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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was originally filed to avoid a deed poll dated 12 February 1904, executed and registered by Haji Saboo Sidick (referred to in the plaint) and his son Mahomed. The deed poll purported to declare a Wakf over properties described in two schedules, appointed the founder (Haji Saboo Sidick) as first Mutawalli with succession of trustees and Mutawallis, directed accumulation of one-third of income, devoted Rs. 500 per mensem of two-thirds to specified charities, and allocated the remainder for maintenance, education and advancement of the founder's descendants and their wives, with ultimate charitable trusts on failure of descendants.

The plaint alleged inaccuracies in the deed recitals (the second-schedule properties had already been transferred into Mahomed's name), that no possession or effect had been given to the deed, and that the properties continued to be managed and treated as Mahomed's with rents credited to him as before. The plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that the settled properties belonged absolutely to Mahomed and that the deed poll be declared void and contrary to law.

During the pendency of the suit Mahomed and his father Saboo Sidick died. The suit proceeded and the court evaluated (a) whether the deed was void for legal defect, (b) if not wholly void whether it could be set aside by proof of coercion or misrepresentation, and (c) if partly void whether a resulting trust arose in favour of Mahomed pro tanto. The court ultimately declared a resulting trust in favour of the representatives of Mahomed subject to setting apart a fund sufficient to produce Rs. 500 per mensem for the specified charities and directed that the costs of all parties be paid from the income of the properties except the Advocate General's costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deed poll is void ab initio by reason of any legal defect (including defects in transfer or absence of possession/effect).
  2. If not wholly void, whether Mahomed (the plaintiff) can avoid the deed by proof of antecedent or contemporaneous circumstances such as coercion or misrepresentation.
  3. If the deed is partly void or avoidable in part, whether a resulting trust arises pro tanto in favour of Mahomed by agreement of the settlors and their representatives.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The deed poll was void because no possession was ever given or taken in respect of the settled properties and no effect was given to the deed.
  • Under Mahomedan law the deed was void because there was no transfer from the name of the ostensible owner to the name of the founder who declared himself Mutawalli.
  • Mahomed had been induced to execute the deed by misrepresentation and coercion: he was told (when taken to the solicitor's office) that a trust was being made whereby during his father's life he would get Rs. 1,000 per mensem and on his father's death he would be sole owner of all property; he was not aware of the contents, had no independent legal advice and signed at his father's bidding.

Defendants' / Respondents' Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The validity of Wakfs in British India, including those where the appropriator constitutes himself the first Mutawalli, has been repeatedly recognised; evidence showed de facto dominion and control of the settlors over the properties at the date of the deed poll, and the deed was registered.
  • English equity principles establish that retention or destruction of a deed by the settlor does not defeat the rights of beneficiaries where the deed was duly and fairly executed.
  • Where a substantial part of the income is devoted to charity the charitable portion should be supported, but provisions amounting to a perpetual family settlement contrary to public policy are not enforceable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fatwai Alamgiri (passage rendered by Baillie) The authority states that it is lawful for the founder to constitute himself and his children as governors (i.e., lawful for Wakif to be Mutawalli). Used to show that constituting oneself Mutawalli is recognised in Mahomedan legal literature and supports validity where the appropriator remains Mutawalli.
Doe Dem Jaun Beebee v. Abdoollah Barber (1838) Fulton 345 Expressly decided that it is lawful for the Wakif to become Mutawalli. Applied as authority that a settlor constituting himself Mutawalli is not, by that fact alone, invalidating the Wakf.
Abul Fata v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry (1894) L.R. 22 I.A. 76 Settlor(s) had constituted themselves Mutawallis; decision held invalid only because there was no substantial gift to the poor. Shows that constituting self Mutawalli does not by itself invalidate a Wakf; validity may fail for lack of substantive charitable dedication.
Mnjibunnissa (Mujibunnissa) v. Abdul Rahim (1900) L.R. 28 I.A. 15 Donor had constituted himself first Mutawalli; the validity of the Wakfnama was not challenged on that ground. Cited to support that self-appointment as Mutawalli is not a fatal defect to the Wakf's validity.
Muhammad Azizuddin v. The Legal Remembrancer (1893) I.L.R. 15 All. 321 Held that an appropriator who retained exclusive proprietary possession after executing the Wakfnama, destroyed the document and never carried recorded intentions into effect, created only an inchoate endowment which he promptly retracted — hence no operative Wakf. Relied on by plaintiffs; the court declined to apply this decision to the present facts, observing it would make it impossible to hold an appropriator who constituted himself Mutawalli to the Wakfnama.
Re Way's Trusts (1864) 2 De G.J. & Section 365 English equity principle: a deed duly and completely executed must be supported even if retained or destroyed by the settlor; retention/disregard does not defeat declared trusts. Adopted by the court as a controlling equity principle relevant in British India to uphold a duly executed deed notwithstanding retention/destruction by settlor.
Fletcher v. Fletcher (1856) 2 Jur. N.S. 854 Supports the principle that a duly executed deed must be given effect even where retained and notice not given. Cited with other English cases to support the court's reliance on equity principles to enforce the deed.
Parnell v. Hinston (1844) 4 Hare 67 English authority supporting the enforcement of duly executed instruments despite retention or absence of notice. Used among English precedents to justify upholding the deed against arguments founded on retention and non-notification.
Jones v. Jones (1874) 23 W.R. 1 English authority in the same line that a duly executed deed should be enforced. Relied on for the principle that retention/destruction by settlor does not invalidate a duly executed deed.
Mahomed Hassan v. Mahomed Ibrahim (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 624 Where income was largely devoted to family and only one-twentieth to charity, the charitable portion was held too small to constitute a substantial dedication; court treated the instrument as consisting of a valid charitable part and an invalid family settlement. Cited as closely analogous: the court followed the approach of upholding the charitable portion (Rs. 500 per mensem here) while holding large perpetuity family provisions invalid.
Sheik Mahomed Ahsanulla Chowdhry v. Amarchand Kundu (1889) L.R. 17 I.A. 28 Privy Council affirmed that a small part of property devoted to charity could be valid while a bulk dedication in the form of a perpetual family settlement was invalid under Mahomedan law. Applied to support the court's view that the bulk of the deed which operates as a family settlement in perpetuity is invalid while a modest charitable dedication may be upheld.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages consistent with the framed issues. First it examined whether there was any legal defect in the execution or effect of the deed. The plaint's allegations that no possession was given and the deed was not acted upon were noted, but the court observed that in British India Wakfs where the appropriator constitutes himself Mutawalli have been repeatedly recognised and that in the present case the de facto dominion and control over the properties remained with Haji Saboo Sidick at the date of the deed poll whereas registered title (ostensible ownership) was in Mahomed.

