AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • the civil procedure code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 115 CPC (Code of Civil Procedure)
  • sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act
  • The Government Grants Act, 1895
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
  • Section 2 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  • Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895
  • Cantonment (House Accommodation) Act
  • Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act
  • Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895
  • Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • the civil procedure code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 115 CPC (Code of Civil Procedure)
  • sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act
  • The Government Grants Act, 1895
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
  • Section 2 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  • Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895
  • Cantonment (House Accommodation) Act
  • Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act
  • Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895
  • Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns a 0.90-acre parcel in Pune Cantonment (GLR Survey No. 258) comprising a bungalow, servant quarters and a garage (“the suit premises”). The land, owned by the Union of India under an old grant of 1827 (GGO 14), was originally allotted to Nusserwanji Sorabji Anklesaria, who built the super-structure. Title to the structure later passed to Maneckji Nusserwanji Anklesaria and, by an indenture dated 12-11-1968, to the respondent–plaintiffs (Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesaria and others). A 1941 “repairing lease” placed the bungalow in Government occupation at a monthly rent of Rs 196.

Invoking its right of resumption under the old grant, the Ministry of Defence served a notice dated 11-06-1971 offering Rs 31,537 as compensation for the authorised structures and took symbolic possession on 12-07-1971. The respondents challenged the notice in Special Civil Application No. 1536/1973; the Bombay High Court quashed the notice on 27-02-1979, following its earlier decision in Phiroze Temulji Anklesaria v. H.C. Vashistha (AIR 1980 Bom 9).

The Union of India’s ensuing SLP (renumbered Civil Appeal No. 613/1980) and allied matters were disposed of by the Supreme Court on 04-08-1998 after the Solicitor General stated that the Government would pursue dispossession through civil suits. Relying on the 1979 High Court ruling, the respondents filed Civil Suit No. 695/1999 in the Small Cause Court, Pune, seeking possession, arrears of rent and damages. The suit was partly decreed on 09-06-2005; the decree was affirmed (with minor modification) by the District Court on 15-01-2009 and by the Bombay High Court (Civil Revision No. 272/2009) on 25-11-2009. The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the land covered by GLR Survey No. 258 belongs to the Union of India under the old-grant tenure, rendering the Government a landlord or an owner rather than a tenant.
  2. Whether the Bombay Rent Act and other landlord-tenant statutes apply to premises situated on Government-grant land in a cantonment, in light of Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895.
  3. Whether the respondent-plaintiffs, as purchasers of the super-structure, could maintain a suit for possession and rent against the Union of India.
  4. Whether the lower courts erred in holding that the Union of India was a tenant and in decreeing eviction and monetary relief in favour of the respondents.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Union of India)

  • Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 exclude the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and any contrary statute; government grants operate strictly by their tenor.
  • Under old-grant terms, the Crown/Union retains unfettered rights, including resumption; grantees are mere licensees with no transferable interest in land.
  • Clause 4 of the 1941 repairing lease reiterates the Government’s right of resumption, so the respondents cannot rely on that lease to claim title.
  • No landlord-tenant relationship exists; consequently, rent-control legislation is inapplicable.
  • The Government lawfully took possession after issuing the 1971 notice; the respondents have no remedy in writ, suit or under the Specific Relief Act.

Respondent-Plaintiffs

  • The 27-02-1979 Bombay High Court judgment quashing the resumption notice attained finality and binds the parties.
  • The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 CPC was correctly exercised; concurrent fact-findings against the Government require no interference.
  • Given the concurrent findings and absence of jurisdictional error, the Supreme Court should decline to disturb the impugned orders under Article 136.

Table of Precedents Cited

PrecedentRule or Principle Cited ForApplication by the Court
Azim Ahmad Kazmi v. State of U.P. (2012) 7 SCC 278 Government grants are governed entirely by their own terms; Section 3, Government Grants Act overrides other laws. Relied upon to affirm that the Transfer of Property Act and rent legislation cannot curtail the Government’s rights under an old grant.
Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil (1999) 3 SCC 555 Grantees under old-grant terms are mere occupiers/licensees without transferable title; Government may resume land. Cited to support the finding that the respondents held no proprietary interest in the land and could not treat the Union as a tenant.
Union of India v. Kamla Verma (2010) 13 SCC 511 The Union’s right to resume land held on old-grant terms is unassailable. Used to reinforce the legality of the 1971 resumption notice and the Government’s ongoing right to repossession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined official records, including the General Land Register, the 1941 repairing lease, the 1968 permission-to-sell letter, the 1968 indenture and the 1971 admission certificate, all of which expressly record that:

  • The land remains Government property held on old-grant terms dating back to GGO 14 of 06-01-1827.
  • The grantee’s interest is confined to the super-structure, with an express condition permitting Government resumption on notice with compensation for authorised buildings.

