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  • 4 of S. 145 of the Criminal P.C Sub-section 1
  • dispute.7. Sub-section 4
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  • 4 of S. 145 of the Criminal P.C Sub-section 1
  • dispute.7. Sub-section 4
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment delivered by Sankaran, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision arises from the final order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in Summary Case No. 5 of 1123 concerning 2 acres and 96 cents of garden land (Sy. Nos. 8320 and 8321 in Munraoe Island Pakuthy). A dispute over possession existed between the petitioner in Summary Case No. 5/23 and counter-petitioners 1–8.

The petitioner asserted that he was in possession and on 8-12-1121 filed a petition before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate complaining of disturbance by the counter-petitioners. After receiving a police report and being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed, the Magistrate passed a preliminary order on 11-1-1123 under section 145(1) Cr. P.C.; the property was attached and placed under a court-appointed receiver.

Following statements and evidence from the parties, the Magistrate on 28-8-1954 passed a final order under section 145(6) declaring possession in favour of the petitioner and forbidding disturbance of that possession except by due civil process. Counter-petitioners 1 and 5 filed the present revision petition challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of section 145(4) Cr. P.C., the material date for ascertaining which party was in possession is the date of the preliminary order passed under section 145(1), or whether it can be treated as the earlier date on which the complaint petition or police report was presented (i.e., the date of filing of the petition).
  2. Whether the first proviso to section 145(4) (which allows treating a party dispossessed within two months before the preliminary order as having been in possession on that date) can be extended by treating the preliminary order as having been made nunc pro tunc on an earlier date to counteract delay by the Magistrate.
  3. Whether the Magistrate acted in excess of jurisdiction by declaring possession in favour of the respondent where the opposing parties alleged they had perfected possession more than two months before the preliminary order.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Magistrate acted in excess of jurisdiction by declaring possession for the respondent while ignoring the revision petitioners' possession which had been perfected long before the two-month period specified in the first proviso to section 145(4).
  • The learned Magistrate treated the material date as the date of filing of the respondent's petition (complaint) rather than the date of the preliminary order; the petitioners contended that this was incorrect and deprived them of the statutory protection afforded by the two-month proviso.

Respondent / Petitioner in Summary Case No. 5/23

  • The written record shows the respondent asserted he was in possession and filed the complaint about disturbance; the Magistrate accepted the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent as true and rejected the counter-evidence as false and unreliable.

