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  • Section 23-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act
  • Section 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act,
  • provisions of the amending Act (Act 23/48)
  • section 7 of the Madras Act IV of 1938.
  • Sections 8 and 19 of Act IV of 1938
  • Act as amended (Madras Act 23/48)
  • provisions of Act IV of 1938.7.
  • Section 20 of Act IV of 1938
  • Sections 144 and 151 C.P.C
  • Order XXI rule 90 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 89 C.P.C
  • Section 151 C.P.C
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 23-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act
  • Section 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act,
  • provisions of the amending Act (Act 23/48)
  • section 7 of the Madras Act IV of 1938.
  • Sections 8 and 19 of Act IV of 1938
  • Act as amended (Madras Act 23/48)
  • provisions of Act IV of 1938.7.
  • Section 20 of Act IV of 1938
  • Sections 144 and 151 C.P.C
  • Order XXI rule 90 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 89 C.P.C
  • Section 151 C.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Obul Reddy, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are three connected Civil Miscellaneous Appeals brought by the appellant (the purchaser of the equity of redemption) against orders of the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam in execution and incidental proceedings arising out of O.S. 14 of 1935. The principal events recited in the opinion are:

  • The execution sale of properties was held by the court on 2-12-1959.
  • The appellant (purchaser of the equity of redemption) filed E.A. 691/61 under Order XXI, rule 90 C.P.C. seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity and fraud in publishing and conducting the sale and because an application under Section 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1938) ought to have stayed the sale.
  • The appellant also filed O.P. 37/60 under Sections 8 and 19 (and relied on Section 7) of Act IV of 1938 to scale down the debt. The Subordinate Judge allowed O.P. 37/60 (scaling down) by order dated 7-3-62, but on the same date dismissed E.A. 691/61 (setting aside sale) and confirmed the sale.
  • The appellant had deposited Rs. 6,800 on 15-9-1961, which, after the debt was scaled down on 7-3-62 to Rs. 6,275.50, exceeded the scaled-down debt.
  • The learned Subordinate Judge was criticised for disposing simultaneously of applications to scale down the debt (allowing) and to set aside the sale (dismissing), and for confirming the whole sale without adjusting for the scaled-down debt or the deposit made by the purchaser.
  • The appellate court (this bench) considered prior authorities and statutory provisions (notably Sections 7, 8, 19, 20, 23-A of Act IV of 1938, Order XXI rules of CPC and Section 151 CPC) and determined the appropriate relief given the peculiar facts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale held on 2-12-1959 was vitiated by material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale so as to justify setting aside the sale under Order XXI, rule 90 C.P.C.
  2. Whether an application under Section 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1938) was pending at the time of the sale and, if so, whether the court was bound to stay the sale in accordance with Section 20.
  3. What is the legal effect of scaling down the decree debt under Sections 7, 8 and 19 of Act IV of 1938 when the scaling down takes place after a sale but before confirmation—specifically whether the subsequent scaling down requires setting aside the sale or its confirmation in whole or in part.
  4. Whether the executing/subordinate court erred in confirming the entire sale on the same date that it scaled down the debt and whether the appellate court can use its inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. to do substantial justice (including partial confirmation/release of items and restitution of excess sums).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The sale of 2-12-1959 was vitiated by material irregularity and fraud in its publication and conduct; hence it should be set aside under Order XXI, rule 90 CPC.
  • An application under Section 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act was pending and thus the court was required to stay the sale; going ahead with the sale violated the mandatory procedure in Section 20.
  • The Subordinate Judge erred in confirming the sale on 7-3-62 after scaling down the decree in O.P. 37/60 on the same date; confirmation of the sale of all items was improper because, after scaling down, only some items would suffice to satisfy the reduced debt.
  • The appellant had deposited Rs. 6,800 on 15-9-61, an amount exceeding the scaled-down debt (Rs. 6,275.50), so the Subordinate Judge should have adjusted that deposit before confirming the sale; failure to do so is a material defect requiring relief.

