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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: N.V. Ramnganadham, P. Venugopal Rao, T. Veerabhadraiah, Advocates.
Judges
  • Lakshmana Rao, J.
Acts
  • provisions of section 10 (2) (ii)
  • Section 10 (2) (ii) (a)
  • section 10 (2) (ii)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: N.V. Ramnganadham, P. Venugopal Rao, T. Veerabhadraiah, Advocates.
Judges
  • Lakshmana Rao, J.
Acts
  • provisions of section 10 (2) (ii)
  • Section 10 (2) (ii) (a)
  • section 10 (2) (ii)
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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges the judgment of the rent control appellate authority and the subordinate judge, Tanuku, dated 23-2-1983 in RCA No. 4 of 1982, which confirmed an order of the Rent Controller, Tanuku dated 4-11-1982 passed in RCC No. 1 of 1980. The Rent Controller had allowed an application filed by the respondent under section 10(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 ("the Act").

The petitioner had taken the petition-schedule premises on lease in 1949 under lease deed Ex. A-6 and ran a retail cloth shop therefrom. The respondent (the widow of the original landlord) filed a petition under section 10(2) asserting three grounds for eviction: (1) the petitioner sublet a portion of the premises to two tailors without the landlord's written consent; (2) the premises was required for the respondent's adopted son to run a business (bonafide requirement); and (3) the premises was required for carrying out repairs. The Rent Controller found for the respondent on all three grounds, and the appellate authority confirmed that order. The petitioner filed the present revision challenging those concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a tenant who, under a lease that does not confer a right to sublet, has permitted subletting of the whole or a portion of the premises can be evicted under section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act in the absence of written consent from the landlord.
  2. Whether the landlord's alleged oral consent, acquiescence, or acceptance of rent over a period (conduct of the parties) can be treated as waiver or substitute for the written consent required by section 10(2)(ii)(a), or whether such conduct gives rise to estoppel that bars eviction.
  3. Whether an eviction petition based on the landlord's bonafide requirement to start a business (for the landlord's adopted son) is maintainable where the petition does not supply particulars or evidence as to the nature of the proposed business or why the vacated portion is unsuitable.
  4. Whether the ground of eviction for carrying out repairs requires separate consideration given the tribunal findings on subletting (i.e., whether the court should decide on repairs when eviction is sustained on subletting).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • The petitioner contends that the subletting of a portion of the premises was with the consent of the original landlord (the husband of the respondent) and, after his death, with the respondent's knowledge — evidenced by the respondent's regular receipt of rents without objection.
  • The petitioner argued the consent need not be written and could be inferred from the conduct of the parties over a long period (waiver by conduct or acquiescence); therefore eviction on the ground of subletting is not maintainable.
  • The petitioner asserted that he did not part with possession of the shop and merely allowed two tailors to keep sewing machines — the payments received from them were nominal, suggesting de minimis use incompatible with an eviction ground.
  • Regarding the claimed bonafide requirement for starting a business by the adopted son of the respondent, the petitioner argued the eviction petition lacks particulars of the proposed business and therefore is not maintainable.
  • The petitioner contended that the repairs claim is a pretext to evict the tenant to obtain a higher rent later.