Invoking Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, the Court reiterated that Government grants operate by their tenor, unaffected by the Transfer of Property Act or rent-control statutes. The precedents in Azim Ahmad Kazmi, Surendra Kumar Vakil and Kamla Verma were cited to underscore that a grantee is a licensee and that resumption cannot be curtailed.

The Court found that the respondents had mis-pleaded ownership of the land, misleading the trial and appellate courts into treating the Union of India as a tenant. Further, the 27-02-1979 High Court judgment relied upon by the respondents had been effectively neutralised by the Supreme Court’s order dated 04-08-1998, which expressly allowed the Union of India to seek dispossession “in accordance with law”.

Consequently, the lower courts’ conclusions that a landlord-tenant relationship existed, and their application of the Bombay Rent Act, were held to be legal errors arising from a disregard of the Government Grants Act and the terms of the old grant.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; judgments of the High Court, District Court and Small Cause Court are set aside, and Civil Suit No. 695/1999 is dismissed.

Direct Effect: the respondent-plaintiffs are denied possession and monetary relief; the Union of India’s ownership of the land and right of resumption stand affirmed.

Broader Implications: while not creating new precedent, the ruling reinforces existing Supreme Court jurisprudence that lands held under old-grant terms in cantonment areas are governed exclusively by the Government Grants Act, rendering rent-control and property-transfer statutes inapplicable where they conflict with the grant.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Union Of India And Another v. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari And Others

    Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 25-11-2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Union of India v. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari. By the impugned judgment the High Court dismissed the revision application and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court and the trial court.

    2. The dispute relates to the piece of property bearing GLR Survey No. 258, admeasuring 0.90 acres which comprise of superstructure consisting of main bungalow, servant quarters and garage situated at Elphinstone Road, Pune Cantonment, Pune (hereinafter referred to as “the suit premises”).

    3. The case of the appellants is that the suit premises as aforesaid belongs to the appellants, “Pune Cantonment Board”. The Governor General by its Order No. 14 (GGO 14) dated 6-1-1827 intimated that officers not provided with public quarters may receive permission to erect houses within fortress or military cantonment conferring on them right of property whatever in the ground allotted to them for that purpose, which will continue to be the property of the State, and resumable at the pleasure of the Government. The plot admeasuring 0.90 acres (suit premises) in question was initially granted to one Nusserwanji Sorabji Anklesaria who erected superstructure, including the bungalow in question. In the year 1891 he bequeathed the suit Bungalow No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road to his son Maneckji Nusserwanji Anklesaria. The name of Maneckji Nusserwanji was registered in the General Land Register. Therein it was mentioned that the bungalow in question is held under old grant under conditions of GGO 14 dated 6-1-1827.

    4. An agreement for occupation by the Government of the property in a cantonment not requisitioned under the Cantonment (House Accommodation) Act known as “repairing lease” was entered into between Maneckji Nasserwanji Anklesaria in one part (first part) and the Governor General-in-Council on the other (second part) on 29-8-1941, whereunder property described in Schedule I thereto i.e Bungalow No. 1-A with servant quarters, garage, etc. was given in possession to the second part (i.e Governor General-in-Council) for a consideration of monthly payment of Rs 196 payable on the first of every month, the first of such payment being made on the first day of August, 1941. As per the said agreement, the appellants were required to maintain the premises i.e Bungalow No. 1-A with servant quarters, garage, etc. It was agreed upon that if by reason of fire or tempest or other cause not occurred by the wilful act or default of the party on the second part, the premises or any part or parts thereof or was in the opinion of the party on the second part is rendered uninhabitable at any time, the said agreement in force, then until the premises or such part and parts thereof as are affected shall be restored or rendered fit for reoccupation to the satisfaction of the party on the second part.

    5. Subsequently, by an indenture of sale dated 12-11-1968 between Maneckji Nassurwanji Anklesaria and two others and respondent-plaintiffs, Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and two others it was agreed to sell and purchase the leasehold rights being perpetual grant under the old grant of the Pune Cantonment Board over the suit premises including the bungalow, servant quarters, garage, etc. with full rights of ownership of the building for a total consideration of Rs 60,000. In the said “indenture of sale” it was narrated that necessary permission on that behalf had been received from the authorities concerned by Letter No. 201125.Q(PP) dated 14-6-1968 signed by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Head Quarter, Southern Command.

    6. The admission certificate with regard to suit premises was issued by the respondent-plaintiffs on 19-4-1971 in favour of the Military Cantonment Estate Officer, Poona Circle, Pune.