Respondent's (Decree-holder's) Arguments

  • The 2-12-1959 sale was not vitiated by fraud or material irregularity: notices were served on the appellant, the appellant was represented, objections were heard and overruled before ordering the sale.
  • There was no stay petition pending at the time of the sale. The Section 20 application (E.A. 474/59) was dismissed at 4:00 p.m. on 2-12-59 and the sale was held at 4:30 p.m., so Section 20 did not apply at the time of the sale.
  • The appellant's remedy, where applicable, lay under Section 23-A of Act IV of 1938 (an application within 90 days of confirmation), and the appellant did not avail of that remedy.
  • The property was sold pursuant to a compromise decree (A.A.O. 466/54 and 467/54) which fixed the amount recoverable; the appellant (having stepped into the shoes of the judgment-debtor) cannot now challenge that compromise decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Thotapalli Dharmayya v. Nelabarla Yanadi Reddy, 1942 II M.L.J. 585 Interpreted Section 20 of Act IV of 1938: court has no discretion to refuse a stay where Section 20 applies; Section 20 does not permit the court to impose conditions; a debtor may file stay applications at the last possible moment. Cited by appellant but distinguished: court held it did not assist the appellant because (1) the appellant withdrew the miscellaneous appeal against the dismissal of the stay application and (2) the Section 20 application (E.A. 474/59) had been dismissed at 4:00 p.m. on 2-12-59 before the sale at 4:30 p.m., so Section 20 was not in operation when the sale occurred.
Mulukulla Kumaraswami v. Ghantasala Mahalakshimma (Govindarajachari, J.) Rule: When a decree is scaled down after a sale, the correct test is to consider what would have been the position had the scaled-down decree existed at the outset; a sale held on a decree which is later scaled down is not necessarily invalid. Relied upon by respondent to support that a sale is not automatically invalidated by subsequent scaling down. The court reviewed this authority but distinguished the present facts (simultaneous disposal of scaling-down and setting-aside applications) and treated the principle as relevant background.
Venkata Swami Naidu v. Annappareddi Nagireddi, 1946 1 M.L.J. 5 Principle: The criterion is to consider the position had the appellate (or final) decree been passed at first instance; if the sales would still have been necessary, there is no reason to set them aside. Identified as the foundational principle followed in later cases; the court referenced it as part of the line of authority that typically supports upholding sales when scaling down occurs later.
Kuppa Sankara Sastri v. Kakumanu Vara Prasad, 1947 1 M.L.J. 369 Principle: Executing court cannot refuse to execute the decree as it stands; sale held under an unsclaed-down decree is not invalid merely because the decree is later scaled down. Cited as authority in the line of cases (including Wadsworth J.'s dicta) that the sale is not per se invalidated by subsequent amendment/scaling down; again, court treated the authorities as persuasive but distinguished present facts.
J.P. Rego v. Ananthamathi (Madras High Court) Scope of Sections 144 and 151 C.P.C.: inherent jurisdiction to call back money paid owing to an erroneous view to a person not entitled to it; court should set right wrongs occasioned by its error. Relied upon to justify invocation of inherent jurisdiction (Section 151 CPC) to correct injustice here — specifically to permit restitution or rearrangement of sales so that only such items as cover the scaled-down debt remain confirmed and excess is returned.
Nachippa v. Ramachandra (Wadsworth & Patanjali Sastri, JJ.) Observation: If a debt is scaled down and properties are purchased by persons who are non-agriculturists subject to the mortgage, the property can be proceeded against only for the scaled-down amount; purchaser of equity of redemption steps into mortgagor's shoes. Used to support the equitable proposition that the purchaser of equity of redemption's liability is limited to the scaled-down debt and therefore only that extent of sale need be confirmed; court relied on this as authority for limiting confirmed items to satisfy scaled-down debt.
Narayanan Chettiar v. Rathinasami Padaychi; Ramayya v. Sambi Reddy (F.B.) Principle: A previous dismissal of an application under Section 19 does not necessarily bar a fresh application when the law is amended (Act 23/48) providing new rights. Invoked by the Subordinate Judge (and referenced in this opinion) to justify allowing a fresh scaling-down application after the 1948 amendment; the bench noted these decisions were followed below when O.P. 37/60 was entertained.
C.M.A. 518 of 1959 (this Court) Principle applied in that judgment: where sale had been held and confirmed, remedy for purchaser lay under Section 23-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The bench observed this decision bound the appellant on the availability of remedy under Section 23-A; it indicated that S.23-A is the procedural remedy to seek setting aside within 90 days of confirmation (and that no such application had been made in the case at bar).
C.M.A. 528/59 (High Court order dismissing appeal) Practical application: confirmation that the appeal from dismissal of E.A. 474/59 was dismissed by the High Court, bearing on whether stay was in force at sale time. Used to demonstrate that the Section 20 stay-application (E.A. 474/59) had been dismissed and that no stay was pending when sale took place on 2-12-59.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual inquiries reflecting statutory wording, procedural timing and equitable considerations. The court's reasoning (as expressed in the opinion) can be summarized in the following steps:

  1. Section 20 inquiry — timing and operation:
    • The court examined whether a Section 20 stay application (E.A. 474/59) was pending when the sale occurred. Section 20 requires the executing court to stay proceedings until the court which passed the decree has passed orders on an application under Section 18 (with a proviso about 60 days).
    • The bench found the Section 20 application had been heard and dismissed by the Subordinate Judge at 4:00 p.m. on 2-12-59. The sale took place at 4:30 p.m. the same day. Consequently, Section 20 was not in operation at the moment of sale and the appellant's reliance on Thotapalli Dharmayya did not assist him in these facts.
    • The court further noted that the appellant had earlier withdrawn a miscellaneous appeal challenging the dismissal of the stay application, and that the appropriate remedy (post-confirmation) was under Section 23-A (which was not invoked in time in this case).
  2. Scope of Order XXI, rule 90 CPC:
    • The court interpreted the phrase “material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale” in Rule 90 as confined to procedural irregularities in the sale process — i.e., irregularities in steps followed before property is put up for sale.
    • The bench held this phrase does not extend to questions of scaling down debt or applications under Act IV of 1938; thus the appellant had not demonstrated a material irregularity under Order XXI, rule 90 CPC based on the matters raised.
  3. Effect of subsequent scaling down of the decree:
    • The court considered authorities which generally hold that a sale held pursuant to an unsclaed-down decree is not automatically invalidated by subsequent scaling down and that the correct test is to ask what would have happened had the scaled-down decree existed from the outset.
    • However, the court distinguished earlier authorities on the facts: in the present case the applications to set aside the sale and to scale down the debt were pending and disposed of together on 7-3-62 (scaling down allowed; sale setting-aside dismissed). The Subordinate Judge confirmed the sale on the same day he scaled down the debt, without adjusting confirmations to reflect the reduced debt and without considering the deposit made by the purchaser.
    • Given these peculiar facts, the court found equitable reasons to intervene: confirmation of the sale of all items resulted in palpable injustice when only some items would suffice to satisfy the scaled-down debt.
  4. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC and equitable relief:
    • The court invoked its inherent jurisdiction (Section 151 CPC) to correct the injustice occasioned by the erroneous procedure adopted by the Subordinate Judge (first confirming sale generally and simultaneously scaling down the debt).
    • The court relied on J.P. Rego v. Ananthamathi to show that there is inherent jurisdiction to call back monies or to remedy an error of procedure where justice and equity require it.
    • Applying these equitable powers, the court concluded that it should confirm the sale only to the extent necessary (serially) to cover the scaled-down debt, and set aside the sale of remaining items; any excess proceeds from confirmed items were to be returned to the appellant.
  5. Practical directions:
    • The court noted the decree debt as pleaded in the execution petition was Rs. 19,000 (with interest) and that the scaled-down figure (after 7-3-62) was Rs. 6,275.50.
    • Because the court did not have particulars of the payments and receipts, it directed the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam, to ascertain what payments had been made towards the decree and to give effect to the appellate court's findings accordingly.

Holding and Implications

The court's final disposition was practical and fact-specific. The principal rulings and their direct consequences were:

  • Primary Ruling: The court confirmed the sale only to the extent that items sold in serial order are sufficient to satisfy the decree debt as finally scaled down (Rs. 6,275.50). The sale of the other items was set aside. Excess amounts realised from the sale of the items that remain confirmed are to be paid to the appellant.
  • Procedural Directive: The matter was reversed and remanded to the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam with directions to ascertain payments made towards the decree and to implement the appellate court's directions in the light of these findings.
  • Case Disposition: C.M.A. 118/62 and C.M.A. 119/62 were allowed to the extent indicated above; C.M.A. 120/62 was dismissed. Each party was to bear its own costs. The judgment concludes with the words “Reversed and remanded.”

Implications: The decision is narrowly tailored to the facts — the court exercised inherent jurisdiction (Section 151 CPC) to avoid injustice where the subordinate court both scaled down the debt and confirmed the sale on the same day without adjusting for the reduced debt or deposits made. The opinion does not purport to lay down a general rule overturning the established authorities that a sale pursuant to an unsclaed-down decree is not automatically invalidated by subsequent scaling down; rather, it applies equitable relief on these particular facts. No broader novel precedent is proclaimed beyond the application of inherent jurisdiction to the present circumstances.