The court reviewed Mahomedan authorities (Fatwai Alamgiri) and precedents where self-appointment as Mutawalli was held lawful. It considered and declined to apply the Allahabad High Court decision in Muhammad Azizuddin, which treated a retained-and-not-acted-upon Wakfnama as inchoate where the appropriator had destroyed the document and retracted before divesting himself of the property. The court expressed reservations about applying that reasoning generally because it would effectively allow any appropriator who appointed himself Mutawalli to escape his declared Wakf.

Because the deed itself declared that, where Sunni Mahomedan law did not extend, trustees should be subject to liabilities provided by any other law in force in British India, the court expressly relied on English equity authorities. It adopted the principle from Re Way's Trusts and other English cases that retention or destruction of a duly executed deed by the settlor does not of itself defeat the expressed trusts; accordingly the court found no executional defect invalidating the deed.

Turning to the content of the deed, the court considered public policy and the law governing charitable versus family settlements. Citing Privy Council and other authorities (Sheik Mahomed Ahsanulla Chowdhry and Mahomed Hassan), the court held that where only a relatively small portion of income is devoted to charity and the bulk is devoted to perpetuity family purposes, the latter part is contrary to Mahomedan law and public policy and cannot be upheld. Applying that reasoning, the court concluded that the Rs. 500 per mensem charitable trust must be given effect but the extensive perpetual family provisions could not be supported as part of a valid Wakf.

The court then addressed the plaintiffs' allegations of misrepresentation and coercion. It noted that Mahomed was of full age (nearly 20) at the time, the deed resulted from considered consultation by the firm's attorneys beginning at least in early 1903, and the deed was attested by solicitors (Messrs. Gulabchand and Dadachanji) who were members of the firm. Since Mahomed and his father died during the suit, their testimony was not available and their representatives did not call the attesting solicitors to give evidence about instructions and circumstances. The only supporting evidence for misrepresentation/coercion was statements deposed by the plaintiff's present solicitor reflecting what Mahomed and Saboo Sidick later said when they had changed their minds. In that evidential context the court found the misrepresentation/coercion claim unsupported and held that Mahomed could not avoid the deed which he executed when of full age and which appeared regular on its face.

