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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • Section 7 of the 1955 Act
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India, Section 362 CrPC
  • Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called “the 1955 Act”)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter called “the 1958 Act”)
  • Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called “CrPC”)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • Section 7 of the 1955 Act
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India, Section 362 CrPC
  • Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called “the 1955 Act”)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter called “the 1958 Act”)
  • Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called “CrPC”)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

An FIR dated 15 September 1998 was registered against the petitioner and another person for unauthorised possession and sale of 1370 litres of blue kerosene, constituting an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The trial court, by judgment dated 27-10-1999/2-11-1999, convicted both accused and sentenced them to one year’s imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,000 each. The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on 30-7-2010.

On 25-7-2011 the petitioner applied to the High Court seeking modification of its judgment by extending to him the benefit of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The High Court rejected that application on 19-9-2011, holding that it had become functus officio under Section 362 CrPC.

The petitioner had already filed SLP (Crl.) No. 1469 of 2011 against the appellate judgment, which this Court dismissed on 27-1-2012. Subsequently, on 29-2-2012, he filed the present special leave petition challenging only the High Court’s order dated 19-9-2011.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after pronouncing its appellate judgment, the High Court was barred by Section 362 CrPC from modifying that judgment to extend probationary benefits to the petitioner.
  2. Whether the petitioner, convicted for an economic offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, could claim the benefit of Section 360 CrPC or Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
  3. Whether the petitioner’s successive and repetitive litigation amounted to an abuse of the judicial process warranting the imposition of costs.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Invoked Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala to contend that, because the earlier SLP had been dismissed in limine, the High Court retained jurisdiction to entertain a modification or review application.
  • Relied on Chhanni v. State of U.P. to suggest that higher courts may direct modifications in the interest of justice.
  • Sought probationary relief on the ground that he was capable of rehabilitation and had already undergone part of the sentence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker (1988) 3 SCC 167 Illustration of contempt arising from derogatory remarks against the Supreme Court. Cited to show that courts are frequently approached even by those who disparage them.
Rathinam v. State of T.N. (2011) 11 SCC 140 Courts must remain accessible to the common man, not only to the powerful. Quoted to highlight that criminals nonetheless exploit court access.
State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770 Court becomes functus officio after pronouncement; only clerical errors may be corrected. Formed the main basis for holding that the High Court could not modify its judgment.
Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P. (2011) 14 SCC 813 Same principle of functus officio; no substantive alteration post-judgment. Cited within the discussion of Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar.
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 Permits review by High Court when SLP is dismissed in limine, if review is filed earlier. Distinguished as inapplicable because the petitioner sought review only after approaching Supreme Court.
Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy (2010) 8 SCC 383 Filing review after approaching Supreme Court is abuse of process. Used to reject petitioner’s reliance on Kunhayammed.
Chhanni v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 396 No provision for modification of judgment; any direction was under Art. 142. Held not of universal application and inapplicable to Section 362 CrPC.
Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran (1996) 5 SCC 530 Courts’ time cannot be consumed by frivolous or misconceived petitions. Cited to emphasise abuse of process by the petitioner.
Sabia Khan v. State of U.P. (1999) 1 SCC 271 Misconceived petitions amount to abuse of court process. Reinforced need to discourage repetitive litigation.
Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai (2003) 1 SCC 488 Court may refuse to proceed where its process is abused. Supporting citation for dismissal with costs.
Ishar Das v. State of Punjab (1973) 2 SCC 65 Probation Act normally inapplicable to offences posing public-health menace. Analogised to economic offences under Essential Commodities Act.
Precious Oil Corp. v. State of Assam (2009) 15 SCC 752 Probation benefits ordinarily denied for offences under Section 7 of the 1955 Act. Directly applied to reject petitioner’s request for probation.
Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange (1974) 1 SCC 167 Economic/food-supply offences are ill-suited to probation because of social risk. Quoted to buttress refusal of probationary relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Statutory Bar under Section 362 CrPC. The Court reaffirmed that once a criminal judgment is pronounced, the trial or appellate court becomes functus officio and cannot alter or review the judgment except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. Relying primarily on Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and allied cases, it held that the High Court correctly dismissed the modification application.

