Krishna Rao, J.:— This appeal is filed by defendants 1 to 6 and 8. The respondents filed a suit O.S 32 of 1959 on the file of the Suborinate Judge, Bapa???a under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, after having obtained the sanction of the Advocate General, for framing a scheme for the management of a public trust consisting of Ac 19.96 cents of tamarind tope situate in S. No. 36 of Annavaram village in Bapatla taluk, Guntur District. The case of the plaintiffs is that the ancestors of the Pinninty family dedicated the suit land and tope for the benefit of the public, that a title deed No. 3???7 was granted at the time of the Inam Commission in favour of Pinninti Lakshmipathi as trustee of the charitable tope free of tax, that ever since, the said tope was being enjoyed by the members of the public, that in August 1958, the defendants ??? and carried away some of the tamarind trees, that the defendants in breach of the trust, obtained a patta in their own name under the Inams Abolition Act, that the defendants had been cultivating an extent of about Ac. 5.00 of she trust property for their own use and that a scheme for the administration of the trust should be framed by appointing new trustees by removing the defendants from their trusteeship and for a rendition of accounts against the defendants.
2. The defendants contested the suit alleging that the land was not the subject matter of trust, that their ancestors dedicated only the fruit of the ???amarind trees for the benefit of the villagers, that their obligation to distribute tamarind fruit ceased as a result of the levy of full assessment on the land under the provisions of the Inams Assessment Act, 1955, that in view of the patta granted to the defendants under the Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956, the defendants became the ryotwari owners of the suit-land, that the said proceedings cannot be questioned in a civil suit, that there was no breach of trust on their part, that they are not liable to tender any account to the plaintiffs, that they cannot be disturbed from the possession of the suit property and that no scheme can be framed in respect of the suit property. The court below recorded the following findings:
(i) that the suit land itself was dedicated by the original owner Pinninti Lakshmipathi who constituted himself as the trustee of the property and that it was not merely the fruit of the trees that was the subject matter of dedication;
(ii) that the decision of the Inams Tahsildar levying full assessment did not operate to extinguish the trust;
(iii) that the patta granted in favour of the defendants under the Inams Abolition Act does not in any way affect the trust which was granted in favour of the public;
(iv) that the defendants committed acts of waste and breach of trust; and
(v) that it is sufficient if the defendants are directed to furnish an account of the profits received by them for a period of six years prior to the suit.
3. In view of these findings, the Court below passed a preliminary decree for the framing of a scheme with a direction to remove the defendants from their trusteeship and for delivery of possession of properties to the new trustees to be appointed under the scheme. There was a further direction that both parties should submit proposals to the Court for framing the scheme decree. Aggrieved by the said decree, the defendants filed the above appeal in this Court. On behalf of the appellants, the learned counsel, Sri Vidyasagar, raised two contentions, firstly, that the suit land was not the subject matter of a public trust that only the fruit of the tamarind trees standing thereon was the subject matter of dedication to the public, that the defendants have no objection even now for the public enjoying the fruit of the tamarind trees and that there is no need to frame any scheme with regard to the fruit distribution of the tamarind; and secondly, that in any event, in view of the ryotwari patta granted in favour of the defendants in their individual capacity, the trust, if any, ceased to exist and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Andhra Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act. (37 of 1956).
