him to promotion and we have no doubt Government will give him his need. However, if the criterion for promotion is one of seniority-cum-merit, comparative merit may have to be assessed in length of service is equal or an outstanding junior is available for promotion.”

    (Underlining is mine for emphasis)

    28. This aspect of the mater was again considered by the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. N.M Thomas reported in (1976) 2 SCC 310 : AIR 1976 SC 490 : [1976 (1) SLR 805 (SC)] wherein it was held:

    “The principle of equality is applicable to employment at all stages and in all respects, namely, initial recruitment, promotion, retirement, payment of pension and gratuity. With regard to promotion, the normal principles are either merit-cum-seniority or seniority-cum-merit. Seniority-cum-merit means that given the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of administration, the senior though the less meritorious shall have priority. This will not violate Articles 14, 16(1) and (2). A rule which provides that given the necessary requisite merit, a member of the backward class shall get priority to ensure adequate representation will not similarly violate Article 14 of Articles 16(1) and (2). A rule which provides that given the necessary requisite merit, a member of the backward class shall get priority to ensure adequate representation will not similarly violate Article 14 or Article 16(1) and (2). The relevant touch-stone of validity adequate representation for the unrepresented backward community or goes beyond it.”

    (Underlining is mine for emphasis)

    29. In Md Usman v. State of andhra Pradesh reported in (1971) 2 SCC 188 : [1971 (2) SLR 584 (SC)], the Supreme Court while considering this validity of rule 5 of Andhra Pradesh Registration Sub-division Service Rules held:—

    “In other words, that selection made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit the seniors among the clerks were selected Subject to suitability”.

    30. The post of Head Clerk in view of the policy decision of the State is not a selection post.

    31. It may be true that the performance of the writ petitioner was better than the respondent No. 4 and the same by itself was not the decisive factor. Seniority in terms of the service rules was to get precedence over merit. The Respondent No. 4 was not unfit for promotion. His service records were satisfactory. He had also-officiated as a Public Relations Officer.

    32. It is, therefore, difficult to comprehend as to how the decision of the State can be turned ‘arbitrary’ or for unauthorised purpose. 321 the State of West Bengal issued a Memorandum dated 1st December, 1972 whereby and whereunder the principles to be followed in the matter of promotion have been laid down. It has been stated in clause (a) of paragraph 1 of the said circular that Government servant should be selected for promotion on grounds of merit and suitability in all respects and not of seniority. Sub-paragraph (2) of the said Circular states the guidelines in determining the merits.

    The said paragraph (2) of the said circular reads thus:—

    “It is considered necessary to indicate some guidelines in determining merit. The following factors should therefore be taken into consideration in deciding merit:

    (a) The annual confidential report of the competent officer in the prescribed form should be given due weight in considering cases of promotion taking into account reports relating to paragraphs (b) and (c) below.

    (b) Satisfactory work based on periodical reports which in case of certain-categories would involve report on maintenance of case records, diaries, etc. and on out-put of work according to the approved norm.

    (c) The conduct of Government servants who resort to cease work and/or indulge in acts of indiscipline like slogan shouting, holding meetings, etc. within office premises during the prescribed office hours and/or resort to or in any way abet strike for any period in violation of the provisions in rule 3 (C) of West Bengal Service Rules, Part I, and Rule 27 of West Bengal Government Servants' Conduct Rules”.

    By Order dated 6th May, 1978, paragraph 2 (C) was directed to be deleted in the following terms:—

    “Due to operation of Finance Department Memo No. 5009-F dated 21.5.74 and Para 2(c) of Government Order No. 7119-F dated 1.12.72, a large number of Govt. employees could not get their promotion to higher posts (including appointment to higher posts while having no lien on the lower feeder posts) and appointment to New/Intermediate Selection Grade posts as also the benefit of confirmation either in the basic posts or in the posts to which they were earlier promoted or appointed. In all these respects, these employees happened to be superseded by the junior colleagues. Finance Department Memo No. 5009-F dated 21.5.74 has since been withdrawn and Para 2 (c) of Government Order No. 7119-F dated 1.12.72 also deleted. A question has been under consideration of the Government for quite sometime past as to the appropriate action to be taken for redressal of the grievances of the employees already deprived of the benefits of promotions and appointments to higher posts and Selection Grades as well as confirmation by virtue of operation of the Finance Department Memo, and the Govt. Order referred to.”

    Various directions were given in paragraph 2 (I)(c) and paragraph 2 (II) (c) which read thus:—

    “2 (I) (c). The seniority of the employees thus promoted or appointed substantively to the supernumerary posts should be reckoned with effect from the date on which the last of the employees as in (a) above was confirmed in the cadre concerned. 1 (II) (c). The promotion or appointment to higher grades of services and posts as referred to in 11(b) above should take retrospective effect from the dates on which the employees 11(a) above” were originally promoted or appointed. To give retrospective effect in this manner, an appropriate number of supernumerary posts should be created on a temporary basis for the specific period from the date on which a particular post was originally filled up till the date of cancellation as in 11(a) above. In the cases of the persons who may be repromoted after reversion on the strength of this order, no supernumerary posts will require to be created.

