(1) The plaintiff is the appellant in this second appeal. The suit was brought on an insufficiently stamped promissory note which was for this reason rcjected by the courts below and the suit was dismissed. The question is whether having regard to the provisions of section 36 of the stamp act, the courts below were right in rejecting the promissory note ; in other words, whether the promissory note had not already been admitted in evidence. The courts below were of the opinion that the stage had not been reached at which the admissibility of the promissory note could not be questioned. Section 36 of the stamp'act prohibits the rejection of a document once it has been admitted in evidence even in a subsequent stage of the same suit and it is clear that under this section, objection could not be taken when there had been such admission. If a promissory note had in fact been admitted in evidence, though in disregard of the provisions of section 35, it will be available as evidence in that proceeding for all pruposes as if it had been properly stamped at the outset. This is the effect of section 36 and the section would apply even where, as in the present case the document is the foundation of the suit: lakshmappa v. Masood sahib, (1934) 67 m. L. J. 539. Venkara reddi v. Hussain setti. (1933) 66 m. L. J. 709 : i. L. R. 57 mad. 779 section 36 would apply even though the document had been wrongly admitted or admitted without objection. The object of the stamp act is to provide revenue for the state and not to arm a litigant with a weapon of defence and section 36 proceeds on that basis. If the objection as to the defective stamping is not taken or is overruled and the document is admitted in evidence, the matter stops there and neither the parties nor the court can thereafter agitate the question of its admissibility. The trial court which admits the document, as well as the appellate and revisional courts are all bound to act upon the document once it has been admitted in evidence as pointed out in alagappa chetti v. Narayanan chsttiar, (1932) 63 m. L. J. 548. And lakshmappa v. Masood sahib. , (1934) 67 m. L. J. 539.
(2) The provisions of order 13, rule 3, civil procedure code, empowering the court to reject at any stage of the suit any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, is subject to the provisions of section 36 of the stamp act. See satyavathi v. Pullaiah. , a. I. R. 1937 mad. 431. The crucial question is, whether in the circumstances of the case, there has been an " admission " of the promissory note in evidence within the meaning of section 36 of the stamp act. The promissory note was produced along with the plaint and filed into court on 19th january, 1951. The objection was taken in the written statement to the validity of the promissory note and an issue was framed in these terms : - "whether the suit promissory note is not true, valid and binding on the defendant?" the trial began on 4th september, 1951 and on that date the defendant's pleader put in a memo. , stating that he did not question the genuineness of the promissory note but questioned its validity. The plaintiff was examined as p. W. 1 and in the course of his evidence, the promissory note was put to him and he proved it. The promissory note was thereupon marked as exhibit a - 1 in the case. I have looked into the document and find that it bears the following endorsement : -
" in the court of the district munsif of ongole. O. S. No. 31 of 1951. Produced by the plaintiff on 19th january, 1951. Proved by p. W. 1, 4th september, 1951. Marked as ex. A - 1."
(3) There are the initials of the district munsif " p. A. R. " below these entries in his own handwriting. The usual appendix of evidence attached to the judgment contains the following entry : - " documents marked for plaintiff. Ex. A - 1. 12 - 9 - 1948. Suit pronote executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. " the effect of the entries on the document has to be understood in the light of order 13, rules 4 and 6 of the civil procedure code. The particulars required by order 13, rule 4, to be endorsed on a document which has been admitted in evidence in the suit are endorsed on exhibit a - 1. When questions as to the admissibility of evidence are raised during the course of the trial, they should be decided as they arise and should not be reserved until judgment in the case is given. If the document is not rejected with an endorsement or the particulars required under order 13, rule 6 and on the other hand the document bears all the particulars of the endorsement required to be made by order 13, rule 4 and the endorsement of the particulars is initialled by the judge it has to be taken that there was admission of the document in evidence for the purposes of section 36 of the stamp act. In spite of the objection taken to the admissibility of the promissory note before the trial began, the document was proved by p. W. 1 and was marked as exhibit a - 1. The district munsif, who tried the case, has initialled in his own hand at the foot of the entries required to be made by order 13, rule 4. Nevertheless, it is argued that the admission of the document exhibit a - 1 in evidence was not the result of a judicial determination of the question whether it could be admitted in evidence or not for want of stamp. It is said that the court did not apply its mind consciously