    7. According to the appellants, as per terms of the old grant, the appellants decided to resume the said property and, therefore, issued notice from its Ministry of Defence being Notice No. 701/27.L/L&C/71/3606.D(Lands) dated 11-6-1971 to the respondent-plaintiffs intimating the intention to resume the suit premises and also informed that the appellants are ready to pay a compensation of Rs 31,537 as the value of the authorised erection made on the said land. The respondent-plaintiffs were informed that in case the amount of compensation offered is not acceptable to them, the committee of arbitration will be convened to assess the value of the authorised erection on the land. The cheque for the said amount was attached with the aforesaid notice. The symbolic possession of the bungalow in question was taken on 12-7-1971.

    8. After about two years, the respondent filed Special Civil Application No. 1536 of 1973 challenging the resumption notice dated 11-6-1971. Some other individuals who had erected bungalows on similarly situated lands which were also resumed, also filed similar special civil applications including Special Civil Application No. 1286 of 1972, etc.

    9. By the judgment and order dated 5-2-1979 the Bombay High Court allowed Special Civil Application No. 1286 of 1972 being Phiroze Temulji Anklesaria v. H.C Vashistha AIR 1980 Bom 9 and set aside the notice of resumption. The High Court held that there is no evidence whatsoever of the Government's right to resume the land in possession and the terms under which right of such resumption, if any, could be exercised. It further held that most importantly there is no evidence of the right or power of the Government to acquire the structure standing on the land in question by arbitrarily or unilaterally determining compensation.

    10. Relying on the aforesaid judgment, the writ petition preferred by the respondent-plaintiffs in Special Civil Application No. 1536 of 1973 was also allowed by the judgment dated 27-2-1979.

    11. Being aggrieved by the judgments passed in various special civil applications whereby the High Court set aside the resumption notices, the Union of India filed SLPs (C) Nos. 498-511 of 1980 before this Court. Against the judgment dated 27-2-1979 passed in the case of the respondent-plaintiffs in SCA No. 1536 of 1973 the defendant-appellants filed SLP (C) No. 503 of 1980.

    12. By order dated 19-3-1980 leave was granted in SLPs (C) Nos. 498-511 of 1980 and they were renumbered as Civil Appeals Nos. 608-621 of 1980. SLP (C) No. 503 of 1980 filed by the appellants against the judgment dated 27-2-1979 passed in the case of the respondent-plaintiffs was renumbered as Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1980 after admission.

    13. Phiroze Temulji Anklesaria, petitioner in Special Civil Applications Nos. 1286, 1487, 1486 and 1484 of 1972 had filed civil suits for rent and possession against the Government of India before the CJSD, Pune. The same were numbered as Civil Suits Nos. 477, 476, 488 and 475 of 1980. The said suits were decreed by the CJSD, Pune relying upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Phiroze Temulji Anklesaria AIR 1980 Bom 9.

    14. Against the aforesaid judgment, the appellants filed Appeals Nos. 1159, 1160 and 1161 of 1984. Cross Appeals Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 1985 were also filed in those appeals. Second Appeals Nos. 15 and 16 of 1989 were subsequently filed before the Bombay High Court.

    15. When Civil Appeals Nos. 608-621 of 1980 preferred by the appellants against the original judgment in Phiroze Temulji Anklesaria AIR 1980 Bom 9 reached for final hearing before this Court, the abovementioned appeals preferred before the Bombay High Court were called for by this Court on the ground that they were interconnected. As a result appeals covered by SCAs Nos. 1286, 1486, 1487, 1484 and 1485 of 1972 got transferred to this Court and numbered as Transferred Cases Nos. 67 to 72 of 1985 and 11 and 12 of 1987.

    16. Transferred Cases Nos. 67 to 72 of 1985 and Nos. 11 and 12 of 1987 titled Union of India v. P.T Ankleshwar on hearing were remitted back to the High Court for disposal by this Court on 20-7-1988, with the following directions:

    “1. While considering the merit of the case, the High Court shall not place any reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of the High Court consisting of D.H Rege and R.A Jahangir, JJ. rendered in Special Civil Application No. 1286 of 1972 decided on 5-2-1979/6-2-1979 against which appeals are pending in this Court.
    2. While considering the case, if the High Court finds that the trial court or the first appellate court has placed reliance or made any reference to the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench, it shall ignore that judgment, to that extent, and the High Court shall decide the matter afresh in accordance with law without taking into consideration or being influenced by the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench.
    3. The parties will be at liberty to adduce additional evidence before the High Court within the period fixed by the High Court.”

    17. Civil Appeals Nos. 608-621 of 1980 titled Union of India v. P.T Anklesaria were subsequently taken up by this Court and in the light of observation made on 20-7-1988 in Union of India v. P.T Ankleshwar, as quoted above, by order dated 25-3-1992 Civil Appeals Nos. 608-21 of 1980, this Court declared the appeals to be infructuous without prejudice to whatsoever rights to which the appellants are entitled in law.

