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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
  • Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949
  • Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
  • Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949
  • Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, employed as an Assistant (Accounts) at the State Bank of India, Thanjavur Branch, was convicted on 3 November 1997 under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Relying on this conviction, the Bank discharged him from service on 7 June 1999.

On 22 February 2002, the Sessions Judge, Ramanathapuram, allowed the respondent’s criminal appeal, acquitting him on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Bank reinstated him on 7 November 2002 but refused back wages for the period of unemployment (7 June 1999 – 7 November 2002).

The respondent filed W.P. (MD) No. 8079 of 2005 seeking back wages. A Single Judge granted the relief, and a Division Bench affirmed the order in W.A. (MD) No. 1715 of 2011 on 22 February 2012. The Bank appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an employee of a banking company, discharged following conviction for offences involving moral turpitude and subsequently acquitted on appeal, is entitled to back wages for the period between discharge and reinstatement.
  2. Whether Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 bars payment of salary during the subsistence of the conviction, notwithstanding its later reversal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Bank’s Arguments

  • Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act creates a statutory bar on employing a person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; therefore the Bank could not have legally paid salary during the period of conviction.
  • Supreme Court precedents (Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore, Jaipal Singh, Baldev Singh, and Banshi Dhar) demonstrate that reinstatement after acquittal does not automatically carry a right to back wages.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Under the Sastry Award, the Bank could have initiated a departmental enquiry after acquittal but chose not to; hence the acquittal wipes out the conviction, entitling him to full back wages.
  • The cited precedents are distinguishable because in those cases the employee was incarcerated; here, the respondent remained on bail and was available for work.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board (1996) 11 SCC 603 Back wages may be denied where the employee’s incarceration prevents service to the employer. Cited by the Bank; Court noted the principle but distinguished factual matrix.
Union of India v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121 Reinstatement after acquittal does not automatically confer entitlement to back wages when service could not be rendered. Referenced similarly to Ranchhodji; part of comparative analysis.
Baldev Singh v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 747 Same principle as above regarding denial of back wages due to incarceration. Considered but factually different because respondent here was not in custody.
Banshi Dhar v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 1 SCC 324 Grant of back wages is not automatic; must depend on totality of circumstances, even when employee was on bail. Relied upon to emphasize that entitlement is discretionary and fact-specific.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first clarified that the Sastry Award does not alter fundamental principles governing the relationship between criminal proceedings and departmental action: an employer may institute departmental proceedings on the same facts, but if it chooses not to, it is bound by the outcome of the criminal case.

While the respondent’s acquittal necessitated reinstatement, the Court treated the claim for back wages separately. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act expressly prohibits a banking company from employing or continuing to employ a person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. The offences under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act fall within that category.

Because the conviction subsisted from 3 November 1997 until its reversal on 22 February 2002, the Bank was legally barred from having the respondent in service during that period. The subsequent acquittal, though it nullifies the conviction, does not retrospectively erase the statutory disability that existed while the conviction stood. Consequently, payment of salary for that interval would contradict the statutory prohibition.

Applying Banshi Dhar, the Court reiterated that back wages are not automatic and must be assessed in the context of statutory constraints and factual circumstances. The only period for which salary could be considered was 22 April 2002 (the date the respondent demanded reinstatement) to 7 November 2002 (the date of actual reinstatement), provided such wages had not already been paid.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; High Court judgment dated 22 February 2012 set aside.

Direct Effect: The respondent is denied back wages for 7 June 1999 – 22 April 2002. He may receive wages only for 22 April 2002 – 7 November 2002 if unpaid.

Broader Implication: The decision affirms that Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act bars payment of salary during the currency of a conviction involving moral turpitude, even when the conviction is later reversed, and that back wages post-acquittal are not automatic but subject to statutory and factual scrutiny.

    State Bank Of India And Another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim .

    Ranjan Gogoi, J.— Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 22-2-2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Madras, Madurai Bench in SBI v. Mohd. Abdul Raheem Writ Appeal (MD) No. 1715 of 2011, affirming the order passed WP (MD) No. 8079 of 2005 by the learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the writ petitioner i.e the respondent in the present appeal. The High Court, for the reasons assigned, has taken the view that the respondent-writ petitioner was entitled to the benefit of back wages for the period that he had remained out of employment following his conviction in a criminal charge.

    2. The relevant facts are as hereunder: the respondent-writ petitioner while working as an Assistant (Accounts) in State Bank of India at Thanjavur Branch was convicted of the offences under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 3-11-1997. Following the aforesaid conviction, he was discharged from the service by an order dated 7-6-1999. Aggrieved by the conviction, the respondent had filed an appeal which was allowed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ramanathapuram by the order dated 22-2-2002. The order of acquittal, on a plain reading, appears to be based on the finding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

    3. Thereafter, on a demand being raised, the respondent was reinstated in service on 7-11-2002. However, back wages for the period that he had remained out of service were not granted. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the appellant Bank, the respondent filed the writ petition (WP No. 8079 of 2005) in question seeking the relief of back wages for the period he was kept out of employment i.e from 7-6-1999 (date of discharge from service) up to 7-11-2002 (date of reinstatement). As already noticed, the learned Single Judge of the High Court having granted the aforesaid relief which was affirmed in the letters patent appeal filed by the appellant herein, this appeal, by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, has been filed.

