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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Section 304-B of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961)
  • Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act [not mentioned]
  • Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Sections 306, 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 306, 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Section 304-B of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961)
  • Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act [not mentioned]
  • Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Sections 306, 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 306, 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh (A-1) married Hasina Mustafa Shaikh on 26-01-1989 in Tembalalwadi, District Kolhapur, Maharashtra. On 23-08-1989, Hasina died by consuming poison in her matrimonial home at Ujalawadi, merely seven months after the marriage. Her grandfather, Abdul Rahim Shaikh (PW-4), lodged an FIR the same day alleging harassment and torture for dowry. A criminal case (CP No. 186 of 1989) was registered under Sections 306, 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34 IPC against the appellant and his relatives.

The matter was tried as Sessions Case No. 7 of 1990. On 07-12-1990, the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Kolhapur convicted the appellant, his father, and his mother for offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC, sentencing each to one year’s rigorous imprisonment (RI) and a fine of ₹1,000 for the Section 498-A offence and seven years’ RI for the Section 304-B offence. The sister-in-law (A-4) was acquitted.

In Criminal Appeal No. 891 of 1990, the Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal on 28-11-2007, confirming the convictions. During pendency of that appeal the appellant’s parents (A-2 and A-3) died, causing the appeal against them to abate. The present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by special leave; it culminated in the judgment summarised here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the ingredients necessary to convict the appellant under Sections 304-B (dowry death) and 498-A (cruelty) IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The evidence failed to establish the statutory requirement that cruelty or harassment occurred “soon before” the death; thus, the proximity test under Section 304-B and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act was not met.
  • All prosecution witnesses were close relatives of the deceased; the absence of independent witnesses undermined the credibility of the prosecution case.
  • In the alternative, given that the appellant was only 23 years old at the time of the incident and is the sole earning member of his family, the sentence should be reduced.

Respondent State’s Arguments

  • The complaint (Exh. 20) and testimonies of PWs 4, 6, 7 and 9, together with the fact that the death occurred within seven months of marriage, clearly fulfilled every element of Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC.
  • In matrimonial offences, testimony of close relatives is natural and reliable; the law does not mandate corroboration by independent witnesses.
  • The sentence cannot be reduced below the statutory minimum of seven years prescribed by Section 304-B(2) IPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N. (2004) 9 SCC 157 Explained the “soon before her death” proximity test under Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B Evidence Act. Relied upon to assess whether the cruelty or harassment was sufficiently proximate to the death.
Yashoda v. State of M.P. (2004) 3 SCC 98 Reiterated principles governing proof of dowry death. Used to underscore that time-lapse must not render incidents of cruelty stale; affirmed applicability to present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court recited the statutory essentials of Section 304-B IPC: (i) unnatural death of a woman; (ii) within seven years of marriage; (iii) antecedent cruelty or harassment by husband or his relatives; (iv) such cruelty linked to dowry demand. It further noted the presumption in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.

Witnesses PW-4 (grandfather), PW-6 (father), PW-7 (mother) and PW-9 (brother) consistently testified to repeated demands for ₹5,000 and gold ornaments, accompanied by physical and mental abuse. The last reported incident of harassment occurred 18-08-1989, five days before Hasina’s death, satisfying the proximity requirement.

Medical testimony (PW-5) confirmed death by ingestion of petroleum hydrocarbon poison, supporting the “unnatural death” element. The Court rejected the contention that relative-witness testimony was insufficient, highlighting that matrimonial offences typically lack independent witnesses.

Given that all statutory ingredients were met and the defence failed to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court. On sentencing, it held that the statutory minimum of seven years under Section 304-B(2) is mandatory, dismissing the plea for leniency based on youth and family circumstances.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The conviction of the appellant under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and the sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment (with additional punishment under Section 498-A) stand confirmed. The judgment reinforces the mandatory nature of the minimum sentence for dowry death and clarifies that close-relative testimony can suffice to establish harassment “soon before” death. No new legal precedent is set, but the decision reaffirms established principles governing dowry-death prosecutions.

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    Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v. State Of Maharashtra .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    P. Sathasivam, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28-11-2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 110 Bom LR 48, (2008) 1 AIR Bom R 365 whereby the High Court confirmed the order of conviction and sentence dated 7-12-1990 passed by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge at Kolhapur against the appellant herein.

    2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as under: on 26-1-1989 Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh (A-1), the appellant-accused married one Hasina Mustafa Shaikh (since deceased) at Tembalalwadi, District Kolhapur, Maharashtra. After marriage, Hasina was staying with the appellant in her matrimonial home at Ujalawadi, Taluka Karveer, District Kolhapur, Maharashtra. On 23-8-1989 when she was at her matrimonial home, she committed suicide by consuming poison. She was taken to CPR Hospital at Kolhapur where the doctor declared that she was brought dead. The appellant and his parents informed about her death to her family members.

