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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983
  • Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 304-B IPC, Section 306 IPC, Section 113-A of the Evidence Act
  • Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 306 IPC, Section 304-B IPC, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Sections 221(1) and (2))
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983
  • Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 304-B IPC, Section 306 IPC, Section 113-A of the Evidence Act
  • Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 306 IPC, Section 304-B IPC, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Sections 221(1) and (2))
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (Accused 1) married the deceased, Hira alias Vaishali, on 27-6-1985. Prosecution evidence alleged that within a few months of marriage the appellant, aided by family members, demanded five tolas of gold and Rs 10,000 from her parental home, subjected her to continuous cruelty, withheld food, and forced her to work excessively. On 10-12-1987 the deceased and her ten-month-old daughter Jyoti disappeared from the matrimonial home at Kasaba Nandgad (Belgaum District) and their bodies were recovered the next day from the Malaprabha River.

The trial court, after examining eleven witnesses, acquitted all six accused of offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC. The State of Karnataka appealed. The High Court gave benefit of doubt to Accused 2–6 but reversed the appellant’s acquittal, convicting him under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) and sentencing him to three years’ rigorous imprisonment. The appellant, on bail, appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s acquittal of the appellant under the settled principles governing appellate interference with acquittals.
  2. Whether a conviction under Section 306 IPC can stand when the original charge was framed under Section 304-B IPC without a separate charge under Section 306 IPC.
  3. Whether the evidence on record, together with the presumptions under Sections 113-A and 106 of the Evidence Act, proved that the appellant abetted the deceased’s suicide.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The trial court’s view of acquittal was a “reasonably possible” and non-perverse view; the High Court had no compelling reason to disturb it.
  • Prosecution witnesses (PWs 1, 2, and 5) were interested family members whose testimony lacked independent corroboration and contained material improvements over the FIR.
  • No specific or credible evidence showed that the appellant demanded dowry or subjected the deceased to cruelty; in fact, the High Court itself acquitted him of the dowry-death charge under Section 304-B IPC.
  • Reliance was placed on Shyamal Saha v. State of W.B. to emphasise limits on appellate interference with acquittals.

State’s Arguments

  • Evidence of PWs 1, 2, and 5 consistently established cruelty and a demand for gold and money.
  • The deceased and her child were last in the custody of the appellant; his failure to explain their deaths attracts the presumption of Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
  • Section 113-A Evidence Act permits a presumption of abetment because the suicide occurred within seven years of marriage and cruelty was proved.
  • Reliance was placed on a line of decisions (e.g., K. Prema S. Rao; Narwinder Singh; Babu v. State of T.N.) supporting conviction for abetment where cruelty, not dowry demand, leads to suicide.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shyamal Saha v. State of W.B., (2014) 12 SCC 321 Appellate court must identify gross error before reversing acquittal. Reaffirmed as guiding principle; Court nonetheless found trial court’s view perverse, justifying High Court interference.
Ganpat v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 59 Re-statement of principles on reversal of acquittal. Cited to frame the appellate standard applied to the High Court’s decision.
Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1997) 7 SCC 677 Grounds permitting appellate reversal when trial court ignores material evidence. Quoted within Ganpat formulation; supports interference where evidence is misread.
Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 Compelling reasons doctrine for setting aside acquittal. Formed part of principles applied.
Chandra Mohan Tiwari v. State of M.P., (1992) 2 SCC 105 Scope of appellate power over acquittals. Listed in Ganpat matrix of authorities.
Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 484 When ignoring crucial evidence justifies reversal of acquittal. Included in the chain of precedents governing appellate review.
K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 217 Presumption under Section 113-A and duty of husband to explain suspicious death. Cited by State; strengthened reliance on Section 113-A, though not expressly analysed further.
Thanu Ram v. State of M.P. (Now Chhattisgarh), (2010) 10 SCC 353 Application of Section 113-A presumption. Referenced by State; buttresses presumption argument.
Narwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 2 SCC 47 Conviction under Section 306 IPC permissible though the charge was under Section 304-B IPC; Sections 221(1)&(2) CrPC. Relied on to uphold High Court’s conversion of charge to Section 306 IPC.
Rakhal Debnath v. State of W.B., (2012) 11 SCC 347 Interpretation of Section 113-A and cruelty leading to suicide. Relied on by State; not independently analysed by Court.
Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 10 SCC 373 Duty of accused under Section 106 Evidence Act to explain facts especially within his knowledge. Cited to draw adverse inference against appellant for non-explanation of deaths.
Gurnaib Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 7 SCC 108 Presumption and burden-shifting in dowry-related suicides. Mentioned by State; not expressly discussed further.
Babu v. State of T.N., (2013) 8 SCC 60 Section 106 Evidence Act—special knowledge with accused. Used in final reasoning to justify adverse inference for appellant’s silence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court applied the framework governing interference with acquittals and found the trial court’s view “clearly unreasonable” for several reasons:

  • Evidentiary Assessment: Testimony of PWs 1, 2 (brothers) and PW 5 (sister-in-law) consistently established cruelty, specific dowry demand, threats, and denial of food. Cross-examination failed to dislodge their narrative.
  • Trial Court’s Errors: It gave undue weight to minor omissions in the FIR, assumed a “rich” family would not seek money, and inferred cordial relations merely from routine visits–all regarded as “trivial” and overlooking core evidence.
  • Statutory Presumption (Section 113-A Evidence Act): Suicide occurred within seven years of marriage; cruelty was proved; therefore the statutory presumption of abetment arose. The appellant offered no rebuttal.
  • Section 106 Evidence Act: The deceased and infant left the matrimonial home and died in suspicious circumstances. Knowledge of these facts lay uniquely with the appellant, who failed to explain their disappearance, justifying an adverse inference.
  • Charge Conversion: Guided by Narwinder Singh, the Court held that absence of a specific Section 306 charge is no bar to conviction where evidence proves that offence, invoking Sections 221(1)&(2) CrPC.
  • Appellate Standards: Following Ganpat and Shyamal Saha, the Court concluded that the High Court correctly identified grave factual errors and acted within its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court DISMISSED the appeal, affirming the High Court’s conviction of the appellant under Section 306 IPC and the sentence of three years’ rigorous imprisonment. The appellant’s bail bond was cancelled with a direction to surrender forthwith.

Implications: The judgment reinforces: (i) the power and responsibility of appellate courts to reverse perverse acquittals; (ii) the permissibility of convicting under Section 306 IPC when the charge was under Section 304-B IPC; and (iii) the combined operation of Sections 113-A and 106 of the Evidence Act in suspicious marital suicides. No new legal doctrine was created, but existing principles were emphatically applied to uphold the conviction.

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    Ramesh Vithal Patil v. State Of Karnataka And Others

    Ranjana P. Desai, J.— Appellant-Accused 1 was tried along with five others (original Accused 2 to 6 respectively) by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B read with Section 34 IPC. Accused 1 is the husband of deceased Hira alias Vaishali (“the deceased”, for convenience). Accused 2 is the father of the appellant, Accused 3 and 4 are the brothers of the appellant, Accused 5 is the wife of Accused 2 and Accused 6 is the wife of Accused 3.

    2. The appellant was married to the deceased on 27-6-1985. According to the prosecution, the appellant and other accused subjected the deceased to cruelty in their house at Kasaba Nandgad, Taluka Khanapur, District Belgaum. They asked her to bring five tolas of gold and Rs 10,000 from her parents. On account of this unbearable cruelty, on 10-12-1987 the deceased committed suicide by jumping in Malaprabha River near Khanapur along with her ten month old daughter, Jyoti.