    Akella Kasamma v. Penugonda Bramaramba And Others

    Obul Reddy, J.:— These are three connected Civil Miscellaneous Appeals preferred by the appellant, the purchaser of equity of redemption against the orders of the Subordinte Judge, Visakhaptnam in E.A No. 691/61 in E.P 25/48 in O.S 14 of 1935 and the consequential orders confirming the sale in E.P 25/48 and against the order in O.P 37/60 for scaling down the debt under Sections 8 and 19 of Act IV of 1938 respectively. E.A 691/61 out of which C.M.A 118/62 arises was filed by the appellant, the purchaser of equity of redemption under Order XXI, rule 90 C.P.C for setting aside the sale held by the Court on 2-12-59. It was the case of the appellant that the sale was vitiated by material irregularity and faund in publishing and conducting the sale and that when an application was made under Section 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, the Court had no option but to stay the sale and the sale held in consequence thereof suffers from material irregularity vitiating the sale itself. It is also contended before us that inasmuchas the learned Subordinate Judge, had scaled down the debt by his order dated 7-3-62 in O.P 37/60 he erred in law by confirming the sale on the same date, and that the confirmation of the sale is a material irregularity.

    2. The case of the first respondent-decree-holder is that the sale held on 2-12-1959 is not vitiated by fraud or material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale and that the appellant although was not the judgment-debtor in the decree was served with notices and was represented by an Advocate who had also filed a counter and that it was only after hearing the objections and overruling the objections raised that the Court ordered the sale. The appellant was also given another opportunity to amend the execution petition pursuant to a compromise decree of the High Court and to state his objections, if any, and he had not chosen to file any objections and that there is no illegality in holding the sale. It is also alleged that the petitioner had once made an application for scaling down the debt and that application was dismissed by the lower Court and that the order of the lower Court was confirmed by the High Court. On these facts the learned Subordinate Judge found that there was no material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale and dismissed the application with costs. The learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Venkatarama Sastry has argued that the lower Court erred in law in holding the sale on 2-12-59 when an application for granting stay under Section 20 of Act IV of 1938 was pending before him on the same date, that having allowed O.P 37/60 and scaled down the debt by his order dated 7-3-62, it went wrong in dismissing E.A 691/61 on the same date and that the confirmation of sale of all the items is not in conformity with law inasmuchas the decree debt after it was scaled down on 7-3-62 has been considerably reduced and that the confirmation of sale of a few items would have been sufficient to satisfy the scaled down debt. It is also pointed out by Mr. Venkatarama Sastry that even by the date 15-9-61 the appellant had deposited Rs. 6800/- which is more than the decree debt of Rs. 6275-50 after it was finally scaled down.

    3. Mr. Rajeswara Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents argued that there was no stay petition pending when the sale was held at 4-30 P.M en 2-12-59 as by 4 P.M that day application (E.A 474/59 for stay of the execution of the decree was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge and the appeal preferred against that order was also dismissed by the High Court in C.M.A 528/59. It is on this basis that Mr. Rajeswara Rao pointed out that Section 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act has no application as the remedy of the appellant was only under Section 23-A of the same Act. It is also pointed out by Mr Rajeswara Rao that A.A.O 466/54 to which the appellant was a party as 4th Respondent ended in a compromise whereby it was agreed that the amount due under the mortgage decree in O.S 14/35 should be declared a Rs. 19,000/- which should be recovered from the mortgaged property and it is pursuant to the compromise decree that the properties were brought to sale and therefore the appellant cannot now question the validity of the sale as whatever rights he enjoys or posseses are those of judgment-debtor in whose shoes he has stepped in.

    4. Having regard to the contentions of both sides' it may be necessary in the first instance to see whether the learned Subordinate Judge held the sale in spite of the pendency of an application E.A 474/59 under Section 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, Section 20 of the Act recites:

    “Every Court executing a decree passed against a parson entitled to the benefits of this Act, shall on application, stay the proceedings untili the Court which passed the decree has passed orders on an application made or to be made under section 18:

    Provided that where within 60 days after the application for stay has been granted the judgment-debtor does not apply to the Court, which passed the decree for relief under section 19 or where an application has been so made and is rejected, the decree shall be executed as it stands, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act to the contrary.”

