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  • Section 90 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, reads:A
  • Section 87 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act 15 of 1950,
  • Section 90(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950,
  • Section 87(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950,
  • provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950,
  • Section 18 of the Travancore Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 3 of 1079,
  • Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950,
  • clause of S. 87 of Act 15 of 1950
  • Cochin Act 1 of 1081 S. 6
  • S. 87 of Act 15 of 1950
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  • Section 90 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, reads:A
  • Section 87 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act 15 of 1950,
  • Section 90(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950,
  • Section 87(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950,
  • provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950,
  • Section 18 of the Travancore Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 3 of 1079,
  • Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950,
  • clause of S. 87 of Act 15 of 1950
  • Cochin Act 1 of 1081 S. 6
  • S. 87 of Act 15 of 1950
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Decision (Menon, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was the Managing Trustee (Managing Uralan) of the Chullurmaniyathu Kavu Devaswom (situated in Poyya village, Mukundapuram Taluk). The Cochin Devaswom Board issued an order dated 10-9-1950 suspending the petitioner and two other uralers, stating that the affairs of the Devaswom were "grossly mismanaged." The Board, invoking its statutory powers under Section 87 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, deputed an Assistant Devaswom Commissioner to make an enquiry, suspended the trustees pending that enquiry, and appointed an interim trustee under Sections 91 and 100 of the Act to "protect and conserve the Trust."

The petitioner filed this writ petition seeking certiorari (or other appropriate writ) to quash the Board's suspension order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 87(3) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 — which permits suspension of trustees pending enquiry and which appears only in the Cochin part of the Act — is discriminatory and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution (i.e., whether S.87(3) is ultra vires).
  2. Whether hereditary trusteeship of a temple is a right in the nature of property protected under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution (as raised by the Board and considered via the Madras High Court decision).
  3. Whether the petitioner is disqualified from holding the office of trustee under Section 90(1) of the Act by reason of having applied for adjudication as insolvent or having been adjudicated an insolvent (as contended by the 2nd respondent).
  4. Whether, more broadly, the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 is intra vires the Constitution (the court framed this in relation to existing Supreme Court authorities but did not decide a wholesale challenge in this judgment).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The suspension order under S.87(3) is discriminatory because an equivalent power to suspend trustees is not present in Part I of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act (which deals with the Travancore area). This difference, the petitioner argued, amounted to unequal treatment of trustees in the Cochin portion compared with those in the Travancore portion.
  • The petitioner relied on authority (cited as State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Singh, AIR 1954 S.C. 297) addressing discrimination arising from historical differences between parts of an integrated State, to support the contention that the discriminatory provision should be struck down under Article 14.

Board's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • The Board contended that the hereditary trusteeship of the Malabar temple does not constitute a right in property and therefore is not protected by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution (i.e., they suggested Article 19(1)(f) was inapplicable to hereditary trusteeship).