Respondent's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • The respondent submitted that section 10(2)(ii) makes written consent of the landlord a condition precedent to valid subletting when the lease does not confer such right, and that statutory requirement cannot be substituted by oral consent or acquiescence.
  • It was argued that the written-consent requirement is based on public policy; allowing waiver or inference of consent would defeat the legislative purpose and amount to estoppel against a statute (which is impermissible).
  • The respondent relied on various precedents (including decisions of higher courts) to support the proposition that conduct or acquiescence cannot replace the express written consent required by the statute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. N. Rao v. K. Radhakrishna Macharyulu (Full Bench), AIR 1978 Andhra Pradesh 319 Authority for the proposition that a landlord by conduct may waive rights under the Act by accepting rent subsequently, preventing the landlord from later maintaining an eviction petition. Referred to by the petitioner to support inference of consent/waiver from conduct. The court considered this authority but rejected the submission that such waiver could supplant the statute's written-consent requirement.
Mrs. Chacko v. Yeditha Seshamma (1971 (1) APLJ 82) Held that in the case of subletting the breach is not continuous and acceptance of rent after knowledge of subletting without demur may lead to a different result; assent to subletting may bar later eviction on that ground. Relying on this single-judge decision, the petitioner argued that acceptance of rent should preclude eviction; the court examined the decision but declined to permit oral consent or waiver to replace the statutory written consent.
Waman Shrinivas v. R. B. & Co., AIR 1959 SC 689 Support for the proposition that statutory requirements (such as written consent) cannot be circumvented by informal acts or conduct inconsistent with the statutory text. Relied upon by the respondent to argue that the written-consent requirement of the Act cannot be treated as satisfied by oral consent or waiver; the court accepted this reasoning in preferring statutory sanctity over inferred waiver.
Aiyannah Chetty v. Muddu Krishnayya & Co., 1956 (ii) MLJ 54 Authority emphasising that statutory requirements for landlord consent cannot be replaced by acquiescence or estoppel by conduct. Used by the respondent to bolster the argument that estoppel cannot operate against a statutory requirement; the court applied this principle in rejecting the petitioner's waiver argument.
T. S. O. Abdul Khader v. G. H. Rao, 1964 (ii) MLJ 288 Supports the view that when a statute requires written consent, conduct or acquiescence by the landlord does not satisfy that requirement. Relied upon by the respondent; the court treated it as consistent authority for holding that written consent is mandatory and cannot be substituted by oral consent/waiver.
Associated Hotels of India v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1968 SC p. 933 Considered statutory provisions (section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act) requiring written consent for subletting/assignment and the consequences of subletting without such consent. Cited by the respondent and noted by the court to show that where statutory written-consent provisions exist, courts have upheld eviction where subletting occurred without written consent; the court applied the same reasoning here.
P. Latchanna v. G. Appa Rao, 1982 (2) APLJ 137 Holds that particulars of the proposed business must be stated with sufficient particularity in an eviction petition based on personal/bonafide requirement to enable the controller to form a satisfactory opinion. Relied upon by the petitioner to argue that the eviction petition was defective for lack of particulars. The court accepted this authority on the bonafide-requirement point and found the tribunals erred in upholding eviction on that ground.
M. M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal (Supreme Court) Expresses the principle that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose how to use premises — quoted in the opinion as part of the legal context for discussing landlord's choice. Quoted by the parties and noted by the court in the discussion of personal requirement; however, the court relied on the absence of particulars and evidence to reject the bonafide-requirement finding rather than invoke an absolute landlord-right rule.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing the statutory text, the factual findings of the two tribunals below, and the competing legal authorities invoked by the parties. The principal lines of reasoning were:

  1. Statutory Text and Condition Precedent: The court emphasised that section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act explicitly renders written consent of the landlord a condition precedent to valid subletting where the lease does not confer such a right. The lease deed Ex. A-6 in this case prohibited subletting without written consent.
  2. Nature and Purpose of the Written-Consent Requirement: The court regarded the written-consent requirement as being grounded in public policy and the legislative purpose of the Act — namely, to regulate leases, control rent and prevent unreasonable eviction. Permitting oral consent or waiver would defeat that object and thereby alter the statutory scheme.
  3. Waiver, Acquiescence and Estoppel: The court distinguished subletting without written consent from other statutory eviction grounds (for example, willful default in payment of rent). It held that while conduct and waiver may be relevant in other contexts (such as inferences about non-payment or waiver of rent claims), they cannot be treated as substitutes for a statutory requirement. Allowing waiver or estoppel to override the written-consent requirement would amount to estoppel against a statute, which is impermissible.
  4. Application to the Factual Findings: Both tribunals below had found on the evidence that the tenant sublet a portion of the shop to RWs 2 and 3 without any written consent from either the original landlord or the respondent. Given that factual conclusion and the mandatory statutory text, the court found no error in sustaining eviction on the ground of subletting.
  5. Bonafide Requirement for Business: The court separately considered the petitioner's challenge to the tribunals' finding on the landlord's bonafide requirement. It noted authoritative guidance that particulars of the proposed business must be set out sufficiently to enable the controller to form a satisfactory opinion. In this case, the eviction petition contained no particulars and no evidence about the nature of the proposed business, nor proof that the vacated portion was unsuitable — therefore the tribunals were in error to sustain eviction on that ground.
  6. Repairs Ground Not Decided Separately: The court observed that it was unnecessary to decide the repair-related ground in view of the clear conclusion on subletting; because eviction is sustainable on that ground, the repairs issue need not be addressed further.
  7. Relief and Equitable Considerations: Although the tenant was held liable to be evicted on the statutory ground of subletting, the court nevertheless recognized the tenant's long possession since 1949 and afforded a limited period (three months) to vacate, subject to deposit of any arrears within four weeks and continued payment of rent for the three months.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision petition is dismissed. The tenant (petitioner) is liable to be evicted from the petition-schedule shop on the ground of subletting without the written consent of the landlord, as required by section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act.