2. Inapplicability of Probationary Relief. Citing Ishar Das, Precious Oil and Pyarali K. Tejani, the Court concluded that economic offences under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955—characterised as “white-collar crimes” with significant social impact—are generally ineligible for the benevolent provisions of Section 360 CrPC or the Probation of Offenders Act.

3. Abuse of the Judicial Process. The petitioner had lost before four forums yet continued filing petitions. The Court invoked precedents such as Buddhi Kota Subbarao, Sabia Khan and Abdul Rahman to emphasise that litigants have no licence to consume unlimited judicial time. The present SLP, filed after an earlier SLP had already been dismissed, exemplified such abuse.

4. Distinguishing Petitioner's Authorities. The Court found Kunhayammed irrelevant because the petitioner sought modification after—rather than before—the dismissal of his earlier SLP, which is impermissible. Chhanni was likewise distinguished as a discretionary Article 142 case not dealing with Section 362 CrPC.

Holding and Implications

Petition Dismissed with Costs of ₹20,000.

The petitioner must deposit the costs with the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority within four weeks, failing which the matter will be listed for recovery directions. The decision reaffirms two principles: criminal courts cannot revisit final judgments except for clerical corrections, and probationary relief is ordinarily unavailable for economic offences under the Essential Commodities Act. While no new legal doctrine was created, the judgment sends a strong deterrent message against abusive, repetitive litigation.

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    Sunil Kumar v. State Of Haryana .

    Dr B.S Chauhan, J.— Delay condoned. Once it had been commented that anti-social elements i.e FERA violators, bride-burners and whole horde of reactionaries have found their safe haven in the Supreme Court and such a comment became the subject-matter of contempt of this Court and had to be dealt with by this Court in P.N Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker (1988) 3 SCC 167, AIR 1988 SC 1208.

    2. This Court in Rathinam v. State of T.N (2011) 11 SCC 140 quoted the observations made by the High Court in that case expressing its views that common man must feel assured to get justice and observed as under:

    “22. … ‘Let not the mighty and the rich think that courts are their paradise and in the legal arena they are the dominant players….’”

    3. These judgments make one thing crystal clear that criminals do not hesitate in approaching the courts, even by abusing the process of the court and sometimes succeed also. The instant case belongs to the same category. The petitioner feels that merely because he is a black marketeer and succeeded in exploiting the helplessness of the poor people of the society and is capable of engaging lawyers, he has a right to use, abuse and misuse the process of the court and can approach any court any time without any hesitation and without observing any required procedure prescribed by law.

    4. An FIR dated 15-9-1998 was lodged against the petitioner and one other person under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called “the 1955 Act”) as they were found in possession of 1370 litres of blue kerosene and indulging in unauthorised sale thereof in violation of the provisions of Section 7 of the 1955 Act. After completing the investigation charge-sheet was filed and trial commenced.

    5. The trial court vide judgment and order dated 27-10-1999/2-11-1999 found them guilty of the said offence and awarded sentence of imprisonment for one year along with a fine of Rs 2000 each. Against the aforesaid order, the appeal of the petitioner stood dismissed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 30-7-2010. The petitioner preferred an application dated 25-7-2011 before the High Court for modifying the aforesaid judgment and order dated 30-7-2010 giving him the benefit of the provisions of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called “CrPC”) and/or Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter called “the 1958 Act”). The said application was dismissed vide the impugned order dated 19-9-2011.

    6. It may be pertinent to mention that against the judgment and order dated 30-7-2010, the petitioner had filed SLP (Crl.) No. 1469 of 2011 on 13-10-2011 which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 27-1-2012. Subsequent thereto this special leave petition has been filed on 29-2-2012 challenging the order dated 19-9-2011. No explanation has been furnished as to why the present petition could not be filed during the pendency of the earlier SLP or both the orders could not be challenged simultaneously as the order impugned herein had been passed much prior to the filing of the first SLP on 13-10-2011, and the petitioner surrendered to serve out the sentence only on 13-1-2012.

    7. The High Court dealt with the various propositions of law while dealing with the averments raised on his behalf including the application of the provisions of Section 362 CrPC which puts a complete embargo on the criminal court to reconsider any case after delivery of the judgment as the court becomes functus officio.

