Jeevan Reddy, J.:-
(1) This civil revision petition has been referred to a bench in view of the importance of the question involved. We shall first state the relevant facts :
(2) Defendants 1 and 2 (respondents 1 and 2 in this civil revision petition) executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff (revision - petitioner) on 17 - 3 - 1968 agreeing to sell an extent of ac. 8 - 62 cents of land in survey no. 681/1 of raghudevapuram village for a consideration of rs. 10,000/ -. A sum of rs. 3,000/ - was paid by way of earnest money. Alleging that defendants 1 and 2 have refused to abide by the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff filed o. S. 105/1968 on the file of the learned district judge, east godavari, rajahmundry, for specific performance of the agreement. Though the suit was dismissed by the trial court on 31 - 12 - 1969, it was decreed in appeal, a. S. 316/1970, by this court by its judgment and decree dated 22 - 3 - 1973. Clause 2 of the decree, while providing that the plaintiff shall pay a sum of rs. 7,000/ - towards balance of the sale consideration, did not evidently by inadvertance - prescribe the period within which such deposit had to be made. The execution of the sale - deed and delivery of possession, of course, had to follow the said deposit. Defendants 4 to 6 in the suit, who are said to be subsequent purchasers of the land in question from defendants 1 and 2, preferred a letters patent appeal, being l. P. A. No. 173/1973, against the judgment and "decree of this court in a. S. No. 316/70. It was dismissed on 23 - 9 - 1975.
(3) Plaintiff deposited the balance" consideration of rs. 7,000/ - on 16 - 4 - 1981 in the trial court and filed an execution petition on 12 - 10 - 1981. In this execution petition he stated that the possession of the land has been delivered to him on 1 - 12 - 1975 but the sale deed has not been executed. He requested the court to direct the defendant to execute the sale - deed, and on his failure to do so, to execute a sale - deed itself.
(4) About one year after the deposit of the sum of rs. 7,000/. (the precise date is not available from the record) , defendants 1 and 2 filed la. No. 314 of 1982 under section 28 (1) of the specific relief act for rescinding the agreement on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to deposit the said sum of rs. 7,000/ - for a period of seven years, and further that he has also tresspassed into the land unlawfully. Defendants 1 and 2 further stated that having waited for some years, they executed a sale - deed in respect of the said land in favour of defendants 4 to 6, and that with a view to remove the trespass by the plaintiff defendants 4 to 6 have filed a suit, o. S. No. 48/ 1982, on the file of the learned subordinate judge, rajahmundry, for recovery of possession and damages against the plaintiff.
(5) Both the e. P. And the i. A. Were taken up together for consideration. The learned first additional district judge held that the e. P. Is barred by limitation, having been filed beyond three years. He allowed i. A. No. 314/82 filed by defendants 1 and 2 and rescinded the agreement, on the ground that the plaintiff is guilty of unreasonable delay in depositing the balance consideration. He held that the mere fact that the decree of the high court did not prescribe the time for such deposit is of no avail to the plaintiff. The validity and correctness of the said order is questioned in this civil revision petition.
(6) We may point cut at the cutset that the filing of an execution petition by the plaintiff for directing defendants 1 and 2 to execute a sale - deed was really unnecessary. No execution petition as such is necessary for the said purpose after the coming into force of the specific relief act, 1963, sub - section (3) of section 28 empowers the court to direct not only the execution of sale - deed in pursuance of a decree for specific performance, but also to direct delivery of possession, and to pass all other necessary and ancillary orders in the same suit. sub - section (3) of section 28 reads as follows :
" (3) if the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub - section (1) the court may, on application made in the same suit award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely :
(a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor ; (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. "
sub - section (4) of section 28 bars a suit for obtaining the reliefs mentioned in sub - section (3). It is true that even after the coming into force of the specific relief act, sub - rule (5) of rule 32 of order xxi, c. P. C. Has been retained and continued - it has been left untouched even while effecting extensive amendments in 1976and for that reason, an execution - petition cannot be said to be not maintainable, yet ordinarily speaking, the procedure provided by sub - section (3) of section 28 may be said to be more convenient. The idea behind sub - section (3) of section 28 evidently is to see that alt the reliefs which the parties are entitled to in a suit for specific performance are worked out in the same suit. The suit does not come to end with the passing or the decree directing specific performance, it continues and subsists until all the directions made in the decree are complied with. In this sense, the decree directing specific performance can be likened to a preliminary decree. Thereafter, if the purchaser does not deposit, the vendor can apply for rescission under sub - section (1) and for other incidental directions under sub - section (2). If, however, the purchaser complies with the directions but the vendor fails to perform his obligations, the purchaser can apply under sub - section (3) for all such reliefs as he is entitled to including execution of sale - deed and delivery of possession. These are very salutory provisions designed to obviate multiplicity of proceedings. In the present case, however, it does not matter whether the application filed by the purchaser (petitioner) is treated as an execution - petition or as an application under sub - section (3) of section 28, as we shall presently show. If we treat it as an execution petition, it is within limitation, having been filed within twelve years of the decree. We are not able to appreciate how the e. P. Could have been dismissed by the court below as barred by time, in view of article 136 of the limitation act, which provides a period of twelve years for filing an execution petition. It is not disputed before us that art. 137 of the limitation act has absolutely np application to such an execution petition. Now, if we treat it as an application under section 28 (3) , no question of limitation arises, since it does not prescribe any such.
