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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit arises from family disputes among members of a household engaged in a chemical business run by the late Dr. Edalji Mody. The plaintiff lived with Dr. Edalji and his widow (defendant 1) from an early age and was admitted to partnership in 1913 with a one-anna share under a written partnership agreement dated 12 October 1913. Profits were, in practice, spent on family board and lodging and not distributed. After Dr. Edalji's death in 1924 defendant 1 (his widow) obtained letters of administration to his estate on 6 March 1925, and disputes arose between defendant 1 and the plaintiff about sums the plaintiff had advanced (including sums for household expenses and a dispensary for Dr. Edalji's son Keki) and also about partnership profits.

On 6 March 1926 a meeting occurred at which two documents were executed: (1) a promissory note signed by defendant 1 in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 16,408, and (2) a release from the plaintiff to defendant 1 reciting the promissory note and stating that the plaintiff gave up claims to any share of profits up to date and would not make use of the promissory note for three months. The plaint (a summary suit) was filed on 22 February 1927, the defendants applied for leave to defend under Order 37, and affidavits were filed by defendant 1 (15 March 1927), defendant 2 (17 March 1927), and by the plaintiff in reply (26 March and 6 April 1927).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the loans/advances claimed by the plaintiff were made to defendant 1 personally or to her late husband (i.e., the identity of the debtor).
  2. Whether there was any separate oral agreement constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under the promissory note (reference made to the proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act).
  3. Whether the promissory note executed on 6 March 1926 is binding, and if so, to what extent (including whether defendant 1 is personally liable or liable only in her capacity as administratrix).
  4. Whether defendant 2, who signed as a co-obligor/surety, is bound by the guarantee — specifically whether there was valid consideration for his guarantee (reference to Sections 127–128 and Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff maintained that the promissory note represented sums actually advanced by him to defendant 1 (or, alternatively, that defendant 1 as administratrix was liable even if advances had originally been to her husband).
  • He asserted that the promissory note and the release were separate transactions (the note dealt with loans; the release with past partnership claims) and that the clause deferring enforcement for three months was an agreement subsequent to the promissory note.
  • The plaintiff pleaded that, as administratrix, defendant 1 was liable for debts of the estate and relied on letters of administration showing assets of the deceased of about Rs. 27,000 to support liability against the estate.

Defendant 1's Arguments

  • In her affidavit defendant 1 stated she signed the promissory note because she was anxious to see certain bargains (sale of property and jewellery) put through and because defendant 2 had represented that the plaintiff tacitly accepted defendant 2's arrangements; she also said defendant 2 promised to manage affairs and stay with her.
  • She asserted that the whole sum of Rs. 16,408 was in fact claimed by the plaintiff against her late husband (i.e., the debt related to the deceased).
  • Implicitly, she relied on the contention that her acts could be viewed in her representative capacity and that any liability should be limited to the estate in her hands.

Defendant 2's Arguments

  • Defendant 2 contended that the promissory note and the release formed one transaction and raised a point as to stamp (i.e., procedural/technical objection regarding stamp duty and transaction character).
  • Defendant 2 did not give evidence but relied on the evidence adduced for defendant 1 and maintained that there were questions going to the nature of the transaction and his alleged role.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tillahchand Hindu-Mal v. Jitamal Sudamm (as cited, Westropp, C.J.) Authority regarding the principle that a person may renounce the benefit of a statute of limitation and that an executor may pay a debt barred by limitation and in equity be allowed credit. The court relied on Westropp, C.J.'s statements to support that an executor/administratrix may undertake to pay time-barred debts and be bound, therefore supporting liability of defendant 1 in her representative capacity.
Administrator-General v. Hawkins (Madras High Court) Held that the Administrator-General may pay a time-barred debt, resting the conclusion on the general rights of an administrator. The court cited this authority to reinforce the proposition that an administrator/administratrix can waive the protection of limitation and promise to pay time-barred debts, supporting liability in representative capacity.
Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree Held/laid down that the Indian Limitation Acts do not extinguish liability but merely bar the remedy. The court invoked this principle to conclude that because limitation only bars remedy, the deceased could have waived the statutory protection and an executor (or administratrix) standing in his shoes can likewise waive it, thus binding the estate.
Rama Pattar v. Viswanatha Pattar Supported the view that an executor/administrator may bind the estate by undertaking to pay time-barred debts (consistent view to those above). The court cited it to show consistency of authority that an executor who gives a promissory note in consideration of a time-barred debt falls within the third exception to Section 25 of the Contract Act and is therefore bound to the extent of the estate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first identifying the material disputes and the legal character of the promissory note executed on 6 March 1926. It noted there was no allegation of fraud or undue influence and therefore accepted that defendant 1 executed the note of her own volition.