2nd Respondent's Arguments

  • The 2nd respondent averred (in affidavit paragraph 11) that the petitioner had been adjudged an insolvent and had no means; on that basis it was contended that the petitioner was disqualified under Section 90(1) of the Act and that any order restoring him would be infructuous, so the petition should be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Singh, AIR 1954 S.C. 297 The case explains that historical or pre-existing legal differences between constituent parts of an integrated State may produce discrimination and that such discrimination is examinable under Article 14; a facially discriminatory provision must be shown to rest on a reasonable classification to be valid. The court relied on the reasoning to evaluate whether S.87(3)'s differential treatment of Cochin trustees (as compared to Travancore trustees) could be justified. Applying the test from this case, the court found no reasonable classification and held S.87(3) discriminatory.
Narayan v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 385 (Madras High Court) Held that hereditary trusteeship is in the nature of property and is within the protection of Article 19(1)(f), even where no emoluments attach to the office. The court expressed respectful agreement with this view and adopted it in concluding that hereditary trusteeship is protected by Article 19(1)(f).
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, AIR 1954 S.C. 282 One of the Supreme Court decisions referenced concerning the constitutionality of the Act (authority relied on to treat the Act as a whole as intra vires). The court, in light of this Supreme Court decision among others, stated that the Act as a whole must be held intra vires and that issues as to particular sections' constitutionality would require separate investigation.
Ratilal Nathalal… Applicant v. Commissioner of Bombay…, AIR 1954 S.C. 388 Another Supreme Court decision referenced regarding the vires of enactments affecting religious institutions. Used alongside other Supreme Court authorities to support the statement that the Act as a whole is intra vires; whether individual sections offend the Constitution must be considered separately.
Jagannath v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 S.C. 400 Supreme Court authority referenced by the court in assessing the Act's vires. As with the other Supreme Court cases cited, it supported the court's view that the Act as a whole is intra vires and that only specific provisions (like S.87(3)) warranted individual scrutiny.
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., (1885) 118 U.S. 394 Authority cited for the principle that corporations have entitlement to due process of law and equal protection of laws. The court cited this U.S. authority to illustrate that corporations (here, religious endowments treated as corporations sole) are entitled to constitutional protections such as equal protection and due process.
Smyth v. Ames, (1897) 169 U.S. 466 U.S. authority cited in the same context as corporate due process/equal protection. Cited to support the proposition that entities treated as corporations are entitled to constitutional protections; used in the court's discussion of the relevance of corporate status.
Kentucky Finance Corpn. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corpn., (1922) 262 U.S. 544 U.S. authority cited on corporate constitutional protections. Referenced with other U.S. authorities to underline that corporate status entails entitlement to due process/equal protection.
Barton v. Taylor, (1886) 11 A.C. 197 Authority cited for the principle that a statutory power to dismiss does not necessarily include an implied power to suspend; the greater does not necessarily include the less. The court used this authority to reject the Board's submission that a power to dismiss implies a power to suspend where the statute does not expressly provide for suspension.
Sesh-adri Aiyangar v. Ranga Bhattar, 35 Mad 631 Authority recognizing that in the disciplinary context (e.g., archakas and servants), a power to suspend pending charges may be regarded as included in a power of removal. The court distinguished that disciplinary analogy from the present statutory context, noting the different legal posture of trustees versus servants/archakas.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court followed a stepwise analytical approach, applying statutory text, constitutional principles and precedent quoted in the petition:

  1. Statutory Basis for the Order: The Board acted under Section 87(1) to deputise an officer to enquire into institutional affairs and, per Section 87(3), to suspend trustees pending enquiry. The text of S.87(3) authorises suspension pending final orders on the enquiry report.
  2. Initial Observation: The court acknowledged that the language of S.87(3) would, on its face, sustain the impugned suspension order because the subsection expressly permits suspension pending enquiry.
  3. Discrimination Argument and Article 14: The petitioner argued that S.87(3) embodied discrimination because no corresponding suspension power exists in Part I of the Act (Travancore area). The court examined the principle from State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Singh, which requires that an obvious discrimination can only be supported if based on a reasonable classification bearing a just relation to the object. Applying that test, the court found no distinction or reasonable basis for classifying trustees of temples in Travancore and Cochin differently.
  4. Conclusion on S.87(3): Because no reasonable classification supported the discrimination, Section 87(3) was held to be inconsistent with Article 14 and therefore ultra vires and of no effect.
  5. Article 19(1)(f) and Hereditary Trusteeship: The Board suggested hereditary trusteeship did not amount to a property right under Article 19(1)(f). The court considered the Madras High Court decision in Narayan v. State of Madras, which stated that hereditary trusteeship is in the nature of property and within Article 19(1)(f). The court respectfully agreed with that view and adopted it for the present case.
  6. Scope of Challenge to the Act: The petitioner urged larger attacks on many provisions of the Act. The court declined to decide a wholesale challenge, observing that in the light of cited Supreme Court decisions (including the Madras and Bombay authorities referenced), the Act as a whole must be treated as intra vires; determination whether individual sections offend the Constitution would require separate, specific examination.
  7. Section 90(1) and Insolvency Argument: The 2nd respondent relied on an affidavit stating the petitioner had been adjudged an insolvent and therefore disqualified under Section 90(1)(b) (which disqualifies a person who "applies to be adjudicated or is adjudicated an insolvent"). The court examined the facts: the petitioner had applied for adjudication, was adjudged insolvent by a district court, and that adjudication was subsequently annulled by an order (Ex. A) reading "No discharge petition is put in. The order of adjudication is annulled." The court interpreted Section 90 as applying to (i) persons whose application for adjudication is currently pending and (ii) persons adjudicated insolvent while the adjudication order remains in force. The court held that a person whose adjudication has been annulled (or whose petition dismissed) is not permanently affected by S.90; thus the petitioner was not disqualified by the annulled adjudication.
  8. Relief Ordered: For these reasons — S.87(3) being ultra vires and the petitioner not disqualified under S.90 — the court allowed the petition and quashed the suspension by issuing a writ of certiorari.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was allowed. The suspension of the petitioner by the Cochin Devaswom Board under Section 87(3) was quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The court held that Section 87(3) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 is discriminatory and offends Article 14 of the Constitution, and is therefore ultra vires and of no effect.

