AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. Order 39. R. 1
  • SECTION 42 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • provisions of Rule 1 of Order 39 of the CPC
  • Order 39 Rule 2,
  • fit.10. Rule 1
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. Order 39. R. 1
  • SECTION 42 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • provisions of Rule 1 of Order 39 of the CPC
  • Order 39 Rule 2,
  • fit.10. Rule 1
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a miscellaneous order dated 24-5-1971 of the Addl. District Judge, Srinagar, which allowed the plaintiff's application to restrain the defendants from interfering with his possession of the suit property. The plaintiff, Ismail Shah, filed a suit for declaration asserting ownership and possession of the suit land and alleged that the defendants threatened to forcibly dispossess him. Concurrently, he sought an ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from interference. The trial court issued notice to the defendants, heard arguments, and passed the impugned order granting the injunction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a court can grant a temporary injunction in a suit for declaration simpliciter where the plaintiff has not claimed any consequential relief such as permanent injunction.
  2. Whether a suit for declaration simpliciter without a prayer for consequential relief is maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
  3. Whether the impugned order granting temporary injunction restraining interference with possession is sustainable in the context of the present suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The court below erred in granting temporary injunction in a suit for declaration simpliciter without a prayer for consequential relief.
  • The plaintiff is not entitled to interim relief of injunction as no claim for perpetual injunction was made in the suit.
  • The suit itself is not maintainable in its present form.
  • Relied on several precedents including AIR 1960 All 252, AIR 1946 Nag 428, AIR 1962 Manipur 18, AIR 1952 Pepsu 118, AIR 1923 Pat 133, and AIR 1963 Punj 104 to support these contentions.

Respondents' Arguments

  • There was no necessity for the plaintiff to claim a specific relief of injunction for the suit to be maintainable.
  • A suit for declaration simpliciter is maintainable even if the relief of injunction is omitted.
  • The court can grant temporary injunction restraining interference with possession in such suits.
  • Relied on precedents including AIR 1951 All 558, AIR 1941 Pat 142, AIR 1937 Lah 295, and AIR 1969 Manipur 21.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1960 All 252 Temporary injunction cannot be granted in a suit for declaration simpliciter without consequential relief. Supported the view that mere declaration suits without injunction claims do not warrant interim injunctions.
AIR 1946 Nag 428 Similar principle regarding injunction in declaration suits. Reinforced the principle limiting interim injunctions absent consequential relief.
AIR 1962 Manipur 18 Maintainability of suit for declaration simpliciter and injunction relief. Used to establish that injunction claims must be specifically made to obtain interim relief.
AIR 1952 Pepsu 118 General principle on injunction and declaration suits. Referenced in support of appellant's position on injunction claims.
AIR 1923 Pat 133 Principle regarding injunction and suit for declaration. Supported appellant's argument on the necessity of consequential relief.
AIR 1963 Punj 104 Injunction relief in suits for possession and declaration. Further authority for appellant's contention on injunction claims.
AIR 1951 All 558 Granting injunction in suits involving possession and declaration. Relied upon by respondents to argue for injunction without specific prayer.
AIR 1941 Pat 142 Maintainability of injunction in possession suits. Used by respondents to support injunction claims in declaration suits.
AIR 1937 Lah 295 Principle on injunction relief in property suits. Respondents cited to justify injunction despite omission of relief in plaint.
AIR 1969 Manipur 21 Declaration with partition and possession suit allowing injunction. Distinguished by the court as involving additional relief beyond declaration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the maintainability of a suit for declaration simpliciter under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, which permits a declaration of title without the necessity of claiming further relief. However, the court noted that if the plaintiff seeks interim relief such as a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must also claim consequential relief (e.g., permanent injunction) in the suit. The plaintiff's averments indicated interference with possession by the defendants, which implies a cause of action for injunction. The court reasoned that temporary injunctions under Rule 1 of Order 39 CPC relate to preventing damage or dispossession of property in dispute, which is distinct from a mere declaration of title. Since a suit for declaration simpliciter concerns only the right to the property and not the property itself, temporary injunctions to prevent interference with possession cannot be granted without a prayer for permanent injunction under Rule 2 of Order 39 CPC.

