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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 397, Section 302, and Section 449 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 9 of the Evidence Act, 1872
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 397, Section 302, and Section 449 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 9 of the Evidence Act, 1872
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 20 October 1997 the appellant and a co-accused, Jose Joseph, went to the residence of PW-1 (Jose, son of Antony) intending to commit robbery. The appellant entered the house, threatened PW-2 Lidiya (then aged 11) by holding her neck, and took her gold chain and ear-studs. He then entered a bedroom, dragged Lidiya’s 90-year-old grandmother Annamma from her cot, beat her on the head with a wall clock, broke a gold chain from her neck, and stole imitation bangles from an almirah. The assailants left; Lidiya informed her father, and Annamma was taken to hospital where she died on 29 October 1997.

The police recovered the stolen articles at the appellant’s instance on 24 October 1997. The appellant was charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 449, 397 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The trial court convicted him on all three counts and imposed concurrent sentences (life imprisonment under Section 302, seven years under Section 397, and ten years under Section 449). Jose Joseph was convicted only under Section 411.

On appeal, the Kerala High Court acquitted Jose Joseph but affirmed the appellant’s convictions and sentences. The present judgment of the Supreme Court arises from the appellant’s further appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP), the in-court identification by a child witness (PW-2 Lidiya) could be safely relied upon to convict the appellant.
  2. Whether the testimony of an 11-year-old witness required special scrutiny so as to undermine the conviction.
  3. Whether the appellant possessed the requisite mens rea for murder under Section 302 IPC.
  4. Whether the facts established an offence under Section 449 IPC (house-trespass with intent to commit an offence punishable with death).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The absence of a TIP rendered PW-2 Lidiya’s courtroom identification unreliable, particularly because the appellant was a stranger to her.
  • Given PW-2’s age (about 11 at the time of the incident), her evidence should be subjected to heightened scrutiny before being accepted.
  • The appellant lacked any intention to cause Annamma’s death; therefore the conviction under Section 302 IPC was improper.

Respondent/State's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sk. Hasib v. State of Bihar (1972) 4 SCC 773 Purpose of TIP is investigative and to corroborate courtroom evidence; absence of TIP not fatal if substantive evidence exists. Used to show that failure to hold a TIP does not automatically vitiate identification evidence when other substantive evidence is strong.
Bikau Pandey v. State of Bihar (2003) 12 SCC 616 General guidance on reliability of identification evidence. Cited by High Court; affirmed by Supreme Court to uphold conviction despite no TIP.
State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (1996) 8 SCC 217 Assessment of identification without TIP. Referenced in High Court; Supreme Court noted concurrence.
Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of A.P., AIR 1960 SC 1340 Sworn testimony in court is substantive; TIP is corroborative. Relied on to emphasise that courtroom testimony is primary evidence.
Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K (1971) 2 SCC 715 Need for prompt TIP linked to proper administration of justice. Cited to highlight desirability, not indispensability, of early TIP.
Budhsen v. State of U.P. (1970) 2 SCC 128 Exception: TIP may be dispensed with when witness is otherwise reliable. Applied to accept PW-2’s identification without TIP.
Malkhansingh v. State of M.P. (2003) 5 SCC 746 Weight to be given to in-court identification in absence of TIP is for trial court to assess. Supports trial and High Courts’ acceptance of PW-2’s evidence.
Vijay @ Chinee v. State of M.P. (2010) 8 SCC 191 TIP is investigative, not substantive; rule of prudence. Reinforces view that absence of TIP is not fatal where evidence is otherwise credible.
State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj (2000) 1 SCC 247 Holding of TIP described as rule of prudence when accused unknown. Quoted within Vijay; adopted to stress prudential—not mandatory—nature of TIP.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Failure to Conduct a TIP. Reviewing the cited precedents, the Court held that a TIP is an investigative aid, not substantive evidence, and its absence is not fatal where credible in-court identification exists. PW-2 was the direct victim, faced the appellant for approximately two minutes, and her testimony remained unshaken in cross-examination. Combined with corroborating evidence (hostile but supportive neighbours and recovery of stolen ornaments at the appellant’s instance), her identification was deemed reliable.

2. Credibility of the Child Witness. Although Lidiya was 11 at the time of the offence, her testimony was recorded six years later when she was no longer a child. The Court found her evidence “clear and unambiguous,” with no material impeached in cross-examination, satisfying the requirement of careful scrutiny for child witnesses.