    8. This Court in a recent judgment in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770, AIR 2012 SC 364 dealt with the issue considering a very large number of earlier judgments of this Court including Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P (2011) 14 SCC 813, AIR 2011 SC 1232 and came to the conclusion: (Davinder Pal Singh case (2011) 14 SCC 770, AIR 2012 SC 364)

    “49. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the criminal justice delivery system does not clothe the court with the power to add or delete any words, except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as has specifically been provided for under the statute itself as after pronouncement of the judgment the Judge becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate forum in accordance with law.”

    9. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed a very heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 wherein this Court has held that in case the special leave petition is dismissed by this Court in limine, the party aggrieved may file a review petition before the High Court. The said judgment has been explained in various subsequent judgments observing that in case the review petition has been filed before the High Court prior to the date the special leave petition is dismissed by this Court, the same may be entertained. However, a party cannot file a review petition before the High Court after approaching the Supreme Court as it would amount to abuse of process of the court. (See Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy (2010) 8 SCC 383.)

    10. The ratio of the aforesaid case has no application in the instant case as that was a matter dealing with civil cases. Further reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner on the judgment of this Court in Chhanni v. State of U.P (2006) 5 SCC 396, wherein the Court itself held as under:

    “9. The High Court is justified in its view that there is no provision for modification of the judgment.”

    Further direction has been issued by this Court to reconsider the case exercising its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the aforesaid judgment does not lay down the law of universal application, nor does it deal with the provisions of Section 362 CrPC. Thus, in view of the above, the said judgment has also no application in the instant case.

    11. The High Court in the impugned judgment came to the right conclusion that the court could not entertain the petition having become functus officio.

    12. Be that as it may, the petitioner being the black marketeer presumed that he had a right to dictate terms to the court and get desired results, thus, approached this Court again and sought the relief prayed before the High Court. The petitioner has lost in four courts earlier. In this fact situation the issue is whether there should be any restrain on the petitioner or he should be permitted to abuse the judicial process as he likes.

    13. This Court in Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran (1996) 5 SCC 530, AIR 1996 SC 2687 observed as under:

    “11. … No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived or frivolous petitions.”
    (emphasis in original)

    14. In Sabia Khan v. State of U.P (1999) 1 SCC 271, AIR 1999 SC 2284 this Court held that filing totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the court and waste of courts' time. Such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly. Similarly, in Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai (2003) 1 SCC 488 this Court held that wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the process of the court is being abused, the court would be justified in refusing to proceed further and refuse the party from pursuing the remedy in law.

    15. Even otherwise, the issue as to whether the benefit of the 1958 Act or Section 360 CrPC can be granted to the petitioner is no more res integra. In Ishar Das v. State of Punjab (1973) 2 SCC 65, AIR 1972 SC 1295 this Court dealt with the case under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act observing that the adulteration of food is a menace to public health and the statute had been enacted with the aim of eradicating that anti-social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. The legislature thought it fit to prescribe the minimum sentence of imprisonment. Therefore, the court should not lightly resort to the provisions of the 1958 Act in case of an accused found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

    16. In Precious Oil Corpn. v. State of Assam (2009) 15 SCC 752, AIR 2009 SC 1566 this Court dealt with the issue of application of the 1958 Act in case of offences punishable under Section 7 of the 1955 Act. The Court did not grant the benefit of the said provisions to the appellant therein placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange (1974) 1 SCC 167, AIR 1974 SC 228 wherein this Court has held as under: (Pyarali K. Tejani case (1974) 1 SCC 167, AIR 1974 SC 228)

    “28. The kindly application of the probation principles is negatived by the imperatives of social defence and the improbabilities of moral proselytisation. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social operations, disguised as a respectable trade, imperil numerous innocents. He is a security risk. Secondly, these economic offences committed by white-collar criminals are unlikely to be dissuaded by the gentle probationary process. Neither casual provocation nor motive against particular persons but planned profit-making from numbers of consumers furnishes the incentive—not easily humanised by the therapeutic probationary measure.”

    17. Thus, in view of the above, the relief sought by the petitioner cannot be granted. The petition is misconceived and untenable. The petition being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed with the cost of Rs 20,000 which the petitioner is directed to deposit within a period of four weeks with the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority and file proof thereof before the Registrar of this Court, failing which the matter be placed before the Court for appropriate direction for recovery.

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    Comments

    Sunil Kumar v. State Of Haryana .
    (Mar 27, 2012)