Combining these strands, the court determined the deed was not void for executional reasons, but that large parts of it (the provisions effecting a perpetual family settlement) were void as contrary to Mahomedan law and public policy, while the specified charitable provision (Rs. 500 per mensem) was valid and enforceable. The court therefore declared a resulting trust in favour of Mahomed's representatives for the remainder subject to setting aside a fund to produce the charitable sum.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court held that the deed poll was not void for legal defect in its execution and could not be set aside by the evidence of misrepresentation or coercion; however, the deed is only partly enforceable. The charitable trust of Rs. 500 per mensem declared in the deed is upheld, while the provisions constituting a perpetual family settlement for the bulk of the income are void as contrary to Mahomedan law and public policy. Consequently, the court declared that, subject to setting apart a fund sufficient to produce Rs. 500 per mensem for the specified charities, there is a resulting trust of the properties in favour of the representatives of Mahomed.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The charitable portion (Rs. 500 per mensem) of the deed poll is to be given effect and administered by trustees to be appointed under a scheme with the approval of the Advocate General for the benefit of the charities specified in the deed.
  • The remainder of the trust provisions that operate as a perpetual family settlement are declared void; the properties are held on resulting trust for the representatives of Mahomed subject to the charitable fund being set apart.
  • Costs: The costs of all parties are to be paid out of the income of the properties in suit, except the Advocate General's costs, because the Advocate General did not support the trusts that the court held valid.
  • The opinion applies and relies upon existing Mahomedan authorities and English equity precedents to reach these conclusions; the decision adjusts the instrument into a valid charitable component and a resulting trust for the remainder rather than validating the instrument in full.

The opinion does not assert that it establishes a novel general principle beyond applying existing decisions and equity principles to the present facts; its effect is to resolve the parties' rights by upholding the charitable dedication and recognizing a resulting trust for Mahomed's representatives for the balance.

    Abdul Rajak v. Bai Jimbabai

    1. This suit was originally filed by Haji Sa', to Sidick and his son Mahomed to avoid a deed poll, dated the 12th of February 1904, executed by them and duly registered. The deed poll purports to be published by the executing parties and recites that Haji Saboo Sidick therein called the founder is absolutely entitled to the premises described in the 1st and 2nd Schedule, although those described in the 1st Schedule had been conveyed by various conveyances to the plaintiff Mahomed as nominee of Haji Saboo Sidick, the consideration moneys mentioned in the conveyances to have been paid by the plaintiff Mahomed having been paid out of the moneys of Haji Saboo. It then recites that the founder was desirous of settling all the premises in Wakf and it is declared that the founder and the trustees for the time being shall stand seized of all the premises upon the trusts thereinafter mentioned, the founder during his lifetime being the sole trustee and Mutawali to be succeeded in those offices by Jimbabai his wife and the plaintiff Mahomed upon trust to accumulate one-third of the income and invest the same from time to time in properties to be added to the trust fund and out of the remaining two-thirds to apply 500 rupees per mensem in certain specified charities according to the discretion of the trustees and Mutawalis and to apply the balance of the two-thirds in the maintenance of, the education and advancement of the trustees and Mutawalis for the time being and of the descendants of the founder and the wives of all the male descendants of the founder, and upon failure of all male and female descendants of the founder through his sons and daughters and the wives of his male descendants to hold the trust premises and accumulate them in trust for any charity recognized or allowed by the Mahomedan law and especially the building endowments and maintenance of hospitals for Mahomedan schools and Masjids and the relief of poor Cutchi Memons and any other kind of charity. And it declares that the trustees and Mutawalis for the time being should have all such rights and powers and be subject to all such liabilities and disabilities as should be allowed and provided by the Sunni Mahomedan law prevailing in British India in relation to Mutawalis and trustees of public charitable trusts and so far as the same should not extend by any other law in force in British India as might apply to the case.

    2. The recital was inaccurate in respect of the premises described in the 2nd Schedule for they also had previous to the execution of the deed poll been transferred into the name of Mahomed.

    3. At the date of the deed poll the properties with which it purported to deal were in the possession and under the management of the firm of Haji Saboo Sidick in which the executing parties were the sole partners. They had been purchased by the firm many years previously, and in 1899, after the death of one of the original partners, Haji Hasan Sidick, had been transferred into the name of Mahomed.

    4. The prayer of the plaint is that the settled properties may be declared to belong absolutely to Mahomed and that the deed poll may be declared to be void and contrary to law.

    5. If the deed is ab initio void, no other question will arise as both the settlors in their life-time and their representatives since their death have agreed that there should be a declaration in favour of Mahomed's ownership.