    3. On the same day, Abdul Rahim Shaikh (PW 4) the grandfather of the deceased lodged an FIR at Karveer Police Station, Kolhapur alleging torture and harassment faced by the deceased on account of demand for dowry. On the basis of the said report, CP No. 186 of 1989 (Ext. 20) was registered against the appellant and his family members for the offence punishable under Sections 306, 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”).

    4. The case was committed to the Court of Session and numbered as Sessions Case No. 7 of 1990 and A-1, husband; A-2, father; A-3, mother; A-4, sister-in-law were arrayed as Accused 1 to 4. During the trial, prosecution examined 12 witnesses and marked several documents. By order dated 7-12-1990, the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, while acquitting the sister (A-4) of the appellant herein, convicted the appellant and his parents for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to suffer RI for 1 year along with a fine of Rs 1000, in default, to further undergo RI for 6 months and RI for 7 years respectively.

    5. Being aggrieved, the appellant and his parents preferred Criminal Appeal No. 891 of 1990 before the High Court of Bombay. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, the parents (A-2 and A-3) of the appellant expired and the appeal against them stood abated. By the impugned judgment dated 28-11-2007 (2008) 110 Bom LR 48, (2008) 1 AIR Bom R 365, the High Court dismissed the appeal while confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court against the appellant. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

    6. Heard Mr Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned counsel for the appellant-accused and Mr Sachin J. Patil, learned counsel for the respondent State.

    Discussion

    7. The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the prosecution has made out a case in respect of the charges levelled against the appellant relating to Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. In support of the above charges, the prosecution heavily relied on the complaint (Ext. 20), the evidence of PWs 4, 6, 7 and 9 and other relevant circumstance viz. the death occurred on 23-8-1989 i.e within a period of 7 months from the date of marriage i.e 26-1-1989.

    8. Before considering the prosecution case as well as the defence pleaded, it is desirable to extract the relevant provisions of Section 304-B which relates to dowry death:

    “304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
    Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
    (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment of life.”

    The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force w.e.f 19-11-1986. There is no dispute about the applicability of the above provision since the marriage and the death occurred in 1989.

    9. In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied:

    (i) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances;
    (ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;
    (iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband;
    (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, demand for dowry.

    When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. If the abovementioned ingredients are attracted in view of the special provision, the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. However, it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such compulsory presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on the defence side.

    10. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:

    “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman [has] been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
    Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

    As stated earlier, the prosecution under Section 304-B IPC cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and such was caused “soon before her death”. In view of the Explanation to the said section, the word “dowry” has to be understood as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which reads as under:

    “2. Definition of ‘dowry’.—In this Act, ‘dowry’ means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly—
    (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
    (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person,
    at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.”

    11. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty or harassment “for, or in connection with the demand for dowry”. The expression “soon before her death” used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to the same while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is “soon before her death”, no definite period has been enacted and the expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term “soon before her death” is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. These principles have been reiterated in Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N (2004) 9 SCC 157, AIR 2003 SC 3828 and Yashoda v. State of M.P (2004) 3 SCC 98

    12. With these principles in mind, let us analyse the evidence led in by the prosecution. Abdul Rahim Shaikh, PW 4, aged about 65 years at the time of the incident deposed that the deceased Hasina was his granddaughter. Hasina was the daughter of his daughter, Chandbi and her husband's name is Dilawar Khan. According to him, after her marriage on 26-1-1989, she went to reside in the house of the appellant-accused at Ujalawadi. She stayed there for 5 days and returned to their house and stayed for 15 days. Thereafter, she again went to her in-laws' house. At the time of Bakrid, Hasina, her husband Mustafa (A-1), the appellant-accused and Hasina's brother, Ayub had gone to Panaji. After 4 days, Ayub and Mustafa returned from Panaji and she stayed there for 15 days. Hasina narrated all her sufferings to her mother Chandbi (PW 7), daughter of PW 4 as to how the accused were torturing, beating and abusing her for the demand of Rs 5000 and a gold ring and a chain. When the appellant and his mother visited his house, he explained to them that they had already spent Rs 6000 for marriage and he was ready to get employment for the appellant. He further deposed that after 5-6 days, he had gone to the house of Abubakhar Nimshikari, PW 10, the mediator to the said marriage and informed him about the cruelty and harassment meted out to the deceased in order to fulfil the demand of dowry.