4. The first question for considerasion depends upon the proper interpretation of the documentry evidence adduced on both sides. The earliest document is Ex. B-3 dated 29-12-1964 which is a certified copy of the Inam statement submitted at the time of the Inam Commission enquiry. The said statement purports to have been given by Pinninti China Sundararamudu. Column I shows that as per the village accounts the grantee was Pinninti Lakshmipathi and that China Sundara Ramudu was the then enjoyer, aged 20 years, resident of Aunavaram village. In column 4, it is mentioned that the tope wag originally grown by Pinninti Lakshmipathi and that the present enjoyer Sundararamudu was his grandson. In column 6, it is stated that about 100 years prior to the said statement, the tope was converted for charitable purposes for the benefit of the public wish the permission of the village officers. There is a further note made in the said statement as follows:
“There are 31 tamarind trees and 5 palmyrah trees and one zuvvi tree. The boundaries of the land are as follows:
No. 22 tope East. No. 2 Cremation ground South. Village West 65-66 Seri North”
5. Column 11 recites that the present enjoyer was protecting the tope and is managing it distributing the fruit charitably for the benefit of the villagers. Column 12 also shows that the tamarind fruit was being freely distributed to the villagers, that the produce was never enjoyed for his personal benefit, that no income was derived by him from the property and that he had no right to alienate the land. Column 13 shows that no documents were filed before the Inam Commissioner. A geneology was attached to the statements according to which Pinninti Lakshmipathi was the ancestor and the present enjoyer Sundararamudu was his son's son. The said statement was attested by some of the villagers and also by the village officers. The next document of considerable importance is Ex. A-4, certified copy of the Inam Fair Register. The said land is described as Dharmadayam and the extent of the land is shown as Ac. 19-87½ cents bearing a total assessment of Rs. 49-11-0 at Rs. 2-8-0 per acre. It is stated to be a permanent grant for the public benefit. The name of the grantor is shown as Pinninti Lakshmipathi about 100 years ago. In the survey and settlement village accounts, it was stated as cist zabitha of Fasli 1248 Pinninti Lakshmipathi tope. The name of the grant is also shown as Pinninti Lakshmipathi. The present enjoyer was shown as Pinninti China Sundararamudu who gave the inam statement, Ex. B-3. In the remarks column, it is noted as follows:
“As this is a charitable tope it is to be confirmed without quit rent”:
6. Column 22 says “confirmed as recommended”, and title deed No: 397 was accordingly issued. It is also noted under columns 2 to 5 that there were 307 tamarind and other trees on the land, In pursuance of the enquiry evidenced by Ex A-4, the Inam Commissioner issued a title deed No. 397 Ex; B-2 dated 4-1-1870 in favovr of Pinninti China Sundararamudu under the following terms:
“By order of the Governor in Council of Madras acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council, I acknowledge your Title to a Dharmadayam or Charity Inam consisting of the right to the Government revenue on land claimed to the Acs. 19-87 cents of dry land situated in the village of Annavaram, Taluk of Bapatla, District of Krishna and held for the public benefit.
This Inam is confirmed to you and your successors tax free to be held without interference so long as the conditions of the grant are duly fulfilled”.
7. Ex. A-6 is the Inam B register of the village for Fasli 1332 in which the land is described as Dharamadayam bearing patta No. 397 and S. No. 36 of an extent of Ac. 19-96 cents and bearing a cist of Rs. 74-14-0. It is noted therein under the column of enjoyers as managers for the time being for the charitable tope.
8. Ex A-7 of the year 1908 is a certified copy of the re-settlement register in which the land is described as charitable tope. The certified copies of No. 2 account Exs. B-13 to B-20 of Faslis 1358 to 1367 show the name of pattadar or enjoyer as “the Dharmadayam Inams then Manager”. No. 14 account Ex. B-21 to B 25 and B-27 also described the suit land as Dharmadayam land. Ex. B-26 which is a certified copy of the Survey and Settlement Register of 1873 also described the suit land as tamarind tope.
9. From the above documentary evidence, it is argued by the appellants' learned counsel that the usufruct of the tamarind trees was alone the subject matter of trust and that the land was never dedicated for a public trust. The first case on which reliance is placed for the appellants is Vallbharaja Swawi Varu v. D. Hanumanthacharulu . 19???8 I An. W.R 242. in which, on a construction of the Inam Fair Register and the title deed issued by the Inam Commissioner, it was held that the inam was granted to the archakas to be held for archakatwam service, that is, daily worship of the Deity. On the basis of the said recitals in the documents, it was held to be a personal inam burdened with service. We do not think that this case supports the plea of the appellants, for, in the instant case, there is no such recital in the Inam Fair Register or in the Title deed granted by the Inam Commissioner imposing a condition of service on the holder.