    5. The learned Counsel for the appellant baaing on the language of the Section pointed out that there is nothing in the Act to prevent a debtor from filing a stay petition under Section 20 when the E.P is pending and when the sale it being held and the dismissal of the application E, A, 474/59 is in contravention of the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 20 and hence the sale should be set aside. In support of his argument he has relied upon a decision of Wadsworrh, J., of the Madras High Court in Thotapalli Dharmayya v. Nelabarla Yanadi Reddy . 1942 II M.L.J 585. where the learned Judge held that Section 20 of Act IV of 1938 does not allow the court a discretion to refuse a stay in a case in which the conduct of the debtor has been obstructive, nor does it contain any provision for imposing conditions for the grant of stay and that there is nothing in the Act to prevent a debtor waiting after a sale in execution has been set aside to the last possible minute and then filing a stay application under Section 20 just at the time when a fresh sale is being held. The case obviously cannot help the appellant for two reasons: 1) that he withdrew the Miscellaneous Appeal preferred against the order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the application for stay of execution on the ground that it had become infructous and (2) for the reason that at the time when the sale was held, this application E.A 474/59 was not actually pending, The application, E.A 474/59 filed under Section 20 of the Act was heard and dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge at 4 p.m on 2-12-59 and it is only after that, the sale was held at 4.30 p.m on the same date. Therefore, it will be perfectly valid for that Court to proceed with the execution of sale or other proceedings in exercution of the decree, when once such an application has been dismissed, As may be seen from the judgment of this Court in C.M.A 518 of 1959, that in view of the fact that the sale of the properties was held and it was also confirmed on 7-3-62, the position was that the matter fell under Section 23-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act and therefore it was not pressed as having become infructuous. This decision is binding on the appellant and his only remedy is under Section 23-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act to make an application, within 90 days of the confirmation of sale, to ask for setting aside that sale and admittedly in this case no such application was made under S. 23-A of the Act. Therefore, in our view, there is no disobedience of the provisions of Section 20 and consequently no material irregularity which had the effect of depriving the debtor of any benefits which had accrued to him under the Act. The feeble contention raised by the learned Counsel Mr. Venkatarama Sastry that he is not a party to the compromises decree of the High Court is devoid of any substance or merit for the reason that he cannot now challenge the compromise decree of the High Court in A.A.O 466 and 467 of 1954 although the appeal was dismissed as against him as he claims his rights, only through the judgment-debtor who was a party to the said compromise decree of the High Court.

    6. So far as the sale is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any material irregularity under Order XXI rule 90 C.P.C The words “material irregularity” in Rule 90 governed as they are by the words “in publishing or conducting it” refer only to an irregularity in the procedure to be followed before the property of the judgment-debtor is put up for sale and they do not cover cases of the kind where a judgment-debtor or one who purchases the equity of redemption makes applications for scaling down the debt or for stay of sale invoking the provisions of Act IV of 1938.

    7. Therefore, the next question that falls for consideration is the effect of scaling down of the decree after the sale was held. O.P 37/60 was filed under Sections 8 and 19 of the Act for scaling down the debt and the debt was scaled down by an order of the lower court on 7-3-62, the date on which the other application E.A 691/61 for setting aside the sale was dismissed. It is not in dispute that consequent on the amendment of 1948 (Act XXIII of 1948) it enabled the appellant purchaser of equity of redemption to make the application O.P 37/60 for scaling down the debt and the Subordinate Judge having regard to the scope of the amendment hell that the debt is liable to be scaled down and both parties were directed to file memos of calculation and it is admitted by both sides that such memos were filed by them.

    8. The learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Venkatarama Sastry relies on Section 7 of the Act which laid down that notwithstanding any law, custom, contract or decree of Court to the contrary, all debts payable by an agriculturist at the commencement of this Act, shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. It is also his case that even before the debt was allowed to be scaled down as per the order of the Court on 7-3-62, he had deposited the amount of Rs. 6800/- on 15-9-1961 which was more than the debt found due after it was permitted to be scaled down on 7-3-62, and hence the Subordinate Judge erred in law in confirming the sale without directing adjustment of the amount deposited on 15-9-61 and having regard to the procedure adopted by the learned Subordinate Judge, the sale is liable to be set aside.

