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2009 INSC 930
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act
  • Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act
  • Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 930
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act
  • Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act
  • Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants, a group of slum-dwellers who had encroached upon CTS No. 61 (Survey No. 59), Village Mulgaon, entered into a written agreement dated 26-6-2005 with the respondents (developers) for their rehabilitation on CTS No. 82. Clause 3 of the agreement made the grant of an “eligibility certificate” by the competent authority—a prerequisite for declaring Plot 61 a slum area—a condition precedent; failure to obtain the certificate would automatically terminate the agreement.

The appellants did not secure the certificate. The respondents consequently began constructing a commercial building on CTS No. 82. The appellants sued in the City Civil Court, Bombay (Short Cause Suit No. 7 of 2009) seeking (i) a declaration that the agreements remained effective and (ii) an injunction restraining further construction. Their notice of motion for interim injunction was rejected on 16-2-2009 on the grounds that: (a) no eligibility certificate had been obtained; (b) CTS No. 82 lay in a commercial zone; and (c) specific performance was therefore unavailable. The Bombay High Court dismissed the appellants’ appeal. The present Supreme Court judgment resolves the appellants’ further challenge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, despite the appellants’ failure to obtain an eligibility certificate, the 2005 agreement remained enforceable so as to entitle them to 225 sq ft residential units on CTS No. 82.
  2. Whether the lower courts erred in refusing an interim injunction and in holding that only commercial, not residential, construction could lawfully take place on CTS No. 82.
  3. Whether the Supreme Court should admit and rely upon a post-judgment letter dated 8-5-2009 from the Municipal Corporation that suggested possible modification of the sanctioned plan under Regulation 57(4)(C), when that document had not been produced before the trial court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The courts below incorrectly concluded that no residential construction could be sanctioned on CTS No. 82; the Municipal Corporation’s letter dated 8-5-2009 shows that permission can be modified under Regulation 57(4)(C) of the 1991 Development Control Regulations.
  • Because residential construction is legally possible, Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act (which bars relief where a breach of contract cannot be specifically enforced) is inapplicable.
  • Consequently, the agreement remains subsisting and the appellants are entitled to the promised flats and to an injunction halting commercial construction.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The letter of 8-5-2009 is inadmissible additional evidence; it was procured after the impugned orders and was never placed before the trial court.
  • Clause 3 of the agreement makes the eligibility certificate a condition precedent; because the appellants never obtained it, the agreement automatically terminated and no rights subsist.
  • Two courts have concurrently so held, and 33 of the 66 original occupants have not even joined the suit, indicating acquiescence in the agreement’s termination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group (2005) 5 SCC 61 Criteria for grant of interim injunction: prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury. Reiterated that these three factors govern any injunction and found that the appellants failed to satisfy them.
Mandali Ranganna v. T. Ramachandra (2008) 11 SCC 1 Affirmation of the same injunction principles. Cited to reinforce the need to satisfy the triple test before an injunction can issue.
Shridevi v. Muralidhar (2007) 14 SCC 721 Same three-fold test for discretionary injunctions. Used cumulatively with the above cases to show appellants’ failure to establish entitlement to interim relief.
Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa (2003) 10 SCC 390 Appellate courts should not lightly interfere with discretionary orders of lower courts. Invoked to justify the Supreme Court’s reluctance to disturb concurrent discretionary refusals of injunction.
U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Brothers, Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 249 Appellate interference with discretion permissible only when exercise is unreasonable or capricious. Quoted (via Manjunath) to underscore deference owed to the trial court’s discretionary order.
Osenton & Co. v. Johnston, 1942 AC 130 (HL) Classic statement on limits of appellate reversal of discretionary orders. Referenced parenthetically to illustrate the same principle of restrained appellate review.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Condition precedent unmet. The Court held that the eligibility certificate was “sine qua non” for enforcement of the agreement; Clause 3 explicitly terminated the agreement upon failure to obtain it. As the appellants never obtained the certificate, no contractual rights survived.

2. Statutory zoning restriction. Both lower courts found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that CTS No. 82 was sanctioned only for commercial development. Even assuming Regulation 57(4)(C) allowed later modification, no such modification had been obtained; therefore residential construction remained prohibited.

3. Inadmissibility of new evidence. The appellants’ reliance on the Municipal Corporation’s 8-5-2009 letter was rejected because it was not part of the trial record and no application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC had been made. Supreme Court Rules bar reliance on such material without leave.

4. Injunction standards unmet. Applying the triad of prima facie case–balance of convenience–irreparable injury from Bombay Dyeing and allied cases, the Court found the appellants lacked a prima facie right (agreement already terminated) and thus could not meet the threshold for interim relief.