The opinion does not provide a detailed, itemized account of legal arguments advanced by the respondent beyond the fact of the respondent's claim to possession and the evidence accepted by the Magistrate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nago v. Atmaram, AIR 1926 Nag 371 Cited among authorities supporting the view that the first proviso to s.145(4) cannot be extended beyond the two months specified; material date is the date of the preliminary order. Referred to as part of the body of decisions supporting strict construction of the proviso.
Emperor v. Baijnath, AIR 1929 Oudh 526 Included in the group of decisions cited for the generally accepted view regarding the limited scope of the first proviso to s.145(4). Quoted as supporting authority for strict application of the two-month limit.
Emperor v. Parashram, AIR 1931 Nag 38 Listed with other cases endorsing that the proviso's two-month period cannot be extended. Referred to in support of the court's construction of the proviso.
Meharban v. Bhola, AIR 1935 All 35 Part of the authorities referenced as taking the generally accepted view about the scope of the first proviso. Used as supporting precedent for the court's strict reading.
Emperor v. Sundar Lal, AIR 1936 Nag 271 Included in the list of cases supporting the limited scope of the proviso. Referred to as part of the line of decisions favouring strict construction.
Mohamood Beg v. Ehsan Beg, AIR 1941 Oudh 515 Cited among authorities that uphold the two-month limitation in the proviso to s.145(4). Listed as supporting the court's approach.
Narayanan Namboori v. Unnimaya Brahamani Amnia, 38 Cochin LR 283 Included in the catalogue of cases taking the view that the proviso's period is fixed and cannot be extended. Referred to as part of the supportive authorities for strict construction.
Tolan Kalita v. Bhuban Chandra, AIR 1951 Assam 161 Cited as an authority in support of the court's stance that the two-month proviso should not be extended. The court expressly notes agreement with the view expressed in this decision.
Janama v. Draupadi, AIR 1952 Orissa 26 Listed among the decisions consistent with the court's reading of the proviso. Noted by the court as one of the authorities with which it is in respectful agreement.
Lakshami Narain v. Jugeshwar, AIR 1954 Pat 169 Cited as supporting the limited application of the first proviso to s.145(4). Identified by the court as a decision in respectful agreement with its view.
Fatima Sultana Begum v. Rang Rao, AIR 1954 Hyd 215 Included among cases endorsing that the proviso's two-month period is to be strictly applied. Explicitly mentioned as a decision with which the court is in respectful agreement.
Krishnam Raju v. Chintala Swami Naidu, AIR 1927 Mad 816 Represents the Madras High Court view that the two-month period could be extended where the Court delayed in passing the preliminary order. Described as taking a contrary view to the generally accepted rule; the present court recounts this as one of the decisions adopting an extendable approach.
Srinivasa Rao v. Dasaratha Rama, AIR 1929 Mad 198 Another Madras decision holding that the two-month period may be extended if the Court delayed in passing the preliminary order. Noted as part of the line of Madras cases advocating extension in cases of court delay.
Arunachala v. Chinnadurai, AIR 1945 Mad 216 The Madras High Court in this later decision dissented from the earlier Madras view (i.e., it rejected the extension principle). Referred to by the court as evidence that the Madras position itself was not uniform.
Chunchu Narayana v. Kesappa, AIR 1951 Mad 500 (also referred to as Narayanan v. Kesappa) A Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court which reaffirmed the earlier Madras view permitting extension (by applying a nunc pro tunc fiction) where necessary. The present court expressly dissents from the view taken in this case and declines to adopt its construction of the proviso.
Katras Jherriah Coal Co. v. Sibkrishta Daw and Co., 22 Cal 297 Cited for commentary on the hardship that could result if a party wrongfully dispossessed shortly before commencement of proceedings under s.145 were denied the benefit of protection; background to the legislative addition of the first proviso. Used by the court to explain legislative purpose for adding the proviso (to avoid hardship to recently dispossessed parties).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from a textual reading of sections 145(1) and 145(4) Cr. P.C.:

  1. The Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to start proceedings under s.145 only upon being satisfied (from a police report or other information) that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists; such satisfaction is subjective and may require a brief preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate.
  2. Section 145(4) requires the Magistrate, in the subsequent inquiry, to decide "whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order before mentioned in such possession" — the "order before mentioned" being the preliminary order passed under s.145(1). Thus, the statutory "material date" for determining possession is the date of the preliminary order.
  3. The first proviso to s.145(4) allows the Magistrate to treat a party who was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date of the preliminary order as if he had been in possession on that date. The proviso is clear, definite and prescribes a two-month period; its scope cannot be extended beyond that period.
  4. The court rejects the application of the legal fiction of "nunc pro tunc" to treat the date of the preliminary order as if it were the earlier date of the complaint or police report in order to enlarge the two-month period. The court reasons that the clear legislative language fixes the date of the preliminary order and that altering that date would defeat the purpose of the proviso.
  5. The court recognises a line of decisions (including some Madras decisions) that permit extending the two-month period where the Magistrate delayed in passing the preliminary order, but holds that the statute does not support the assumption that the Magistrate must automatically pass the preliminary order on receipt of the complaint or report. Instead, the Magistrate must achieve a prompt subjective satisfaction that proceedings are necessary and then pass the preliminary order without appreciable delay.
  6. The court emphasises the policy: s.145 is meant to avoid breaches of the peace and the Magistrate's action must be prompt; the two-month period signals that conclusion must be reached within two months from receipt of complaint or police report in ordinary cases.
  7. Applying these principles to the present case, the court finds the Magistrate was wrong in law to treat the material date as the date of the complaint petition rather than the date of the preliminary order. However, the court also finds that, despite that incorrect legal view, the Magistrate correctly evaluated the evidence to determine which party was in possession on the date of the preliminary order: he accepted the respondent's evidence and rejected the counter-petitioners' evidence and recorded a definite finding of possession in favour of the respondent at the relevant date.
  8. Because the revisional jurisdiction cannot be used to re-open or overturn the Magistrate's factual finding about possession on the material date, and because the protection order under s.145(6) is consistent with that factual finding, the court concludes there is no basis in revision to disturb the order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is DISMISSED.