Additional holdings and directions:

  • The court accepted the view (as expressed by the Madras High Court in Narayan v. State of Madras) that hereditary trusteeship is in the nature of property and is within the protection of Article 19(1)(f).
  • The court observed that, in the light of several Supreme Court decisions cited (including Commissioner, H.R.E. Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, Ratilal Nathalal…, and Jagannath v. State of Orissa), the Act as a whole must be regarded as intra vires; determinations as to particular sections will require specific inquiry.
  • On the Section 90(1) point, the court held that a person whose adjudication as insolvent has been annulled (or whose petition was dismissed) is not permanently disqualified under Section 90; the statutory disqualification applies while an application for adjudication is pending or while an adjudication order remains in force.
  • Costs: The petitioner was awarded costs from the respondents, including an advocate's fee of Rs. 200/-. The costs (including the advocate's fee) were to be borne in equal shares by respondents 1 and 2.

Implications: The direct effect is the quashing of the petitioner's suspension and the declaration that S.87(3) is void for violating Article 14. The court did not pronounce a general invalidation of the Act; rather, it struck down the specific discriminatory provision and left open examination of other sections on a case-by-case basis.

This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, authorities, reasoning and orders expressly recited in the provided opinion text. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

    Kumaran Nambudiri v. Cochin Devaswom Board And Another

    Menon, J.:— This petition seeks a writ of certiorari or other appropriate direction quashing the order of the Cochin Devaswom Board suspending the petitioner from his office as Managing Trustee of the Chullurmaniyathu Kavu Devaswom. The order is dated 10-9-1950 and reads as follows:

    “Whereas the Cochin Devaswom Board is satisfied that the affairs of the Chulurmaniyathu Kavu Devaswom situated in Poyya village, Mukundapuram Taluk, are grossly mismanaged by the Managing Uralan Meladath Manakkal Sankaran Kumaran Namboori, whereas the other two uralers Vadakke Kizhiyedath Vishnu Namboori and Meladath Sankaran Subramanian Namboori are found to participate in the various acts of mismanagements, the Deveswom Board, in virtue of the powers vested in it under Section 87 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act 15 of 1950, is pleased to depute the Assistant Devaswom Commissioner, Trivanohi-kulam group, to conduct an enquiry into the affairs of the said Devaswom and to suspend these uralers pending the enquiry and to appoint the 4th Uralan Sri. Thekkekizhfadath Vishnu Narayanan Namboori as an interim trustee of the said Devaswom under Ss. 91 and 100 of the Act with a view to protect and conserve the Trust.”

    2. The enquiry directed is by virtue of the powers conferred on the Board under Section 87(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, which reads:

    “The Board may depute any officer not lower in grade than a Devaswom Assistant Commissioner to enquire into the affairs of any institution and to examine the properties, moveable and immovable, and the accounts, registers and other records of any institution and to submit a full report on the result of such enquiry and inspection. The trustees, office-holders and servants of such institution shall furnish the officer so deputed with all the information he may call for and shall also assist him in the examination of the properties, accounts, registers & records. On the report of the officer deputed to conduct the enquiry the Board shall pass such orders as it may think proper.”