    18. The respondents, thereafter, filed Civil Application No. 3382 of 1992 in Special Civil Application No. 1536 of 1973 before the Bombay High Court for possession of the suit premises. The Bombay High Court by its order dated 11-9-1992 directed the appellants to hand over symbolic possession of the suit premises bearing Survey No. 258, Bungalow No. 1-A situated at Elphinstone Road, Pune Cantonment, Pune to the respondents.

    19. The appellants filed a review application before this Court for review of order dated 25-3-1992 Civil Appeals Nos. 608-21 of 1980 passed in Civil Appeals Nos. 608-621 of 1980 on the ground that only the civil appeals connected with transferred cases in which the issue of ownership of land and building were interlinked with validity of resumption notices had become infructuous. In other Civil Appeals Nos. 620, 610, 613 (the appeal preferred against the judgment in the case of respondent-plaintiffs), 614, 618, 609 and 621 of 1980, the issue of ownership of land and building was not interlinked with validity of resumption notices and hence the same had not become infructuous.

    20. By the order dated 13-1-1995, this Court allowed the review application thereby modifying the order dated 25-3-1992 Civil Appeals Nos. 608-21 of 1980 passed in Civil Appeals Nos. 608-621 of 1980 by setting aside the order of dismissal of the aforesaid civil appeals as infructuous as there were no eviction decrees obtained by any of the bungalow owners.

    21. The aforesaid civil appeals including Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1980 filed by the Union of India against the respondent-plaintiffs were taken up for hearing on 4-8-1998 when the following order Civil Appeals Nos. 609-11 of 1980, (2014) 14 SCC 204 (F6) was passed:

    “The learned Solicitor General states that the Union of India would seek dispossession of the respondent occupants from the properties involved in accordance with law and if need be, through a civil court by filing suits. In case such steps are taken, any observations made by the High Court which would tend to defeat the remedies sought would not stand in its way. On such stance of the Union of India, the civil appeals as also the special leave petitions stand disposed of accordingly.”

    22. The respondent-plaintiffs thereafter filed suit for possession, arrears of rent and damages against the appellant defendants in the Small Cause Court at Pune numbered as Civil Suit No. 695 of 1999. It was contended therein that the appellant defendants served resumption notice upon the respondent-plaintiffs which was challenged by the respondent-plaintiffs before the Bombay High Court in SCA No. 1536 of 1973 which was allowed and the resumption notice was declared void, inoperative and without legal effect. The said order of the High Court was affirmed in Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1980. The appellants filed review application and the same was disposed of recording the statement of the learned Solicitor General. An order which was passed by the High Court with respect to resumption notice was not set aside. Therefore, the occupation of appellant defendants in the said property is that of lessee. The respondent-plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to ask for possession of the property from the appellant defendants as the defendants are trying to set up adverse title.

    23. The appellant defendants contested the suit by filing detailed written statement. It was brought to the notice of the Court that the property was held on old grant terms, therefore the Government of India has every right to resume the property. It was also contended that the Government has resumed the property and the respondent-plaintiffs have no right to ask for possession. It was also contended that the military authorities have made a plan to demolish the present structure and construct a new building for accommodation of its officers and therefore, repair for the suit premises was not undertaken.

    24. In the said suit the trial court framed the following issues:

    (1) Do the plaintiffs prove that they are landlords and the defendants are tenants of the suit premises?
    (2) Do they prove that the defendants have committed breach of agreement of lease by not maintaining the property and by causing damage to it?
    (3) Do they prove that the defendants have disowned the title of the plaintiff and thereby committed breach of the agreement of lease?
    (4) Do they prove that the defendants have caused damage to the extent of Rs 4 lakhs to the suit property?
    (5) Do they prove that the defendants are in arrears of rent since 1-7-1971 to 30-6-1999 at the rate of Rs 196 per month?
    (6) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide this suit?
    (7) What is due to the plaintiffs?
    (8) What relief, order and decree?

    25. By the judgment and decree dated 9-6-2005, the trial court partially decreed the suit on the ground of breach of terms and conditions of tenancy i.e non-repair of the suit premises. The trial court directed the appellant defendants to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises together with structure consisting of main bungalow, servant quarters, garage and any other structure thereon to the respondent-plaintiffs:

    25.1 With reference to Issues 1 and 6, it was held that in view of sale deed dated 12-11-1968 in favour of Maneckji Anklesaria, the consent letter dated 19-12-1967 and the lease agreement dated 29-8-1941 the plaintiffs were only holders of occupancy rights in respect of the land and were owners of the superstructure. The defendants were tenants and hence the suit was between the landlord and the tenant and the Small Cause Court has jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the same.

