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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 679
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 242 of the Bihar Education Code
  • Section Not specified, Subsection Not specified of the Juvenile Justice Act
  • Section 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 5 thereof was save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act
  • Article 21 of the Constitution
  • Section 68 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
  • Section 6 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 679
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 242 of the Bihar Education Code
  • Section Not specified, Subsection Not specified of the Juvenile Justice Act
  • Section 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 5 thereof was save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act
  • Article 21 of the Constitution
  • Section 68 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
  • Section 6 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1 is being tried for the murder of Tribhuvan Singh in Nava Nagar P.S. Case No. 102 of 2003. He claimed juvenility, producing (i) an admission register from Government Secondary School, Nava Nagar and (ii) a school-leaving certificate from Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav High School, both reflecting his date of birth as 10-2-1987. The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) rejected the claim on the basis of a Medical Board’s ossification report estimating his age at 20–22 years on 10-2-2005 and remitted the matter to the regular court. On revision, the Patna High Court set aside the JJB’s decision and declared the respondent a juvenile. The present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by the deceased victim’s uncle challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for determining juvenility under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and its 2001 Rules, priority should be given to a date-of-birth entry in the first school attended or to a subsequent medical (ossification) report.
  2. Whether the school admission register met the admissibility requirements of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872, notwithstanding the appellant’s contention that it is not a public document.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The High Court erred in preferring school records over the Medical Board’s opinion, contrary to Section 35 of the Evidence Act.
  • Entries in a school register are not public documents and must be proved to have been made at the guardian’s instance; reliance was placed on Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit and Raja Janaki Nath Roy v. Jyotish Chandra Acharya Chowdhury.
  • The High Court failed to critically evaluate the testimonies of PW-2 (school teacher) and the respondent’s father regarding the register’s authenticity.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The admission register from the first school attended was duly proved and, under Rule 22(5) of the 2001 Rules, enjoys priority over medical opinion.
  • Even accepting the Medical Board’s assessment, a recognised ±2-year margin of error would still place the respondent below 18 on the date of offence.
  • Under the Bihar Education Code (a statutory instrument), the school register is entitled to a presumption of correctness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604 School registers are not public documents; entries must be proved under Section 35 Evidence Act. Court accepted the principle but held that, in this case, the register was duly proved by PW-2 and the respondent’s father.
Raja Janaki Nath Roy v. Jyotish Chandra Acharya Chowdhury, AIR 1941 Cal 41 Similar evidentiary requirements for school records. Relied on by appellant; Court distinguished on facts, noting compliance with evidentiary standards.
Jaya Mala v. Govt. of J&K, (1982) 2 SCC 538 Radiological age determination may have a two-year margin of error. Used to show that even the Medical Board’s age estimate could accommodate juvenility.
Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584 Uniform standard for applying Section 35 in civil and criminal contexts. Cited to reinforce that properly proved school records are admissible in criminal proceedings.
Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 223 When school documents are found forged, medical evidence may prevail. Distinguished; here the documents were genuine, so medical evidence was secondary.
Vimal Chadha v. Vikas Choudhary, (2008) 15 SCC 216 Remand for age determination in accordance with rules and CrPC Section 472 when records are doubtful. Referenced to show that such remand is unnecessary where authentic records exist.
Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551 Model Rules give way to statutory rules once framed. Invoked to underline that the 2001 statutory Rules (Rule 22) govern the priority of evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting that Rule 22(5) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001 gives chronological priority to a birth certificate from the first school attended; medical opinion is to be sought only when such a document is unavailable or its genuineness is in doubt. In the present case:

  • The original admission register from Government Secondary School, Nava Nagar was produced, showing the respondent’s date of birth as 10-2-1987. PW-2 (a teacher) and the respondent’s father testified to its authenticity, satisfying Section 35 of the Evidence Act.
  • The xerox copy from the second school was disregarded for technical reasons, but that did not affect the primary register’s probative value.
  • The Medical Board’s report (age 20–22 on 10-2-2005) was not preferred because (a) it was secondary under Rule 22(5) and (b) even applying the ±2-year margin endorsed in Jaya Mala, the respondent would still be a juvenile on the date of offence (10-9-2003).
  • Previous authorities (Birad Mal Singhvi, Ravinder Singh Gorkhi) were reconciled by finding that the evidentiary prerequisites for admission registers had been met.
  • The Court rejected the appellant’s submission that the register was not proved, observing that both documentary and oral evidence established its reliability.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the Patna High Court’s order declaring Respondent 1 a juvenile on the date of occurrence.