1) Personal capacity of defendant 1: The Court considered whether defendant 1 could be held personally liable for time-barred debts of her late husband under Section 25 (exception (3)) of the Indian Contract Act. The Court interpreted the exception as applying only where the person making the promise is the person against whom the liability could have been enforced but for limitation. The Court held that a person who is under no obligation to pay a third party's debts (even if time-barred) falls outside that exception; accordingly, defendant 1 in her personal capacity did not incur liability under Section 25 merely by promising to pay her husband's time-barred debts.

2) Consideration / compromise argument: The Court examined the contention that the promissory note was supported by consideration in the form of a compromise (the plaintiff giving up partnership claims in return for defendant 1 undertaking to pay debts). The Court rejected this on the evidence: the plaintiff's own affidavit asserted the note and the release were separate transactions and the quantum and nature of the plaintiff's past partnership claim were such that he had likely already received equivalent benefit by living with the family and enjoying household maintenance; the plaintiff had acquiesced in the expenditure of profits. The precise amount of the promissory note matched the principal of the loans, which supported the conclusion that the promissory note dealt solely with loans and did not represent a compromise of partnership claims.

3) Representative capacity (administratrix): The Court then considered defendant 1's position as administratrix under the Indian Succession Act (citing Section 211). It held that an administrator is the legal representative and the estate vests in the administrator, and if the deceased could have waived the protection of limitation and promised to pay a time-barred debt, so could the administrator. Authorities (including the cases cited in the table) were relied upon to conclude that an executor/administrator may pay or undertake to pay time-barred debts, and the undertaking falls within the third exception to Section 25 so far as liability against the estate is concerned. Consequently, defendant 1 was held liable, but the liability was limited to the assets of the deceased in her hands (i.e., limited to the estate).

4) Liability of defendant 2 (surety): The Court addressed defendant 2's position as a surety. It concluded that there was no consideration for the guarantee because nothing was done and no promise was made for the benefit of the principal debtor (defendant 1). Relying on Sections 127 and 128 and the reasoning under Section 25, the Court held that where the principal obligation itself lacks consideration (or the exception operates only to bind the principal in a representative capacity), there is no consideration moving to the surety, and a surety is not bound by a guarantee of an agreement without consideration. Thus the Court held defendant 2 was not bound by his guarantee and the suit against him must be dismissed.

5) Other contentions: The Court briefly addressed Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (liability of a legal representative who signs a promissory note) and rejected a dual approach by the plaintiff: the plaintiff could not treat defendant 1 as both a personal promisor (to obtain a personal decree) and as an administratrix (to obtain relief limited to the estate). The Court refused to permit that inconsistent approach.