3. Mens Rea for Murder (Section 302 IPC). Dragging a 90-year-old woman from her bed and striking her head with a wall clock inevitably endangered life. The Court concluded that the appellant either intended death or knew it to be a likely consequence, fulfilling the elements of murder.

4. Applicability of Section 449 IPC. The intrusion was for robbery, not for committing an offence punishable with death. Therefore, the conviction under Section 449 IPC lacked statutory foundation and had to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed in Part and Allowed in Part.

  • Convictions and sentences under Sections 397 and 302 IPC are affirmed.
  • Conviction under Section 449 IPC is set aside.

Consequently, the appellant remains liable to life imprisonment (Section 302) and seven years’ rigorous imprisonment (Section 397), to run concurrently. The decision reiterates that the absence of a TIP is not, by itself, decisive where a victim’s credible testimony is corroborated, but it does not create a new legal standard beyond existing jurisprudence.

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    Kunjumon Alias Unni v. State Of Kerala .

    Madan B. Lokur, J.— The question before us is: whether in the absence of a test identification parade (“TIP”, for short), the evidence of a child witness should have been accepted for convicting the appellant? In our opinion, on the facts of this case both the trial court and the High Court were right in convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 397 (robbery or dacoity, with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt) and Section 302 (punishment for murder) of the Penal Code, 1860. However, no case has been made out for convicting the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 449 IPC (house trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death).

    The facts

    2. On 20-10-1997, the appellant and Jose Joseph came to the residential premises of PW 1, Jose, son of Antony at about 4.30 p.m with the common intention of committing robbery. While Jose Joseph stood guard near the house, the appellant made an entry and came upon PW 2, Lidiya, daughter of PW 1, Jose, son of Antony, who was then aged about 11 years. Thereupon he caught hold of her neck, threatened to kill her and then robbed her of her gold chain and two gold ear studs.

    3. Thereafter, he entered one bedroom in the house and attempted to rob Lidiya's grandmother Annamma, aged about 90 years of her ornaments. When Annamma raised an alarm the appellant pulled her down from the cot on which she was lying and beat her on the head with a wall clock. He then robbed her of her gold chain weighing about 5.5 gm by breaking it from her neck and also took two imitation bangles from a bag kept inside the almirah in the room. The appellant then went away from the house.

    4. Upon the departure of the appellant and Jose Joseph from the scene of crime, Lidiya went to the school where she learnt dancing from her father and informed him of the incident. They both rushed back to the house along with some friends and on discovering Annamma's condition, she was first taken to Kanjirappally Government Hospital and then to Kottayam Medical College Hospital for treatment. Unfortunately she passed away on 29-10-1997.

    5. On a complaint having been lodged of the robbery, the police investigated the case and during the investigations, on 24-10-1997, the Investigating Officer PW 13, T.A Salim recovered the stolen articles at the instance of the appellant. On conclusion of investigations, a challan was filed and the appellant was charged with the offences punishable under Section 449 IPC, Section 397 IPC and Section 302 IPC. Jose Joseph was also similarly charged but the trial Judge found him guilty of an offence punishable under Section 411 IPC.

    6. Both the convicts filed appeals in the High Court. While the appeal filed by Jose Joseph was accepted by the High Court, the appeal of the appellant was rejected and his conviction and sentence upheld. We are, therefore, concerned only with the appeal filed by the appellant.

    Decision of the trial court

    7. The trial Judge found from the medical evidence given by PW 10, Dr V.P Rajan, Civil Surgeon in Kanjirappally Government Hospital that Annamma was aged about 90 years. She had an injury on her forehead above the left eyebrow with suspicion of a fracture, oedema of both eyelids and lacerated injury on right side of the forehead. According to him, the injuries could have been caused by a wall clock as alleged by the prosecution. The trial Judge also considered the medical evidence of PW 11 Dr Babu, Assistant Professor of Forensic Medicine, Kottayam Medical College that Annamma died on 29-10-1997 as a result of the head injuries sustained by her. The trial court found that the evidence of both the doctors was not challenged and proved that Annamma died due to the violence inflicted on her including being hit with a wall clock. The trial Judge also found no reason to disbelieve the consistent testimony of Jose, son of Antony and Lidiya who was an eyewitness to the incident.

