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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: B. Subhashan Reddy, Kush Kumar Waghray, S. Balchand, Advocates.
Judges
  • Muktadar, J.
Acts
  • provisions of order 1 rule 10 and order 22 rule 10 c. P. C. And section 109
  • 22 rule 10 of the code
  • 1 rule 10 of the code
  • Order 1 rule 10 (2)
  • Order 22 rule 10
  • 1, rule 10c. P. C.
  • 1 rule 10
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: B. Subhashan Reddy, Kush Kumar Waghray, S. Balchand, Advocates.
Judges
  • Muktadar, J.
Acts
  • provisions of order 1 rule 10 and order 22 rule 10 c. P. C. And section 109
  • 22 rule 10 of the code
  • 1 rule 10 of the code
  • Order 1 rule 10 (2)
  • Order 22 rule 10
  • 1, rule 10c. P. C.
  • 1 rule 10
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These five revisions were disposed of by a common order because they involved similar questions of fact and law. The petitioner in these revisions is the tenant of the suit premises. The original landlord (respondent no. 7) had filed five eviction petitions under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act ("the Act"), on grounds including wilful default in payment of rent.

While the eviction proceedings were pending, the original landlord sold the suit premises to respondents 1 to 6 and 8. The purchasers (respondents 1–6 and 8) moved under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to be impleaded in place of the original landlord; the rent controller dismissed that petition. The purchasers appealed to the appellate authority under the Act; the appellate authority allowed the appeal and the petition to implead them as parties. The tenant/petitioner challenged that result by filing these revisions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal preferred by respondents 1 to 6 and 8 against the rent controller's order dismissing their petition to be impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was maintainable.
  2. Whether the sale of the suit premises by the original landlord to respondents 1 to 6 and 8 during the pendency of eviction proceedings defeats or destroys the original landlord's cause for eviction.
  3. Whether purchasers whose sale deed is silent as to collection of arrears of rent acquire the rights of the original landlord (including to collect arrears) pendente lite or only upon registration/express conveyance of such rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Sri B. Subhashan Reddy)

  • The appeal preferred by respondents 1–6 and 8 was not maintainable because the rent controller's order dismissing their petition to be impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC did not affect the rights and liabilities of the parties; therefore the purchasers had no right to appeal. In support of this contention counsel cited Lingayya v. Lakshminarasmma and Chaganlal (died) Sardarilal v. N. Pershad.
  • Once the original landlord sold the premises, any cause of action that was applicable to the original landlord was lost and, accordingly, the eviction proceedings should have been terminated.
  • The eviction petitions are founded on wilful default in payment of arrears of rent; the sale deed to respondents 1–6 and 8 is silent regarding collection of arrears. Therefore, unless the sale deed expressly or by implication transferred the right to collect arrears, the purchasers cannot acquire those rights (and any rights would accrue only after registration of the sale deed).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of arguments advanced specifically on behalf of respondents 1–6 and 8.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lingayya v. Lakshminarasmma (1962 (1) A.L.T. 434) Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that an interlocutory order dismissing an application to be impleaded does not affect rights and so is not appealable. The court observed that the judgment did not discuss the words "any person" in the relevant statutory provision and, in view of subsequent authority (and reasoning), concluded that Lingayya's case could not be followed for the proposition as applied to the instant facts.
Chaganlal (Died) Sardarilal v. N. Pershad (1972 (1) A.P.L.J. 343) Cited by petitioner for the principle that interlocutory orders which only regulate proceedings and do not affect rights or liabilities are not appealable. The court noted that the judges in that case did not consider the term "any person" and that it was not a case of dismissal of a petition to be impleaded; on that basis the court held the ruling inapplicable to the present facts.
P. N. Rao v. K. Radhakrishna Macharyulu (A.I.R. 1978 A.P. 319) (Full Bench) Held that where the Act is silent on a matter, provisions of the CPC are applicable provided they are not contrary to the Act. The court relied on this full bench ruling to apply CPC provisions (Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 22 Rule 10) to the eviction proceedings because the Act and its rules are silent regarding addition of parties during pendency.
Abdul Wahafa v. Wazirunnissa Begum (1965 (1) An. W.R. 331) Referenced in the court's analysis in relation to construing who may be regarded as "any person" for purposes of appealability. The court cited this case as a basis to reject the applicability of Lingayya in the present context and to support the view that third parties affected by interlocutory orders can have a right to appeal under the Act's appeal provision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded principally by reference to the statutory framework under the Act, to provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure where the Act is silent, and to the transfer provisions in the Transfer of Property Act.