Direct Consequences and Orders:

  • The dismissal of the revision petition upholds the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority that the tenant sublet part of the premises without written consent, making eviction proper under the statute.
  • No separate determination was necessary on the repairs ground because eviction was sustained on subletting.
  • The tribunals' finding in favour of the respondent on the ground of bonafide requirement for starting a business was set aside because the eviction petition lacked particulars and evidence about the proposed business.
  • Practical relief to the tenant: The court granted the petitioner three months from the date of the judgment to vacate and deliver possession. The petitioner was directed to deposit any arrears of rent within four weeks and to continue paying rent for the three months (payments by the 15th of each month). On deposit, the respondent may withdraw the amount without furnishing security.
  • Costs: There shall be no order as to costs.

Broader Implications:

The opinion enforces the statutory requirement of written landlord consent for subletting where the lease does not confer such a right, treating that requirement as grounded in public policy and not susceptible to being overridden by waiver, oral consent or estoppel by conduct. The court did not purport to lay down a new principle of law beyond applying established authorities; its decision reaffirms that statutory formalities for consent cannot be bypassed by informal conduct.

Show full summary ...

    Manepalli Lashminarayana v. Mandavalii Suryakantham .

    (1) This revision petition is filed against the judgment of the rent control appellate authority and subordinate judge, tanuku dated 23 - 2 - 1983 in r c a no. 4 of 1982 confirming an order of the rent controller. Tanuku dated 4 - 11 - 1982 passed in r c c no 1 of 1980 allowing an application filed by the respondent herein under section 10 (2) of the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act 1960 (herein after referred to as 'the act').

    (2) The petitioner herein took on lease the petition schedule premises for running a cloth shop, in the year 1949 under a lease deed ex. A - 6. The petition was filed under section 10 (2) on the grounds that 1) the petitioner sublet the building to two tailors without the written consent of the respondent 2) the petition schedule premises is required for running business by the respondent's adopted son and 3) the said premises is required for carrying on repairs. Oral and documentary evidence was produced both on behalf of the respondent and the petitioner herein. On consideration of the evidence on record, the rent controller held that the petitioner herein is liable to be evicted from the said premises on the grounds of 1) sub - letting 2) requirement to carry on repairs and 3) bonafide requirement for the purpose of carrying on business by the respondent's adopted son. On appeal, the learned subordinate judge (rent control appellate authority) confirmed the order of the learned principal district munsif (rent controller).

    (3) It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petition schedule premises was leased out by the husband of the respondent herein in favour of the petitioner under ex. A - 6 lease deed dated 15 - 10 - 1949 and eversince then he has been running a retail cloth shop in the said premises. The landlord died some time back and the respondent herein is his widow. It is the case of the petitioner herein that a portion of the petition schedule premises was sublet to two tailors with the consent of the landlord, long back and the respondent having full knowledge of subletting, has been receiving rents regularly from the petitioner herein, without raising any objection against subletting.

    (4) It is contended that the subletting was with the consent of the landlord and after his death, of the respondent herein and as such the petitioner herein who is the tenant is not liable to be evicted on the ground of subletting. It is submitted by the learned counsel that no particulars as to the nature of the business proposed to be commenced by the adopted son of the respondent herein are mentioned in the petition for eviction and no evidence is led as to the nature of business proposed to be started in the petition schedule shop. In the absence of particulars of business, it is argued that the petition for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement to start business is not maintainable. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petition schedule shop does not require any repairs as mentioned in the petition filed by the respondent herein for eviction and that it is merely a ruse to evict the petitioner herein from the said shop so that it may be leased out later on a higher rent. section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the act reads as follows :

    "2) a land - lord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the controller for a direction in that behalf. If the controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied - ii) that the tenant has, in the andhra area, after the 23rd october, 1945, and in the telangana area after the commencement of the hyderabad houses rent control order of 1353 fasli, without the written consent of the landlord - (a) transferred his right under the lease or sub - let the entire building or any portion thereof if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so. The controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application."

    (5) As per, the terms of the lease deed ex. A - 6 the petitioner herein should not sublet the premises without the written consent of the landlord. section 10 (2) (ii) (a) specifically provides that if the tenant in the andhra area 23 - 10 - 1945 has transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or a portion thereof without the written consent of the landlord and the lease does not confer on him any such right, the tenant is liabe to be evicted.