    8. In addition, the trial court relied on the testimony of PW 3 Leelamma, a neighbour of Jose, son of Antony. Although this witness had turned hostile, she admitted having seen the appellant on the fateful day about 100 m away from the house of Jose, son of Antony. She had seen the appellant earlier also and could, therefore, recognise him. The trial Judge also relied on the evidence on PW 5 Thankuppam, who was residing close by and had also seen the appellant in the vicinity of the house of Jose, son of Antony. This witness had also turned hostile, but confirmed seeing the appellant and that he knew the appellant. It appears that this witness had turned hostile on the issue of having seen both the appellant and Jose Joseph together. The trial Judge also saw no reason to disbelieve the investigating officer who confirmed the recovery of the gold ornaments at the instance of the appellant on 24-10-1997.

    9. The principal contention of the appellant before the trial Judge was that since he was a total stranger to Lidiya, she could not have recognised him in the court and in the absence of a TIP, reliance on her identification of the appellant could not be considered safe. The trial Judge rejected this contention on the ground that there was sufficient other evidence to show the presence of the appellant in the vicinity of the house of Jose, son of Antony and in view of the corroboration from other witnesses, there was no reason to doubt Lidiya.

    10. Accordingly, the trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment and fine for an offence punishable under Section 449 IPC, imprisonment for 7 years and fine for an offence punishable under Section 397 IPC and for life for an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. It was directed that the sentences would run concurrently.

    Decision of the High Court

    11. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 835 of 2004 in the High Court of Kerala. By its judgment and order dated 30-10-2007 Criminal Appeal No. 835 of 2004, the High Court rejected the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant. The High Court relied upon the evidence of the witnesses mentioned above to uphold the conviction.

    12. Before the High Court also the contention urged by the appellant was that since a TIP was not conducted, it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of Lidiya. However, the High Court rejected this contention by holding that there was clear evidence against the appellant, who had been identified by Lidiya and the witnesses in Court, and in view of the decisions of this Court in Sk. Hasib v. State of Bihar (1972) 4 SCC 773, AIR 1972 SC 283, Bikau Pandey v. State of Bihar (2003) 12 SCC 616, AIR 2004 SC 997 and State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (1996) 8 SCC 217, AIR 1996 SC 3035, there was no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 835 of 2004 was dismissed.

    Discussion and conclusions

    13. Before us the facts as found by both the courts below have not been contested by the learned counsel for the appellant and rightly so. However, it was submitted that since a TIP was not conducted, the evidence of Lidiya could not be relied upon. Additionally, it was contended that since Lidiya was about 11 years of age at the time of the incident, the evidence of the child witness should be carefully scrutinised. Finally, it was contended that the appellant had no intention to murder Annamma and therefore the conviction for an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC was improper.

    14. We are unable to agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant.

    (i) Not holding a TIP

    15. We have gone through the decisions referred to by the High Court and find that only Sk. Hasib (1972) 4 SCC 773, AIR 1972 SC 283 is of any relevance. In that case, this Court explained the purpose of a TIP. It was observed that an identification parade is held at the investigation stage by the investigating officer for a twofold purpose: to identify the property subject-matter of the alleged offence or the person concerned in the alleged offence and to assure the investigating authority that the investigation is proceeding along the right lines. For this reason, the identification parade should be held at the earliest, so that memory does not fade in the meanwhile. More importantly, however, to ensure that the identification parade inspires confidence and is fair and effective, certain precautions need to be taken. In spite of this, it was held, relying on Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of A.P AIR 1960 SC 1340, 1960 Cri LJ 1681 that: (Sk. Hasib case (1972) 4 SCC 773, AIR 1972 SC 283)

    “5. … the substantive evidence is the statement of a witness in court and the purpose of test identification is to test that evidence, the safe rule being that the sworn testimony of the witness in court as to the identity of the accused who is a stranger to him, as a general rule, requires corroboration in the form of an earlier identification proceeding.”

    Consequently, if there is no substantive evidence against an accused, a TIP will not assist the prosecution.

    16. The advisability of holding a TIP (particularly with reference to avoidable or unreasonable delay) has been emphasised in Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K (1971) 2 SCC 715, by tethering it to “proper administration of justice”. In Budhsen v. State of U.P (1970) 2 SCC 128 it has been pitched to “the life and liberty of an accused”. However, in Budhsen (1970) 2 SCC 128 an exception has been noted:

    “7. … when for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness, on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration.”

    17. A more useful and elaborate discussion on the subject is to be found in Malkhansingh v. State of M.P (2003) 5 SCC 746, where the TIP is linked to the requirement of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and coupled with the caution that in the absence of a TIP, the weight to be attached to the identification of the accused in Court is a matter for the courts of fact to decide.