(7) Coming to the merits of the case, the position is this, the decree passed by the high court does not provide the time for depositing the balance consideration by the plaintiff, as it ought to have done. Indeed, both sub - section (1) as well as sub - section (3) of section 28 are based upon the assumption that a decree for specific performance does provide the time within which the purchaser has to deposit the balance of purchase money, if any. La this sense, strictly speaking, both the application of the plaintiff (execution petition) as also la. 314/82 filed by defendants land 2 are not strictly within the terms of sub - section (3) and sub - section (i) , respectively, of section 28. For the sake of convenience we may also set out sub - section (i) of section 28 here, which would bear out the above observation. It reads.
"28 (1) : where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further peripd as the court may allow, pay the purchase chase money other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor, may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require."
(8) We are, however, of the opinion that even in such a case applications of the nature filed by the parties must be relatable to these provisions, reading the concept of reasonable time into the decree.
(9) Treating the petitioner's application as e. P. Too does not mean automatically that since it is filed within twelve years, it ought to be ordered automatically. Can it be said that inasmuch as the decree did not prescribe the time for depositing the balance consideration, it is open to the purchaser to deposit at any time within twelve years? cannot the concept pf 'reasonable period' imported in such a context? this is the question that we have to answer. On this question it is well to remember that the relief of spepific performance is an equitable remedy. Indeed, the specific relief act itself is based upon equity, tair play and good conscience. It has been held by the supreme court in h. I. Trust vs. Haridas mundhra #1 that the contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of a decree 'for specific performance, and that the contract subsists notwithstanding the passing of the decree; (vide paragraph - 22). The purchaser cannot, and should not be allowed to take unfair advantage of the situation. He must act with reasonable diligence. The application for execution of the sale - deed and/or for delivery of possession, whether by way of an e. P. Or an application under section 28 (3) , must therefore be made within a reasonable time. What is 'reasonable time' is a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of a given case. No hard and fast rule can be enunciated in that behalf. However, it may be borne in mind that the period of limitation prescribed by the limitation act for enforcing an agreement of sale is three years from the date fixed for the purpose, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused; (art. 54). The said period must be treated as the outer limit, generally speaking. Indeed, it should be much sooner.
(10) Now coming to the facts of the case before us, following is the factual position; the agreement of sale is dated 17 - 3 - 1968; the total consideration is rs. 10,000/ - out of which a sum of rs. 3,000/ - was paid on the date of the agreement of sale; the decree for specific performance was passed by this court on 22 - 3 - 1973. However, inasmuch as the said decree was appealed against by defendants 4 to 6 in l. P. A. No. 173/1973, we shall take the date of dismissal of the said letters patent appeal as the relevant date, which is (23 - 9 - 1975. "there is no evidence that after this date (or for that matter after 22 - 3 - 1973) the plaintiff ever called upon defendants 1 and 2 to execute a sale - deed and/or to deliver possession. He deposited the balance consideration oi rs. 7,000/ - on 16 - 4 - 1981, i. E. , more than 5 1/2 years later, in the execution petition he made an allegation that possession was delivered to him on 1 - 12 - 1975, which was denied by defendants 1 and 2. According to defendants 1 and 2 they never delivered possession. They say, plaintiff forcibly trespassed into the said land. They say further that having waited for a few years after 23 - 9 - 1975, they sold the land in favour of defendants 4 to 6. The said defendants have also filed a suit, o. S. No 48/1982, on the file of the sub - court, rajahmundry, for recovery of possession against the plaintiff. The application asking for execution of the sale - deed (e. P. No. 54/1981) was filed on 12 - 10 - 1981. Column 9 of e. P. 54/1981 filed by the plaintiff shows that the plaintiff has recovered the costs due and payable in the suit, first appeal, as well as the letters parent appeal, before the filing of the e. P. (from the decree of the high court it appears that the costs in the trial court and the first appeal came to more than rs. 4,000/ - ,)