The court further clarified that granting a temporary injunction without a corresponding claim for permanent injunction would amount to an impermissible extension of relief beyond what the suit pleads. The learned Additional District Judge failed to consider these legal principles, rendering the impugned order unsustainable.

Additionally, the court analyzed the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, emphasizing that Rule 1 pertains to protection of property from damage or alienation, whereas Rule 2 contemplates injunctions against breaches of contract or injury of any kind, requiring a substantive suit for permanent relief. The plaintiff's failure to claim permanent injunction and pay the requisite court fee precluded entitlement to temporary injunction restraining interference with possession.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the lower court granting the temporary injunction. The trial court was directed to proceed in accordance with the legal observations made in the judgment.

The decision directly affects the parties by vacating the interim injunction restraining defendants from interfering with possession. No broader precedent altering the law was established; rather, the ruling reaffirmed established principles regarding the necessity of consequential relief for granting temporary injunctions in suits for declaration simpliciter.

    Amma Shah And Another v. Ismail Shah And Others

    Jalal-Ud-Din, J.:— This appeal arises out of a miscellaneous order dated 24-5-1971 of the learned Addl. District Judge, Srinagar, allowing the application of the plaintiff to restrain the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff in the suit property.

    2. Ismail Shah Plaintiff has brought a suit for declaration against the defendants to the effect that the suit land as described in the plaint is in his possession as a full fledged owner, but the defendants are trying and threatening to dispossess him forcibly from the said land. Simultaneously with the suit he moved an application for ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in his possession over the suit property. The learned Judge issued a notice to the defendants and after hearing the arguments passed the impugned order.

    3. The short point taken by Mr. G. Mohd. Ali counsel for the appellants is that the court below could not pass an order of temporary injunction in a suit for declaration simpliciter unless the plaintiff made a prayer for consequential relief as well. In support of the proposition enunciated by him he has relied upon AIR 1960 All 252 : AIR 1946 Nag 428 : AIR 1962 Manipur 18 : AIR 1952 Pepsu 118 : AIR 1923 Pat 133 and AIR 1963 Punj 104. It is submitted that the plaintiff has not claimed any relief for perpetual injunction in the suit therefore he is not entitled to an interim relief for an ad-interim injunction. Also the suit of the plaintiff in the present form is not maintainable. As against this Messers M.A Nehvi and Abdul Hamid have submitted that there was no necessity for the plaintiff to have claimed a specific relief of injunction in the suit. Plaintiffs suit was maintainable notwithstanding the fact that he had omitted to add the relief of injunction in the plaint. In a suit for declaration simpliciter the court could issue an order of temporary injunction against the defendants restraining them from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. Counsel for the respondents have relied upon AIR 1951 All 558 : AIR 1941 Pat 142 : AIR 1937 Lah 295 and AIR 1969 Manipur 21 (Para 8).

    4. On a consideration of the matter relating to the maintainability of the suit, I am of the view that a suit for declaration simpliciter in respect of the property is maintainable. Under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act when the right or title to such property is denied by another person the court has the power to pass a decree for declaration in its discretion. In such a suit the plaintiff need not ask for any further relief. This is provided by Section 42 itself of the Specific Relief Act. It cannot therefore be laid down as a broad proposition of law that in no case a suit for declaration is maintainable; but where the plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title omits to do so the court will not entertain such a suit and will insist on the plaintiff to add the prayer for consequential relief. In the Instant case we, however, find that on the one hand the plaintiff seeks declaration of his title in the suit property and at the same time by means of an application seeks interim relief by way of temporary injunction. In the very plaint he makes an averment to the effect that the defendants interfere with his possession and invade his rights. It is clear that not only does the plaintiff seek recognition of his title in respect of the property but he further by means of an application wants to restrain the defendants from doing an overt act. His allegation in the plaint regarding the defendants' interference in the suit property implies that the defendants are invading his right and want to dispossess him. This indeed furnishes a cause of action to him and in my opinion, the plaintiff is, therefore, bound to ask for consequential relief as per his own averments.