5. Appellate deference. Citing Manjunath Anandappa and related authorities, the Court emphasised that discretionary orders of lower courts should not be disturbed absent unreasonableness or caprice, conditions not met here.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS (₹10,000)

Immediate Effect: The refusal of an injunction stands; the respondents may continue commercial construction on CTS No. 82, and the appellants obtain no right to residential units there.

Broader Implications: The decision reinforces (a) strict enforcement of contractual conditions precedent in rehabilitation agreements, and (b) the limited scope of Supreme Court review over discretionary interim orders, without creating new substantive precedent.

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    Sonu Babu Bhambid And Others v. Dream Developers And Others

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted. The appellants herein are slum-dwellers. They and/or their predecessors encroached upon a property bearing CTS No. 61, Survey No. 59 in Village Mulgaon. Indisputably, an agreement was entered into by and between the parties hereto with regard to their rehabilitation on CTS No. 82, the relevant conditions whereof read as under:

    “3. Eligibility
    There are a number of huts which are existing on the slum property, whose names of occupant and structures are appearing in 1995 voters' list and are occupying the same till date. It will be the responsibility and obligation of the occupant to obtain eligibility certificate by the competent authority. In case the occupant fails to get such certificate, this agreement will ipso facto come to an end and the occupant will not have any rights against the party of the other part. The eligibility certificate to be issued by authority concerned shall be final and binding.
    4. Consent
    Slum-dwellers hereby agree and give consent to participate in SPA as per DCR(10), Appendix IV. If, however, the developer is unable to implement SRA scheme due to any reasons, the occupant will still get the allotment of 225 sq ft carpet area on ownership basis from the developer in case the proposal will be sanctioned by MCGM. In other words, the interest of the occupant is safeguarded from all angles. The occupant is hereby aware and agrees to shift into permanent ultimate accommodation admeasuring 225 sq ft carpet area which will be consisted (sic constructed) for them on CTS No. 82, Village Mulgaon.”

    2. Inter alia on the premise that the appellants failed to obtain the eligibility certificate, the respondents started construction of commercial building on Survey No. 82.

    3. The appellants filed a suit in the City Civil Court at Bombay which was marked as Short Cause Suit No. 7 of 2009 praying inter alia for a declaration:

    “(a) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to declare that the agreements under the head as ‘Agreement between Slum-dwellers and Developer’ as identical to Exhibit B to the plaint entered into on different dates between Defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff are effective, subsisting and binding on the parties and accordingly the plaintiffs are entitled to be provided a flat of carpet area of 225 sq ft in the plot CTS No. 62 situated at Moolgaon, Andheri (E), Mumbai;
    (b) that pending the hearing and final disposal of this suit any construction activities in view of the IOD dated 18-10-2007, CC dated 18-10-2007 and sanctioned plan dated 19-7-2007 on CTS No. 82 situated at Moolgaon, Andheri (E), Mumbai be stayed in the interest of justice.”

    4. In the said suit, the appellants took out a notice of motion for grant of injunction for the following terms:

    “(a) that pending the hearing and final disposal of this suit, any construction activities in view of the IOD dated 19-7-2007, CC dated 8-2-2008 and sanctioned plan dated 19-7-2007 on CTS No. 82 situated at Moolgaon, Andheri (E), Mumbai be stayed in the interest of justice.”

    5. The learned trial Judge by an order dated 16-2-2009 opined that as the appellants failed to obtain an essentiality certificate and CTS No. 61 was not declared as slum area, the question of taking recourse to the slum rehabilitation scheme did not arise. It was, however, held:

    “… I find much substance in the submissions made by the learned advocate for the defendant that no residential premises can be constructed on CTS No. 82 as it comes under the commercial zone and there is permission in respect of the construction of commercial premises only on CTS No. 82 by the Municipal Corporation and as performance of the agreement between the defendants and slum-dwellers cannot be specifically enforced, the reliefs as prayed in the notice of motion cannot be granted….”

    An appeal preferred thereagainst before the High Court has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.

    6. Mr V. Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would contend that the City Civil Court and consequently the High Court committed a serious error in holding that no residential building could be constructed on CTS No. 82. In this connection, our attention has been drawn to a Letter dated 8-5-2009 issued by Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai addressed to the Secretary, Durga Nagar Rahiwasi Sangh that in case constructions of the buildings are not commenced, the permission can be modified in terms of Regulation 57(4)(C) of the Development Control Regulations, 1991 and in that view of the matter as construction of a residential building is not prohibited by law, the provisions of Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act will have no application. Mr Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, objected to consideration of the additional document viz. the Letter dated 8-5-2009 on the premise that the same was procured subsequent to the passing of the impugned order.