    4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

    5. The learned counsel for the appellant has drawn the attention of the Court to the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (for short “the Act”) and contends that there was a legal bar for the appellant Bank to continue to employ the respondent after his conviction by the criminal court for the offences under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on several judgments of this Court to demonstrate that grant of back wages may not be permissible in a situation where an employee, who is dismissed from service on the basis of an order of conviction in a criminal case, is reinstated in service following the reversal of the conviction. Specifically the judgments of this Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board (1996) 11 SCC 603, Union of India v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121, Baldev Singh v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 747 and Banshi Dhar v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 1 SCC 324 have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the contention noticed above.

    6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the norms under the Sastry Award governing disciplinary action in respect of employees of the public sector banks. Pointing out the relevant clauses of the Sastry Award, it is argued that upon the acquittal of the employee concerned from a criminal charge it is open for the appellant Bank to initiate a departmental proceeding which, admittedly, in the present case was not so done. The learned counsel has pointed out that in such a disciplinary proceeding, if the charges against the acquitted employee are found to be substantiated, necessary disciplinary action can be invoked. However, in that event the employee concerned would be entitled to the benefit of full pay during the suspension period, if any. In the present case, as the provisions of the Sastry Award were not invoked and no departmental proceeding was initiated, the acquittal of the respondent has attained finality and, in effect would wipe out the initial conviction thereby entitling the respondent to back wages.

    7. The learned counsel for the respondent has also pointed out that in the decisions relied upon on behalf of the appellant Bank the basis for denial of back wages is the incarceration of the employee in custody following his arrest and conviction which disabled the employee from rendering any service whatsoever. In the present case the respondent was on bail all along. It is, therefore, argued that the ratio of the decisions relied upon would not apply to the facts of the present case.

    8. Before delving into the contentious issues arising from the arguments advanced, the issue with regard to the applicability of the provisions of the Sastry Award may be dealt with in the first instance. According to us, the said provisions do not have any special significance inasmuch as there can be no doubt on the proposition that on the very same facts that give rise to a criminal offence it is always open to the employer to initiate a departmental proceeding which option the employer may or may not exercise. In the event the employer chooses to initiate a departmental proceeding, it would be open for such an employer to take disciplinary action against the erring employee if the charges levelled are found to be substantiated notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee in the criminal case that may have been lodged against him. This is on the principle that standard of proof in a criminal case and a departmental proceeding is different. However, in a case where the employer chooses not to initiate a departmental proceeding and acts only on the basis of the conviction in the criminal prosecution, he would be bound by the final verdict in the same i.e in case of a reversal. The provisions of the Sastry Award, relied upon on behalf of the respondent, therefore, do not in any manner alter the basic principles surrounding the initiation of a criminal action and a departmental enquiry on the same set of facts and the consequences thereof.

    9. In the present case, the respondent was acquitted by the appellate court. There can be no manner of doubt that the said acquittal would relate back and the initial order of conviction would stand obliterated. On that basis, there can be no manner of doubt that the substratum of the cause that had led to the respondent's dismissal/discharge in the present case had ceased to exist. The same would entitle him to be reinstated in service, an act that has been duly performed by the appellant Bank.

    10. The issue relating to entitlement to back wages, however, stands on a somewhat different footing. While in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (1996) 11 SCC 603, Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121 and Baldev Singh (2005) 8 SCC 747, the basis of refusal of back wages by this Court would appear to be the inability of the employer to avail of the service of the employee due to his incarceration in jail, in Banshi Dhar (2007) 1 SCC 324 the refusal of back wages by this Court was in a situation largely similar to the case before us, namely, where the employee was all along on bail and was thus available for work.

    11. In Banshi Dhar (2007) 1 SCC 324 this Court answered the question against the employee by holding that grant of back wages is not automatic and such an entitlement has to be judged in the context of the totality of the facts of a given case. It is on such consideration that back wages were declined. In the present case, it will not even be necessary for the Court to perform the said exercise and delve into the surrounding facts and circumstances for the purpose of adjudication of the entitlement of the respondent to back wages in view of the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The said provisions impose a clear bar on a banking company from employing or continuing to employ a person who has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. No discussion as to the meaning of the expression “moral turpitude” is necessary having regard to the nature of the offences alleged against the respondent, namely, under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. No doubt, the respondent was not in custody during the period for which he has been denied back wages inasmuch as the sentence imposed on him was suspended during the pendency of the appeal. But what cannot be lost sight of is that the conviction of the respondent continued to remain on record until it was reversed by the appellate court on 22-2-2002. During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.

    12. The respondent was acquitted on 22-2-2002, the demand for reinstatement was made by him on 22-4-2002 and he was reinstated in service by the appellant bank on 7-11-2002. On the view that we have taken, at the highest, what can be said in favour of the respondent is that he is entitled to wages from the date he had lodged the demand for the same following his acquittal, namely, from 22-4-2002, until the date of his reinstatement, if the same has not already been granted by the appellant Bank.

    13. In the light of the above discussions, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order dated 22-2-2012 Writ Appeal (MD) No. 1715 of 2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Madras, subject to the observations made above.

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    State Bank Of India And Another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim .
    (Jul 15, 2013)