    5. Again, in a case where the plaintiff seeks a mere declaration of his title it is doubtful if he can ask the court to grant him an interim relief of temporary injunction in his favour, for here he does not allege any apprehension of interference by the defendant.: But where, however, as in the present case the plaintiff says that he is in possession of the suit property and further says that he apprehends an interference from the defendants then in that case before claiming an interim relief of temporary injunction he must specifically pray either for permanent or for mandatory injunction in the suit. Further, an examination of the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 39 of the CPC would reveal that a court is competent to grant temporary injunction only where any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or others wise being dealt with, or the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff from the said property. In a suit for declaration simpliciter there cannot be said to be any such dispute in regard to the property because the fight is not about the property but about the right to the property, and the property itself is not directly involved. Therefore no temporary injunction can be ordered. I am fortified in my view by the observations made in AIR 1960 All 252 para 7 and again in AIR 1962 Manipur 18. These authorities lay down the proposition that where a suit is merely for declaration of title without any consequential relief and no further relief is claimed, no order of temporary injunction could be granted by the Court on these averments. AIR 1969 Manipur 21 on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondents was a case for declaration with partition and also for possession. Therefore the said authority is distinguishable. AIR 1937 Lah 295 and AIR 1941 Pat 142 cited above and relied upon by the respondents lay down precisely the same proposition of law relating to maintainability of the suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act as has been stated above. There can be no dispute with regard to these propositions. The moot question, however, before us is whether the impugned order is sustainable in view of the frame of the present suit. In my opinion it is not for the reasons mentioned above.

    6. I would, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Court below. The trial court will now proceed to deal with the case in accordance with the observations made above.

    7. Mufti, J.:— I agree with my learned brother, Mian Jalal-ud-Din. J., that the appeal should be accepted and the order of temporary injunction granted by the lower court set aside but I Would like to add a few words of my own.

    8. The provisions governing the grant of temporary injunction are contained in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. Order 39. R. 1 reads:—

    “Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise—

    a) That any property. In dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or

    b) that the defendant threatens or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors the court may by order grant a temporary Injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staving and preventing the wasting, damaging alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.”

    9. And Order 39 Rule 2, so far as relevant provides:

    (1) “In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other iniury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not the plaintiff may at any time after the commencement of the suit and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.

    (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction on such terms as the duration of the injunction keeping an account giving security, or otherwise as the Court thinks fit.”

    10. Rule 1 is intended to frustrate attempts regarding dissipation or disposal pendente lite of suit property as also those directed towards the disposal of other property by the defendant with a view to defrauding his creditors.

    11. In this the form of the suit is not material and so long as the plaintiff is able to show that he has a prima facie case and that an irreparable loss will ensue if the temporary injunction were withheld, the court will be justified in granting such Injunction. Thus in a suit for declaration simpliciter with regard to the title of any land in the plaintiff's possession the plaintiff may under Rule 1 legitimately ask for a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from digging or removing the earth therefrom or otherwise damaging it or even from entering into negotiations for the sale thereof. He cannot however, do so where the act sought to be prevented is interference with his possession. Such an act would not be one covered by Rule 1. For this he must rely upon Rule 2 as an “injury of any other kind”. That Rule, however, envisages the pre-existence of a suit to restrain such act permanently. Unless, therefore he combines with the relief for declaration of title a consequential relief by way of permanent injunction and pays the necessary court-fee he cannot be entitled to an order for temporary injunction. If he omits to do so and confines his claim to mere declaration of title a temporary injunction preventing interference by the defendant with his possession would amount to the enlargement indirectly of the relief claimed in the suit which the law does not countenance. In such a suit, even if the plaintiff were to succeed, all that he will get is a declaratory decree and not a prohibitive decree. What he could not therefore, get directly upon trial of the suit, he cannot be allowed to have indirectly by means of a temporary injunction. All these points arose in the present case which the learned Additional District Judge has omitted to consider. That is what makes his order bad which must therefore, be set aside. I make an order accordingly.

    12. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Amma Shah And Another v. Ismail Shah And Others
    (Sep 28, 1971)