    3. Sub-s. (3) of that section provides:

    “Pending final orders on the report of the officer deputed to conduct the enquiry under sub-s. (1) or pending the enquiry, the Board may suspend the trustee, office-holder or servant.”

    4. And there can be no doubt that the words of the sub-section will sustain the impugned order of the Devaswom Board. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was that sub-s. (3), embodies a discrimination as far as the trustees of the Devaswoms in the Cochin portion of this State is concerned as no similar provision obtains in Part I of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, which deals with the Travancore portion of the State and — ‘State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Singh’, AIR 1954 S.C 297 (A), was cited in support of the contention.

    5. In that case their Lordships said:

    “It appears that in the former State of Rajasthan provisions regarding the management by Government of Jagirs and the right to collect rents already existed, whereas there was no such provision in the former States of Jaipur, Bikanner, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur and Matsya Union, but when the integration took place in April and May 1949 the discrimination exhibited itself not by virtue of anything inherent in the impugned Ordinance but by reason of the fact that Jagirdars of one part of the present State of Rajasthan were already subjected to a disability in the matter of management of their Jagirs while the other parts were wholly unaffected. This discrimination, however undesirable, was not open to any exception until the Constitution came into force in 26-1-1950 when Article 13 declared that all laws in force in territory of India Immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.” that

    “It becomes therefore necessary to see whether the impugned provision which is discriminatory on the face of it is hit by article 14 which declares that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”

    6. And concluded:

    “Such an obvious discrimination can be supported only on the ground that it was based upon a reasonable classification. It is now well settled by the decision of this court that a proper classification must always bear a reasonable and just relation to the things. In respect of which it is proposed. Judged by this criterion it seems to us that the discrimination is based on no classification at all and is manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary.”

    7. We are unable to see any distinction between the trustees of the temples in the Travancore and Cochin areas of the State or any reasonable basis for classifying them into two separate groups. It follows that, S. 87(3) is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and should hence be considered as ‘ultra vires’ and of no effect.

    8. It was suggested before us on behalf of the Board that the hereditary trusteeship of the Malabar temple does not spell a right in property and is not hence within the protection afforded by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The same question came up for consideration of the Madras High Court recently in the case of certain trustees of a Malabar Temple (— ‘Narayan v. State of Madras’, AIR 1954 Mad 385 (B)). Their Lordships said:

    “The nature and incidents of the office of hereditary trusteeship are well settled by authority.” that

    “there is ample authority for the view that trusteeship where hereditary, is in the nature of property”.

    “we are accordingly of opinion that hereditary trusteeship is within the protection afforded by Article 19(1)(f) even though there was no emoluments attached to the office.”

    9. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the High Court of Madras and feel that no useful purpose will be served by our surveying the ground afresh in this judgment.

    10. In the view we have taken the larger contention of the petitioner that many of the other provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, if not the whole of that enactment, are ‘ultra vires of the Constitution, does not arise for consideration. All that we propose to say at present is that in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in — ‘Cornmr. Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar’, AIR 1954 S.C 282 (C); — ‘Ratilal Nathalal…Applicant v. Commissioner Of Bombay….’, AIR 1954 SC 388 (D) and — ‘Jagannath v. State of Orissa’, AIR 1954 SC 400 (E), the Act as a whole must be held ‘intra vires’ and whether any particular section does or does not offend the Constitution will be a matter for special investigation.

    11. The only further question to be dealt with is a contention urged on behalf of the 2nd respondent. In paraghaph 11 of his affidavit filed on 19-3-1953 he said:

    “The petitioner has been adjudged an insolvent and is not possessed of any means. If any liability accrues it would be absolutely impossible to realise anything out of the petitioner.” and on the basis of that averment his learned counsel contended before us that the petitioner is disqualified from holding the office of a trustee under Section 90(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, that any order in his favour cancelling the suspension will hence be infructuous and that the petition should be dismissed on that ground. It is admitted that the petitioner did apply to be adjudged as insolvent to the Anjikatmal District. Court, Ernakuiam by I.P No. 46 of 1110, that he was adjudged an insolvent by the said court in pursuance thereto and that the order of adjudication was subsequently annulled by Ex. A dated 15-12-1110 which reads as follows:

    “No discharge petition is put in. The order of adjudication is annulled.”