    3. In support of its case the prosecution examined 11 witnesses. The important witnesses who unfolded the prosecution story are PW 1, Bhavakanna and PW 2, Balram, elder brothers of the deceased and PW 5, Babita, wife of PW 2. PW 4, Dr Ishwarappa, the Medical Officer attached to the District Civil Hospital at Belgaum, conducted post-mortem examination of the deceased. He opined that death of the deceased was due to asphyxia on account of drowning. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

    4. The trial court came to a conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused. The trial court observed that while in court PW 1 and PW 2 stated that all the accused were harassing the deceased and asking her to bring 5 tolas of gold and cash of Rs 10,000 from her parents; that the deceased was made to work in the house for the whole day; that the deceased was not given food to eat and that on her last visit to her maternal house the deceased had told her brothers that if the demand of her in-laws is not met she would be murdered, the FIR lodged by PW 1 does not contain these allegations. In the FIR there are vague allegations about the demand. PW 5, the wife of PW 2 has not referred to the specific amount and quantum of gold allegedly demanded by the in-laws of the deceased. She has not even referred to the last visit of the deceased.

    5. The trial court was also of the view that since the accused belonged to a rich family it is inconceivable that they would make a demand for money and gold. The trial court was further of the view that since the evidence on record established that the deceased was allowed to visit her maternal home and that the appellant and his father visited her maternal home, the allegation that the deceased was ill-treated in the house is not true. The trial court in the circumstances held that demand was not proved and that it cannot be said that the deceased committed suicide because she was ill-treated by the accused.

    6. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal, the State of Karnataka preferred an appeal before the Karnataka High Court. The High Court held Criminal Appeal No. 521 of 1999 that PW 2 had stated in his evidence that the appellant and the deceased were staying in another house belonging to the accused. The evidence also shows that effort was made by PWs 1 and 2 to open that house to find out whether the deceased was in that house. The High Court observed that therefore the possibility of the deceased staying with the appellant in that house at least for major part of the day cannot be ruled out and hence though the other accused can be given benefit of doubt, the appellant cannot escape the liability. The High Court observed that it is more so because the appellant kept mum after the disappearance of the deceased for a long time. The High Court relied upon the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 5 and by the impugned judgment Criminal Appeal No. 521 of 1999 partly allowed the appeal. The acquittal of the appellant of the offence under Section 304-B IPC was set aside. Instead he was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. The acquittal of the other accused was confirmed. The High Court held that they must be given benefit of doubt. Being aggrieved by his conviction, the appellant has approached this Court.

    7. We have heard at some length Mr P. Vishwanath Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. He submitted that the High Court erred in disturbing the acquittal of the appellant. He submitted that the trial court's view was a reasonably possible view. It was not a perverse view warranting interference from the High Court. In support of this submission the counsel relied on Shyamal Saha v. State of W.B (2014) 12 SCC 321, (2014) 2 Scale 690 The counsel submitted that all the witnesses examined by the prosecution are interested witnesses and, therefore, the High Court ought not to have placed reliance on them. Their evidence is not corroborated by the other evidence on record.

    8. The counsel submitted that there is nothing on record to suggest that the appellant demanded dowry, in fact, the High Court has acquitted the appellant of the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. There is no cogent evidence to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the appellant which led her to commit suicide. The counsel pointed out that the evidence of PW 1, brother of the deceased, shows that the deceased was regularly visiting her parents' house. Therefore, cruelty or ill-treatment is not established. The counsel submitted that there is a vague allegation of demand for money and gold ornaments in the FIR. The demand is not specified in the complaint. Whereas PW 1 and PW 2, the brothers of the deceased have tried to give particulars of the demand, PW 5, the wife of PW 2, has omitted to do so. The prosecution witnesses have improved their version in the court. There is no evidence to establish that the appellant abetted the suicide of the deceased. In the circumstances, the impugned order Criminal Appeal No. 521 of 1999 deserves to be set aside.