    (6) In this case, the first question that arises for consideration is whether there is written consent of the landlord for subletting when the lease deed does not confer any such right on the tenant to sub - let. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the consent need not be in writing and it can be inferred from the conduct of the parties, spreadover a fairly long period of time. In this context, it is contended that as the right conferred on the landlord under section 10 (2) to seek eviction of a tenant from the premises can be waived by the landlord, by such waiver, the requisite consent for subletting can be inferred. In this connection, it is submitted that the original landlord who is the husband of the respondent herein consented for subletting and the respondent herein has full knowledge of sub letting and has been regularly receiving rent without raising any objection. According to the petitioner herein, he did. Not part with the possession of the suit schedule shop and merely allowed two tailors to have their sewing machines as is the practice with every person runing a retail cloth shop. It is further submitted that the rent collected from the two tailors was nominal. Relying upon a judgment of the full bench in p. N. Rao vs. K. Radhakrishna macharyulu (1) air 1978 andhra pradesh, 319 wherein it is laid down that the landlord by his conduct may still waive his right to the benefits of the act by accepting the rent subsequently and hence he must not be permitted to maintain the eviction petition. "

    (7) It is contended that by the conduct of the original landlord and after his death the conduct of his wife, the respondent herein, in accepting the rent regularly and without raising any objection against subletting, the original landlord and the respondent herein shall be held to have waived their right to the tenant on the benefit under the act to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of subletting. It is submitted by the learned counsel that as a matter of fact the husband of the respondent herein consented for subletting to the two tailors and it is not open to the respondent herein to file a petition for eviction on the ground of subletting without consent, my attention is drawn to a judgment of a learned single judge of this court in mrs. Chacko v yeditha seshamma (2) 1971 (1) a p l j page 82 wherein his lordship has taken the view that: "in the case of subletting, the breach is not continuous and if there was acceptance of rent, without demur after the landlord has knowledge of the subletting a different result might follow. Once a subletting is assented to, it may not be open to the landlord to have recourse to that ground for obtaining an eviction order. '' on the basis of the above referred two judgments it is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not open to the respondent at this stage to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of subletting, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case.

    (8) On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that under section 10 (2) (ii) the written consent of the landlord is a condition precedent for subletting when the lease deed does not confer any such right on the tenant. It is stated that the date 23 - 10 - 1945 referred to in section 10 (2) (ii) is the date of commencement of madras house rent control order 1945 issued under defence of india rules. They ceased to be in force from 1 - 10 - 1946 when madras (lease and rent) control act 1946 came into force. When the act itself has specifically provided that the landlord can seek eviction of a tanant on the ground of subletting, when the tenant sublet the premises or a portion of it without the written consent of the landlord, when the lease deed does not confer any such right on him, the tenant cannot be permitted to raise the plea of waiver or oral consent. In this context it is submitted that the provisions of section 10 (2) (ii) requiring written consent of the landlord for subletting are based on public policy and such a public policy should not be permitted to be defeated by raising a plea of waiver or oral consent in the place of the landlord. In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a judgment of the supreme court in waman shrinivas v r b and co. , (3) air 1959, s c page 689. Relying upon the judgments in aiyannah chetty v muddu krishnayya and co. , (4) 1956 (ii) m l j 54 and t. S. O. Abdul khader vs g h rao (5) 1964 (ii) m l j 288 it is argued that when the act requires the written consent of the landlord any kind of acquiescence by the landlord or estoppel by his conduct cannot be a substitute for the plain requirement under the statute of a written consent' in associated hotels of india v ranjit singh (6) a i r 1968 s c p 933 the supreme court considered the scope of section 13 of the delhi and ajmer rent control act which provided that a tenant is liable to be evicted from the premises if he has sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent of the landlord in writing. In this case, both the courts below concurrently found that the subleltings after the commencement of the act were without obtaining the consent of the landlord in writing, and the sublettings before the commencement of the act were made without obtaining the consent of the landlord either orally or in writing. Having regard to the said concurrent finding of fact, their lordships of the supreme court have declined to interfere with the judgment of the court below. Relying upon the above referred judgments, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that in this case as there is admittedly no written consent for subletting and the provisions under section 10 (2) (ii) are based on public policy, no waiver, if any, can be inferred from the conduct of the parties and such an inference amounts to estoppel against a statute.