    7. The appellants are said to have been in possession of the property in question as trespassers. They are said to have acquired indefeasible title thereto by alleged possession for more than thirty years. It is not in dispute that for the purpose of attracting the rehabilitation scheme the area in question should be declared as a slum area. It is only for the said purpose, the appellants were required to obtain the eligibility certificate. Grant of eligibility certificate was, thus, sine qua non for enforcement of the agreement dated 26-6-2005. As Clause 3 of the said agreement categorically provides that in case the occupants fail to get such certificate, the agreement would ipso facto come to an end and the occupants would have no right against the party of the other part, we are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to have committed any legal infirmity in passing the impugned order.

    8. The respondents contend that as the eligibility certificate has not been obtained by the appellants, the agreement itself has come to an end. A finding to that effect has concurrently been arrived at by both the courts below.

    9. Furthermore, indisputably, 66 persons were occupying the same Plot No. 61. The suit, however, has been filed by 33 persons. The rest 33 persons, thus, have accepted that they had no right under the agreement.

    10. Consent of the appellants for their rehabilitation on CTS No. 82, whereupon strong reliance has been placed by Mr Shekhar, in our opinion, is not of much significance. The consent on the part of the appellants was merely one of the terms of the contract. But, if in absence of any eligibility certificate, CTS No. 61 could not be declared to be a slum area, the scheme of rehabilitation and/or relocation of the occupants thereof, in our opinion, would not arise.

    11. We will assume that in terms of Regulation 57(4)(C) of the Development Control Regulations, 1991 modification in the matter of the nature of construction was permissible in law. It is one thing to say that such modification can be directed to be granted but it is another thing to say that unless such an order is obtained, the occupants of the land would not be entitled to raise any construction other than the one provided for in the Regulations itself.

    12. The learned City Civil Court has categorically held that only commercial constructions could be raised on CTS No. 82. The parties to the agreement did not file any application for modification of that plan. So long such modification is not granted, in our opinion, the restriction noted by the courts below shall remain operative. It is in that sense the statutory interdict shall have a role to play in terms whereof the respondents could not be permitted to raise constructions for residential purposes.

    13. In any event, we, however, must notice that the appellants herein had merely filed an application for bringing the additional document on record. Indisputably, the said document was not filed before the City Civil Court. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the appellants to file an application for permission to file the said document by way of additional evidence in terms of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court Rules prohibit placing reliance upon any document which was not part of the records of the courts below, save and except with the permission of the court.

    14. A court of law before passing an order of injunction must take into consideration three relevant factors viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. This Court in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group (2005) 5 SCC 61 held as under:

    “22. This Court at this stage is concerned with an interim order passed by the High Court. The writ petition is still to be heard. Affidavits between the parties are yet to be exchanged. The objection as regards maintainability of the writ petition is also required to be finally determined by the High Court itself. This Court at this stage cannot, thus, enter into all the contentious questions raised in these appeals. But, there cannot be doubt or dispute whatsoever that before an interim order is passed and in particular in a public interest litigation, the court must consider the question as regards existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience as also the question as to whether the writ petitioners shall suffer an irreparable injury, if the injunction sought for is refused. The courts normally do not pass an interlocutory order which would affect a person without giving an opportunity of hearing to him.”

    (See also Mandali Ranganna v. T. Ramachandra (2008) 11 SCC 1 and Shridevi v. Muralidhar (2007) 14 SCC 721.)

    15. Furthermore, when a court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction, the appellate court would be slow to interfere therewith unless sufficient and cogent reasons exist therefor. In Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa (2003) 10 SCC 390 this Court held:

    “36. It is now also well settled that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below.
    37. In U.P Coop. Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros. AIR 1967 SC 249 the law is stated in the following terms: (AIR p. 253, para 8)
    ‘8. It is well established that where the discretion vested in the court under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act has been exercised by the lower court the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. As is often said, it is ordinarily not open to the appellate court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the trial Judge; but if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts then it would certainly be open to the appellate court to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion. This principle is well established; but, as has been observed by Viscount Simon, L.C, in Osenton (Charles) & Co. v. Johnston 1942 AC 130, (1941) 2 All ER 245 (HL), AC at p. 138:
    “… The law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by the Judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case.” ’ ”

    16. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000.

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    Sonu Babu Bhambid And Others v. Dream Developers And Others
    (Jul 21, 2009)