The court's direct rulings and immediate consequences are:

  • The Magistrate erred in law by treating the material date for possession as the date of filing of the respondent's petition rather than the date of the preliminary order; that aspect of the Magistrate's approach was incorrect.
  • Notwithstanding that legal error, the Magistrate's factual finding that the respondent was in possession on the date of the preliminary order was based on acceptance of the respondent's evidence and rejection of the counter-evidence; that factual conclusion cannot be upset in revision and supports the protection order under s.145(6).
  • The protection order in favour of the respondent therefore stands until set aside by due process in a competent civil court; s.145(6) orders are police orders intended to prevent breach of the peace and do not finally determine proprietary rights.

Broader implications emphasized by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The first proviso to section 145(4) must be strictly construed: the statutory two-month period is fixed and cannot be extended by treating the preliminary order as having been made earlier (no general application of nunc pro tunc to alter the material date).
  • Magistrates must act promptly when invoking s.145: they are to form the necessary subjective satisfaction and pass the preliminary order without undue delay, with the two-month limitation functioning as an indication of the period within which that preliminary step should ordinarily be taken.
  • If a Magistrate delays beyond the indicated period so that a party is prejudiced, the proper remedy is not for the Magistrate to retrospectively alter the date of his order in violation of the statute; parties aggrieved by resulting consequences should pursue their civil remedies.

The court also expressly dissents from the Madras Division Bench decision in Chunchu Narayana v. Kesappa (AIR 1951 Mad 500) insofar as that decision treats the proviso as extendable by judicial fiction; the present judgment aligns with other cited authorities that require a strict construction of the proviso.

Disposition: Revision dismissed.

    Ayyan Padmanabhan v. Padmanabhan Nanu Counter Petitioner.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sankaran, J.:— The final order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate at Qulion in Summary Case No. 5 of 1123 on the file of his Court, has given rise to this revision petition. The property involved in that case consists of 2 acres and 96 cents of garden land comprised in Sy. Nos. 8320 and 8321 in Munraoe Island Pakuthy. Regarding the possession of this property there was dispute between the petitioner in Summary Case No. 5/23 on the one side and counter-petitioners 1 to 8 on the other.

    2. The petitioner who claimed to be in possession of the property filed a petition before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 8-12-1121 complaining of disturbance caused to his possession and enjoyment of the property by the counter-petitioners. After getting a report from the police on the allegations contained in that petition and on being satisfied that there was dispute between the petitioner and the counter-petitioners about the possession of the property and that such dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace, the Magistrate started proceedings under S. 145 of the Criminal P.C, by passing a preliminary order on 11-1-1123 under sub-s. 1 of that section. The property was also attached and placed in the possession of a receiver appointed by the Court. After considering the statements filed by the opposing parties and the evidence tendered by them, the Magistrate passed the final order on 28-8-1954 under sub-s. 6 of S. 145 declaring possession in favour of the petitioner and forbidding all disturbance of such possession except in accordance with the decision of a competent civil court.

