(1) This is a revision against the judgment of the munsif, huzuroagar, dismissing the suit under section 9 of the specific relief act, 1963 filed by the revision - petitioner on the ground that section 99 of the hyderabad tenancy and agricultural lands act (xxi of 1950) , bars the jurisdiction of the civil court. The learned munsif held that the revision - petitioner had admitted in certain revenue proceedings that the respondent was his tenant and presumably applying section 37 of the hyderabad tenancy and agricultural lands act, came to the conclusion that the respondent was a protected tenant within the meaning of that section and consequently, (though he does not say so in so many words) he very probably thought that landlords should apply to the tahsildar under section 32 (2) instead of seeking a remedy in a civil court, the jurisdiction of which, accotding to him, is barred by section 99. Section 99 is as follows :
" (1) save as provided in this act no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the tahsildar, tribunal or collector or by the board of revenue or government. (2) no order of the tahsildar, tribunal or collector or of the board of bevenue or government made under this act, shall be questioned in any civil or criminal court."
(2) The essential thing which bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts is that which is required to be settled or decided or dealt with by a tahsildar, tribunal or collector or by the board of revenue or government under the provisions of the act. It is, therefore, necessary to see whether the remedy sought for by the revisionpetitioner is required to be settled, or decided under the provisions of the aforesaid act. In order to determine this it is necessary to state a few facts. The revision - petitioner was in possession of her lands when she alleged the respondents ejected her forcibly without any legal justification. The munsif came to the conclusion on the evidence that she was in fact illegally ejected by the respondents four months prior to the suit. It is as a result of this action of the respondents that she filed a suit under section 9 of the specific relief act, 1963, which in so far as it is relevant is as under:
"if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit."
(3) The question, therefore, is whether the revision - petitioner could under the provisions of this central act seek the remedy under section 9 or should she be obliged to have recourse to the provisions of the hyderabad tenancy and agricultural lands act. The only provisions to which my attention has been directed by the learned advocate for the revision - petitioner is sub - section (2) of section 32 of the tenancy act which is as under:
" (2) no landholder shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the tahsildar, for which he shall apply in the prescribed form."
(4) According to this provision if a tenant was in possession of any land or dwelling house, it will be obligatory on the landholder to apply in the prescribed form to the tahsildar. He cannot, therefore, in such circumstances have recourse to a civil suit under section 99 to eject the tenant, but this case is the reverse of what is contemplated in sub - section (2) of section 32. Here the landholder has been ejected from her possession. There is no provision in the tenancy act where - under she could apply for restoration of possession and it, therefore, follows that she must have recourse to the civil or criminal law and seek remedy in a civil or criminal court as the case may be. This appears to be the position on a general reading of the relevant provisions of the act to which my attention has been directed. Learned advocate for the revision - petitioner further contends that under subsection (2) of section 2 and section 104 of the hyderabad tenancy and agricultural lands act, that act will prevail over all acts which are made in exercise of the legislative powers vested in the states under list ii of 7th schedule of the constitution, but if there is a conflict between any act passed by virtue of the powers vested in the parliament under list i or list iii of the 7th schedule, those remedies will be available. In support of this contention he has cited two decisions of the erstwhile hyderabad high court one that of mohd. Abdul khader and others v. Sedam asru and others, where it was held in circumstances similar to the present case, that a suit under section 9 of the specific relief act, 1963 is outside the purview of the hyderabad tenancy act; as such section 99 of the hyderabad tenancy act has no application and rhe civil suit is not barred. Similarly another bench of the same high court in gandipalli ramkrishen rao v. Mucha badrappa and another held in relation to criminal law that the prohibition under section 99 (2) does not apply to the proceedings undet the criminal procedure code or the penal code which are enactments of the central and can be enquired into by criminal courts inspire of tenancy certificate granted by the tahsildar. While these are persuasive precedents, it is not necessary for me to express an opinion on this aspect of the matter, because in the view i have already taken, viz. , that the facts and circumstances of the case do not require the landholder to take any steps under the tenancy act, and as such no question of the bar of jurisdiction of the civil courts on that count will arise. That apart the fact whether the respondents were protected tenants ot not has also not been proved by admissible evidence. It was alleged on behalf of the respondents that a petition was filed by bhadradi ramarao, an advocate of the petitioner in which the respondents were alleged to have been admitted tenants. Bhadradi ramarao was not summoned to prove whether he had filed such a petition and if so whether he received instructions from the revision - petitioner. Instead one g. Sitharama reddy, a pleader, was examined as d. W. 4 and he appears to have looked at the original of the petition and stated that it bore the signature of bhadradi ramarao.
(5) There is no evidence to show why bhadradi ramarao, was not called. The best evidence is the evidence of the person who has appended the signature to the document unless evidence is sought to be admitted under section 32 of the evidence act. In the absence of any specific allegation as to why bhadradi ramarao was not called, the evidence of sitharama reddy cannot, in my view, prove the document upon which the munsiff relied for holding that the respondents were tenants of the revision - petitioner. In this view of the matter and having regard to the finding of the lower court that the revision - petitioner was dispossessed four months peior to the suit by the respondents the suit for specific performance is decreed and the revisionpetitioner will be entitled to a decree for possession with costs of the lower court. Since the respondents are not present, i make no order as to costs of this court. T. A. B. Revision allowed.