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Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 271
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 149, Subsection (2) of the Act
  • Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 170 of the Act
  • Sections 149 and 170 of the Act
  • Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Section 149(2) of the Act
  • The Act (year not specified)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 271
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 149, Subsection (2) of the Act
  • Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 170 of the Act
  • Sections 149 and 170 of the Act
  • Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Section 149(2) of the Act
  • The Act (year not specified)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arose from two separate motor-accident claims decided by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) in Gujarat. In both matters the insurer had been granted permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to contest the claims on merits because the driver and/or owner of the offending vehicles did not effectively contest the proceedings. The Tribunal awarded compensation to the claimants, whereupon the insurer filed appeals before the Gujarat High Court.

The High Court dismissed those appeals solely on the ground that the MACT had not recorded reasons while granting permission under Section 170. The insurer sought relief from the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s approach and, in the alternative, questioning the quantum of compensation.

The Supreme Court clubbed the matters as Civil Appeal No. 1171 of 2002 (accident of 1991 resulting in death of a mason) and Civil Appeal No. 1172 of 2002 (accident of 1996 resulting in death of a 23-year-old bus conductor).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether failure by the MACT to record detailed reasons while granting permission to the insurer under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act invalidates that permission and justifies dismissal of the insurer’s appeals.
  2. Upon holding that the insurer was properly before the court, what is the just and reasonable amount of compensation payable in each claim petition, including the appropriate rate of interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurer)

  • Permission granted under Section 170 without recorded reasons was legally insufficient and could not form the basis for a merits appeal dismissal by the High Court.
  • In Civil Appeal 1171 (mason’s death):
    • The claimants (married son and daughter-in-law) were not fully dependent; therefore the Tribunal should have deducted 50 % — not one-third — of the deceased’s income towards personal expenses.
    • The sum of Rs 15,000 awarded for loss of estate was excessive.
  • In Civil Appeal 1172 (bus conductor’s death):
    • The Tribunal erred in assuming monthly income of Rs 5000 when actual salary proved was Rs 3000.
    • The overall compensation and 15 % interest rate were excessive.

No detailed arguments of the claimants/respondents were recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176 Guidelines on selection of multiplier and realistic assessment of income. Court affirmed use of multiplier 10 in the first appeal and relied on the decision for a “realistic” approach to probable future income in the second appeal.
U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362 Confirmation of multiplier method parameters. Used to justify the multiplier adopted by the MACT (10) in the first appeal.
Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav (1996) 3 SCC 179 Need to adopt a realistic—not speculative—future income while computing compensation. Guided the Supreme Court to peg the deceased conductor’s notional income at Rs 4000 per month rather than the Tribunal’s Rs 5000.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed examination of Sections 149(2) and 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It distinguished two distinct rights of an insurer:

  • Under Section 149(2), to repudiate or deny liability limited to policy defences.
  • Under Section 170, to contest the claim “on all or any grounds” available to the driver/owner, but only when (a) collusion is suspected or (b) the driver/owner fails to contest.

Because insurers are routinely impleaded in practice, applications under Section 170 are “routinely granted” when owners or drivers do not participate. In such circumstances, the Tribunal may legitimately pass even a brief or one-line order; insistence on elaborate reasoning would elevate form over substance.

In the present matters, the records clearly showed that the driver and owner either remained ex parte or took no effective steps. Consequently, the MACT’s grant of permission was justified. The High Court therefore erred in equating absence of recorded reasons with denial of permission and in dismissing the insurer’s appeals on that ground alone.

Having upheld the insurer’s locus standi, the Supreme Court proceeded to reassess compensation:

  • Civil Appeal 1171 (mason, age 55-58): Deduction for personal expenses corrected to 50 %; multiplier 10 retained; amounts under conventional heads rationalised; interest rate reduced from 15 % to 9 %.
  • Civil Appeal 1172 (bus conductor, age 23): Notional income fixed at Rs 4000 per month; deduction for personal expenses set at 25 % given larger family; multiplier 17 applied; conventional heads reduced to Rs 5000 each; interest cut to 9 %.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; HIGH COURT ORDERS SET ASIDE.

In Civil Appeal 1171, compensation stands at Rs 1,50,000 with 9 % interest from the date of petition to the date of deposit. In Civil Appeal 1172, compensation is fixed at Rs 6,27,000 with 9 % interest, to be apportioned 40 % to the widow, 20 % each to the two minor children, and 20 % to the mother, with appropriate directions for bank deposits.