6) Costs and procedural critique: The Court commented that the plaintiff's choice to proceed by a summary suit and his late assertion of representative capacity complicated matters. The Court found defendant 1 had at times set up at least a partly frivolous defence. The Court crafted an equitable costs order reflecting the mixed outcomes.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Decree for the plaintiff against defendant 1, limited to the estate of the deceased Edalji; suit decreed. The suit is dismissed as against defendant 2.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The plaintiff obtains a decree for the amount claimed against defendant 1, but recovery is limited to the assets of the deceased in defendant 1's hands (i.e., liability is in her representative capacity, not personal liability beyond the estate).
  • The claim against defendant 2 (who had become a surety/co-obligor) is dismissed on the ground that there was no consideration for his guarantee; defendant 2 is ordered to be absolved and the suit dismissed as against him (with costs in his favour).
  • As between the plaintiff and defendant 1, the Court ordered that they bear their own costs (the Court considered this the fairest outcome in light of procedural choices and the nature of defenses raised).
  • The opinion applies established authorities concerning the power of executors/administrators to waive limitation and bind the estate; the Court did not purport to establish new precedent but applied existing case law to the issues before it.

    Pestonji Manekji Mody v. Bai Meherbai

    1. This is a somewhat unfortunate suit. It arises out of family dissensions which might have been better composed outside a Court of law. But unfortunately the parties have found themselves unable to come to any terms, and the differences between them must, therefore, be decided according to their strict legal rights.

    2. The introductory facts necessary to understand the points that arise are as follows: One Dr. Edalji Mody was engaged in the business of preparing certain chemicals useful in the mills, and that business was at one time a very flourishing one. Defendant 1 is his widow, and the plaintiff is his brother. It appears that from a very early age the plaintiff lived with his deceased brother and defendant 1, and as it has been expressed by both sides, was regarded by them in the light of a son. He took an active part in the business from a very early age, and in the year 1913, he was admitted into partnership, his share being one anna. There is an agreement of partnership dated 12th October, 1913, which defines the shares of the parties concerned. The share of defendant 1 is two annas, the plaintiff's share is one anna, the share of Dr. Edalji Mody was twelve annas, and the share of his son Keki Edalji Modi was one anna. There is not proved to be any other agreement of partnership, and in spite of certain statements that have been made by the plaintiff, that document appears to contain the only terms that were settled between the parties. As they were all members of one family, they appear to have lived together in the same house in complete amity down to the year 1924, when Dr. Edalji died. It is abundantly established, in the evidence that the whole of the partnership profits were expended by Dr. Edalji on what may be called briefly the board and lodging of the family, and that there was never any distribution of profits among the partners, and never any demand for such distribution. In fact it appears from the evidence in the case that the parties lived at a rate, considerably beyond the profits which, they derived from the partnership, and it; was necessary from time to time to borrow money either for the expenses of the common house or for the expenses of the maintenance of the members of the family. Defendant 1 had money of her own, and from time to time she made advances to her husband. We find in the year 1912, as shown by Ex. 10, a receipt of 9th April of that year, that at that date she had advanced Rs. 60,000 to her husband. On 9th October, 1913, see Ex. 7, Edalji made a declaration that he had borrowed-in all Rs. 1,000,000 from his wife from 1909 to date, and that the rent of the bungalow amounting to Rs. 650 was being paid to her as equitable mortgagee. It also appears in the case that at some date which is disputed the plaintiff advanced Rs. 11,000 for the purposes of the common dwelling house. Whether that advance was made to Dr. Edalji or to defendant 1 is one of the questions which is in dispute in the case. It also appears from certain documents in the plaintiff's own hand (see Exs. 1 and 2) that between 31st July 1919 and 6th September, 1921, be advanced two sums of Rs. 3178-9-4 and Rs. 2,230-12-3. The former of these sums was for household expenses, and the latter for expenses incurred as regards the establishing of a dispensary for Keki, the son of Edalji, who had set up as a doctor. Keki, it might be remarked, was then a major. That was, generally speaking, the state of the affairs of this family up to the time of Edalji's death. After Edalji died the plaintiff, and defendant 1 continued to live together for some time and to carry on the business. But unfortunately, as is only too apparent from the evidence in this case, the parties found it impossible to continue to live together harmoniously, and in the year 1925 (the exact date is not material) the plaintiff left the house in Bombay and went to live at Poona with his father-in-law. Some correspondence ensued which does not cost any very clear light upon the points for decision in the suit, but may be briefly alluded to as bringing matters up to the date when the facts took place which gave rise to the questions in this suit.