    (9) Both the tribunals below have thoroughly and elaborately considered the oral and documentary evidence and came to the conclusion that the tenant violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed ex. A - 6 and sub - let a portion of the premises to r ws 2 and 3 without the written consent of the respondent or her husband and as such the tenant is liable to be evicted. Under section 3 of the act, every landlord is under a legal obligation to give notice of the vacancy in writing to the authorised officer within 10 days after the building becomes vacant. The act is intended to regulate the lease of buildings, the control of rent thereofand the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom. When the legislature has specifically provided that a tenant shall not sublet without the written consent of the landlord unless the lease deed confers such a right on him, which provision appears to be based on public policy, the very object and purpose sought to be achieved by the said provision will be defeated if sub letting is permitted on the basis of oral consent or on the ground of waiver. Wilful default in payment of rent as a ground for eviction of tenant stands on a different footing from the ground of sub letting without the written consent of the landlord. In case of wilful default in payment of rent, a contract to the contrary can be inferred from the conduct of the parties end a plea of waiver can be permitted to be raised. But when section 10 (2) (ii) specifically requires the written consent of the landlord for sub - letting when the lease deed does not confer any such right of subletting on the tenant, no oral consent or an inferance of consent from the conduct of the parties can be permitted to be substituted in place of written consent as it amounts to alteration of the provisions of the act itself. Apart from that, when a landlord is entitled to seek eviction of a tenant on the ground of sub - letting without written consent of the land lord, denial of such a right on the basis of oral consent or waiver of the right amounts to estoppel against a statute which is not permissible under law. For the reasons stated above, i do not find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner by the reason of the oral consent and the conduct of the original landlord and after his death the conduct cf his widow the respondent herein, in accepting the rent regularly having full knowledge of sub - letting which amounts to waiver of the right to seek eviction of the tenant, the petition filed under section 10 (2) (ii) is liable to be dismissed.

    (10) The next contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no particulars of the business proposed to be commenced by the adopted son of the respondent herein are mentioned in the petition and in the absence of such particulars the eviction petition filed on the ground of bonafide requirement to start business is liable to be dismissed in view of the judgment of this court in p latchanna v g appa rao (7) (1982 (2) ap l j 137). The learned judge held that : "the particularisation of the business without being vague or equivocal must be stated in the petition itself and it is this ingredient that in essence contributes towards the formation of satisfactory opinion by the controller. Since thts ingredient is woefully lacking in this petition, the petition deserves to be dismissed. '' on the other hand, the learned for the respondent submits that it is not for the tenant to dictate for what purpose he should use the building and how he should make use of it and it is for the landlord to choose but having regard to the view expressed by the supreme court in m m quasim v manohar lal (8) that :

    "the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very reason d'etre of the rent act."

    It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the respondent let out a portion of the building which was useful to carry on business, before the filing of the eviction petition it is not open to her to file a petition for eviction on the ground of personal requirement when she failed to establish that the premises which was vacant was not suitable for the purpose for which shn wanted the said premises. On the basis of the judgment of the supreme court as well as that of this court referred to above, and having regard to the evidence on record it has to be held that both the tribunals below erred in holding that the tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of bonafide requirement and that the said premises is required for the purpose of commencing the proposed business by the adopted son of the respondent herein. It is an admitted fact that no particulars of the business are given and no evidence is let in as to the nature of the business that is proposed to be commenced by the adopted son of the respondent. No evidence is produced before the court as to how the portion that fell vacant before or at the time of filing of this eviction petition was not suitable to carry on the porposed business and how the petition schedule premises is more suitable. In the circumstances, having regard to what is stated above, it has to be held that the tribunals below erred in holging that the petitioner is liable to be evicted on the ground of requirement of the premises to commence the business as the nature and particutars of which are not mentioned in the eviction petition.

    (11) As regards the contention relating to eviction of the tenant for the purpose of carrying out repairs, i consider that it is not necessary to deal with the said contention in view of what i have held in respect of subletting. The petitioner herein is liable to be evicted from the petition schedule shop on the ground of subletting. As both the tribunals below have concurrently found that the tenant sublet a portion of the shop without the written consent of the landlord, i do not see any error of jurisdiction or law in the judgment of the appellate authority to the extent stated above. For the above mentioned reasons, the revision petition fails and is accordingly dismitsed. In the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.

    (12) The petitioner herein has been continuing in possession of the suit schedule shop since the year 1949 carrying on retail cloth business. Having regard to this fact, i consider that it will be just and proper if three months time from today is granted in favour of the petitioner to enable him to vacate the petition schedule premises and deliver possession of the same to the respontent. The petitioner is directed to deposit the arrears of rent if any due uptodate, within four weeks from today and he shall continue to pay rent for the said three months on or before 15th of each month. On deposit, the respondent is permitted to withdraw the amount without furnishing any security.

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    Comments

    Manepalli Lashminarayana v. Mandavalii Suryakantham .
    (Apr 18, 1983)