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Disposition
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  • Section 302, Section 149, Section 147, and Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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  • Section 302, Section 149, Section 147, and Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Eight accused were tried for offences under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the death of Daddu on 4-11-1992 in Village Gotetoriya, District Narsinghpur, Madhya Pradesh. The altercation arose after the deceased’s sister, PW-6 Mayabai, became pregnant allegedly by accused Onkar and Ganesh, leading to a panchayat decision to outcaste the deceased’s family. On the night of the incident, abusive exchanges between the accused’s wives and the deceased escalated into a physical assault in which Daddu sustained eight injuries, one of which proved fatal.

The trial court acquitted Accused 6 and 7 (Suresh and Badelal) but convicted the remaining six. During the appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Accused 3 and 4 (Rewaram and Lakhan Lal) died; their appeals abated. The High Court upheld the convictions of the surviving four appellants—Veeran, Onkar, Ganesh and Ashok—under Sections 302/149, 147 and 148 IPC, sentencing Veeran to life imprisonment (already undergone about 15 years) and the others likewise (actual custody about 2½ years). The present appeal before the Supreme Court challenges the nature of that conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts, the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302/149 IPC should be maintained or altered to a lesser offence, particularly Section 304 IPC.
  2. Whether the evidence established a common intention/common object to commit murder, or whether the incident fell within Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC (sudden fight, absence of premeditation).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The assault occurred spontaneously without common intention or common object to kill; hence Section 302 is inapplicable.
  • Veeran has already spent more than 15 years in custody; the others about 2½ years—disproportionate if the correct offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
  • Some accused also sustained injuries inflicted by the complainant party, showing mutual combat; these injuries were inadequately explained by the prosecution.
  • Because only one fatal injury was proved, with no specific overt acts by the other appellants, their liability should be for lesser offences.

State's Arguments

  • Multiple incised injuries on vital parts demonstrate the appellants’ knowledge that the acts were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
  • Concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court should not be disturbed; no grounds for leniency exist.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650 Explained distinction between culpable homicide and murder; affirmed test in Virsa Singh. Quoted to illustrate how intent and knowledge under Sections 299 & 300 IPC must be analysed before classifying an offence as murder.
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 Laid down the test for clause “Thirdly” of Section 300—intention to inflict a particular injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Referred to underscore that, in the present facts, such intention was absent; therefore murder charge could not be sustained.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

After reviewing eyewitness testimonies (PW 6, PW 7, PW 12) and medical evidence, the Court found that only Veeran delivered the fatal gandasa blow to the deceased’s head; the others were linked merely by omnibus statements without specific roles. Several accused themselves suffered injuries, indicating a mutual, sudden fight with no pre-planning.

The Court emphasised:

  • The incident erupted spontaneously upon verbal abuse; weapons were not carried in anticipation of killing.
  • No material suggested premeditation or a common object to commit murder.
  • Fatal injury was singular; remaining injuries were not grievous.
  • Facts fit Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC (grave and sudden provocation; sudden fight without undue advantage).

Applying the principles from Virsa Singh and Thangaiya, the Court concluded the mental element required for murder (particularly intention or knowledge meeting the threshold of Section 300) was missing. Consequently, Veeran’s act amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, while the others were liable only for simple hurt under Section 323/149 along with the rioting offences.

Holding and Implications

PARTLY ALLOWED. Conviction of Appellant 1 (Veeran) modified to Section 304 Part I/149 IPC plus Sections 147 & 148 IPC; sentence limited to period already undergone (≈15 years). Conviction of Appellants 2-4 (Onkar, Ganesh, Ashok) altered to Sections 323/149, 147 & 148 IPC; sentences reduced to time served (≈2½ years). All appellants ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Implications are confined to the parties: sentences were curtailed, and appellants released. The judgment reiterates established principles distinguishing murder from culpable homicide but sets no new precedent.

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    Veeran And Others v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .

    Deepak Verma, J.— Leave granted. The perennial question whether the accused deserve to be convicted under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter shall be referred as “IPC”) as held by the trial court and upheld by the High Court or whether the conviction should be converted to that under Section 304 IPC, has once again cropped up for consideration before us, in this appeal.

    2. In the instant case, eight accused were charged and prosecuted for commission of the offences under Sections 147, 148, 302 or 302/149 and 325 IPC. After the trial, giving the benefit of doubt, Suresh and Badelal, Accused 6 and 7 respectively, were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gadarwara, Narsingpur in Sessions Case No. 21 of 1993 vide his judgment and order dated 21-4-1994. The six convicted accused preferred Criminal Appeal No. 472 of 1994 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. During the pendency of the appeal, Accused 3, Rewaram and Accused 4, Lakhan Lal died. Thus, the appeal in respect of these two accused stood abated. However, as regards the remaining four accused, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court. Now, in this appeal, it is prayed before us to consider, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, whether, the four surviving convicted appellants, Veeran, Onkar, Ganesh and Ashok deserve to be convicted under Sections 302/149, 147 and 148 IPC, who have been awarded life imprisonment and one year each respectively for the commission of the aforesaid offences or it deserves to be converted under Section 304 IPC.

    3. The prosecution story in a nutshell is as under: it is said, PW 6, Mayabai, real sister of deceased Daddu had become pregnant on account of accused Onkar and Ganesh. Panchayat was called to resolve the dispute. Panchayat passed a resolution to outcaste deceased Daddu, PW 6 Mayabai and their family members. On account of this, they were on inimical terms. On 4-11-1992, Radhelal, uncle of deceased Daddu, was not in his house. Deceased Daddu, and Narmada alias Narbadi were required to sleep at Radhelal's house and hence were proceeding towards his house at about 8.00 p.m for this purpose. Narmada alias Narbadi was the brother-in-law of deceased Daddu. When they reached the house of Radhelal, wives of accused Veeran, Onkar and Rewaram started abusing them saying that these persons had lost their reputation because of the misconduct committed by PW 6 Mayabai, sister of deceased Daddu, after which Daddu (deceased) asked the ladies not to abuse them. At that time accused Veeran, Onkar and Rewaram came out from their houses but went back to their respective houses. However, before leaving they challenged deceased Daddu to come out of the house. Daddu came out of his house and at that point of time, accused Lakhan, Ashok and Ganesh also came to the spot armed with gandasa, farsa and lathis, etc. All of them told Daddu that he was crossing all limits and he should behave in a proper and orderly manner. After some altercation, they started beating Daddu (deceased) with the weapons they were carrying.

    4. It is said that Veeran caused injuries on the head of Daddu. On account of the injuries sustained by Daddu, he fell down. Even though, Narmada alias Narbadi raised protest but they did not stop. Mayabai, PW 6, Rambai and Trivenibai, PW 7 (sisters of deceased Daddu), Shiv Prasad and Kailash, PW 9 (cousin of the deceased) of the same village came to intervene but the accused persons did not stop. After inflicting injuries on Daddu, thinking him to be dead, the accused left the spot. Narmada alias Narbadi and Mayabai also sustained injuries as they were trying to intervene. Daddu was then taken in a bullock cart to Police Station Gotetoriya, Narsingpur by Mayabai and others. FIR was lodged by Mayabai on 4-11-1992 at 2330 hrs naming all the eight accused in the same and giving details of the injuries caused by each one of them, with the weapons they were carrying. Thereafter, Daddu was taken to Civil Hospital, Gadarwara but before any medical help could be provided to him, he was declared “brought dead” by the doctors attending on him.

    5. After completion of the investigation, the accused were prosecuted for commission of the aforesaid offences by the trial court. As mentioned hereinabove, accused Suresh and Badelal were acquitted, whereas Rewaram and Lakhan expired during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. Thus, now only four accused are before us. In the criminal appeal, the High Court confirmed the judgment and order of conviction against all the four appellants and found them guilty of commission of the offences under Sections 302/149, 147 and 148 IPC. Hence, this appeal.