    9. Mr K. Parameshwar, learned counsel for the State of Karnataka, on the other hand, submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The brothers and sister-in-law of the deceased have clearly stated that she was subjected to cruelty. Moreover, the deceased was staying in the matrimonial house. She was in the custody of the appellant. The bodies of the deceased and her daughter Jyoti were found in Malaprabha River near Khanapur. It was incumbent upon the appellant to explain how the deceased and her daughter Jyoti died in suspicious circumstances. The counsel submitted that Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (“the Evidence Act”, for short) is clearly attracted to this case. In support of his submissions the counsel relied on K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217, Thanu Ram v. State of M.P (2010) 10 SCC 353, Narwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2011) 2 SCC 47, Rakhal Debnath v. State of W.B (2012) 11 SCC 347, Gurnaib Singh v. State of Punjab (2013) 7 SCC 108 and Babu v. State of T.N (2013) 8 SCC 60

    10. Since we are dealing with a case involving reversal of acquittal order by the High Court, it is necessary to see the principles laid down by this Court in that behalf. After adverting to several judgments of this Court in Ganpat v. State of Haryana (2010) 12 SCC 59, this Court reformulated the principles as under:

    “(i) There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded and to come to its own conclusion.
    (ii) The appellate court can also review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law.
    (iii) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons may set aside the judgment of acquittal.
    (iv) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are ‘compelling and substantial reasons’ for doing so. If the order is ‘clearly unreasonable’, it is a compelling reason for interference.
    (v) When the trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial court depending on the materials placed. (Vide Madan Lal v. State of J&K (1997) 7 SCC 677, Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, Chandra Mohan Tiwari v. State of M.P (1992) 2 SCC 105 and Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 4 SCC 484.)”

    11. In Shyamal Saha (2014) 12 SCC 321, (2014) 2 Scale 690 this Court referred to Ganpat (2010) 12 SCC 59 and observed that it is the obligation of the High Court to consider and identify the error in the decision of the trial court and then decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference. The High Court is not expected merely to substitute its opinion for that of the trial court because it has power to do so—it has to correct an error of law or fact significant enough to necessitate overturning the verdict of the trial court. This Court further observed that the High Court has to exercise its discretion keeping in mind the acquittal of the accused and the rights of the victim (who may or may not be before it). We shall proceed to deal with this case keeping these principles in mind.

    12. There is no dispute about the fact that the bodies of the deceased and her daughter Jyoti were recovered from Malaprabha River near Khanapur on 11-12-1987. In the complaint dated 11-12-1987 PW 1 Bhavakanna stated that the deceased was treated well in her matrimonial house for 4 to 5 months after her marriage, thereafter, she was subjected to harassment. She was asked to bring money and gold from her parents for the business of her husband. It is further stated that during her visits to her parents' house the deceased used to complain about the harassment meted out to her. They used to console her and send her back. It is further stated that about 15 days back when the deceased had visited their house she complained about the demand for money and gold and the harassment meted out to her. The complaint further goes on to say that on 10-12-1987 the appellant came to the village and told them that the deceased had left their house along with her daughter Jyoti. The appellant enquired whether she was in their house. All of them rushed to the appellant's house where they were ill-treated and abused. They started searching for the deceased. They found the dead bodies of the deceased and her daughter Jyoti lying in Malaprabha River. The complaint ends with the apprehension expressed by PW 1 that there was some foul play.

    13. In his evidence PW 1 Bhavakanna reiterated the same story. He stated that during the marriage they had given 2½ tolas gold mangalsutra and 2½ tolas gold laxmihar to the deceased. About 4 to 5 months after her marriage, the appellant and the members of his family started harassing her. They asked her to get 5 tolas of gold and cash of Rs 10,000 from her parents house. They were making the deceased work for the whole day. They were not giving her food. She used to convey her woes to her brothers whenever she visited their house. Even after the birth of the child, the appellant continued to ill-treat her. Fifteen days prior to her death, the deceased had visited her parents' house and told them that if 5 tolas of gold and cash of Rs 10,000 were not given to her in-laws she would be murdered. She refused to go to her matrimonial house, but, they told her that after the draught is over they may think of meeting the demands of the appellant. After consoling her they took her to her matrimonial house and left her there. On 10-12-1987 the appellant came to their house and asked them whether the deceased had come there. The appellant told them that she had left the house with the child on 9-12-1987. Thereafter, he along with his brother PW 2 Balram went to Nandgad. They searched for the deceased but could not find her. On 11-12-1987 they again went in search of the deceased and her daughter Jyoti. They found their bodies lying in Malaprabha River. PW 1 then went to Khanapur Police Station and lodged the FIR, Ext. P-1.