10. The next case cited for the appellants is Sri Ranga Chariar v. Pranatharthihara Chariar . 30 I.C 74. where it was held that a scheme of administration under Sec. §2 C.P.C cannot be framed in respect of an inam granted to certain individuals for the purpose of the service of Acharya Purusha in a temple. The principle underlying the said ruling is that the object of the grant was for the support of the individual and that it was not public trust. We do not therefore think that this case is of any assistance to the appellants.
11. The third case cited for the appellants is an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in As. 362/56 dated 7-10-1961 (Muppamanli Lakshmaiah v. M???vva Sriramulu) in which while holding on a construction of the relevant documents that the land itself was the subject-mattter of the trust in respect of a charitable tope, it was finally held that the trust itself was extinguished there being no trees and that the re-grant in favour of the inamdars was valid, The resumption proceedings were started on the basis of the statement of the inamdars that they were not willing to carry out the trust and that full assessment may be levied after issuing pattas in their name. On the basis of the said evidence, it was held that the re-grant of the land in favour of the inamdars was no longer impressed with the character of trust. The said ruling has no applicabilty to this case as there is no case of any extinguishment of the trust. Admittedly there are considerable number of trees in the suit tope and the inamdars never applied for resumption.
12. The last case to which reference is made by the appellants' learned counsel is Gela Ram v. Dist. Board, Muzaffar Garhi which is also a case where the trust was held to have become extinguished. As we have already pointed out, there is no plea in the present case that the trust became extinguished. But the only contention raised is that the trust related only to the usufruct of the trees and not to the land itself.
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents Sri Venkatarama Sastri placed strong reliance on a ruling in Venkatachalapathi Rao v. Bhima Rao in which a Division Bench of this Court which decided the unreported judgment A.S 256/56 cited by the appellants (supra), held on a construction of the recitals in the Inam Fair Register and the title deed issued by the Inam Commissioner which are exactly similar as in the present case, that the land itself was dedicated as Dharmadayam tope for public benefit by the original owner constituting himself as the trustee thereof. The recitals in the title deed are also exactly the same as in the present case and are as follows:
“I acknowledge your title to the Dharamadayam or charity inam consisting of the right to the Government revenue on land claimed to be 5-53 acres held for the public benefit.
This inam is confirmed to you and your successors tax free; to be held without interference so long as the conditions of the grant are duly fulfilled”.
14. This ruling was followed by the lower Court in coming to its conclusion in favour of the respondents and we are also inclined to hold that the said decision directly governs the present case. This decision was sought to be distinguished by the appellants on the ground that in the said case, there was a certain admission by the trustees that the tope was a public charitable tope. But on a perusal of the judgment, though the said fact was merely noted, as part of the evidence, we find that the conclu3.’on is based mainly on an interpretation of the entries in the Inam Fair Register which are exactly similar to the entries in the present case. In arriving at this conclusion, the learned Judges followed the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Dikshitulu v. Venkatappayya . 1959 I An. W.R 357. in which on identical facts it was held that the land itself was dedicated as a charitable trust but not merely a partial interest in the land. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is clear beyond doubt that the entries in the Inam Fair Register refer to the land itself as having been granted for the public benefit. In the inam statement also, the trustee who was the grandson of the original vendor gave the boundaries of the land as representing the Charitable tope. The mere fact that the trees then in existence were mentioned, does not give rise to an inference that the trust related only to the usufruct of the trees. The further admissions contained in the inam statement that the enjoyers had no personal benefit in the produce and that no income was derived by the enjoyers and that the property cannot be alienated are strong indications to show that the subject matter of the trust was the land itself and not the usufruct. If the land was not the subject matter of dedication, the person who made the statement would have certainly stated that the public are entitled only to the usufruct of the tamarind trees while he is entitled to derive any other benefit out of the land. In the subsequent revenue records also, the land itself is treated as a charitable tope in the possession of the managers for the time being. There is absolutely no evidence to show that the members of the Pinninti family who founded the trust ever asserted private ownership of the land, except when a patta was applied for under the Inams Abolition Act recently which gave rise to the present suit. The conclusion that the land itself was the subject matter of the trust gains support from the fact that the Inam Commissioner confirmed the title making it tax free as the trustees did not derive any personal benefit from the land. Hence, on a consideration of the documentary evidence in this case, we hold that the original owner Pinninti Lakshmipati having conceived the idea of growing a tamarind tope for the benefit of the villagers, raised a tope and dedicated the land as public charitable tope constituting himself as a trustee. We are not, therefore, prepared to hold that the trust consisted merely of the usufruct of the trees. We are further of the opinion that as the land itself was the subject-matter of trust the title deed granted by the Inam Commissioner did not confer any personal right in the land in favour of the grantee. What was granted under the title deed was only a remission of the land revenue and nothing else. As the land did not previously belong to the Government what could be granted under the title deed was only a remission of the land revenue due to the Government Hence we do not think that the land itself was granted by the Government under the title deed.