    6. We have, accordingly, heard Shri R.P Gupta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Parmanand Gaur, for the appellants, Smt Vibha Dutta Makhija for the respondent State and perused the record.

    7. At the outset, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that looking to the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased, both the courts below committed grave error in finding the appellants guilty of commission of the offences under Sections 302/149, 147 and 148 IPC. It was further submitted that Appellant 1 Veeran, the so-called main accused has already undergone a sentence of more than 15 years, whereas the others are in jail for over 2½ years. It has also been submitted that some of the accused had also sustained injuries, which have not been explained properly by the prosecution. The incident had occurred on the spur of the moment and there was neither common object nor common intention in the minds of the accused to commit the murder of deceased Daddu. According to them, thus, the offence deserves to be converted under Section 304 IPC as far as Veeran is concerned, more so when he has already undergone more than 15 years in jail and the others deserve to be convicted for lesser offences as no specific overt act could be attributed to them.

    8. On the other hand, Smt Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned counsel for the respondent State, vehemently opposed and contended that looking to the nature of the injuries inflicted on vital parts of the body of the deceased, with deadly weapons, no scope of doubt remains that they had common intention to kill the deceased. In any event, the accused were aware of the fact that the nature of injuries caused by them would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It was, therefore, contended that no case for showing any leniency was made out and the concurrent findings of the two courts below need not be disturbed. Consequently, this appeal deserves to be dismissed.

    9. The post-mortem report shows that deceased Daddu had sustained in all eight injuries, out of the which four were incised wounds and others were either contusions or abrasions. As per this report, the deceased had died of shock and haemorrhage. Injury 8 was sufficient to cause death. This post-mortem report has been duly proved by an autopsy surgeon. It has neither been disputed nor challenged before us that deceased Daddu had met with homicidal death. Now, the question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, conviction of the appellants under Sections 302/149 IPC can still be upheld or it deserves to be converted under Section 304 IPC.

    10. A perusal of the record shows that in the same incident some of the accused i.e Suresh, Badelal, Rewaram and Ganesh had also sustained injuries on their persons, which were caused by the complainant party. These injuries have been proved by DW 4, Dr. O.P Nayak and DW 5, Dr. Patel, vide their injury reports. It is also clear from the record that the accused did not try to cause any predetermined injuries on the person of the deceased, which could have proved fatal. There does not appear to be any premeditation on the part of the accused to commit the crime. It occurred all of a sudden and on the spur of the moment. There is nothing to suggest that the accused were already aware that the deceased and his brother-in-law were to come at the spot where the crime was committed.

    11. The evidence of all the three main eyewitnesses, PW 6 Mayabai, PW 7 Trivenibai and PW 12 Narmada alias Narbadi is consistent that Veeran had hit the deceased with gandasa and the blow inflicted by him had proved to be fatal. As regards the other accused, there appears to be an omnibus statement that they all had hit the deceased but details of the same have not been given specifically. No specific overt acts have been attributed to the other remaining three accused except the omnibus statement as mentioned hereinabove. PW 6 Mayabai has deposed that on reaching the spot, she had seen eight persons, namely, Veeran, Rewaram, Ganesh, Lakhan, Onkar, Ashok, Badelal, Suresh, beating her brother Daddu. Veeran was having gandasa, Rewaram, Onkar and Ashok were armed with farsas, while Ganesh and Lakhan had lathis. Similar is the statement of PW 7 Trivenibai, who has deposed that Mayabai, Rambai, Kailash had reached the spot where Veeran, Ganesh, Rewaram, Lakhan, Ashok, Suresh and Badelal were beating her brother Daddu. Veeran was having gandasa, Ashok had farsa, Onkar and Rewaram had farsa, Badelal, Ganesh and Suresh had lathis. PW 12 Narmada alias Narbadi was in fact with Daddu, when they were going to the house of Radhelal to sleep at night. According to him, Veeran was having gandasa and he had hit with it on the head of Daddu. His evidence appears to be convincing and natural as he was accompanying the deceased Daddu, when the incident had taken place. Recovery of gandasa was made from the possession of Veeran. Thus, from the analysis of the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that it was Veeran, who had caused the fatal blow on the person of deceased.