1. Applicability of the CPC: The court relied on the full bench decision in P. N. Rao v. K. Radhakrishna Macharyulu to hold that where the Act and its rules are silent on a point, the provisions of the CPC apply so long as they are not contrary to the Act. Because the Act is silent about addition of parties during eviction proceedings, Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and Order 22 Rule 10 CPC were regarded as applicable.

2. Provisions permitting impleading pendente lite: The court explained that Order 1 Rule 10 permits making a person a party where a subsequent event during the pendency of proceedings makes that necessary to adjudicate disputes completely and effectively. Order 22 Rule 10 CPC permits continuation of a suit by or against a person to whom an interest has been assigned, created, or devolved during the pendency of the suit. These provisions envisage cases where assignment or devolution of interest during proceedings makes the transferee the appropriate party.

3. Transfer of Property Act (Section 109): The court referred to section 109 which provides that if the lessor transfers the leased property or part of his interest, the transferee (absent contract to the contrary) possesses the rights and, if the lessee so elects, is subject to the liabilities of the lessor as to the transferred property while the transferee remains owner; the proviso states the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer. The court used this provision to support the proposition that a transferee pendente lite is entitled to be brought on record to effectually decide the dispute.

4. Appealability under the Act (Section 20): The court examined Section 20 of the Act, which allows "any person aggrieved" by an order of the controller to appeal within thirty days (with time to obtain a certified copy excluded). The court read the phrase "any person" to include persons who have applied to be impleaded (i.e., third parties like the purchasers) and concluded that where an interlocutory order dismisses such an application it affects their rights and is therefore appealable. The court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Lingayya and Chaganlal as inapplicable, noting those cases did not consider the term "any person" and, in the case of Lingayya, had not discussed that wording at all.

5. On the effect of sale on the landlord's cause and arrears: The court held that although the original landlord might have lost the cause of eviction by reason of the sale, that loss would not estop the original landlord from claiming arrears of rent by filing a regular suit. Regarding whether the sale deed conveyed rights to collect arrears to the purchasers, the court said the sale deed was silent on that point and the court would not express an opinion on such matters at that interlocutory stage so as not to prejudice either party; these questions can be raised by the petitioner after the purchasers are impleaded and will be considered by the rent controller in the eviction proceedings.

6. Conclusion of analysis: Having regard to Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, and Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, the court concluded that respondents 1–6 and 8 were proper parties and should be impleaded. Because their petition to be impleaded affected their rights, their appeal under Section 20 of the Act against the rent controller's dismissal was maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the revisions/appeals (the petitioner's challenges) with costs (one set).

Immediate implications and consequences:

  • Respondents 1 to 6 and 8 were held to be proper parties and should be impleaded in the eviction proceedings (i.e., brought on record as parties).
  • The purchasers' appeal against the rent controller's dismissal of their petition to be impleaded was held to be maintainable under Section 20 of the Act because the term "any person" includes third parties whose rights are affected by interlocutory orders; accordingly the appellate authority's order allowing their impleading was supported by the court's reasoning.
  • The petitioner (tenant) remains free to raise contentions regarding (a) whether the sale deed conveyed rights to collect arrears and (b) the effect of the sale on the landlord's cause of eviction, after the purchasers are impleaded; the rent controller is to consider such contentions in the eviction proceedings.
  • The decision implements existing statutory and precedent-based principles (use of CPC provisions where the Act is silent; application of Section 109 T.P. Act) rather than announcing a new legal principle or precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts of these cases.