    (a) Where the supersession of senior colleagues was made in consultation with the P.S.C action indicated as in 11(b), above should be taken in consultation with the P.S.C

    (b) After cancellation of earlier orders officiating promotion or appointment as in 11(a) above, an employee having lien on the lower feeder post will come over to his substantive post and an employee having no such lien will be appointed to the post which he held prior to holding of the post in respect of which the appointment has been cancelled. The pay of an employee having no hen on any post will be fixed in relaxation of normal rules on his appointment to the lower post which he was holding before appointment to the higher post, in the same manner in which his pay would have been fixed had he had lien on the lower post.”

    33. The employees who were earlier promoted to the post of Head Clerks and who became junior to the employees who were later on promoted pursuant to the aforementioned circular filed a writ petition before this Court and the matter was ultimately decided by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Biplab Bhusan Mazumdar v. State Of West Bengal reported in 1982 (1) CLJ, 77 : 1982 Lab. and I.C 563.

    34. The Division Bench of this Court held that the Circular letter dated 283.78 had not retrospective effect.

    35. The division Bench held that the writ petitioners therein were reported only on the ground that they had superseded their juniors. It observed the peculiar feature of the case that the petitioners were reverted to their substantive posts not on any of the usual grounds but on the basis of the rules subsequently framed by this circular letter dated 28.3.1978

    36. The bench, thereafter considered as to whether the said circular letter dated 283.1978 can be given retrospective effect. The said question was answered in the negative.

    37. It was held that by executive instructions, rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India cannot be varied or modified.

    38. None of the aformentioned questions is relevant in this application.

    39. In Biplab Bhusan Mazumdar's case the 1980 or the 1981 circulars were not considered having not been/brought to the notice of the bench.

    40. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that the circular letter dated 1.12.72 was issued under the rule making power of the State i.e in terms of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The said circular was in fact issued by the Finance Department. Audit Branch of the State. The said circular letter even does not satisfy the requirements of Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It is not even authenticated in terms of Article 166(3) of the Constitution.

    41. The Finance Department, therefore, could itself vary the said circulars and lay down the new statement of policy. When a new policy is adopted, the same shall override the earlier and in the event there exists any conflict between the two, the doctrine of implied repeal will be attracted.

    42. For the reasons aforesaid the submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner respondent No. 1 cannot be accepted.

    43. It is now well known that this Court while exercising its power of judicial review is only concerned with the decision making process. It is not concerned with the merit of decision impugned before it.

    44. The learned trial Judge himself stated the law thus:

    “While considering the action of the respondents in overlooking the cases of the other candidates for the post of Head Clerk including the petitioner this Court reaffirms that the judicial review of the administrative discretion based on abuse of power is merited. In the case of Secretary of State for the Environment v. Nottinghamshire County Council and Secretary of State for the Environment v. City of Bradford Metropolitan Council reported in (1986) LRC (Const) page 762 held that judicial review is a great weapon in the hands of the Judges, but the Judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon their exercise of this beneficial power. The action of the respondent in overlooking the cases of the candidates including the petitioner, in my view, is infected with illegality, rationality and impropriety which is the recent classical analysis of Lord Diplick in Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for Civil Services (1985) IRC (Const) 948 at 1026. In this connection, a reference may be made to the judgment in Patrioti Frontjapu v. Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 1986 IRC (Const) at page 672 and page 690.”

    45. Despite saying so the learned Judge considered the merits of the respective candidates which he could not do. The learned Judge also committed a grave error in not dismissing the writ petition on the ground that all the affected employees were not impleaded as parties. In this case the policy decision was not in issue. The contention of the writ petitioner that although he was junior, he should have been promoted on merits superseding his seniors. All employees whom he sought to supersede were thus necessary parties.

    46. It is now well known that the power of judicial review can be exercised, inter alia, on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety.

    47. None of the aforesaid grounds is available in this case to interfere with an administrative action of the State.

    48. It was also not the case of the writ petitioner that the order of promotion issued in favour of Dasgupta was vitiated on account of mala fide on the part of the concerned authorities, nor was it his case that the said order was passed for unauthorised purpose.

    49. For the reasons aforementioned the judgment and order passed by the learned trial judge cannot be sustained.

    50. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and order passed by the learned trial judge is set aside and the writ petition filed by the Respondent No. 1 is dismissed.

    51. However, there will be no order as to costs.

    Basudeva Panigrahi, J.:— I agree.

    52. Order accordingly.

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