15. The Court below also considered the oral evidence in the case including that of the Commissioner as P.W 3 and held that there are 44 tamarind trees besides certain other trees on the land and that the villagers bad been using the tope for their benefit without any obstruction.
16. The second question which falls for consideration is whether the defendants acquired an absolute right as per the patta granted under the Andhra Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (37 of 1956) free of any obligation of trust and whether the jurisdiction to the Civil Court is barred under section 14 of the said Act.
17. In view of the finding that the land was dedicated as a public trust, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that even if a patta is granted to the defendants who belong to the family of trustees under the Andhra Inams Act, they should hold the patta only as trustees and not for their individual benefit. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on Mohammad Esufsahib and Amir Bibi v. Moulvi Abdul Sathar Sahab and Amir Khan Sahib. It was laid down in the said ruling that the land having been granted as inam in trust for a mosque, did not cease to be such on being resumed by the Government for non-performance of the duties by the trustees. It was accordingly held that the resumption of the inam by the levy of full assessment on the land followed by the issue of a ryotwari patta to the trustees did not free the lands from the trust and make them the private property of the trustees and that the trustees held the lands for the benefit of the trust.
18. Even otherwise, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respordents that the orders of the Revenue authorities granting patta under the Inams Abolition Act do not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court from determining the question whether the suit land was trust property. The Inams Deputy Tahasildar held that as the suit land is not an institution, patta should be granted in favour of the defendants. The enquiry contemplated under section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act relates to three questions, whether the particular land is an inam land, whether the land is situate in a ryotwari, zamindari or in an inam village and whether such inam land is held by an institution. In the present case, there is no question of the suit land having been held by an institution as the very land itself constitutes the institution, namely, a Dharmadayam tope. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1102/65 dated 8-8-1968, it was held that under Hindu law, a tank can be regarded as an institution of a charitable nature. Applying the same principle, the charitable tope can be regarded as an institution by itself. Hence the Tahsildar has no jurisdiction under section 3 to treat the suit land as an inam held by an institution. The enquiry under section 3 is only confined to the question whether the inam land is held by the institution. Section 4 of the Act provides that a person or institution holding the inam land shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta. Section 7 contemplates an enquiry by the Tahsildar either suo motu or on the application of a person or the institution for the determination of the person or institutions entitled to ryotwari pattas under the Act. It was further provided under Sec. 7 that an appeal to the Revenue court against the said judgement is final and if no such appeal is filed, the decision of the Tahsildar shall be final. Section 12 of the said Act lays down that every person or institution receiving a ryotwari patta under the Act in respect of an inam land shall, from the date of the grant of such patta, be liable to pay to the Government the ryotwari assessment thereon. Section 13 confers powers on the Revenue authorities in the matter of enquiries only with respect to specified matters contemplated in the Civil Procedure Code relating to summoning of witnessess and production of documents. Section 14 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in the following terms.
14. “No suit or other proceeding shall be instituted in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any decisions of the Tahsildar, the Revenue Court, or the Collector under this Act, except where such decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties”.
19. Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the Act states that all enquiries under the Act shall be summary.