No information beyond the text of the provided opinion has been added. Sections and conclusions are confined to the material expressly contained in the opinion.

Show full summary ...

    K. Sitarama Rao v. Ratanlal Panwar And Others

    (1) These five revisions are being disposed of by this common order as the questions of fact and law involved in them are similar. The petitioner in these revisions is the tenant of the suit premises. The original landlord who is respondent no. 7 in these revisions filed five eviction petitions on different grounds namely wilful default in payment of rent etc. During the pendency of the eviction proceedings under the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, hereinafter referred to as the 'act' respondent no. 7, that is the original landlord sold the suit premises to respondents 1 to 6 and 8 before me. Thereafter, respondents 1 to 6 and 8 filed a petition under order 1 rule 10 of the code of civil procedure to implead them as parties in the place of original landlord. The rent controller dismissed that petition. Aggrieved by the order of the rent controller the purchasers filed an appeal. The appellate authority under the act allowed the appeal and also the petition to implead them as parties. Hence these revisions.

    (2) Sri b. Subhashan reddy the learned advocate for the petitioners in these revisions has raised the following contentions (1) that the appea preferred by respondents 1 to 6 and 8 herein before the appellate authority was not maintainable because the order of the rent controller dismissing their petition to implead them as parties under order 1 r. 10 of the code of civil procedure cannot be considered as affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties. In support of this contention the learned advocate has cited the decisions reported in lingayya v. Lakshminarasmma (1962 (1) a. L. T. 434) and chaganlal (died) sardarilal v. N. Pershad (1972 (1) a. P. L. J. 343). The second contention of mr. Subhashan reddy is that the moment the original landlord sold the suit premises to respondents 1 to 6 and 8, what ever cause that was applicable to the landlord was lost and therefore the proceedings ought to have been terminated. The third contention of mr. Subhashan reddy is that the original landlord has filed the eviction petitions on the ground of wilful default in payment of arrears of rent. So far as the ground of wilful default in payment of arrears of rent is concerned, mr. Subhashan reddy says that the sale deed in favour of respondents 1 to 6 and 8 is completely silent with regard to the collection of the arrears of rent. If at all, the purchasers under the sale deed will have the rights accruing to them only after the registration of the sale deed and whatever rights the original landlord had since they were not conveyed expressly or by implication to the purchasers, they cannot be acquired by them. So far as the first contention is concerned namely the maintainability of the appeal before the appellate authority egainst the order allowing the petition under order 1 rule 10 of the code of civil procedure and making respondents 1 to 6 and 8 herein as parties, it has to be noted that a full bench of this court in p. N. Rao v. K. Radhakrishna macharyulu (a i r. 1978 a. P. 319) has held that in those matters which have not been specifically provided for by the act, the provisions of the code of civil procedure would be applicable provided that they are not contrary to the provisions of the act. Since the act and the rules framed thereunder are silent with regard to the addition of the parties during the pendency of the eviction proceedings, therefore in the light of the ruling of full banch i am of the opinion that the provisions of civil procedure code could be made applicable to eviction proceedings. Now under order 1 rule 10 or under order 22 rule 10 of the code of civil procedure a person can be made a party by virtue of the happening of a subsequent vent during the pendency of the suit or the proceedings. Order 1 rule 10 (2) empowers the court to make a person as a party to the suit in order to enable the court to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit effectually and completely. It is now well - settled that if any subsequent event takes place during the pendency of the proceedings or the suit the court can order amendment or add parties to the suit or proceedings. Order 22 rule 10 c. P. C. Provides that in cases of an assignment, creation, or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. This provision envisages a case where during the pendency of the suit or proceedings, an event takes place whereby assignment or creation or devolution of any interest has occurred as a result of which the original party has lost his right to file the suit or has transferred the same to another person who was not so far a party to the suit. Moreover, section 109 of the transfer of property act provides.