Implications: The decision clarifies that where drivers or owners default, a brief order suffices to grant insurers permission under Section 170; High Courts cannot summarily dismiss insurer appeals merely for lack of elaborate reasons. While the judgment hints at the desirability of legislative reconsideration of Sections 149 and 170, it sets no new binding ratio beyond reinforcing a pragmatic, record-based approach to insurer participation.

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    National Insurance Company Limited v. Meghji Naran Soratiya And Others

    R.V Raveendran, J.— The insurer has challenged the dismissal of its appeals (against the awards of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal), by the Gujarat High Court on the sole ground that the Tribunal while granting permission to the insurer to contest the claim under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the Act”, for short) did not assign reasons for granting permission.

    2. Chapter XII of the Act relates to “Claims Tribunals”. Chapter XI relates to “insurance of motor vehicles against third-party risks”. The scheme, in particular, the provisions of Section 170 read with Section 149, contemplate the claimants in a motor accident claim filing the claim petition against the driver and the owner of the motor vehicle. The claimants are required to furnish the particulars relating to insurance and the name and address of the insurer, but are not required to implead the insurer as a party to the proceedings.

    3. Having regard to the statutory obligation imposed on the insurer to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third-party risks, the Tribunal is required to issue notice to the insurer about the initiation of the claim proceedings. When such notice is given, the insurer can seek impleadment only for the limited purpose of defending the action on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 149, that is, breach of a specified condition of the policy by the insured (owner of the vehicle) or voidness/invalidity of the policy by reason of the policy having been obtained by non-disclosure of material facts or by representation of any fact which was false in some material particular. An insurer is not entitled to contest the claim on merits when it received such notice under Section 149(2).

    4. However, Section 170 of the Act requires the Tribunal to implead the insurer as a party to contest the claim in the following two circumstances, where it is satisfied that:

    “170. (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made; or
    (b) the person against whom the claim is made, has failed to contest the claim.”

    5. The Tribunal is required to record the reasons in writing while directing the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings.

    6. On being so impleaded in pursuance of an order under Section 170 of the Act, the insurer, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 149, has the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. Thus, the insurer has two distinct and compartmentalised rights, while defending against claims.

    7. First, is where it wants to repudiate or deny liability as insurer, either on the ground that there is a breach of a specified condition of the policy or on the ground that the policy itself is void. Participation under Section 149(2) is only to repudiate or deny its liability under the insurance policy. Neither the issue of liability of the driver/owner nor the issue of quantum of compensation can be the subject-matter of contest by the insurer who is served a notice under Section 149(2).

    8. Second, is where the insurer is impleaded as a respondent with the right to contest the claim even on merits, either on account of the Tribunal being satisfied that there is collusion between the claimants and the owner/driver, or on account of the owner/driver who have been impleaded as respondents, failing to contest the proceedings. When the insurer is impleaded and permitted to contest under Section 170 of the Act, it can contest either the quantum of compensation claimed or even the liability of the driver/owner to pay compensation. This is in addition to, and without prejudice to its statutory right under Section 149(2) to repudiate or deny its liability.

    9. Section 170 therefore proceeds on the assumption that the insurer will not be a party to the claim proceedings and requires for the Tribunal to implead it as a party to contest the claim on merits in the two circumstances mentioned therein, namely, (a) collusion between claimants and driver/owner; and (b) non-contest by driver/owner. Where the insurer is not a party, and it becomes necessary to implead the insurer as a party-respondent under Section 170 of the Act, with right to contest the claim on merits, either on the application of the insurer or suo motu, the Tribunal has to make a brief order recording reasons showing that either of the two conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied for impleading the insurer as a party.

    10. But in practice, virtually in all claim petitions, the insurer is impleaded as a party-respondent along with the driver and owner. Consequently, many Tribunals instead of issuing the special notice under Section 149(2) notifying the insurer of the lodging of a claim against the insured (so as to give the insurer an option to deny the validity of the policy or repudiate its liability under the policy under any of the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act), issue regular notice to the insurer. As a result, in practice the insurers file their reply in all claim petitions. They raise the grounds available under Section 149(2), if such grounds exist. Otherwise they generally traverse the averments in the claim statement, though not permitted to contest on merits. But where one of the two circumstances mentioned in Section 170 exists, that is collusion or non-contest on the part of driver/owner, then the insurer who is already a party, files an application under Section 170 of the Act seeking permission to contest, which is routinely granted.