20. The above provisions of the Act make it clear that the sole object of the Act is to alter and abolish the inam tenure, and ryotwari pattas are granted to individuals for the sole purpose of collecting the land revenue thereon. The enquiries under the Act are stated to be summary and the scope of the enquiries and the remdeies provided under the Act are not as adequate and effective as the ordinary remedies open before a Civil Court. The Revenue authorities are not entrusted with the duties of adjudicating upon the title of persons in possession under general law. Even if the Revenue authorities decide the disputes of rival claimants, the said decisions cannot operate as res judicata between the parties in a Civil Court. As there is no express provision in the laid Act that decisions of Revenue authorities under the Act are binding on a Civil Court, the finality attaching to the decisions of the Revenue authorities under the Act is always understood as being final only before the Revenue Authorities and for the purposes of the Act and nothing more. As observed by Varadachari, J. in Kamaraja Pandiya v. Secretary of State after referring to the earlier cases of the Madras High Court.
“A statute may attach finality to particular orders, in the sense of precluding further appeal to the statutory authorities; whether it was intended to go further and oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts as well will depend not upon words of that kind but upon the general scheme of the particular legislation”.
21. Having regard to the object and scheme of the Act, we are not prepared to hold that the decisions of the Revenue authorities under the Act are binding on the Civil Court. When proceedings under the special enactment are said to be summary, it was certainly not the intention of the legislature to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in deciding questions of title to the property notwithstanding the grant of patta by the Revenue authorities under the Act in favour of any particular individual. As regards the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, the question has been the subject matter of decisions from time to time by the Supreme Court and it is sufficient to refer to the principles laid down to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 260 to 263 of 1967 dated 5-4-1968 in which on a consideration of the decided cases, it is laid down that where the statute gives finality to the orders of special tribunal, the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded only if there is an adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit and that even if there is a specific provision excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it is still open to a Civil Court to examine whetheir the provisions of the particular Act had been complied or whether the Statutory tribunal acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure. On a scrutiny of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, it is clear to our mind that the enquiries contemplated and the remedies provided for the aggrieved party are not as efficacious and adequate as those contemplated before the ordinary courts of the land. In such a case, the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts cannot be readily implied. Turning to the language of section 14 of the Act, it has to be noted that suits of a specified nature only are barred, namely, suits which involve a direct attack on the decisions of the revenue tribunal, that is to say, suits for setting aside or modifying the orders of the revenue authorities under the Act, subject to the exceptions stated in the case of misrepresentation, fraud or collusion. If the object of the suit is not directly to set aside the order of the revenue authorities, it is always open to a Civil Court to consider all questions in a suit praying for reliefs which cannot be granted by the Revenue authorities. Construing the provisions of he Berar Land Revenue Code relating to the bar of Civil Court's Jurisdiction to set aside a sale held by a Revenue Court, it was held by the Supreme Court in Kanhaiyalal v. D.R.D.R Banaji that it was not a suit simpliciter to set aside the sale held by the revenue authorities, but was a suit for a declaration and for recovery of possession against an auction purchaser which is not a matter which the revenue authorities under the Code were empowered to dispose of. In the instant case, the plaintiffs pray for a declaration that the suit property is a public trust, for removal of the defendants-trustees, for the framing of a proper scheme and for its administration after recovering possession of the same from the defendants. A claim for these reliefs is not cognizable before the revenue authorities and hence, a Civil Court has undoubted jurisdiction to decide all questions which are necessary for giving or refusing relief to the plaintiffs. The order of the revenue authorities granting patta in favour of the defendants cannot, therefore, be regarded as conclusive of the defendants' title to the property. In any view of the matter, the defendants cannot set up any personal or individual right in the suit property in derogation of the trust.
22. The last question be to considered is whether the defendants should be directed to render an account of the profits derived by them by cultivation of the land.
23. So far as the usufruct of the tamarind trees is concerned, we do not think that any case is made out for rendition of account.
24. But as regards the other profits which the defendants derived out of the suit land which is trust property, the defendants may be directed to render an account as provided in the decree of the lower court for a period of six years prior to the suit. The decree of the Court below is accordingly confirmed. In view of the passing of the new Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (17 of 1966) pending disposal of this appeal, it is open to the parties to approach the concerned authorities under the Act for the framing of a scheme.
25. This appeal is accordingly dismissed; but without any order as to costs:
26. Appeal dismissed.