    3. Counter-petitioners 1 and 5 have filed the present petition seeking a revision of that order.

    4. The point raised by the revision petitioners is that the Magistrate has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in declaring possession in favour of the respondent after ignoring the possession which the revision petitioners had perfected long prior to the period of two months specified in the first Proviso to sub-s. 4 of S. 145. It is pointed out that the learned Magistrate was definitely of the view that the material date on which the respondent had to prove his possession is the date on which he filed the petition before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate complaining about the disturbance of his possession by the revision petitioners and that if he succeeds in proving that he had possession on that date he is entitled to a protection order under sub-s. 6 of S. 145, even if he had been out of possession for a period of more than two months prior to the date of the preliminary order under sub-s. 1.

    5. That the Magistrate was of that view, is clearly borne out by the following observations made by him in the course of the impugned order:

    “Since the dispute arose in 1121 Karkatagam and Ext. C petition was filed in Karkatagam by the petitioner, the possession after that date need not be taken into consideration; if the counter-petitioners trespassed after that date the property and committed waste, that would not give them any right”.

    6. The point raised in this revision petition has to be considered in the light of the provisions contained in sub-ss. 1 and 4 of S. 145 of the Criminal P.C Sub-section 1 states the circumstances under which a competent Magistrate can start proceedings under that section by passing a preliminary order. That sub-section runs as follows:

    “Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or Magistrate of the First Class is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader, within the time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute”.

    7. Sub-section 4 deals with the subsequent inquiry to be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining which of the opposing parties was in possession of the property at the material time. The material time is clearly indicated by the sub-section read along with the first proviso to it. The sub-section and the proviso runs as follows:

    “The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them respectively, consider the effect of such evidence, take such further evidence (if any) as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order before mentioned in such possession of the said subject:

    Provided that, if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has within two months next before the date of such order been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, he may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in possession at such date.”

    8. What the sub-section requires is that the Magistrate should, if possible, decide “whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order before mentioned, in such possession of the said subject”. The order referred to is undoubtedly the preliminary order passed under sub-s. 1. By the Proviso to sub-s. 4 the Magistrate is empowered to ignore the effect of forcible and wrongful dispossession of any parties to the controversy if such forcible and wrongful dispossession had been within a period of two months prior to the date of the preliminary order, and to hold that the party so dispossessed had been in possession on the date of the preliminary order.

    9. The provision is clear and definite and there is no ambiguity about it. Going by the strict and literal meaning of the provision, it is clear that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass a protection order under sub-s. 6 in favour of a party who has been out of possession of the property in dispute for a period of more than two months just before the date of the preliminary order.

    10. Normally the party found to be in possession on the date of the preliminary order is entitled to get a protection order in his favour under sub-s. 6. The first Proviso to sub-s. 4 is in effect an amplification of this rule, and the scope of such amplification cannot be extended beyond the period of two months expressly stated in the Proviso. This is the generally accepted view regarding the scope of the first Proviso to sub-s. 4 of S. 145.

    11. Reference may be made in this connection to the decisions in — ‘Nago v. Atmaram’, AIR 1926 Nag 371 (A); — ‘Emperor v. Baijnath’, AIR 1929 Oudh 526 (B); — ‘Emperor v. Parashram’, AIR 1931 Nag 38 (C) : — ‘Meharban v. Bhola’, AIR 1935 All 35 (D)’, — ‘Emperor v. Sundar Lal*’, AIR 1936 Nag 271 (E); — ‘Mohamood Beg v. Ehsan Beg’, AIR 1941 Oudh 515 (F); — ‘Narayanan Namboori v. Unnimaya Brahamani Amnia’, 38 Cochin LR 283 (G); — ‘Tolan Kalita v. Bhuban Chandra’, AIR 1951 Assam 161 (H); — ‘Janama v. Draupadi’, AIR 1952 Orissa 26 (I); ‘Lakshami Narain v. Jugeshwar’, AIR 1954 Pat 169 (J); and — ‘Fatima Sultana Begum v. Rang Rao’, AIR 1954 Hyd 215 (K).