    3. On 6th May, 1925 the plaintiff wrote to defendant 1 complaining of the position which he found himself in after twenty-five years of service. He says he has left the house penniless, and he desires to know his position as a partner in the business, and what arrangements defendant 1 proposed to make for repaying the sum of Rs. 11,000 and the miscellaneous sums large and small taken from time to time for household expenses, and for brother Keki's dispensary. Defendant 1's reply to that letter, Ex. B, is vague, and contains nothing but protestations as to her unfortunate position in the world. Then on 10th January, 1926 there was a further letter from defendant 1 to the plaintiff alluding to certain attempts at settlement of the matters in dispute, and asking the details of the plaintiff's claim and for any suggestion that he may have to make as regards the disposal of the questions arising between, them. On 2nd March, 1926, defendant 1 wrote a further letter to the plaintiff in which she again asks for an account of his claims, and suggests that he Should come down to Bombay along with his father-in-law in order that matters may be satisfactorily ended. I may add here that defendant 1 took out letters of administration to the estate of her decease husband on 6th March, 1925. Generally, therefore, the position was that the plaintiff believed himself to have some claim, against defendant 1 on account of the advances which he had made, and possibly on account of profits which might be due to his share as a partner.

    4. The events with which we are mom closely concerned took place on 6th March, 1926. It is admitted that there was a meeting between the parties concerned, whether it was on the fifth and the sixth, or whether it was on 6th March only, is a matter on which there is some discrepancy in the evidence but that is quite immaterial for the purposes of this case. Defendant 1 was assisted by a number of persons. She had the advice of Dr. Desai, who had been living in the house practically as a member of the family and who had been helping her in her wordly affairs. She had also the advice of a very respectable witness, Mr. Coyajee, who was also at one time living in the same house. She was also, as I see the matter, advised by defendant 2 who is the managing clerk in a firm of solicitors. Her son was also with her, and all these persons were present at this interview. On the other side were the plaintiff and his father-in-law.

    5. I may here digress in order to explain how defendant 2 came to be concerned in these matters. Defendant 2 has given no evidence in the case. He relies upon the evidence adduced for defendant 1. But it must not be assumed that defendant 1 and defendant 2 are making common cause. That is not the case. There are indeed grave causes of disagreement between them. But this much is clear that, defendant 2 long before the date of the meeting of 6th March had become ???with defendant 1. He appears to have gone to her in the first; instance for some proposition to sell a house of his; and defendant 1 replied that far from being in a position to purchase a house, she was looking for a chance of selling her own house, that is, the house in which all these parties formerly resided, and that she also desired to dispose of some of her jewellery as the estate left by Edalji was if not insolvent, at all events highly embarrassed. I do not desire to say much as regards what took place between defendant 1 and defendant 2, for I understand that there are criminal proceedings as between them which are now sub-???, but so far as is necessary for the purposes of this case, I may say that it appears to me that defendant 2 made a proposition to defendant 1 that he would find a purchaser for the house in the Maharaja of Birwani for whom he said he was acting, and that there would be no difficulty in obtaining two and half lakhs of rupees for that property. As regards the question of the ornaments it is unnecessary for me to say anything in this suit beyond this, that there plainly was some talk as between the defendants of the sale of the ornaments of defendant 1. Thus at the date with which we are concerned, 6th March, 1926, defendant 2 was plainly assisting defendant 1 in her affairs. As to what happened at the interview of 6th March, 1926, there is to some extent no dispute. It is agreed that two documents were executed, one, a promissory note by defendant 1 in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 16,408, and the other a document in the nature of a release passed by the plaintiff to defendant 1, in which the execution of the promissory note is recited. It is stated that some arrangement will be made hereafter as regards the business, the partnership having come to an end on the death of Dr. Edalji Mody, and further that the plaintiff gives up all claims to any share of the profits of the said business up to date. There is also a final clause in this document that the plaintiff will not make use of the promissory note for three months. The present suit arises out of these transactions and it will be convenient here to turn to the pleadings of the parties in order to understand what are the precise points in dispute.