    25.2 Issue 3 was answered in negative with the observation that the defendants have legal right of resumption. Mere exercise of such right does not mean that the defendants have denied the leasehold right over the land and ownership of the superstructure of the plaintiff.

    25.3 Issue 5 regarding the defendants being in arrears of rent since 17-7-1979 to 30-6-1999 @ Rs 196 per month was answered in negative with the observation that there was no wilful default on the part of the defendants and the defendants have deposited arrears of rent along with interest thereon @ 9% per annum before the date of hearing of the suit. Thus, the defendants are entitled to protections of eviction as per the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act. The defendants were not in arrears of the rent on the date of hearing of the suit.

    25.4 Issue 2 regarding the breach and terms of the agreement by not maintaining the property and by causing damage to it was answered in affirmative.

    25.5 Issue 4 regarding the plaintiffs' entitlement to damages of Rs 4 lakhs was answered in negative for want of evidence.

    25.6 Issue 7 regarding the amount due to the plaintiff was answered in negative.

    26. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 9-6-2005 passed in Civil Suit No. 695 of 1999, the appellants preferred Civil Appeal No. 26 of 2006 in the District Court, Pune. In Civil Appeal No. 26 of 2006, the first appellate court by judgment and decree dated 15-1-2009 dismissed the appeal and modified the judgment and decree passed by the trial court holding that the respondent-plaintiffs are entitled to recover the amount of Rs 20,972 along with cantonment taxes @ 6% per annum from February 2000 till the date of actual realisation. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment dated 15-1-2009 the appellants preferred Civil Revision Application No. 272 of 2009 before the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court dismissed the same giving rise to the present appeal.

    27. Mr Mohan Parasaran, learned Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the appellant Union of India made the following submissions:

    27.1 As per Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not applicable to such government grant lands and the government grant is taken effect as if the said Act had not been passed.

    27.2 Not only the Transfer of Property Act is made inapplicable to the Government but Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 makes it clear that government grants are to take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature to the contrary to the same.

    27.3 The Crown, Union of India has unfettered discretion to impose any condition, limitation or restriction in its grants and rights, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated only in accordance with the terms of the grant itself though they are inconsistent with the provisions of any statute or common law.

    27.4 The possession of the house was taken by the appellant Union of India from the respondent-plaintiffs in due course of law and that the respondent-plaintiffs was not entitled to any remedy against the Government either by way of a writ petition or a suit or under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.

    27.5 Clause 4 of the repairing lease deed dated 29-8-1941 even protects the Government's right of resumption and therefore, the respondent-plaintiffs cannot derive advantage of the repairing lease deed for claiming right or title over the suit premises.

    27.6 In view of Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, the Bombay Rent Control Act will not be applicable in the absence of the landlord-tenant relationship, the land being in the nature of a government grant over which the superstructure was constructed.

    27.7 No right has been vested or granted in the repair lease to the occupant to evict the owner of the land who in this case incidentally proceeded to become the occupant of the superstructure put up by the respondent-plaintiffs. That will not create any legal landlord-tenant relationship as in other cases as the property in question falls in the cantonment area and is governed by the government grants.

    28. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs raised following grounds to dismiss the appeal:

    28.1 The High Court's judgment dated 27-2-1979 passed in the writ petition preferred by respondent-plaintiffs in SCA No. 1536 of 1973 setting aside the notice of resumption dated 11-6-1971 has reached finality. The legality and propriety of the aforesaid decision cannot be raised at this stage.

    28.2 In the absence of jurisdictional error committed by the courts below, the High Court was right in refusing to interfere with concurrent findings of fact. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is limited and the same cannot be exercised to interfere with the finding of fact.

    28.3 Since the High Court's approach and analysis is correct, this Court should not exercise its power under Article 136 of the Constitution to set aside the impugned order.

    29. The case of the appellants is that the suit premises (land) belongs to the Union of India “Pune Cantonment Board”. It was allotted by way of grant to one Nusserwanji Sorabji Anklesaria who erected superstructure including bungalow, garage and servant quarters. In 1891, the suit Bungalow No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road was bequeathed to Maneckji Nusserwanji Anklesaria by his father Nusserwanji Sorabji Anklesaria. The name of Maneckji Nusserwanji was registered in the General Land Register. Therein it was mentioned that the bungalow in question is held under old grant under conditions of GGO 14 dated 6-1-1827. The aforesaid fact is also clear from the agreement and repairing lease dated 29-8-1941 reached between Maneckji Nusserwanji and the Governor General-in-Council wherein at Clause (iii)(4) it is mentioned as follows:

    “(4) Nothing herein shall prejudice the right of the party of the second part to resume under the terms of the Cantonment tenure abovereferred to; and
    (5) In the event of any dispute arising between the party of the first part and the party of the second part as regards the interpretation of any terms or condition herein contained, the same shall be referred to CRE Poona Area whose decision will be final.”