(11) Before we proceed further it is necessary to pronounce upon the factual dispute relating to the delivery of possession of the land concerned herein. According to the plaintiff, possession of the land was delivered to him on 1 - 12 - 1975 by defendants 1 and 2, which they deny. According to defendants 1 and 2 it was a case of trespass and forcible entry by the plaintiff. We are inclined to believe the version of defendants 1 and 2. Having fought the litigation upto high court it is unlikely that defendants 1 and 2 would have voluntarily delivered possession of the land to the plaintiff, that too even before the plaintiff deposited the balance consideration and obtained the sale - deed. It is unlikely that defendants 1 and 2 would have delivered possession of the land without receiving the bulk of the consideration which was still due and which was, admittedly, not paid to them. (as we have stated above, the said sum of rs. 7,000/ - was deposited into court only on 16 - 4 - 1981). Therefore, the theory of the plaintiff being voluntarily put in possession by defendants 1 and 2 is false. On the contrary, it was a highhanded act. Not only the plaintiff did not deposit the bulk of consideration, i. E. , rs. 7,000/ - out of a total sum of rs. 10,000/ - , but he forcibly occupied the land, and also recovered the decree costs from the defendants. This conduct of the plaintiff is also relevant in considering what is the reasonable time for applying whether by way of an e. P. Or under section 28 (3). (regard may also be had to the fact that section 28 (3) uses the word 'may', which emphasizes the discretionary nature of the relief).
(12) The facts stated above leave no doubt in our minds that the plaintiff waited far an unreasonably long time. His conduct aformentioned also militates against him, which disinclines the court from granting the discretionary, or any equitable relief to him.
(13) Mr. S. Venkata reddy, the earned councel for the petitioner (plaintiff) argued that inasmuch as the decree of the high court did not prescribe the period within which the plaintiff had to deposit the balance consideration, it was open to him to deposit the same at any time and ask for execution of the sale - deed. This plea. Ignores the equitable nature of the remedy of specific performance, ignores the specific language of section 28 (3) , and above all, ignores the fact that mere passing of the decree does not extinguish the agreement between the parties, as held by the supreme court. Even though there is no time limit prescribed, the plaintiff must approach the court within a reasonable time and his hands must be clean. In this case it cannot be said either that the plaintiff has approached the court within a reasonable time, or that he has come to the court with clean hands on this occasion true it is that defendants 1 and 2, having executed an agreement of sale in his favour, resiled therefrom and drove him to court, which litigation he had to fight upto the l. P. A. Stage in the high court; but, that fact has to be weighed against his subsequent conduct, viz. , his forcible occupation of the land without paying the balance consideration and without obtaining the sale - deed, more particularly when the balance of consideration yet to be paid was 70% of the total consideration; the collection of deres costs by him from the defendants, when he had, admittedly, to deposit more amount than the decree costs, and his setting up a false case in the e. P. That possession was delivered to him by defendants 1 and 2 on 1 - 12 - 1975. In our opinion, therefore, the plaintiff is disentitled to any relief.
(14) Mr. S. Venkata reddy further argued that the rescission of the contract by the court below was not warranted, inasmuch as the application therefor was filed only in 1982, i. E. , seven years after the decision in l. P. A. No. 173/73. He reiterated his submission that inasmuch as the decree of the high court does not prescribe the time for depositing the balance consideration, the application under section 28 (1) is itself not maintainable. Our answer to this contention again is that, even where no time is prescribed in the decree, it must be read as a reasonable time, the length of reasonable time being a question of fact in each case, having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. Moreover, in this case we are not so mush concerned with the petition for rescission filed by defendants 1 and 2 under subsection (1) of section 28. Even if they had not applied for such rescission, the plaintiff had to, and did apply whether by way of an - execution petition or under section 28 (3) for execution of a sale - deed, and we have held that he is not entitled to any relief for the reasons stated above,
(15) Before concluding we may refer to the two decisions of this court which are referred to in the order of muktadar, j. , referring this case to the bench. In s. Suryanarayana vs. T. Sydaiah #2 the court held that it is not necessary for the vendor to file a separate suit for rescinding the contract, and that the said relief can be obtained by an application under sub - section (1) of section 28. It was held that sub - section (4) of section 28 bars a suit for the purpose mentioned in sub - section (1). In that case the contract was rescinded and the possession of the land was ordered to be delivered back to the vendor.
(16) In nazeeruddin vs. Ram devi #3 the court negatived the contention that once a decree for specific performance is passed without fixing the date for performance, the court has no jurisdiction to amend the decree, fixing the time for its performance. Both the above decisions were rendered by learned single judges of this court.
(17) For the above reasons, we dismiss the civil revision petition with costs.