    6. The plaint was filed on 22nd February, 1927, and the suit being framed as a summary suit, does no more than recite the fact of the promissory, note of 6th March, 1926. The defendants thereupon applied for leave to defend according to the provisions of O. 37, and defendant 1 put in an affidavit, of 15th March, 1927. In that affidavit there are certain statements which are relevant for the purpose of this suit. In para 3 she sets out some of the facts as regards the execution of the promissory note and she recites that defendant 2 at that time had offered to get Rs. 2½ lakhs for the immovable property and Rs. 80,000 for the jewellery and as regards the execution of the note she says:

    As I was very anxious to see that the aforesaid bargains were put through and I did not like to displease defendant 2 and as the plaintiff himself tacitly accepted all that defendant 2 had stated to me in his presence to the effect that I should be responsible for payment of the amount only if the aforesaid bargains were put through and that in default the plaintiff would look to defendant 2 alone and as further inducement was also given to me in manner hereinafter stated I signed the said promissory note jointly with defendant 2.

    7. Then she goes on to say:

    Defendant 2 told me that he had induced the plaintiff to attend to the business again and that he would attend to it and would stay with me as he used to do before May 1925.

    8. Further in para 5 she says that the whole sum of Ss. 16,408 was claimed by the plaintiff against her late husband.

    9. The affidavit of defendant 2 in support of his application for leave to defend is dated 17th March, 1927, and in para. 2 he makes this point that the promissory note and the release are one and the same transaction, and that, therefore, some question as to stamp arises. The plaintiff filed two affidavits in reply. As regards defendant 1's affidavit he says that the money was borrowed by defendant 1, that the maintenance of himself and his family by his deceased brother was ??? part of the partnership arrangement, farther that he made his claim under two heads; first as regards the several sums borrowed aggregating Rs. 16,408, secondly as regards the profits of the partnership business, and as to the latter he makes the following statement:

    As regards the 2nd head of my claim, viz., in the partnership business, defendant 1 said that the business was not very paying and she asked me to forego all my past claims about the business offering at the same time to take me into the business again and to settle the terms about the conduct of the business in future. In view of the relations between myself and defendant 1 and in view of the promise made by defendant 1 to discuss terms about introducing me into the business again I did not press for my past claims against the business and thereupon defendant 1 asked me to pass a release in her favour in respect of any past claims in the business.

    10. That affidavit was sworn on 26th March and as regards the case of defendant 2 the plaintiff's affidavit was sworn on 6th April. In that he says:

    I deny that the release and the promissory note form part of the same transaction. The facts above set forth in paras 3 to 7 of this affidavit clearly show that the promissory note and the release related entirely to different matters. The promissory note as stated above dealt with my claim in respect of the loans made by me from time to time to defendant 1 herself, whilst the release dealt with an entirely different matter, viz., my rights in the business of the deceased husband. The release was executed after the promissory note, and the clause therein relating to my agreement not to demand payment of the promissory note for a period of three months constitutes an agreement arrived at subsequently to the signing of the said promissory note and the same is an independent agreement made subsequently to the promissory note in question and cannot affect the same.

    11. That is a significant statement as will shortly appear, having regard to the questions in dispute and though no doubt it is made for the purpose of countering the objection taken by defendant 2 on the score of stamp, it cannot necessarily be assumed, to put the matter no higher, that it is not the truth. It is indeed consistent with what I have set out of the affidavit made in reply to the affidavit of defendant 1. One thing more I may add, and that is that in the affidavit in reply to defendant 1 plaintiff says:

    Assuming that the said debt was due not from defendant 1 but from her husband even then she is liable under the said promissory note, she having obtained letters of administration to his estate in November 1924 showing the assets of the deceased to be about Rs. 27,000.