    30. The consent letter dated 19-12-1967 written by Maneckji Nassurwanji Anklesaria to the Military Estates Officer, Poona Cantonment, Poona shows that permission for sale of property bearing No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road, Poona Cantonment, Poona was sought for by Maneckji Nassurwanji Anklesaria and two others as they wanted to sell off their right, title and interest in the property to Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and two others as a part of settlement of the family dispute. Permission was also sought for to complete the said transaction with clear assurance that Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and two others in whose favour the rights are sought to be sold are ready to execute such document in favour of the State as may be required under the existing rules.

    31. The Military Estates Officer, Poona Circle in reference to the above letter dated 19-12-1967 informed Maneckji Nassurwanji Anklesaria that sanction was accorded to the transfer by sale of the above bungalow to Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and others and asked them to comply with certain instructions, as evident from the said letter, is quoted below:

    “No. H/517 Office of the Military Estates Officer, Poona Circle, Poona 1, 25-6-1968. To, Maneckji Nassurwanji Anklesaria, 94, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Poona-1. Subject: Transfer of Bungalow No. 1-A Elphinstone Road, Poona Cantonment. Dear Sir, Reference your letter dated 19-12-1967. 2. With the previous concurrence of the GOC-in-C, Southern Command, Poona sanction is hereby accorded to the transfer by sale of the above bungalow to Shri Dinshaw S. Anklesaria and others of 94-A Mahatma Gandhi Road, Poona 1 for a sum of Rs 60,000 subject to the

    condition that the intending purchasers executed and register the admission certificate of their own expense as per their undertaking dated 3-1-1968. 3. Please comply with the following instructions: (i) It should be mentioned in the sale deed to be executed that the land is held on old tenure and is not being sold. (ii) The date of execution of the sale and the number and date on which it was accepted for registration should be intimated to this office. (iii) The sale deed duly registered should be forwarded to this office through CPO, Poona for necessary mutation entries being made in the GLR. The document will be returned when no longer required. Yours faithfully, sd/- Military Estate Officer, Poona Circle, (Y.P Kapoor) Copy to: Shri Dinshaw S. Anklesaria and others, 94-A, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Poona 1 —With reference to his undertaking dated 3-1-1968 please forward a non-judicial stamp paper to the value of Rs 3.00 together with site plan (one on tracing cloth) … drawn to a scale 40′ to an inch in respect of the above bungalow showing the existing authorised buildings to enable this office to take further necessary action in the matter. The C.R.O, Poona 1 — For information.”

    32. Indenture of sale made and executed on 12-11-1968 by Maneckji Nassurwanji Anklesaria and two others (vendors) in favour of Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and two others (vendee) reads as follows:

    “Whereas the vendors are fully seized and possessed of and otherwise well and sufficiently entitled to all the leasehold rights in all that piece and parcel of land being perpetual grant under the old grant of the Poona Cantonment and of the full right of ownership of all the building and structure standing on the property known as No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road, Poona Cantonment, Poona 1 and which property is more described in Schedule ‘A’ hereunder written … the vendors agreed to sell and the purchaser agreed to purchase all the leasehold rights being perpetual grant under the old grant of the Poona Cantonment Board in all that piece and parcel of the land situated within the registration district of Poona and registration sub-district of Taluka Haveli and situated within the limits of the Poona Cantonment Board and within the revenue limits of Taluka Poona City and bearing Poona Cantonment No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road, Poona Cantonment, Poona 1 and bearing GLR and Survey No. 258 and bearing Military Estate House No. 517 along with the full rights of ownership of all buildings outhouses, structures, appurtenances and benefits of all amenities belonging to or available to the said property and which property is more fully described in Schedule ‘A’ hereunder written, free from all encumbrances, charges, burdens….”

    33. Thereafter, Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria purchaser of Bungalow No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road, Poona Cantonment signed admission certificate dated 19-4-1971 with the following conditions:

    “Admission Certificate We, the undersigned, Shri Dinshaw S. Anklesaria residing at 94-A Mahatma Gandhi Road, Poona Cantonment, the purchaser of Bungalow No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road, General Land Register Survey No. 258 of Poona Cantonment, Sub-District and Taluka Haveli, District Poona, do hereby subscribe to the conditions (reproduced below) of the original grant pertaining to the site thereof and this agreement shall be binding on me as well as my heirs, successors and assigns as the case may be whoever shall be in possession of the said property. Conditions 1. Permission to occupy ground in a Military Cantonment confers no proprietary right; it continues to be the property of the estate and resumable at the pleasure of the Government, but in all practicable cases one month's notice of resumption will be given and the value of all buildings which may have been authorised to be erected thereon, as shown in the accompanying plan, as estimated by the Committee contemplated in General Order-Separate of 1856, will be paid to the owner. 2. That no buildings are to be erected on the ground other than those now existing and shown on the attached plan, no additions or alternations are to be made thereto without the permission of the Officer Commanding the Station. 3. The ground, being the property of the Government cannot be sold by the grantee. The buildings may be sold by house owners of the previous permission of the Officer Commanding the Station. 4. That the Military Authorities have the power to cancel the grant if the ground is used for any purpose other than for which it was originally granted. 5. We also agree to abide by any orders and rules that may be passed regarding tenure of land in cantonments. Place: Poona Dated: April 1971 Signature of the purchaser of Bungalow No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road Survey No. 258, Poona Cantonment.
    The above conditions have been explained by me to the purchaser of Bungalow No. 1-A Elphinstone Road, Poona Cantonment, and have been subscribed to by him in my presence. Place: Poona Dated: 19-4-1971 Military Estates Officer Poona Circle (K.C Agarwal)”

    34. From the aforesaid records, it is clear that the land measuring 0.90 acres bearing General Land Register Survey No. 258 situated at Elphinstone Road, Poona Cantonment, Poona belongs to the appellant. The said land was leased by way of grant originally to Nusserwanji Sorabji Anklesaria under conditions of GGO 14 dated 6-1-1827. The superstructure including bungalow, garage and servant quarters on the plot was constructed by him. In the year 1891, the superstructure was bequeathed to his son, Maneckji Nusserwanji. Maneckji Nusserwanji Anklesaria and two others sold their right, title and interest over the superstructure i.e Bungalow No. 1-A in favour of Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and two others (nephews of Maneckji Nusserwanji Anklesaria). Thereby file of the superstructure was transferred in favour of Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and two others but the title of the land remained with the appellant. This is also evident from the General Land Register Cantonment 8-A(1) dated 7-3-2007 and relevant portion of which is as follows:

    “Extract from General Land Register Cantonment 8-A(1) Survey No. 258 S No. 122 Vol. No. II Page Details and date of mutation 1 Subsidiary Sy. No. 2 Volume and page no. of Register 3 Area in acres/sq ft 4 0.90 acre Description 5 Bungalow No. 1-A, Elphinstone Road Class 6 B-3 By whom managed 7 D.E.O Landlord 8 Central Government Holder of occupancy rights 9 Maneckji Nusserwanji Nature of holder's right under GGO 10 Old grant conditions of 14 of 6-1-1827 Rent payable: Central Govt. Per annum Cantt. Board 11 Date of expiry of lease 12 Remarks 13 Station: Pune 1 Dated: 7-3-2007 sd/- Defence Estates Officer Pune Circle (S.R Nayyar)”

    35. The Government of India from Ministry of Defence by Notice dated 11-6-1971 intimated Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and two others that the land belongs to the President of India i.e the Government and is held on old grant terms under which the Government is entitled to resume the same. It was informed that the Government has resumed the said property under the terms of the aforesaid old grant for its use and therefore, in exercise of power conferred under the provisions of the Act agreed to offer a sum of Rs 31,537 as the value of the authorised erection standing on the said land. It was further intimated that in case if the amount of compensation offered was not acceptable to the respondent, a committee of arbitration will be convened to assess the value of the erection on the land. A cheque for the amount was also attached along with the said notice.

    36. The Government Grants Act, 1895 as would be evident from the Preamble and Section 2 therein, seeks to clarify the doubts with regard to the extended operation of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 2 of the Act reads as follows:

    “2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to Government grants.—Nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government to, or in favour of any person whomsoever; but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed.”

    37. Not only the Transfer of Property Act is made inapplicable to the government grants but Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 further makes it clear that the Government grants is to take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature to the contrary. Section 3 lays down as follows:

    “3. Government grants to take effect according to their tenor.—All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.”

    38. This Court in Azim Ahmad Kazmi v. State of U.P (2012) 7 SCC 278, has held that the government grant of lease of land is governed entirely by the terms of the grant. The Court took note of Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 which is to take effect according to its tenor notwithstanding any other law to the contrary.

    39. In Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil (1999) 3 SCC 555, this Court has held that the grantee under the old grant terms is a mere occupier/licensee having no title over the land so as to entitle him to transfer the land to another person without prior consent of the authorities concerned. The Court further held that the regulations as well as the General Land Register which are old documents maintained in the regular course and coming from proper custody clearly indicate that the land was held on old grant basis and this was sufficient for the Government to resume the land in accordance with law.

    40. In Union of India v. Kamla Verma (2010) 13 SCC 511, this Court has held that it is always open to the Union of India to resume the land held on old grant terms and that the Union of India cannot be prevented from resuming the said land.