    12. A contrary view, however, appears to have been taken in some of the decisions of the Madras High Court. In — ‘Krishnam Raju v. Chintala Swami Naidu’, AIR 1927 Mad 816 (1) (L), and in — ‘Srinivasa Rao v. Dasaratha Rama’, AIR 1929 Mad 198 (M), it was held that the two months' period referred to in the first Proviso to sub-s. 4 of S. 145 could be extended in cases where there has been delay on the part of the Court in passing the preliminary order under sub-s. 1.

    13. This view was dissented from by the Madras High Court itself in a later case i.e — ‘Arunachala v. Chinnadurai’, AIR 1945 Mad 216 (N). The same matter was again considered by a Division Bench of the same court in — ‘Chunchu Narayana v. Kesappa’, AIR 1951 Mad 500 (O), and there the earlier view taken in ‘AIR 1927 Mad 816 (1) (L)’, and ‘AIR 1929 Mad 198 (M)’, was again affirmed.

    14. It has been ruled in that case that no appreciable time should elapse between the presentation of the complaint or the receipt of the police report and the passing of the preliminary order and by applying the legal fiction of ‘nunc pro tunc’ the preliminary order should be deemed to have been made when the Magistrate takes cognisance of the matter and satisfies himself about the urgency.

    15. The main reason given in justification of thus construing the Proviso to sub-s. 4 against the plain meaning of the express words used by the Legislature is that the delay of the Court in passing the preliminary order under sub-s. 1 after satisfying itself that the dispute about possession is likely to cause a breach of the peace, should not prejudice the petitioner if in fact the petition was presented within two months of his dispossession by the opposite party.

    16. It appears that these principles have been enunciated on the assumption that the Magistrate is bound to pass the preliminary order contemplated by sub-s. 1 of S. 145 immediately on receipt of a complaint or police report or other information that a dispute exists about possession of immovable property and that such dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace.

    17. But it has to be pointed out that the section does not lend any support to such an assumption. Even though the section is intended to meet an emergent situation and to avoid a breach of the peace occurring, it is significant to note that the section does not confer any jurisdiction on the Magistrate to start proceedings merely on the strength of the complaint or the police report or other information about an apprehended breach of the peace.

    18. On the other hand, the section makes it clear that the Magistrate gets the jurisdiction to commence proceedings only on being satisfied that there is real dispute about possession of immoveable property and that such dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace. No doubt he may be so satisfied from the complaint petition or the police report. But it cannot be said that in every case such satisfaction must automatically follow from the complaint petition or the police report.

    19. What is required is a subjective satisfaction on the part of the Magistrate that the situation is one demanding action under S. 145. There may be instances where the Magistrate might feel the necessity of some sort of preliminary investigation for satisfying himself about the necessity of starting proceedings under S. 145.

    20. This may require some time which in the nature of things must be short because at that stage the Magistrate is not expected to go into the merits of the respective claims of possession made by the opposing parties. He has only to see if there is real dispute about possession and, if such dispute is likely to result in a breach of the peace.

    21. Since the action contemplated to be taken is to avoid any such breach of peace occurring, it is incumbent on the Magistrate to come to a speedy conclusion as to the necessity or otherwise of the commencement of proceedings under S. 145.

    22. When the Magistrate is satisfied of the necessity to take action under S. 145, the preliminary order contemplated by sub-s. 1 must immediately follow. The subsequent inquiry directed by sub-s. 4 is intended to find out which of the contending parties was in actual possession of the property on the date of the preliminary order so that an order under sub-s. 6 may be passed in favour of such party.

    23. The section as it originally stood did not empower the Magistrate to protect the possession of a party who was wrongfully dispossessed by the opposite party some time immediately prior to the date of the preliminary order. The hardship bound to follow from such a situation was specially commented upon by the Calcutta High Court in — ‘Katras Jherriah Coal Co. v. Sibkrishta Daw and Co.’, 22 Cal 297 (P), where one of the parties to the dispute had been dispossessed by the other party in 14 days, prior to the commencement of the proceedings by the Magistrate.