    14. In the cross-examination PW 1 has stuck to the same story. This witness comes across as a truthful witness. He admitted that the appellant is a leading merchant in Nandgad. He admitted that for her first delivery the deceased came to their house and after the child was born the appellant and her father-in-law came to their house to see the child. He also admitted that the deceased had been to their house to see PW 2 Balram, who was sick. It is argued that the evidence of this witness shows that the relations between both the families were cordial. It is submitted that the appellant is a rich merchant and, therefore, he could not have made any demand for money. It is not possible for us to accept this submission. It would be wrong to say that the poor are avaricious and not the rich. Many a murder are committed by the rich out of greed for money. Besides, merely because the appellant and his father visited the maternal house of the deceased it cannot be presumed that both the families maintained cordial relationship and, therefore, the deceased must not have been ill-treated. The trial court has wrongly come to this conclusion, despite there being cogent evidence on record to establish the demand. PW 1 Bhavakanna's evidence establishes this case of the prosecution. His evidence becomes more acceptable because of the honesty displayed by him. There is no reason to disbelieve his statement that whenever the deceased used to come to their house she used to tell them about the demand for money and gold and the harassment meted out to her in her matrimonial home in that connection.

    15. It is argued that, whereas in the evidence, PW 1 stated that the appellant made a demand for 5 tolas of gold and cash of Rs 10,000, it is not so mentioned in the complaint. This is hardly a significant omission. The fact that the deceased was asked to bring money and gold from her parents' house and she was harassed for that is stated in the complaint. The specific details of the demand are given in the evidence. PW 1 must have been in a great shock when he saw the dead bodies of his sister and niece lying in Malprabha River. He could not have therefore given details of the demand made by the appellant and other particulars of harassment to which the deceased was subjected, in his complaint. In any case, it cannot be said that he has completely omitted to say anything about the demand. The trial court wrongly gave importance to absence of such details in the FIR. It is not necessary for us to repeat that the FIR is not expected to be a treatise.

    16. PW 2 Balram, the other brother of the deceased, has supported PW 1 Bhavakanna. PW 2 explained why their family had not disclosed the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased to anyone. He stated that they felt that if these facts are disclosed to people, the ill-treatment of the deceased may increase. This reaction is normal and the fear appears to be genuine. He also stated that the deceased was not given food in the house and she was made to work for the whole day.

    17. Both PW 1 and PW 2 stated that the deceased was asked to bring money and gold from her parents' house and was given dire threats. Both these witnesses have been cross-examined at length. The cross-examiner could not make any dent in their evidence. PW 5 Babita, wife of PW 2 Balram has supported PW 1 and PW 2. PW 5's evidence cannot be overlooked because she has not verbatim repeated the version of PW 1 and PW 2. Being wife of PW 2 her presence in the house is natural and her evidence can be safely relied upon. In our opinion, on the basis of evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 5, the High Court has rightly concluded that the deceased committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the appellant.

    18. It is true that the appellant was not charged under Section 306 IPC. The charge was under Section 304-B IPC. It was, however, perfectly legal for the High Court to convict him for offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Narwinder Singh (2011) 2 SCC 47. In that case the accused was charged under Section 304-B IPC. The death had occurred within seven years of the marriage. The trial court convicted the accused for an offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. Upon reconsideration of the entire evidence, the High Court came to the conclusion that the deceased had not committed suicide on account of demand for dowry, but, due to harassment caused by the husband in particular. The High Court acquitted the parents of the accused and converted the conviction of the accused from one under Section 304-B IPC to Section 306 IPC. This Court dismissed the appeal filed by the accused. It was observed that it is a settled proposition of law that mere omission or defect in framing charge would not disable the court from convicting the accused for the offence which has been found to be proved on the basis of the evidence on record. In such circumstances, the matter would fall within the purview of Sections 221(1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

    19. The relevant observations of this Court could be quoted: (Narwinder Singh case (2011) 2 SCC 47)

    “21. The High Court upon meticulous scrutiny of the entire evidence on record rightly concluded that there was no evidence to indicate the commission of offence under Section 304-B IPC. It was also observed that the deceased had committed suicide due to harassment meted out to her by the appellant but there was no evidence on record to suggest that such harassment or cruelty was made in connection to any dowry demands. Thus, cruelty or harassment sans any dowry demands which drives the wife to commit suicide attracts the offence of ‘abetment of suicide’ under Section 306 IPC and not Section 304-B IPC which defines the offence and punishment for ‘dowry death’.”