    11. Where the insurer is already a party-respondent in the claim petition and it makes an application seeking permission to contest the claim on merits on the ground that the driver and owner have failed to contest the claim, even a one-line order or non-reasoned order may be sufficient as the Tribunal can satisfy itself about the need to grant the permission by a perusal of the record, without anything more. But where the driver/owner are defending the claim, but the insurer seeks permission on the ground that there is collusion between the claimants and the driver/owner, it may be necessary for the Tribunal to record reasons to show that it is satisfied that there is collusion, before granting permission.

    12. Where applications under Section 170 of the Act filed by the insurer specifically alleged that the driver/owner failed to contest the claim and therefore it was seeking permission, the same is verifiable from the record. On such verification, the Tribunal may pass a separate order or even endorse the order “granted” on the application itself. Even if any reason was to be recorded, all that the Tribunal is required to say is: “Permission is granted as driver/owner have failed to contest the claim.” In such cases, failure to record reasons cannot render the order invalid or illegal as the record on the face of it would show the claim was not being defended by the driver/owner. Procedural requirements should not be stretched to absurd levels to defeat the ends of justice itself.

    13. There is a prevalent view that a rethink on Sections 149 and 170 of the Act is necessary. As noticed above, Section 149 contemplates claim petitions being filed only against the driver and the owner, and the driver/owner alone contesting the claim on merits. The insurer is required to satisfy the award made by the Tribunal, even if it is not impleaded as a party to the claim proceedings. But in practice, the insurer is invariably made a party to the claim proceedings, presumably to avoid any kind of delay.

    14. It is also a reality that drivers who are primarily liable seldom contest the proceedings either because of their financial incapacity or because they know that the burden will be borne vicariously by the owner and by the insurer under the policy of insurance. It is also a reality that many of the owners do not appear and contest the claim proceeding, or even if they appear and file a reply, do not defend the claim by effectively cross-examining the claimant's witnesses and by leading defence evidence. Owners are complacent as they have an insurance cover and know that the insurer will bear the liability. In practice therefore the insurer has to keep on goading the owner to contest the matter and place necessary evidence.

    15. Section 170 provides that if the driver/owner fail to contest the claim, the Tribunal may permit the insurer to contest the claim. But, what if the driver/owner file a reply but fail to effectively participate in the proceedings? What if the counsel for driver/owner are present but resort to only cursory cross-examination? What if the driver/owner do not at all lead defence evidence? What if there is a well-planned collusion that does not meet the eye? Where the insurer does not get permission under Section 170, there is a reasonable chance of the defence to the claim being far from satisfactory.

    16. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that there have been several false claims by the claimants in collusion with the owners/drivers of vehicle and/or police and/or doctors. The question raised is whether it is proper to prohibit the insurer, which is to bear the liability statutorily and contractually, from participating in the process of adjudication of liability and assessment of compensation? Or the statute having made the insurer directly liable to the claimants, should the insurer be given a direct right to contest the claim on merits without the technical requirement of permission? Should the insurer always be at the mercy of the owner to contest the claim? These are matters that invite serious consideration, particularly by Parliament and the Law Commission and other stakeholders. Be that as it may.

    17. Coming to these cases, we are satisfied that the grant of permission by the Tribunal to the insurer to contest the proceedings does not call for interference. In the first case, both the driver and the owner, though served, remained absent and did not contest the claim. In the second case, the driver was deleted from the array of parties as he could not be served and the owner entered appearance, but did not file statement of objections or contest the claim. The insurer specifically alleged in the applications under Section 170 that the driver/owner failed to contest the claim and therefore it was seeking permission.

    18. Even assuming that order granting permission required recording of reasons, if the order failed to record reasons on being challenged, the High Court could either set aside the permission granted, with a direction to the Tribunal to reconsider the applications and pass a reasoned order, or in special circumstances, itself consider whether the case warranted the grant of permission and decide the question. But under no circumstances, the Tribunal's permission to contest the claim, can be equated to or treated as denial of permission to contest the claim, merely on the ground that reasons were not recorded.

    19. Further, where the order granting the permission to contest is not challenged at all, the High Court cannot dismiss the appeal filed by the insurer on merits, on the ground that the Tribunal did not assign reasons while granting permission under Section 170 of the Act. Consequently, the orders of the High Court dismissing the appeals only on the ground that the Tribunal did not record reasons for granting permission, are liable to be set aside.

    20. Having regard to the fact that the two appeals relate to accidents which took place in the years 1991 and 1996 and the appeals have been pending in this Court for nearly seven years, we propose to consider and dispose of the appeals on merits, instead of relegating the parties to one more round of litigation before the High Court.