    18. Similarly, in Vijay v. State of M.P (2010) 8 SCC 191 after a discussion on the subject, it was concluded that:

    “18. … the test identification is a part of the investigation and is very useful in a case where the accused are not known beforehand to the witnesses. It is used only to corroborate the evidence recorded in the court. Therefore, it is not substantive evidence. The actual evidence is what is given by the witnesses in the court.”

    It was noted in Vijay (2010) 8 SCC 191 with reference to State of H.P v. Lekh Raj (2000) 1 SCC 247 that the holding of a TIP is

    “15. … a rule of prudence which is required to be followed in cases where the accused is not known to the witness or the complainant.” (Vijay case (2010) 8 SCC 191)

    19. We have gone into some detail on this issue because of the unfortunately cursory manner in which the matter has been dealt with by the trial Judge and the High Court.

    20. The sum and substance of the various decisions referred to above and others on the same lines is that the failure to hold a TIP is not fatal to the case of the prosecution, but the trial Judge will need to be circumspect in accepting the identification of an accused by a witness in Court if the accused is a stranger to the witness.

    21. In the present case, we are not dealing with the evidence of any ordinary witness—we are dealing with a victim of a crime, someone who was directly at the receiving end of the actions of the appellant and who came face to face with the threat and intimidation by the appellant. The evidence of such a victim of a crime must be placed, in our opinion, on a somewhat higher pedestal, in terms of the credibility attached to it, than the evidence of any other witness. We need to seriously consider a partial shift in focus in the “proper administration of justice” by including not only the “life and liberty of an accused” but issues of victimology and the treatment of victims. Theories concerning criminal law and the administration of criminal justice are fast developing and we need to keep up with these developments.

    22. What does Lidiya say in her evidence? Firstly, she identifies the appellant but no question is put to her in this regard in her cross-examination. Then, she says of the appellant:

    “He caught me on my neck and told that if I open my mouth I shall be killed. I was scared and kept mum. He told me to remove my earrings and chain. I being scared removed my earrings and chain and gave it to him.”

    She reiterates this in her cross-examination and says that she saw the appellant for two minutes. The entire traumatic sequence of events would have been clearly etched in Lidiya's memory, even though it may have taken only two minutes. And so, the only question put to her in cross-examination in this regard is “You are deposing falsely that you saw A-1 (the appellant)?” which of course she denied.

    23. We have considered the delay of about 6 years in recording the evidence of Lidiya, but are of the opinion that on a reading of her testimony the episode did not (understandably) fade away from her memory.

    24. It is quite clear from the evidence of Lidiya, the absence of any meaningful cross-examination, the evidence given by the other witnesses and the recovery of gold ornaments from the possession of the appellant that the absence of the TIP makes no difference to the case of the prosecution or the identification of the appellant.

    (ii) Testimony of a child witness

    25. This issue need not detain us for any length of time. It is true that Lidiya was about 11 years of age when the incident took place. However, her testimony was recorded, unfortunately, after a lapse of 6 years. She was, by then, no longer a “child witness”. That apart, her evidence is clear and unambiguous and nothing adverse could be elicited during her cross-examination. We see no merit in this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant.

    (iii) Murderous intent of the appellant

    26. Looking to the overall facts of the case, we see no reason to disagree with the concurrent view of the trial court and the High Court that the appellant is guilty of murder. If a frail old woman aged about 90 years is dragged down from her cot and beaten on the head with a wall clock, it is not difficult to imagine what the consequences would be—and surely the appellant would not be oblivious of them. There is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that his client did not intend the death of Annamma or even did not know that his actions would result in her death.

    27. However, it seems quite clear, and this was also the case of the prosecution, that the appellant had gone to the house of Jose, son of Antony for the purpose of committing a robbery. He did not go for the purpose of or with the intention to kill anybody. That he killed Annamma is unfortunate, but the house trespass was for the purpose of committing a robbery and not for the purpose of committing an offence punishable with death. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, it would not be proper to convict the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 449 IPC. To this extent, therefore, his appeal must be allowed.

    Result

    28. There is no merit in this appeal to the extent of the appellant's conviction and sentence for the offences punishable under Section 397 and Section 302 IPC. Accordingly, it is dismissed in this regard. However, the appeal is allowed to the extent that no offence punishable under Section 449 IPC has been made out against the appellant.

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    Comments

    Kunjumon Alias Unni v. State Of Kerala .
    (Nov 21, 2012)