    41. Therefore, it is clear that the Government has unfettered discretion and under Section 3 impose any condition, limitation or restriction in its grants and the rights, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated only according to the terms of the grant itself though they may be inconsistent with the provisions of any statute or common law.

    42. The grants of lands situated in cantonment area under Old Grants form a self-contained provision prescribing the procedure as to the grant and resumption of the land and hence recourse to the civil procedure code or the Specific Relief Act will not be applicable.

    43. From the permission for sale of property letter dated 19-12-1967, indenture of sale dated 12-11-1968 and admission certificate dated 19-4-1971 signed by the respondent it is clear that the military authorities have the power to cancel the grant if the land is used for any purpose other than for which it was originally granted.

    44. In the suit the respondent-plaintiffs falsely claimed that the suit premises described in Para 1 of the plaint is owned by the plaintiffs as freehold property. This would be evident from the pleadings made by the respondent-plaintiffs, as discussed below.

    45. The description of the property has been shown at Para 1 of the plaint as under:

    “1. Description of the property: All that piece and parcel of property bearing GLR Survey No. 258 and corresponding an area of 0.90 acres together with structure consisting of main bungalow, servant quarters and garage, and is bounded as under:
    On or towards the East: Elphinstone Road
    On or towards the South: Bungalow No. 2, Elphinstone Road
    On or towards the West: Bungalow No. 13, Moledina Road
    On or towards the North: Bungalow No. 13, Moledina Road”
    (emphasis supplied)

    Paras 2, 3 and 4 of the plaint read as under:

    “2. That the property described in Para 1 above is owned by the plaintiffs as freehold property.
    3. That the said property originally belonged to Nusserwanji Sorabji Anklesaria. The plaintiffs have purchased the property as per conveyance deed dated 12-11-1968 from Shri Maneckji Nusserwanji Anklesaria. That the name of the plaintiffs was also recorded in GLR record and which was subsequently removed by Defendant 2 illegally. The plaintiff has challenged the aforesaid act of Defendant 2 deleting the name of the plaintiffs in civil court.
    4. That lease deed dated 29-8-1941 was executed by the then owners of the suit property and the Union of India. That as per the aforesaid lease deed the said property was leased out to the defendants under repairing lease for a period of 5 years. After the expiry of the said period the defendants continued to be in use and occupation of the said property as a tenant holding over on the same terms and conditions as a monthly tenant. Thus the defendants are occupying the said property as a statutory tenant only.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    46. The respondent-plaintiffs also misled the Court by stating that the resumption notice dated 11-6-1971 was set aside by the Bombay High Court and the said order has attained finality.

    47. In fact the judgment aforesaid on challenge before this Court in Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1980, heard along with other appeals, this Court by order dated 4-8-1998 Civil Appeals Nos. 609-11 of 1980, (2014) 14 SCC 204 (F6) made the following observation:

    “Order
    The learned Solicitor General states that the Union of India would seek dispossession of the respondent occupants from the properties involved in accordance with law and if need be, through a civil court by filing suits. In case such steps are taken, any observations made by the High Court which would stand to defeat the remedies sought would not stand in its way. On such stance of the Union of India, civil appeals as also the special leave petitions stand disposed of accordingly.”

    48. The liberty given to the Union of India to dispossess the respondent-plaintiffs from the suit property clearly indicates that the decision of the Bombay High Court that the suit premises do not belong to the Union of India was not acceptable to this Court.

    49. The aforesaid misleading pleading made by the respondent-plaintiffs is without any evidence and the same influenced the Court in coming to a wrong conclusion that the respondent-plaintiffs are the landlords and the appellant defendants are the tenants of the suit premises.

    50. The appellate court also failed to appreciate the evidence and erred in affirming the trial court's view that the respondent-plaintiffs are the landlords and the appellant defendants are the tenants.

    51. The land of the suit premises belongs to the Union of India, the appellants herein. Therefore, they cannot be held to be the tenants of the suit premises comprising of an area of 0.90 acres together with structure consisting of main bungalow, servant quarters and garage. The respondent-plaintiffs have only the right with regard to the structure built on the suit premises. The appellant Union of India have a right for resumption of the suit premises, as is evident from the evidence on record as discussed above. This issue was not properly appreciated by the trial court, the appellate court and the High Court which also failed to notice the appellants' right under Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895.

    52. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 25-11-2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Union of India v. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari, the judgment dated 15-1-2009 passed by the first appellate court and judgment and decree dated 9-6-2005 passed by the trial court. Civil Suit No. 695 of 1999 on the file of the Small Cause Court, Pune is dismissed.

    53. The appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Union Of India And Another v. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari And Others
    (May 6, 2014)