    Civil Appeal No. 1171 of 2002

    21. The claim related to the death of a mason aged 58 years in a motor accident which occurred in the year 1991. His son and daughter-in-law were the claimants and claimed a compensation of Rs 3 lakhs. The Tribunal after considering the evidence, held that the deceased was aged 55 to 58 years, that his income was Rs 2250 per month and that he was contributing Rs 1500 per month to the family. It however restricted the annual loss of dependency to Rs 15,000 instead of Rs 18,000 and by applying a multiplier of 10, arrived at the loss of dependency as Rs 1,50,000. It awarded Rs 15,000 towards loss of estate, Rs 5000 for funeral expenses, Rs 5000 towards medicines/treatment (as the deceased underwent treatment for a short period in a hospital before death). Thus it determined the compensation payable as Rs 1,75,000 and awarded the same with interest @ 15% per annum from the date of petition.

    22. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that when there was no clear and conclusive evidence that the married son and daughter-in-law were dependent on the deceased, the Tribunal erred in restricting the deduction towards the living/personal expenses of the deceased to only one-third. He also submitted that award of Rs 15,000 towards loss of estate was excessive. There is some merit in the said contentions. We will therefore reassess the compensation. The Tribunal found that the income of the deceased was Rs 2250 per month or Rs 27,000 per annum. There is no serious challenge to this finding.

    23. On the facts and circumstances of the case, 50% should have been deducted towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased and not one-third. Thus, the contribution to the family (or the saving by the deceased even assuming that the claimants were fully dependent) would have been Rs 13,500 per annum.

    24. There is nothing wrong in the multiplier applied (that is 10) as it is in consonance with the principles laid down in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176 and U.P SRTC v. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362. Therefore, the total loss of dependency would be Rs 1,35,000. By adding Rs 5000 each under the heads of loss of estate, funeral expenses and cost of treatment, the total compensation is determined as Rs 1,50,000.

    25. We find that the award of interest at 15% per annum was excessive. We are of the view that award of interest at 9% per annum would be appropriate, just and reasonable.

    26. We therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and reduce the award to Rs 1,50,000 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of petition to date of deposit.

    Civil Appeal No. 1172 of 2002

    27. The claim related to the death of a bus conductor aged 23 years in a motor accident in 1996. The claimants were his widow aged 22 years, two minor children aged three years and one year and parents. The claimants stated that the deceased was earning Rs 3000 per month plus Rs 600 as bhatta charges; that the deceased was pursuing his studies for Master's degree, and that he would have earned Rs 5000 to 6000 by securing other employment, after completing his studies.

    28. The Tribunal held that the deceased would have earned at least Rs 5000 per month on completing his studies. After deducting one-third towards personal and living expenditure of the deceased, it arrived at the contribution to the family as Rs 3334 per month or Rs 48,008 per annum. It applied a multiplier of 16 and arrived at the total loss of dependency as Rs 6,40,128. By adding Rs 20,000 towards loss of estate, Rs 10,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 2000 towards funeral expenses, the Tribunal determined the total compensation as Rs 6,72,128 and awarded the same with interest at 15% per annum from the date of petition till the date of deposit.

    29. The learned counsel for the insurer submitted that in view of the admissions and evidence that the deceased was getting a salary of Rs 3000, the Tribunal ought not to take the income at a figure more than Rs 3000 per month.

    30. But having regard to the fact that the claimants had produced evidence to show that the deceased had passed BA and was studying for securing an MA degree, we are of the view that the Tribunal was justified in assuming a higher income at the time of death instead of the actual earning at the time of his death. But the amount assessed as income cannot be a fancy figure. It should be realistic and should be close to the actual earning (vide Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176 and Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav (1996) 3 SCC 179, AIR 1996 SC 1274).

    31. On the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the income should be taken as Rs 4000 per month (Rs 48,000 per annum). Only one-fourth of the income (instead of the standard one-third) has to be deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, having regard to his larger family. Thus the contribution to the family would have been Rs 36,000 per annum. By applying a multiplier of 17, the loss of dependency would be Rs 6,12,000. By adding Rs 5000 each under the heads of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses, the total compensation would be Rs 6,27,000. As the rate of interest awarded (15% per annum) is excessive, we reduce it to 9% per annum.

    32. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and modify the award by reducing it to Rs 6,27,000 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of petition till date of relief. We direct that the compensation be apportioned in the ratio of 40% to the widow, 20% each to the two minor children and the mother. The Tribunal shall make appropriate consequential directions relating to bank deposits.

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    National Insurance Company Limited v. Meghji Naran Soratiya And Others
    (Feb 26, 2009)