    12. From those pleadings two matters of fast appear to be in dispute and both those matters have been put in issue in the suit. The first question is whether the loans were made to defendant 1 or to the husband of defendant 1. The second question is whether there was, to use the words of proviso 3, Section 92 of the Evidence Act, any separate oral agreement constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under the promissory note. (After considering evidence and finding that the money was paid to defendant 1 herself, his Lordship proceeded). I do not propose to deal with the correspondence between the attorneys of the parties prior to the filing of the suit. I do not think that correspondence carries the matter any further, nor is there anything more in the oral evidence which throws any more light upon the case.

    13. Thus on 6th March, 1926, the position was this. Defendant 1 was the administratrix of her husband's estate. Plaintiff had certain claims, he says, against defendant 1, but in effect against the estate of the deceased, and it was under those circamstances that the document in suit came to be executed. The question which I have to determine is whether this promissory note is binding, and if so, to what extent and the matter has been presented under several aspects.

    14. I will first consider the position of defendant 1 in her personal capacity. I may say here that no question of fraud or undue influence has been raised or even suggested in this case. In the circumstances any suggestion of the kind would be impossible. We must, therefore, take it that defendant 1 executed this promissory note of her own free will and pleasure whatever may have been the inducements emanating from defendant 2 which led her to do so. Now there were the debts of her husband, and in her personal capacity she was not liable for those debts and if she undertook to pay those time-barred debts, she can only be held liable by virtue of Section 25 of the Contract Act. S. 25 begins by reciting that an agreement made without consideration is void. That is the general rule laid down, and there follow three cases in which agreements made without consideration are nevertheless contracts. That is the general scope of the section, and any agreement which is a contract, by virtue of S. 25 must, ex hypothesi, be without consideration. In the present case reliance is placed upon the third exception. That runs as follows:

    (3) (Unless) it is a promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits.

    15. It seems to me that these words imply that the person making the promise is the person against whom the liability might have been enforced and if that, is the case, a promise made by a person who is under no obligation to pay the debts of another, even though they are time barfed, is clearly not within this exception to the general rule. The grounds of that rule have been stated by Westropp, C.J in Tillahchand Hindu-Mal v. Jitamal Sudamm(1). That learned Judge rests the efficacy of such promises on the principle that a person may renounce the benefit of the law made for his own protection. I fail to see how that principle applies to the case of one who undertakes to pay the time-barred debts of a third party which he would not be bound to pay even if no statute of limitation existed. If exceptions are sought to be made to the general rule that an agreement made without consideration is void, then they must, in my opinion, be brought strictly within the words of the exceptions to S. 25. Therefore, in her personal capacity defendant 1, by executing this promissory note, incurred no liability by virtue of anything contained in Section 25 of the Contract Act.

    16. But it is farther urged that there was consideration for the promissory note of another kind. It is said that there was a compromise, viz., that the plaintiff gave up certain rights in consideration of defendant 1 undertaking to pay the time-barred debts of her husband. If that was so, there would be good consideration, but upon the evidence I do not think that is so. I have already set out passages from the plaintiff's affidavit in which he says distinctly that the promissory note was an entirely separate transaction and that appears to be the truth of the matter. Again it is by no means clear to me that the plaintiff gave up any real rights of any kind whatever. No doubt the compromise of a doubtful claim may be good consideration, but where the claim is almost on the face of it groundless, then the compromise of such a claim is not a good consideration. As to this I may refer again to what I have already said as to the manner in which the family lived and in which the profits of the business were expended. The plaintiff's share in the business was one anna, and accepting the estimate that for five years from 1914 onwards the profits were Rs. 25,000 a year, his share of the profits would be somewhere about Rs. 130 a month.