    9. Mr. Rajeswara Rao relied up on a decision of Govinidarajachari J in Mulukulla Kumaraswami v. Ghantasala Mahalakshimma which shows that a sale in such cases is not liable to be set aside. The learned Judge observed that in deciding the question whether by reason of the scaling down of the decree subsequent to the sale in execution, the rule is liable to be set aside, the principle to be applied is to consider what would have been the position had the scaled down decree been passed by the Court in the first instance and that where though there were three plots of land they were brought to sale as one plot without any objection and the decree was subsequently scaled down in the circumstances it could not be said that if the decree had been scaled down prior to the date of the sale, there would have been no need to sell the property and as such it cannot be maintained that the subsequent scaling down of the decree rendered the sale invalid. The learned Judge followed two earlier decisions of the same Court Venkata Swami Naidu v. Annappareddi Nagireddi . 1946 1 M.L.J 5. and Kuppa Sankara Sastri v. Kakumanu Vara Prasad . 1947 1 M.L.J 369. and summed up the position of law observing that it was not open to an excuting Court to refuse the execute the decree as it stands and that a sale held on foot of a decree which to not then scaled down but which ultimately turns out to be one which is liable to be scaled down is not invalid as offending against section 7 of the Madras Act IV of 1938. The case before us is not where the right of the purchaser of equity of redemption to have the debt scaled down is in question but a case where his right was recognised for selling down after the sale was held and before the sale was confirmed.

    10. In the other case Kuppa Sankara Sastri v. Kakumanu Vara Prasad referred to by Govindarajachari, J. a suit was filed on a mortgage and a preliminary decree was obtained on 13-8-37 and a final decree was passed on 8-1-38. An application made under section 19 of the Act for scaling down the decree debt during the pendency of the execution proceedings was dismissed on the ground that the judgment debtors were not agriculturists having no saleable interest in agricultural lands. The sale was held on 9-1-39. The judgment-debtors filed a Revision against the dismissal of their application under Sec. 19 but there was no stay of the confirmation of sale by the High Court nor was any deposit made or tendered even for the admitted amount by the judgment-debtors. The Revision resulted in a favourable decision that the judgment-debtors were agriculturists and hence entitled to the benefits of the Act; and the application under Sec. 19 was remitted to the trial Court which ultimately resulted in scaling down and on the basis of the decree as scaled down the judgment debtors claimed restitution and cancellation of the sale on payment by them of the amount of the decree as scaled down. On these facts, Wadsworth J. held that (1) Unless the decree had been amended by appropriate procedure it was not open to the executing Court to refuse to execute the decree as it stood and the sale did not offend section 7 of the Madras Act IV of 193??? and (2) that had the ultimate decree as scaled down been in existence at the time of the sale the executing Court would have had no option but to proceed with the sale of the second item also as the sale of the first item would have left balance still due under the amended decree.

    11. In the case of Mulukulla Kumaraswmi v. Ghantasala Mahalakshamma at the time when the sale was held the applications for scaling down stood dismissed and by reason of certain orders of the High court and the consequential orders passed by the Court of the Subordinate Judge the decree was ultimately scaled down. The sale in that case was held on 20th June, 1941, and on that date there was no application pending under Section 19 for scaling down and it is obvious, although the facts cannot be gathered from the reported judgment, that at the time when the sale was confirmed there was no application pending for scaling down since the application was already dismissed.

    12. In the other case Venkataswami Naidu v. Annappareddi Nagireddi which was followed by Govipdarajachari, J., it was held by the learned Judges that (1) that the decree in second appeal having become final any finding by the trial court regarding the relief which might have been obtained had the proper procedure been taken will not affect the decree, and (2) that as the true criterion for restitiution is to consider what would be the position had the appellate Court's decree been passed by the Court of First in???nce and as the sales which had been held were tales which would have been held even if the court of First Instance had decreed the amount eventually found to be due in appeal, there was no legal or equitable reason for setting aside the sales or ordering restitution. The facts in that case are; three appeals were filed by the decree-holder in a mortgage suit against the orders resulting from proceedings after the decree. The suit was instituted in 1928 which was dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in January 1934, for payment of Rs. 3031-7-0 as on 22-4-34 the date fixed for redemption. A second appeal was preferred to the High Court and during the pendency of the second appeal the decree-holder took out execution proceedings. On 1-2-36 a portion of the hypotheca belonging to the 8th defendant who was not one of the mortgagors was sold for Rs. 1785/- to the decree holder who got delivery. There was a further sale in January (4-1-37) for certain other items belonging to the mortgagor-defendants. The second appeal came up for hearing on 1-11-38 by which time Act IV of 1938 had come into force and the High Court applied the provisions of the Act and reduced the amount of interest thus bringing down the total decree amount as on the date fixed for redemption by the first appellate Court. By reason of the application of law the result of all the proceedings was that the lower appellate court directed setting aside of the sale of the 8th defendant's property on payment of the amount of the decree as scaled down and also directed ascertainment of mesne profits on the lands for the period during which they were in the possession of the decrees-holder. Against the order of restitution and the order of scaling down and against the order of mesne profits, three civil miscellaneous appeals were preferred and they were the subject-matter of the decision by Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ. In that case the decree-holder took out execution and had a portion of the hypothecs brought to sale on 1-2-36 and some other items were brought to sale on 4-1-37 prior to the coming into force of Act IV of 1938. Therefore on those facts it was held that the true criterion to be applied was to consider what would be the position of the appellate's court decree being passed by the court of first instance, as the sale which had been held was one which would have been held even it the court of first instance had decreed the amount eventually found due in appeal and hence they were of the view that there was no legal or equitable reason for setting aside the sale or ordering restitution. The two earlier decisions referred to supra of Wordsworth J and Govindarajachari, J., are based on the principle laid down in Venkataswami Naidu v. Annapareddi Nagireddi.