    13. PW 4 also deposed that when he had gone to the house of the accused about 2-4 days prior to her death, she took him to a room and narrated how the accused began to torture her more for their demand for money and gold chain and she also asked him to do something with regard to the same. He also explained that 4 days thereafter, the father-in-law and mother-in-law of Hasina came to their house and told him that Hasina had consumed poison and she had been admitted in CPR Hospital. They also showed the bottle to him. Thereafter, PW 4 and his wife rushed to CPR Hospital. When they reached the hospital, the doctor informed that she was brought dead. Nobody was present near the dead body from the house of the accused. Thereafter, he went to Kharvi PS and lodged a report which is Ext. 20. In fact, while recording his evidence, the trial Judge has noted that PW 4, grandfather of the deceased became overemotional and began to weep in the witness box. His evidence, who is an elderly person and affectionate to the deceased Hasina, clearly proves the torture, harassment, and demand of dowry at the hands of the accused including the appellant.

    14. The next witness examined on the side of the prosecution is Dilawarkhan, PW 6, father of the deceased. In his evidence, he also explained that his daughter told him that her in-laws used to torture her by beating and keeping her starved. He subsequently mentioned that on 18-8-1989, he himself and his wife had visited the house of his father-in-law, namely, PW 4 at Tembalwadi and, thereafter, they had gone to the house of the accused at Ujalawadi. There itself Hasina explained the harassment and torture meted out to her. She started weeping and told PW 6 that her husband, the appellant herein tortured her more. On the next day, when the appellant and his mother came to their house, PW 6 told them that he would get employment for the appellant-accused and he should not harass her daughter. However, he did not listen to him and left his house. The evidence of PW 6, the father of the deceased also proves the torture and harassment for the settlement for the payment of money and, in fact, this was narrated on 18-8-1989 i.e just 5 days prior to the date of her death. It very clearly satisfies the expression “soon before her death”.

    15. The next witness relied on by the prosecution is Chandbi, PW 7 the mother of the deceased. She also narrated similar to PWs 4 and 6. From her evidence also, it is clear that the accused tortured and harassed her daughter for money.

    16. The other witness relied on by the prosecution is Ayubkhan (PW 9), the brother of the deceased. Like PWs 4, 6 and 7, he also highlighted that his sister used to inform that her husband, sister-in-law, father-in-law and mother-in-law tortured her on many occasions for the payment of money and gold ornaments. A perusal of his entire evidence also corroborates the similar claim made by PWs 4, 6 and 7.

    17. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contended that all the witnesses relied on by the prosecution are close relatives and no outsider has been examined to prove their case, we are of the view that in a case of this nature i.e matrimonial death, we cannot expect outsiders to come and depose what had happened in the family of the deceased. We have already highlighted that the death occurred within a period of 7 months from the date of the marriage and she died at her matrimonial home. It has also come in evidence from the prosecution witnesses that on the date of the death, the appellant and his parents alone were in the house. In such circumstances, we reject the contention raised by the counsel for the appellant.

    18. Apart from the above witnesses, Dr Ramdas, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem was examined as PW 5. In the post-mortem report, he opined that death of Hasina was due to poisoning. He further explained that poison was petroleum hydrocarbons. He also deposed that the said poison was sufficient to cause death of a human being.

    19. From these materials, we are satisfied that the prosecution has clearly established the offence under Section 304-B IPC and the same has been rightly accepted by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court.

    20. Coming to Section 498-A which speaks about cruelty by husband or relatives of the husband. It is useful to extract the said provision:

    “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
    Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’ means—
    (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
    (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

    The object of inserting the above section by Act 46 of 1983 which came into force w.e.f 25-12-1983 was with a view to punish the husband or his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The prosecution evidence, which we have already discussed, clearly prove the ingredients of cruelty and no further elaboration is required, on the other hand, we fully agree with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court.

    21. Finally, a faint argument was advanced by the counsel for the appellant for reduction of the sentence of the appellant-accused considering his age viz. 23 years at the time of occurrence. It is also pleaded that he is the only earning member in his family and prayed for leniency. These aspects were duly considered by the trial court while awarding punishment. Further, Section 304-B itself mandates that in the case of conviction in terms of sub-section (1) the imprisonment shall not be less than 7 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. In view of the fact that the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt by placing acceptable evidence and of the fact that the minimum sentence of seven years has been prescribed, it cannot be possible to award sentence less than 7 years. These aspects were also considered by the High Court. Accordingly, we reject the similar request made by the counsel for the appellant.

    22. In the light of what is stated above, we fully concur with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court and the High Court (2008) 110 Bom LR 48, (2008) 1 AIR Bom R 365. Consequently, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

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    Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Sep 14, 2012)