    6. The first question is, whether the deed is void by reason of any legal defect. If the deed is not void wholly or in part, the question will be, whether it can be avoided by Mahomed by reason of proof of antecedent or contemporaneous circumstances such as coercion or misrepresentation entitling him to set it aside. If it is partly void, or can be avoided in part, there, will be a resulting trust pro tantoby agreement of the settlors and their representatives in favour of Mahomed.

    7. As regards the first question, the plaint states that no possession was ever given or taken of the properties and no effect was ever given to the deed poll. That the properties have been managed as the property of the plaintiff Mahomed and the rents credited to him just as they were before the execution of the deed. The argument in support of this aspect of the case has been based on Mahomedan law, according to which, it is contended, the deed is void in that there was no transfer from the name of the ostensible owner to the name of the founder, who declared the trusts of which he was to be the first Mutawalli.

    8. In British India the validity of Wakfs under' which the appropriator constitutes himself the first Mutawalli, has been repeatedly recognised, and where the dominion-over the property is with the Mutawalli, at the time of the appropriation, we are not aware that their validity has ever been challenged upon that ground where the appropriation has been acted upon. In the present case, there can be no question upon the evidence as to the dominion of the settlors over the properties in suit at the date of the deed poll. The de facto control was with Haji Saboo Sidick, the ostensible ownership by registered deed was with Mahomed. These two settlors, after executing the deed poll, proceeded to the registration office and caused it to be recorded there.

    9. The point is dealt with in the Fatwai Alamgiri in a passage which is rendered by Baillie (p. 591) as follows :

    "Moohummud, the son Alfuzl being asked respecting one who had made it a condition in constituting a Wakf that the governance of it should be for himself and children, answered, 'it is lawful, according to all.'"
    Moohummud, the son of Alfuzl was, according to Tarajun-ul-Hanafia, a famous jurist who died in 381 Hijri. In Doe Dem Jaun Beebee v. Abdoollah Barber (1838) Fulton 345 it was expressly decided that it is lawful for the Wakif to become Mutawalli, and in Abul Fata v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry (1894) L.R. 22 I.A. 76 the settlors had constituted themselves Mutawallis but the Wakf was held invalid merely on the ground that there was no substantial gift to the poor. Again in Mnjibunnissa v. Abdul Rahim (1900) L.R. 28 I.A. 15, 24 the donor had constituted himself the first Mutawalli but the validity of the Wakfnama was not challenged on that ground.

    10. On behalf of the plaintiffs, however, reliance has been placed upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Muhammad Azizuddin v. The Legal Remembrancer (1893) I.L.R. 15 All. 321, in which it was held that the appropriator having retained exclusive proprietary possession after the execution of the Wakfnama, and never carried his recorded intentions into effect, having, it was said, destroyed the document, there was no valid or operative Wakf but an inchoate endowment only, from which he at once receded before he had put it out of his power to do so by divesting himself of the property.

    11. It appears to us that upon this line of reasoning it would be impossible ever to hold an appropriator, who had constituted himself the first Mutawalli, to the terms of his Wakfnama.

    12. We have not been referred to any Mahomedan law book in support of such a conclusion. The point does not seem to us to be dealt with in the passage from the Hedaya cited in that judgment, and we are not prepared to apply the decision of the Allahabad High Court to the facts of the present case.

    13. In dealing with the argument that the settlor had never acted upon or given effect to his deed, we prefer to base our decision upon the principles to be found in the English Equity Reports, and we do so with the more confidence in that the j. deed poll declares that, in so far as the Sunni Mahomedan law V^ does not extend, the trustees shall be subject to all such liabilities, as are provided by any other law in force in British India which may apply to the case.

    14. That the retention and disregard of the deed by the settlors cannot operate to defeat the claims of the beneficiaries under it, is established by various cases among which reference may be made to Re Way's Trust (1864) 2 De G.J. & Section 365, Fletcher v. Fletcher (1856) 2 Jur. N.S. 854, Parnell v. Hinston (1844) 4 Hare. 67, and Jones v. Jones (1874) 23 W.R. 1.

    15. In Re Way's Trusts, the question arose between the Attorney General, representing the ultimate trust for charity declared in a disregarded deed, and the representatives of the settlor. Knight Bruce L. J. said: "The deed of 1852 must, in my judgment, be taken to have been duly and completely executed by Lady Cholmeley. There is no evidence before us that its execution was unfairly or improperly obtained, or that she executed it under any mistake, misapprehension or erroneous advice. In these circumstances the deed must be supported, although no notice of it was ever given to the trustees or to any other person. That the deed was retained by Lady Cholmeley and afterwards destroyed by her, does not, in my judgment, alter the case." Turner L. J. said: " According to the principle of the modern decisions, if the deed is duly executed, effect must be given to it, notwithstanding the retainer and the absence of notice. "

    16. For these reasons, we are unable to hold that the deed is void on account of any legal defect or omission connected with its execution or subsequent history.