    24. In that case the court took the view that the Legislature could not have intended that the party wrongfully dispossessed within so short a time just prior to the commencement of the proceedings by the Magistrate should be denied the benefit of the section as it stood then. The Legislature appears to have felt that the matter should not be left in such a state of uncertainty as to the nature of the possession which required protection at the hands of the Magistrate and that it was necessary to empower the Magistrate to protect the possession of the party who is wrongfully dispossessed within a specified period prior to the date of the preliminary order.

    25. It is obvious that the fixation of such time limit had to be arbitrary. The Legislature in its wisdom thought that the period might be fixed at two months prior to the date of the preliminary order and accordingly the First Proviso to sub-s. 4 of S. 145 was added when the Criminal Procedure Code was re-enacted in the year 1898. If it was the intention of the Legislature to treat the date of the complaint petition or of the police report as the material date for the purpose of determining possession under sub-s. 4, it would have been so stated when this Proviso was added in the year 1898.

    26. But it is seen that even in the Proviso it is particularly emphasised that possession has to be determined as it was on the date of the preliminary order and that in doing so any wrongful dispossession occurring within two months prior to the date of that order may be ignored and the party thus dispossessed may be deemed to have been in actual possession of the property on the date of the preliminary order in spite of such dispossession.

    27. Where the intention of the Legislature is so manifest and the same has been expressed in clear and unambiguous language, there is no scope or justification for the application of the legal fiction ‘Nunc pro tunc’ and to enlarge the period fixed in the Proviso by pushing back the date of the preliminary order and to treat that order as one passed on the date of the complaint petition or the police report calling for action under S. 145.

    28. Since the Magistrate passes the preliminary order only when he is satisfied about the necessity of taking such a step, it cannot be said that the order can be deemed to have been passed on an earlier date. The date of the order is known and fixed and to construe the Proviso in such a way as to result in an alteration of that date will be definitely defeating the very purpose of the Proviso.

    29. As the Proviso stands, a party who has perfected his possession by being in undisturbed possession of the property for a period of more than two months prior to the date of the preliminary order cannot be disturbed from such possession in proceedings under S. 145.

    30. On the other hand, such party is entitled to a protection order under sub-s. 6. It is not for the Magistrate to inquire into and decide on the question of that party's right to possession of the property or as to the propriety of the means adopted by that party for securing possession and for perfecting the same by being in peaceful possession for more than the required period of two months prior to the date of the preliminary order.

    31. These are matters to be agitated before a Civil Court by the party aggrieved by the Magistrate's Order under sub-s. 6. The Magistrate's concern is merely to avoid a breach of the peace occurring on account of dispute about possession of the property and that purpose is achieved by passing a protection order in favour of the party found 10 be in possession at the relevant period and for the required duration.

    32. In short, an order under sub-s. 6 is in effect only a police order and it does not finally decide the rights of any of the parties to the controversy. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that even where the passing of the preliminary order has been delayed for more than two months from the date or the complaint petition or the police report, such delay would result in any serious prejudice to any of the parties to the dispute.

    33. No doubt such delay might enable one party to perfect his possession obtained by wrongful means and thus necessitate the other party to go to the Civil Court for securing his rights. Even the possibility of such contingency cannot be a justification for going against the plain meaning of the First Proviso to sub-s. 4 and to enlarge the period of two months deliberately fixed by the Legislature.

    34. In attempting to restore possession of the property to a party who had no possession on the date of the preliminary order and who had been out of possession for more than two months prior to that date, the Magistrate would be ignoring the time limit prescribed by the statute and would be interfering with the possession of a party who has already perfected his possession which has to be maintained by the criminal Court until otherwise decided by a competent civil court.

    35. The result will be a clear violation of the statute and such violation can be justified on no ground whatever. The Magistrate will be at fault in causing undue delay in taking appropriate action on a complaint petition or a police report drawing his attention to the likelihood of a breach of the peace occurring on account of dispute about possession of immovable property.