    12. A close look at the evidence of the said main witness makes it clear that the accused were not already armed with lethal weapons to cause the death of Daddu. As per his own admission, when they reached in front of the house of Radhelal, wives of the accused started abusing them, meaning thereby, at that time none of the accused were there. The contention of the learned counsel for the State that the accused had common intention to cause death of Daddu thus stands repelled.

    13. Looking to the facts and feature of the case and also keeping in mind that it was Accused 1 Veeran who had caused a fatal injury to deceased Daddu and the other injuries were not grievous, it would be in the fitness of things to convert the conviction of Appellant 1 to that under Section 304 Part I IPC and to award him the sentence already undergone, which is about 15 years.

    14. To understand the legal complexities of the matter, we would consider the import of Sections 299 and 300 IPC, reproduced hereinbelow. Section 299 IPC reads as follows:

    “299. Culpable homicide.—Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.”

    15. In the instant case, there has been death of Daddu caused on account of injuries by the aforementioned accused. The two courts below have convicted the accused for the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC. In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that under the scheme of IPC, “culpable homicide” is the genus and “murder” its species wherein all “murder” is “culpable homicide” but all “culpable homicide” is not “murder”. Exceptions 1 to 5 to Section 300 IPC indicate the circumstances where “culpable homicide” is not “murder”. Exceptions 1 and 4 which are relevant for the present appeal read as follows:

    “300. Murder.—***
    Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
    Exception 2.—***
    Exception 3.—***
    Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
    Exception 5.—***”

    16. In the instant case, it can be inferred that:

    (i) The fight between both the parties was not premeditated as the incident took place due to heated arguments and altercations between them and could be termed as a result of sudden and grave provocation.
    (ii) There was no intention to cause death of the deceased.
    (iii) They had no common intention to cause death of the deceased as only Veeran had hit Daddu (deceased) with gandasa on head, without there being any premeditation amongst themselves.
    (iv) They were not aware that the injuries caused by them were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

    17. Also, the fine distinction between Section 299 and Section 300 IPC has been eloquently and beautifully carved out by Hon'ble Dr. Justice Arijit Pasayat in a recent judgment, after considering all the previous judgments of this Court. We may quote profitably the following paragraphs of the judgment in Thangaiya v. State of T.N (2005) 9 SCC 650:

    “17. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818, 1958 SCR 1495 for the applicability of clause ‘Thirdly’ is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause ‘Thirdly’ of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
    18. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818, 1958 SCR 1495 even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
    19. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons—being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
    20. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.”

    18. From the evidence of the doctors examined by the prosecution, it is clear that PW 6 Mayabai, PW 7 Trivenibai, and PW 12 Narmada alias Narbadi had also sustained injuries, which were caused by the other accused. Thus, Appellant 1 Veeran is held guilty of commission of the offences under Sections 304 Part I/149 IPC and the others are held guilty under Sections 323/149 IPC together with Sections 147 and 148 IPC. All of them are awarded the sentences already undergone by them i.e Veeran about 15 years and others more than 2½ years.

    19. From the upshot of the aforesaid discussions, it appears that the death caused by the accused was not premeditated, the accused had no common intention to cause death of the deceased, the injuries were not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to have caused his death, hence the instant case falls under Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC.

    20. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed in part. Appellant 1, Veeran is held guilty of commission of the offences under Sections 304 Part I/149, and under Sections 147 and 148 IPC and awarded the sentence already undergone whereas others are held guilty of commission of the offences under Sections 323/149, 147 and 148 IPC and awarded the sentences already undergone. The appellants be thus, released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

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    Comments

    Veeran And Others v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .
    (Apr 13, 2011)