    " if the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof or any part of his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him: provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer, and that if the lessee, not having reason, to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not be liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee"
    .

    Therefore, a reading of the provisions noted herein above would show that the transferee pendente lite is entitled to be brought on record with a view to effectually decide the dispute between the parties. The contention of mr subhashan reedy is that the appeal against the order of the rent controller disposing of interlocutory application by impleedlng respondents 1 to 6 and 8 as parties was not maintainable. To my mind this contention also cannot be accepted. Section 20 of the act provides sec. 20 (1) : " any person aggrieved by an order passed by the controller may, within thirty days, from the date of such order prefer an appeal in writing to the chief judge, small causes court in the cities of hyderabad and secunderabad end elsewhere to the subordinate judge, or if there are more than one subordinate judge, to the principal subordinate judge having original jurisdiction over the ared aforesaid. In computing the said period of thirty days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded". A close reading of the section would show that it does not limit the appeal to the parties only. If it had been the intention of the legistature that only parties to the procedings can appeal. It would have said so in clear terms, to my mind. The words " any person" cocuring in sec. 20 of the act would also. Envlsage a case where third parties file an application under or. 1, rule 10c. P. C. To tmplead them as parties and when their petition is dismissed, it would mean an interlocutory order has been passed finally affecting their rights and therefore, they would be en - titled to file an appeal. The rulings relied upon by mr. Subhashan reddy cannot be applicable tj this case. In the first instance, in lingayya's case (supra) the learned judge has not at all discussed with reference to the words " an/ parson ". Moreover in the light of the ruling in abdul wahafa v. Wazirunnissa begum (1965 (1) an. W. R. 331). I cannot follow 1he ruling in lingayya's case (supra). So far as the ruling in chaganlai (died) sardarilal v. N. Prasad (supra) is concerned, the learned judges did not at all consider the term " any person". Nor was that a case of dis - missal of a petition for being impleaded as parties to the proceedings - the sum and the substance of the ruling relied upon by the learned advo - cate is that an interlocutory order, if it is a step taken towards the final adjudication of or for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceedings regulates the proceedings only and does not effect any rights or liabilities of the parties. Therefore, an appeal can. Not lie against such an order, in other words, whether the order affectg the rights or liabilities of the parties would be a test to find out whether an appeal is maintainable or a revision is maintainable. In the instant case, respondents 1 to 6 and 8 were persons who were aggrieved by the order of the rent controller dismissing their petition to be impleaded although they had become the owners according to law and the pro - vision cited above would show that they were entitled to be made parties to tha proceedings. Therefore, under these circumstances if their petition to be impleaded as parties was dismissed it would mean that they were the persons whose rights have been affected and as such the appeal was maintainable. So far as the second contention of mr. Subhashan reddy is concerned, it might be that the original landlord has lost the cause for eviction of the tenant as he is no longer the landlord of the suit property. That would not have estopped him from claiming the arrears of rent by filing a regular suit. So far as the third contention is concerned, it is not known whether the sale deed has expressly or by implication given the rights to the new lessors to collect the rent. These are matters about which i do not wish to express any opinion as it might prejudice the case of the parties. The petitioner before me may raise these points after respondents 1 to 6 and 8 are brought on record. Hence, to my mind, having regard to the provisions of order 1 rule 10 and Order 22 rule 10 c. P. C. And section 109 of the transfer of property act, respon - dents 1 to 6 and 8 would be proper parties and as such they should be impleaded. After their being impleaded, it would be open to the peti - tioner to raise these contentions and the rent controller will consider these contentions while disposing of the eviction proceedings.

    (3) Hence these appeals dismissed with costs one set.

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    Comments

    K. Sitarama Rao v. Ratanlal Panwar And Others
    (Nov 13, 1981)