Implications: The respondent will now be dealt with under the juvenile justice framework rather than the regular criminal justice system. The judgment reinforces that, under Rule 22(5), authentic school records take precedence over medical opinion in age determination, offering clear guidance to Juvenile Justice Boards and trial courts.

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    Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh Alias Chhotu Singh And Another

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted. Respondent 1 is facing trial in Nava Nagar PS Case No. 102 of 2003 on the charge of committing murder of one Tribhuvan Singh. The appellant before us is the uncle of the deceased.

    2. Before the learned trial Judge, a plea was raised by Respondent 1 that he was a juvenile. In support of the said plea, entries in the admission register/certificate in Government Secondary School, Nava Nagar, Buxar, in which he took admission on 22-1-1996 and studied up to 31-12-1999, were produced. The said certificate was issued on 23-2-2000, the relevant portion whereof reads as under:

    “(1) Name of student : Prabhat Ranjan (2) Father's/guardian's name : Shri Raj Kishore Singh (3) Permanent address : Village Amir Pur, Post Nava Nagar, District Buxar (Bihar) (4) Date of first admission in the school : 22-1-1996 * * * (7) Date of birth in admission register (in number and words) : : 10-2-1987 Tenth February, eighty-seven (8) Date of leaving the school : 31-12-1999 (9) At the time of leaving school studying in which class : 8th”

    The said admission register/certificate, thus, shows that the date of birth of the accused is 10-2-1987.

    3. A xerox copy of another certificate dated 12-11-2003 was also brought on record which was issued by the Principal, Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav High School. The said certificate also shows the date of birth of the first respondent to be 10-2-1987. It was proved by a teacher of the said school, Shri Raj Kumar who examined himself as PW 2 as also by the father of the accused, namely, Raj Kishore Singh. The learned Magistrate, however, appointed a Medical Board. The Medical Board, in its report dated 10-2-2005, inter alia, upon taking the ossification test, estimated his age to be within 20 to 22 years. By an order dated 3-8-2005, the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Patna held that on the date of occurrence i.e 10-9-2003, the age of Respondent 1 was more than 20 years stating:

    “Considering the evidence on record, there is only evidence which is the report of the Medical Board. The statement of the father of the accused and the teacher of the school supported with the certificate which are not conclusive and sufficient under the rules of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001. Accordingly, on the basis of the report of the Medical Board and on physical appearance of the accused and conclusion arrived at that this accused is not a juvenile at this stage nor at the time of alleged commission of the offence. Accordingly, this case record is remitted back to the court concerned for disposal in accordance with law.”

    4. Respondent 1 filed a revision application thereagainst before the High Court of Patna which, by reason of the impugned order dated 17-5-2006, was allowed by a learned Single Judge, holding:

    “[i] Considering the submission made by the parties and the decision relied on by them, find that the evidence which was produced by the petitioner before the Juvenile Justice Court was sufficient for the determination of his age. The certificate granted by the Headmaster of Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav High School stating the date of birth of the petitioner as 10-2-1987 was issued on 23-2-2000 and the date of occurrence is 10-9-2003, much after issuance of certificate by the Headmaster of Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav High School where the date of birth of the petitioner has been mentioned as 10-2-1987.
    [ii] In support of the age, the admission register of the school was also produced wherein the petitioner's name has been mentioned in Sl. No. 134. There also the date of birth of the petitioner has been mentioned as 10-2-1987 and the date of issuance of school leaving certificate is mentioned as 23-2-2000. There is no reason for doubting or suspecting the genuineness of these two documents. In the impugned order also no reason has been assigned for disbelieving the transfer certificate and the photocopy of the certificate issued from Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav High School, Nava Nagar.
    [iii] Rule 22(5) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001, order of priority has been given to the certificate of birth issued by the school in preference to the opinion of the duly constituted Medical Board. Only in case of some dispute regarding genuineness of these documents, the Juvenile Justice Board can seek the opinion of the duly constituted Medical Board for ascertaining the age of an accused for declaring him juvenile.
    [iv] Considering the fact that there is nothing on record to disbelieve these documents the evidence of the father as well as teacher, the Juvenile Justice Board should have decided in favour of the petitioner and declared him juvenile. The Apex Court in similar matters has also decided that the liberal view should be taken by the Juvenile Justice Board as well as courts while ascertaining the age of accused for the purpose of declaring him juvenile. Relying upon the certificate produced before the Juvenile Justice Board and the evidence of the father and the teacher, certainly the petitioner was a juvenile on the date of occurrence.
    [v] Accordingly the order dated 3-8-2005 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Patna City in JJB No. 492 of 2005 is set aside and this application is allowed.”

    5. Mr Praneet Ranjan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would contend:

    (i) Having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the High Court committed a serious error in relying upon the entries made in the school register in preference to the opinion of the Medical Board.
    (ii) An entry in regard to date of birth of a student recorded in admission register, being not a public document, must be proved to have been recorded at the instance of a person who was the guardian of the student. Strong reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit 1988 Supp SCC 604 and a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Raja Janaki Nath Roy v. Jyotish Chandra Acharya Chowdhury AIR 1941 Cal 41.
    (iii) As the age of a person required to be determined by a person having regard to the provisions contained in Section 35 of the Evidence Act both in civil as also in criminal proceedings involve the same legal principle, the High Court failed to consider the depositions of the witnesses examined in the enquiry, namely, Raj Kumar and Raj Kishore Singh, in their proper perspective.

    6. Mr Shishir Pinaki, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent 1, on the other hand, urged:

    (a) As the admission register of the school in respect of Respondent 1 showing his date of birth has been proved, the impugned order is unassailable.
    (b) It was, however, submitted that in the event the medical report is taken into consideration [which otherwise may not be necessary in view of Rule 22(5) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001], the respondent's age would be 18 years having regard to the fact that an error of two years or (sic on) either side is possible.
    (c) The Bihar Education Code having a statutory status, as Article 242 whereof provides for maintenance of a school register, presumption of correctness in respect thereof should be raised.

    7. Determination of age of a person sometimes poses a difficult question. In the absence of any statutory rule having been framed, no doubt, the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act were required to be strictly complied with.

    8. Section 6 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 deals with the power of the Juvenile Justice Board which is extracted below:

    “6. Powers of Juvenile Justice Board.—(1) Where a Board has been constituted for any district or a group of districts, such Board shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force but save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, have power to deal exclusively with all proceedings under this Act relating to juvenile in conflict with law.
    (2) The powers conferred on the Board by or under this Act may also be exercised by the High Court and the Court of Session, when the proceeding comes before them in appeal, revision or otherwise.”

    9. Respondent 1 claims himself to be a juvenile. An enquiry was directed to be conducted. In the said enquiry, evidently, the original register maintained by Government Secondary School, Nava Nagar was produced. Date of birth of the said respondent was stated to be 10-2-1987. Before us, a contention was raised as to whether Column 5 thereof was filled up or not. An affidavit was filed to show that Column 5 is the statement on the declaration of the father. We would, therefore, proceed on the said basis. Respondent 1 was admitted in Government Secondary School, Nava Nagar on 22-1-1996. He left the school on 31-12-1999. Certificate was issued on 23-2-2000 so as to enable him to take admission in another school, namely, Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav High School. We may not consider the certificate granted by the Principal of the latter school as only a xerox copy thereof was filed inasmuch as the original having not been produced, the same was inadmissible in evidence.