    17. And having regard to the style in which the family lived, it is impossible to suppose that the plaintiff did not get an equivalent or even more than an equivalent for any profits accruing due to his share and after all, the plaintiff acted with his eyes open; he lived with the family, allowed the profits to be expended in this manner; he never took any objection or made any claim for payment of his profits, and he must be taken to have acquiesced in that; which was done by his brother with the profits of the business. Therefore it is absurd to say that the plaintiff gave up his claim for the profits in consideration of the defendant undertaking to pay the time-barred debt. He did nothing of the kind. I have no doubt that what really happened has been correctly stated by the witnesses for defendant 1 that plaintiff advanced his claim, and defendant 1 pointed out that if he had a claim for Rs. 15,000 for profits, then her claim would be Rs. 30,000 and her son's claim Rs. 15,000, and as a matter of fact there were no partnership assets which could possibly meet that claim. It is also significant, is consideration of this matter, that the promissory note was executed for the precise amount of the principal of the loans advanced by the plaintiff to the deceased Dr. Edalji. That again shows that the two transactions were entirely unconnected, and that the promissory note must stand or fall alone.

    18. So far as defendant 1 is concerned, there remains one last point which is by no means free from difficulty, and it is this. Defendant 1 was in point of fact the administratrix of her husband's estate and if what she did be regarded as done by her in the capacity of administratrix, entirely different considerations would arise. I pointed out that the plaintiff in his affidavit in reply to the summons for leave to defend stated categorically that as administratrix of her husband's estate defendant 1 was liable to pay the amount of his debt even if the money had been advanced to her husband and not to her. I see no reason why the plaintiff should be precluded from raising that question here. I do not think that the provisions of O. 1, R. 8, to which I made a reference in the argument, would necessarily stand in his way. It is impossible for me to say that there are numerous creditors, and that, therefore, a suit should have been tiled in a representative capacity. The point is sufficiently raised in the pleadings, and all the evidence necessary to determine it has been given on either side. It was mentioned at a very early stage of the suit. Therefore, I consider that I am bound to determine it. I do not think that it is very fruitful upon this question to try to determine upon the evidence in what capacity defendant 1 acted. The fact is that she was the administratrix, and I see no reason why what she did should not be referred to her capacity as administratrix. What then are the powers of an administratrix as regards the estate? For this purpose I refer to the Indian Succession Act, and I begin with S. 211. Under that section the administrator of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such. Therefore, stated broadly, it would appear that an administrator can do that which a deceased could have done, and if it was open to the deceased, as undoubtedly was, to promise to pay his time-barred debts, it seems to me that it must be open to the executor to make the same promise. Nor is there wanting authority upon that point. In the very case which I have already cited Tillakchand Hindumal v. Jitamal Sudaram, Westropp, C.J says (p. 214):

    An executor may pay a that justly due by his testator, although barred by the Statute of limitations, and will, in equity, be allowed credit for such a payment.

    19. If an executor can pay a time-barred debt and take credit for the payment, I can see no logical reason for holding that he cannot undertake to pay a time-barred debt and be bound by such undertaking. The two things must, in my opinion, go together. In another case, Administrator-General v. Hawkins(2), the Madras High Court have held that the Administrator-General may pay a time-barred debt, and they rest it upon the general rights of an administrator. In this case, as also in Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree(3), it is laid down that the Indian Limitation Acts do not extinguish the liability, but merely bar the remedy, and just as the deceased could have waived the statute introduced for his own benefit, so equally an executor can, in my opinion, do so and if the executor does so, then he is as much bound as the deceased would have been bound. In reality the case of an executor who gives a promissory note in consideration of a time-barred debt is precisely within the terms of the 3rd exception to Section 25 of the Contract Act, for he is a person against whom but for the statute of limitation the creditor might have enforced payment, to the extent of course of the estate in his hands, and, therefore, he is a person who can make the promise we find in the 3rd exception to that section, and if he does make that promise, then the promise is a contract. The same view was taken in Rama Pattar v. Viswanatha Pattar(4). Thus in the result it appears to me that defendant 1 as administratrix is liable to pay the amount of this promissory note, but that the liability is limited to the estate of the deceased in her hands.