to the question whether the document is admissible or not. Reliance was placed on venkanua v. Parasuram byas, (1939) 56 m. L. J. 633 : i. L. R. 53 mad. 137 sadasiva aiyar v. Meenakshi aiyar, (1933) 65 m. L. J. 673. And abdul wahab v. Anjaneyulu, a. I. R. 1935 mad. 888 for the position that unless the question of the admissibility of a document was actually considered by the trial judge after applying his mind consciously to the question whether the document was admissible or not, the endorsement thereon of the particulars required by order 13, rule 4, does not preclude him from considering the question of the admissibility of the document in evidence at a later stage of the case. To some extent, the argument involves nice considerations of human psychology into which a court is reluctant to be drawn. This is particularly so where an admission of a defectively stamped document in evidence without the court being alive to or aware of the provisions of section 35 of the stamp act, is rendered unassailable under section 36 of the act. In the case of a judicial proceeding which is required to be reduced to writing, the record made by the judge is the authentic evidence of what he intended to do. In applying the provisions of section 36 of the stamp act, the court should have regard to what has been actually done and not to the unexpressed intentions of the judge. The judge might have intended to reject the document, but if in fact he had not rejected it, but admitted it in evidence, it must be acted upon at the subsequent stages of the litigation.
(4) The decision of phillips and wallace, jj. , in venkanna v. Parasuram byas1, pointed out that in that case it was not clear whether the judge or a clerk of the court placed the rubber stamp containing the initials of the judge on the document and that it was very doubtful whether the provisions of order 13, rule 4, had been complied with. In these circumstances, the learned judges held that a document could not be deemed to have been admitted in evidence until the judge has applied his mind to a consideration of its admisibility. In other words, it was held that the admission of the document in that case was a mechanical act. Whether the decision was right or wrong, the facts here are far more compelling than in that case. Sadasiva aiyar v. Meenakshi aiyar2, was a decision of curgenven, j. In that case the endorsement had been made by a clerk but had not been signed or initialled by anybody else. The learned judge observed :
"it is difficult to resist the statement of the court itself that no occasion had arisen for it to look at the document and that it had not in fact considered the question of its admissibility."
(5) The position here is that objection was raised to the admissibility of exhibit a - 1 and it was proved by p. W. 1 and marked as exhibit a - 1. The endorsements were initialled by the district munsif in his own hand. The facts here bear no resemblance to those in the case before curgenven, j. Abdul wahab v. Anjaneyulu3, is a decision of pandrang rao, j. There a hundi was given a mark by the commissioner who neither initialled nor dated it and the procedure prescribed by order 13, rule 4, had not been followed. All that was done was to give an identifying mark to the hundi and no more and the identifying mark was given to put beyond doubt the particular piece of paper which was shown to a witness during his examination by the commissioner. The learned judge held that the commissioner had no authority to admit the document in evidence when objection to its admissibility had been taken and that the commissioner did not also purport to admit the document in evidence under the provisions of order 13, rule 4, civil procedure code. These are the only decisions cited by the respondent.
(6) In his judgment, the learned district munsif sought to bring the case within the decisions cited above by stating that he had not applied his mind to the question of the admissibility of the suit document when it was marked as an exhibit. In the face of the endorsements on exhibit a - 1 which have been initialled by him and which are regular and in strict compliance with the provisions of order 13, rule 4 and in the absence of any order under order 12, rule 6, rejecting the document, it is difficult to accept the view of the district munsif. If the district munsif had rejected the document when it was tendered in evidence through p. W. 1 instead of admitting it in evidence, the plaintiff might have asked for relief on the footing of the original consideration for the promissory note particularly when the plaintiff was the payee and not an endorsee of the promissory note. The document exhi - bit a - 1 was admitted in evidence on 4th september, 1951 and the learned district munsif closed the trial on that date and did not make any order rejecting exhibit a - 1. He pronounced his judgment on i4th september, 1951, dismissing the suit observing that he had not applied his mind to the question of the admissibility of the promissory note till he pronounced the judgment. Even if the district munsif remained in that uncertain state of mind, it would not affect the legal result of his action in admitting the document in evidence on 4th september, 1951. For these reasons, i reverse the decisions of the courts below and decree the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.