    13. The facts presented before us are totally different as in the instant case the sale was not confirmed and applications for betting aside the sale as also for scaling down the decree debt was made on 2-1-60. The application made under O. 21 R. 90 C.P.C setting aside the sale and the application for scaling down the debt were together disposed of on the same date i.e, 7-3-62. The other question although is concluded by a judgment of this Court in C.M.A 518/59 that the remedy for the appellant, the purchaser of equity of redemption lay under Section 23-A of the Act, and that position was also conceded at that stage by the learned Counsel for the appellant, it may still be relevant to notice that even on the date i.e, 2-12-59 when the sale was held, the prayer in E.A 474/59 filed under Sec. 20 of Act IV of 1938 was that the sale should be stayed.

    14. So on these facts, the question is whether Section 7 of the Act cannot be invoked at least to the extent that the sale of some of the items is sufficient to satisfy the decree debt as finally scaled down on 7-3-62. This case confronts us with some difficulty in view of the tact that no case is made out under Order XXI, rule 90 C.P.C and also in view of the view adopted by the Madras High Court in the cases referred to above. It is significant to remember that what the learned Judges were called upon to decide in Venkata swami Naidu case was with respect to sale held and confirmed prior to the enactment of Act IV of 1938 and therefore the questions of restitution and setting aside the sale bad to be considered. The legal position enunciated by the Bench was subsequently followed by Wadsworth, J. in Kuppa Sankara Sastri v. Kakumanu Varaprasad and these two decisions were cited with authority and followed by Govindarajachari, J. The opinion expressed in these three judgments goes to show that there was no legal or equitable reason for setting aside the sale or ordering restitution. The question that has to be considered in the present case is apart from the question of legality or validity of the sale held on 2-12-59 whether there is any equitable reason for setting aside some of the items of sale if the other items cover and satisfy the decree debt as eventually scaled down on 7-3-62. The fact of this case as already adverted to are somewhat peculiar by reason of the fact that the E.P of the decree-holder for bringing the property to sale as also the applications made by the purchaser of equity of redemption were pending and were simultaneously disposed of. In none of the aforesaid three cases relied upon by Mr. Rajeswara Rao there were petitions both for execution as well as for stay of the proceedings and for scaling down the debt. There is nothing in Section 7 of the Act which lends support to the argument of Mr. Rajeswara Rao, when the debt is liable to be scaled down and when a petition for scaling down is pending, that the sale held on the basis of the decree debt shown in the execution petition prior to the relief claimed under Section 19 should be confirmed. Mr. Venkatarama Sastry filed a true copy of the ledger extract of the Subordinate Judge's Court for 1961–62 showing that Sri Balaramamurthy. Advocate for the appellant, had deposited as per challan 267 dated 15-9-61 a sum of Rs. 5000/- for setting aside the sale. The learned Subordinate Judge dealing with the application (O.P 37/60) filed consequent on the rights conferred by the Act as amended (Madras Act 23/48) following two decisions of the Madras High Court-Narayanan Chettiar v. Rathinasami Padaychi and Ramayya v. Sambi Reddy (F.B) held that the fact that the previous application for relief under Section 19 was dismissed will not debar a fresh application being filed consequent on the rights conferred by the change of law or the amendment of a statute and scaled down the “debt and called upon the parties to file calcuation memos. The difficulty in this case is that the learned Subordinate Judge has simultaneously disposed of the application for scaling down the debt and also the application for setting aside the sale, allowing the former and dimissing the latter. He has not considered at the time when he was dismissing the application (E.A 691/61) for setting aside the sale the effect of the other application which was pending before him and also did not consider the other aspect of the case that the purchaser of the equity of redemption deposited more amount than what was found due ultimately after the debt was scaled down, Therefore, what has to be considered is whether this Court can invoke the inherent powers conferred by Section 151 C.P.C for setting right injustice, occasioned to the appellant having regard to the facts that the application under Order XXI, rule 90 C.P.C was pending till 7-3-62 and that the appellant had made an application on 2-1-60 a sum more than what was found due ultimately after it was finally scaled down on 7-3-62. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in J.P. Rego v. Ananthamathi dealing with the scope of Sections 144 and 151 C.P.C held that there is inherent jurisdiction in the Court to call back money paid, owing to an erroneous view to a person not entitled to it, and that it there are no other circumstances affecting the equities as between the defendants and X, it is the duty of the Court to set right the wrong done to the defendants by reason of its own error and to order restitution. This case no doubt has been relied upon by Mr. Rajeswara Rao to show what all the appellant is entitled to is only for the restitution of the amount realised at the auction in excess of the decree debt after it was ultimately scaled down. In that Rego's case, the facts were different. A mortgage was executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff. Although defendants 2 and 3 belonged to the same joint family as D-I, relict was sought against D-I alone on the ground that the hypotheca was the self acquired property of D-I and that the amount received by him under the mortgage was for hit own purposes, The defendants contended that the property was joint family property and there was no necessity for the loan. The suit on the mortgage was decreed and in execution, the plaintiff himself purchased the property. The defendants thereafter deposited the decree amount under Order 21, rule 89 C.P.C and the sale was set aside. A third person ‘X’ who held a decree against the plaintiff obtained attachment for a portion of the amount deposited in the suit when the application was made for setting aside the sale. The attached sum was later transferred to the E.P filed by ‘X’ and the amount was also paid to him, Meanwhile in the appeal which was pending in the High Court against the original mortgage decree it was held that the mortgage property was family property and as it had never been the plaintiff's case that the mortgage was for purposes binding on the family that suit was dismissed. Then the defendants applied for restitution of the sum deposited by them a part of which was attached by ‘X’ and later withdrawn by him and the view taken by the Madras High Court was that there was inherent jurisdiction in the Court to call back money paid owing to an erroneous view to a person not entitled to it. In the instant case, the learned Subordinate Judge should have first decided the application O.P 37/60 made for scaling down the debt before he thought of confirming the sale as that would have avoided the confirmation of the sale of all the items. It is not as though the learned Subordinate judge was obvious of the provisions of the amending Act (Act 23/48) which clothed the agriculturists with further rights to have his debts scaled down. He rather observed an erroneous procedure in first confirming the sale and simultaneously scaling down the debt. The decree debt as shown in the E.P is Rs. 19,000 with interest at 6¼ from 7-2-1958 and the debt after it was eventually scaled down on 7-3-62 came to Rs. 6275-50, We are therefore of the view that as there are equitable reasons this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction in setting right the palpable injustice of all the iteme of property going to the auction purchaser or the purchasers, as the case may be, when the confirmation of sale of a few items would have been sufficient to satisfy the scaled-down debt as it stood eventually. Although there is no direct decision touching this question. Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., in Nachippa v. Ramachandra observed that if the debt was scaled down at the instance of a mortgagor who is an agriculturist and claims the benefits of the Act and the properties are purchased by persons who are non-agriculturists subject to the mortgage, the property can be procedeed against only for the scaled down amount and no more, under the general law relating to mortgages, The purchaser of equity of redemption gets the same rights, as the liability of the purchaser of equity of redemption is not a new liability, but one arising under the pre-existing mortgage debt though his liability is confined only to the property in his possession and therefore the rights of a purchaser of equity of redemption are co-extensive with that of the mortgagor as he has only stepped into his shoes. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case due to the erroneous procedure adopted by the Sub Judge it is necessary in the interests of justice and to do substantial justice that the sale of such items in seriatim as would cover the scaled-down debt alone should be confirmed and the rest of the items should be released. We therefore confirm the sale of such items in serial order to the extent the items sold in serial order cover the decree debt as finally recorded down and set aside the sale of the other items. Excess amount realised from the sale of the items which are confirmed will be paid to the appellant, Since we do not have the particulars regarding payment we find it necessary to ascertain what payments have been made towards the decree and therefore we direct the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam to go into the question of payments and give effect accordingly in the light of our findings and observations.

    15. In the result, C.M As. 118/62 and 119/62 are allowed to the extant indicated above and C.M.A 120/62 is dismissed. Each Party will bear its own costs.

    16. Reversed and remanded.

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