    20. The further question arises as regards the position of defendant 2. Defendant 2 has admittedly become surety for the payment of the amount due under the promissory note. The fact that by operation of law the liability of the principal debtor is limited to the estate in her hands does not in any way affect the contract of guarantee except in so far as any limitation is imported by Section 128 of the Contract Act. But it has been urged that so far as defendant 2 is concerned there is no consideration for the Contract of guarantee. I am disposed to hold that is correct and I do so for this reason that I cannot see in this case anything done or any promise made for the benefit of the principal debtor, and, therefore, under Section 127 of the Contract Act there is no consideration for a contract of guarantee. It seems to me that the same result is arrived at from a consideration of Section 25 of the Contract Act. As I have already said, ex hypothesi the agreement is an agreement without consideration, that is to say, that there is nothing done, and there is no promise made for the benefit of the principal debtor. It is not always easy to construe the provisions of the Indian Contract Act with accuracy, but if it be true that the exceptional cases set out in S. 25 are cases of agreements wherein there is no consideration, then, though the law may make such agreements effective as a Contract against the principal debtor, the fact remains that there is no consideration. The surety who guarantees the performance of an agreement without consideration is not bound by his guarantee. For these reasons, therefore, it appears to me that as against defendant 2 this suit must be dismissed.

    21. As regards the position of defendant 1, I wish to add one word in reference to an argument advanced based upon Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. That section runs as follows:

    A legal representative of a deceased person who signs his name to a promissory note, bill-of-exchange or cheque is liable personally thereon unless he expressly limits his liability to the extent of the assets received by him as such.

    22. The case contemplated by this section is of course one where a person signs a promissory note without adding anything to show that he is acting as executor or administrator of another. In the ordinary case if he does so, no doubt he may be personally liable, but in this case the plaintiff cannot have it both ways. If he chooses to treat defendant 1 as having executed the promissory note in her personal capacity, well and good, but in that case, as I have already shown, he would be entitled to no relief whatever. It, on the other hand, he treats her as administratrix, then she is entitled to whatever protection that capacity gives her as regards the liability which she has incurred. In the first event plaintiff would get nothing, in the second event lie is entitled to that which I have allowed him. He cannot say:

    I sue you as executor, but because in signing the promissory note you did not make it clear that you were the executor, therefore, you are bound to pay on the footing that you are personally liable even though in your personal capacity you would not be bound.

    23. That is not a possible position. As regards the costs of the suit, the suit must be dismissed with costs as against defendant 2. As to plaintiff and defendant 1, I feel some doubt as to the correct order which should be made. A large amount of the difficulty of the case is due to the fact that the plaintiff filed the suit as a summary suit, which should not, I think, have been done, and that he nowhere, or at least not till a late stage, stated specifically that he was suing defendant 1 in her representative capacity. Indeed that was not the case which he gut forward on the facts though it was suggested as an alternative in his affidavit. Defendant 1, on the other hand, set up what was in part at least a frivolous defence. The ordinary ??? is that costs follow the event. But here the decree for the plaintiff is something much more limited than that which he set out to obtain. He was asking for a personal relief against defendant 1 and he gets a decree against the assets of the deceased Edalji. Taking matters all round, it appears to me that the fairest order is that as between plaintiff and defendant 1 the parties should bear their own costs, and that is the order which I make.

    24. Decree for plaintiff as against defendant 1 out of the estate of the deceased Edalji.

    25. Suit decreed.

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    Pestonji Manekji Mody v. Bai Meherbai
    (Jan 24, 1928)