    10. Before the courts below, Shri Raj Kumar, a teacher of Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav High School examined himself. Although he was not present when Respondent 1 was admitted in the school, but he proved the contents of the admission register. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the contents of the admission register were not proved. Raj Kishore Singh, father of Respondent 1 also examined himself. He also proved the date of birth of Respondent 1.

    11. In terms of the provisions of Section 68 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, the Central Government has framed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001. Rule 22 of the said Rules provides for the procedure to be followed in respect of determination of the age of a person. It indicates that the opinion of the Medical Board is to be preferred only when a date of birth certificate from the school first attended is not available.

    12. The condition laid down in Section 35 of the Evidence Act for proving an entry pertaining to the age of a student in a school admission register is to be considered for the purpose of determining the relevance thereof. But in this case, the said condition must be held to have been satisfied. An entry in a school register may not be a public document and, thus, must be proved in accordance with law, as has been held by this Court in Birad Mal Singhvi but in this case the said entry has been proved.

    13. Even if we had to consider the medical report, it is now well known that an error of two years in determining the age is possible. In Jaya Mala v. Govt. of J&K (1982) 2 SCC 538, AIR 1982 SC 1297 this Court held:

    “9. … However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side.”

    14. There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever that the same standard is required to be applied for the purpose of Section 35 of the Evidence Act both in civil as also criminal proceedings, as was held by this Court in Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P (2006) 5 SCC 584, stating:

    “38. The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.”

    However, the medical opinion rendered in the present case corroborates the entry made in the register. Admission register of the school having been proved in accordance with law, we do not see any reason as to why the same should not be taken into consideration.

    15. We are not oblivious of the fact that it is difficult to lay down a law as to whether in a case of this nature, the lower or the upper age or the average age should be taken into consideration. Each case depends on its own facts. In Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar (2008) 15 SCC 223, (2008) 3 Scale 348 this Court, upon consideration of a large number of decisions, opined:

    “23. The appellant herein had produced a large number of documents to prove his age purported to be as on the date of commission of the crime. The genuineness of the school certificate and the horoscope had been questioned. The school certificate produced by the appellant was found to be forged and fabricated and as a matter of fact a criminal case was directed to be instituted against the Head of the Institution.
    24. The Court, therefore, had no other option but to determine the age on the basis of the medical reports. Both the medical reports dated 24-4-2001 and 29-6-2001 opined the age of the appellant between 18 and 19 years. In terms of the first medical report, the age of the appellant came to be 18 years 5 months 8 days and in terms of the second medical report, it came to be between 18 and 19 years. The High Court opined that the appellant on 1-4-2001 was definitely above 18 years of age and not below 18 years of age.
    25. The courts have considered this aspect of the matter on earlier occasions also. If, thus, on the basis of several factors including the fact that school leaving certificate and the horoscope produced by the appellant were found to be forged and fabricated and having regard to the two medical reports the courts below have found the age of the appellant as on 1-4-2001 to be above 18 years, we are of the opinion that no exception thereto can be taken.”

    In the present case, however, the documents produced by Respondent 1 were not found to be forged, fabricated or otherwise inadmissible in law. If a document is proved to be genuine and satisfies the requirements of law, it should be, subject to just exceptions, relied upon. However, in Vimal Chadha v. Vikas Choudhary (2008) 15 SCC 216, (2008) 8 Scale 608 this Court remitted the matter back for consideration of the age in terms of the rules keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    16. Mr Praneet Ranjan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon certain observations made by one of us in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 to contend that model rules have no application, but as the statutory rules have come into force the procedure laid down therein should be followed.

    17. As in this case, the date of birth entered into the school register has been proved, we are of the opinion that there is no reason as to why the same should not be given effect to. We, therefore, find no legal infirmity in the order passed by the High Court. This appeal is dismissed.

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    Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh Alias Chhotu Singh And Another
    (May 5, 2009)