    12. The relevant portion of Section 90 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, reads:

    “A person shall be disqualified from holding the office of trustee of an institution if he

    (b) applies to be adjudicated or is adjudicated an insolvent.”

    13. And the foundation for the contention is what we consider an undue emphasis on the words “applies to be adjudicated” from which is drawn the conclusion that if there was an application for adjudication the person concerned is debarred for all time irrespective of subsequent circumstances from holding the office of a trustee of a Hindu Religious Institution. We have no doubt that a person whose petition has been dismissed or whose adjudication has been annulled is not affected by S. 90. What the section really means is that person whose application for adjudication is pending and any person adjudicated as an insolvent while the order of adjudication is in force are within the mischief of the section.

    14. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be allowed and suspension of the petitioner by the Cochin Devaswom Board under S. 87(3) quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari in that behalf. We direct accordingly.

    15. The petitioner will have his costs from the respondents: advocate's fee Rs. 200/- the costs including the advocate's fee being borne in equal shares by respondents 1 and 2.

    Subramania Iyer, J.:— I am entirely of the same opinion and am in full agreement with the judgment which has been delivered. There is no escape from the conclusion that the third clause of S. 87 of Act 15 of 1950 which is obviously discriminatory is void as it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It is true that both the first and the second parts of the Act authorise the respective Devaswom Boards to remove or dismiss trustees after enquiry and then to arrange for the management of the concerned institutions. (See Ss. 41 and 43). The provision for suspending a trustee which obtains only in the second part cannot be regarded as an immaterial addition on the ground that a power to suspend is incidental to and is implied or involved in the power to dismiss and that even the Board in part I can suspend a trustee though there is no express conferment of the power. The reason is that a statutory authority to dismiss does not include a power to suspend nor has the principle that the greater includes the less any application. (See — ‘Barton v. Taylor,’, (1886) 11 A.C 197 at pp. 204, 205 (P), see also — ‘37 Mad 35 (Sic.) The case of Archakas and servants subject to the discipline of a trustee presents an altogether different aspect and affords no analogy as in that case a power to suspend as a disciplinary power pending charges may be and has been regarded as included in the power of removal. (See — ‘Sesh-adri Aiyangar v. Ranga Bhattar’, 35 Mad 631 (G)).

    16. The impugned clause i.e, the 3rd in S. 87 of Act 15 of 1950 imposes a fresh disability on the trustee as it did not exist in the repealed Cochin Act 1 of 1081 S. 6 whereof corresponding to S. 87 contained only two sub-clauses, the 1st and 2nd which are the same in both the Acts, Thus in the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court (in — ‘AIR 1954 S.C 297 at p. 299, para. 9 (A))

    “there is no question of continuing unchanged the old laws and judicature in one portion and a different law in the other”

    17. Assuming without deciding that the plea of continuance is available in the matter of statutes of the description as those concerned in this case and also that it would avail even if the old statutes whose source of authority, i.e, the legislature of the two States of Travancore and Cochin, were different, have been repealed and a new enactment made, as here, by the authority of the integrated State of Travancore-Cochine having legislative competence over the entire territory of both the erstwhile States. Section 48 which in terms re-enacted Section 18 of the Travancore Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 3 of 1079, enacts that all religious endowments falling under the Act shall be treated as corporation sole. There is no such provision in part 2 relating to religious endowments in the Cochin area. This circumstance is immaterial because corporations are entitled as natural persons to the due process of law and the equal protection of laws. (See — ‘Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co.’, (1885) 118 U.S 394 (H). See also — ‘Smyth v. Ames’, (1897) 169 U.S 466 (I); — ‘Kentucky Finance Corpn. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corpn.’, (1922) 262 U.S 544 (J), Willoughby's Constitution of the United States Vol 3, p. 1682 Willi's Constitutional Law, p. 453.)

    18. Petition allowed.

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    Kumaran Nambudiri v. Cochin Devaswom Board And Another
    (Jul 27, 1954)