    20. Moreover, admittedly the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is, therefore, clearly attracted to this case. Presumption contemplated therein must spring in action. This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 to resolve the difficulty of proof where married women are forced to commit suicide but incriminating evidence is difficult to get as it is usually available within the four walls of the matrimonial home. Section 113-A reads as under:

    “113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
    Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

    In this case the prosecution has led evidence to establish cruelty or harassment caused to the deceased, which is rightly taken into account by the High Court. Thus, the foundation for the presumption exists. The appellant, however, has led no evidence to rebut the presumption. Therefore, it can be safely concluded in the facts of this case that the appellant abetted the suicide of the deceased.

    21. There is also another angle to this case. The prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the deceased committed suicide by jumping in the river along with her daughter. The deceased was in the custody of the appellant. She left the appellant's house with the small child. Admittedly, neither the appellant nor any member of his family lodged any missing complaint. The appellant straightaway went to the house of the deceased to enquire about her. This conduct is strange. When his wife and small child had left the house and were not traceable the appellant was expected to move heaven and earth to trace them. As to when and why the deceased left the house and how she died in suspicious circumstances was within the special knowledge of the appellant. When the prosecution established facts from which reasonable inference can be drawn that the deceased committed suicide, the appellant should have, by virtue of his special knowledge regarding those facts, offered an explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. The burden of proving those facts was on the appellant as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act but the appellant has not discharged the same leading to an adverse inference being drawn against him (see Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 10 SCC 373 and Babu (2013) 8 SCC 60).

    22. In our opinion, the trial court erred in giving undue importance to trivial matters. The trial court missed the core of the prosecution case which is established by the straightforward and honest evidence of the brothers of the deceased. The trial court should have seen that when a woman is harassed and ill-treated in her matrimonial house, it is not possible to get independent witnesses to depose about the harassment. No doubt, the brothers of the deceased are interested witnesses. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinise their evidence carefully. Keeping this caution in mind if the evidence of the brothers is examined, the conclusion is irresistible that it inspires confidence and bears out the prosecution case. The trial court should have taken note of the callous and indifferent attitude of the appellant. It should have taken into account the fact that there is nothing on record to suggest that the deceased was schizophrenic or was insane. That is not even the case of the defence. It is also not the case of the defence that the death was accidental. When a married woman jumps in a river along with her small child that too within seven years of marriage and when the prosecution leads reliable evidence to establish harassment caused to her in her matrimonial house in connection with demand of money for her husband's business and the accused husband leads no evidence to prove to the contrary the logical and legal conclusion that must follow is that she committed suicide and her suicide was abetted by her husband.

    23. Undoubtedly, the High Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal because it has power to do so and just because some other view is also possible. The High Court must locate some gross error of law or fact and must feel impelled to interfere with the order of acquittal to rectify it. The purpose behind such interference is obviously to prevent miscarriage of justice. If in a given case the High Court feels that the trial court could never have taken the view it has taken and that it is a perverse view which may result in gross miscarriage of justice, it is not only its legal obligation but duty to interfere with such order of acquittal.

    24. Applying the above principles, we have no hesitation in recording that the trial court's order acquitting the appellant is replete with gross errors of facts resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High Court has rightly held that the other members of the appellant's family can be given benefit of doubt, but the appellant cannot escape the liability. We concur with the High Court. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment Criminal Appeal No. 521 of 1999 of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. The appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender forthwith. His bail bond stands cancelled.

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    Ramesh Vithal Patil v. State Of Karnataka And Others
    (Mar 31, 2014)