    36. The remedy for the consequence brought about by such delay does not lie in the Magistrate himself violating the mandate contained in sub-s. 4 of S. 145 and in acting in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on him by that section. If the Magistrate is fully alive to his own responsibilities in taking action under S. 145, there will be no occasion to cause any prejudice to one party or the other on account of the delay in passing the preliminary order under sub-s. 1.

    37. Since such an order is meant to meet an emergent situation alleged to be threatening a preach of the peace, it is the undoubted duty of the Magistrate to act promptly. The time limit of two months prescribed by the First Proviso to sub-s. 4 can and must be taken as an indication that he is to come to a conclusion as to the necessity or otherwise of starting proceedings under S. 145 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a complaint petition or police report about an apprehended breach of the peace.

    38. Since no detailed investigation into the merits of the claim of possession by the disputants is expected to be made at this stage, the aforesaid two months' period must be more than sufficient for the Magistrate to come to his own conclusion as to the existence or otherwise of the situation demanding action under S. 145. If the passing of the preliminary order is not delayed beyond this period, neither of the parties to the dispute will be in a position to gain an undue advantage over the other.

    39. A party who is wrongfully dispossessed during this period could be afforded the necessary protection by invoking the First Proviso to sub-s. 4. The party who is not prompt in complaining about his wrongful dispossession will himself be responsible for the consequences of his own delay. But a Magistrate who has to take action under S. 145, must realise that he should not delay the commencement of the proceedings under the section, where such action is found necessary, beyond a period of two months from the date of receipt of complaint petition or police report or other information about the likelihood of a breach of the peace on account of dispute about possession of immoveable property.

    40. If the Magistrate realises his responsibility in this matter and acts in accordance with the true import of S. 145, there will be no occasion for complaint of his delay, in taking action under that section having caused prejudice to either of the contending parties. Examining the scope of the First Proviso to sub-s. 4 of S. 145 in all these aspects we are clear that it has to be strictly construed and enforced and that it will not sustain the construction put upon it in — ‘Narayanan v. Kesappa’, AIR 1951 Mad 500 (O).

    41. We have therefore to respectfully dissent from the view taken in that case as to the scope and effect of sub-ss. 1 and 4 and also of the First Proviso to sub-s. 4 of S. 145. On this point a contrary view has been taken in ‘AIR 1951 Assam 161 (H)’ : ‘AIR 1952 Orissa 26 (I)’ : AIR 1954 Pat 169 (J)’; and in ‘AIR 1954 Hyd 215 (K)’. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in these decisions.

    42. The view taken in this case by the learned Magistrate that the material date for the purpose of determining possession of the property is the date on which the respondent petitioner had filed his complaint petition, is clearly erroneous. To that extent the contention urged on behalf of the revision petitioners must prevail. But that by itself will not be a justification for interfering with the order passed by the learned Magistrate declaring possession in favour of the respondent.

    43. It is seen that in spite of the erroneous view of law taken by the Magistrate as to the true scope of S. 145, he has made a correct approach to the evidence on record for the purpose of reaching a conclusion as to which of the contending parties had possession of the property on the date of the preliminary order.

    44. After a due consideration of such evidence the learned Magistrate has accepted the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner as true and has rejected the evidence adduced by the counter-petitioners as false and unreliable. Accordingly he has recorded a definite finding that the petitioner was in possession of the property at the time when the proceedings were started. It is obvious that the time referred to by him is the date of the preliminary order.

    45. The correctness of the Magistrate's finding on the question of possession of the property on the material date cannot be allowed to be canvassed in revision. Consistent with such a finding as to possession, the Magistrate was perfectly in order in declaring that the respondent petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the property until evicted there from in due process of law and forbidding disturbance of his possession until such eviction. The revisional jurisdiction of this court cannot be invoked for interfering with that order. In the result this revision petition is dismissed.

    D.H.Z

    46. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Ayyan Padmanabhan v. Padmanabhan Nanu Counter Petitioner.
    (Mar 25, 1955)