    17. It is next contended that the deed is not enforceable at all events in part, inasmuch as it was designed to create a perpetual family settlement such as is contrary to public policy. We are of opinion that the trust of Rs. 500 per mensem for charitable purposes must be given effect to, but that its validity will not save or validate the subsequent provisions of the deed. The Wakfnama is very similar to that which came under the consideration of Mr. Justice Tyabji in Mahomed Hassan v. Mahomed Ibrahim (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 624. In that case, according to the calculation of the learned Judge, the income was devoted as to one-twentieth to charity and as to nineteen-twentieths to members of the family. He said that, from whatever point of view he looked at it, the proportion of income for the charity was so small as compared with the proportion devoted to family purposes, that he could not, consistently with the decisions of the Privy Council, hold that there had been a substantial dedication entirely to charitable and religious purposes. He therefore took the Wakf as susbtantially consisting of two documents, one dealing with the certain proportion of the income in favour of the charity and the other devoting the rest of the income to family purposes. He accordingly declared the former to be valid and the latter void.

    18. This was in accordance with the decision in Sheik Mahomed Ahsanulla Chowdhry v. Amarchand Kundu (1889) L.R. 17 I.A. 28, 37 where the Privy Council affirmed the decision of the Calcutta High Court that a small part of the property had been well devoted to charity but that as to the bulk of it the settlement was, notwithstanding some expressions importing Wakf, in substance nothing but a family settlement in perpetuity and as such contrary to Mahomedan law. In the present case, between one-sixth and one-eighth of the income of the settled properties is devoted to immediate charitable trusts; the rest of the income is substantially settled for the support of the descendants of the settlor in perpetuity, and we are unable, having regard to the cases already cited and that of Mujibunnissa v. Abdul Rahim (1900) L.R. 28 I.A. 15, to support the trusts in favour of the settlors descendants as part of a valid Wakf.

    19. These conclusions do not, however, finally dispose of the case of Mahomed and his representatives, for the plaint states that Mahomed was informed by his father and his solicitor's managing clerk, when he was taken to the solicitor's office, to execute the deed, that a trust of his properties was made, whereby during his father's life-time he was to get a thousand rupees per mensem, and on his father's death he would be the sole owner again of all his property. The plaint also states that Mahomed was not aware of the contents of the deed when he signed it, that it was executed by him without any inde. pendent legal advice, and on the representations made to him as aforesaid, and at his father's bidding. Thus a case of misrepresentation and coercion is set up.

    20. Now, it is to be observed that at the date of the deed poll, Mahomed was nearly twenty years of age, having attained majority in April 1902. The deed poll was the result of much consideration and consultation by the attorneys of the firm to which he belonged, which consideration had commenced at least as early as the beginning of 1903. The deed poll was attested by Messrs. Gulabchand and Dadachanji, solicitors of this Court, residing in Bombay, who were members of the firm by whom the deed poll was prepared. Owing to the death of Mahomed and his father Saboo Sidick, during the pendency of the suit, the case of misrepresentation and coercion is unsupported by their evidence. Their representatives have abstained from calling either Mr. Gulabchand or Mr. Dadachanji who could speak to the instructions upon which, and the circumstances under which, the deed poll was prepared and executed. The only evidence in support of this part of the case is that which has been given by the plaintiff's present solicitor, who deposes to certain statements made to him by Mahomed and Saboo Sidick in their own favour in the year when they had changed their minds and wanted to get rid of the deed poll. In this state of the evidence the plaintiffs' case of misrepresentation and coercion wholly fails, and we hold that Mahomed and his representatives cannot avoid the deed executed by him when of full age and upon the face of it perfectly regular.

    21. Having regard to the agreement between the plaintiffs, it is not necessary to discuss the voluminous documentary evidence bearing upon the question of the real ownership of the property. But we may say that we are by no means prepared to acquiesce in the conclusion of the learned Judge that the properties really belonged to Mahomed.

    22. We declare that, subject to setting apart a fund sufficient to produce 500 rupees per mensem applicable by trustees to be appointed under a scheme with the approval of the Advocate General for the benefit of charities of the nature specified in the earlier trusts of the deed poll, there is a resulting trust of the properties in favour of the representatives of Mahomed. The costs of all parties must be paid out of the income of the properties in suit except those of the Advocate General who did not support the trusts which have been held to be valid.

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    Abdul Rajak v. Bai Jimbabai
    (Nov 13, 1911)