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2008 INSC 345
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Disposition
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • this Act
  • Section 9 of the Act
  • Section 2(b) of the Act
  • Section 2(b), Section 6 of the Act
  • Section 2(b) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 345
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • this Act
  • Section 9 of the Act
  • Section 2(b) of the Act
  • Section 2(b), Section 6 of the Act
  • Section 2(b) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Several employers challenged determinations made by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) that sums paid to employees on encashment of earned leave must be treated as part of “basic wages” under Section 2(b) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, thereby attracting pro-rata employer contributions under Section 6. The Employers’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal disagreed with the Commissioner, holding that leave-encashment amounts are not basic wages, but it noted that the Bombay High Court had taken the opposite view and advised that the matter be carried to the Karnataka High Court.

The Commissioner accordingly filed writ petitions before a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court, who allowed the petitions and reinstated the Commissioner’s demands. The present appellants (the employers) filed writ appeals before a Division Bench of the same High Court, which dismissed the appeals by a common judgment. The employers then approached the Supreme Court of India, resulting in the present group of civil appeals decided by Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amount received by an employee on encashment of earned leave constitutes “basic wages” within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, thereby requiring employer and employee contributions under Section 6 of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The Karnataka High Court merely followed Hindustan Lever Employees Union v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner without independent analysis.
  • The Madras High Court in Thiru Arooran Sugar Ltd. v. Provident Fund Commissioner has taken the contrary view that leave encashment is not part of basic wages.
  • The issue was settled by the Supreme Court in Bridge & Roof Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and Jay Engg. Works Ltd. v. Union of India, which establish that only payments universally, necessarily and ordinarily paid to all employees constitute basic wages.
  • Invoking the label of “beneficial legislation” cannot expand the statutory definition when its meaning is clear.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Even applying the principles laid down in Bridge & Roof, the Bombay High Court’s interpretation—accepted by the Karnataka High Court—correctly concludes that leave-encashment amounts form part of basic wages.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hindustan Lever Employees Union v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, (1995) 2 LLJ 279 (Bom) Held that leave-encashment dues should be included for provident-fund contribution. Cited as the view adopted by the Karnataka High Court; ultimately declined to be followed.
Thiru Arooran Sugar Ltd. v. Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras High Court, judgment dated 12-10-2007 Took the view that leave-encashment amounts are not part of basic wages. Relied upon by the appellants to show judicial divergence; consistent with Supreme Court’s conclusion.
Bridge & Roof Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1474; (1963) 3 SCR 978 Laid down the “universality” test: payments universally, necessarily and ordinarily paid to all employees are basic wages; contingent or special payments are excluded. Formed the primary doctrinal basis for holding that leave-encashment payments—being contingent and optional—are excluded from basic wages.
Jay Engg. Works Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1480; (1963) 3 SCR 995 Clarified that only payments analogous to allowances listed in Section 2(b)(ii) may be excluded; production bonus beyond the “norm” is not basic wage. Quoted to reinforce the distinction between universal wages and incentive-based or contingent payments.
TI Cycles of India v. M.K. Gurumani, (2001) 7 SCC 204 Held that incentive wages for extra output are excluded from basic wages. Used by the Court to analogise leave-encashment amounts to incentive payments dependent on contingencies.
Daily Partap v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, (1998) 8 SCC 90 Emphasised the necessity of “uniform treatment” and the absence of dependence on individual work for inclusion in basic wages. Supported the conclusion that leave-encashment sums fail the uniform-treatment test.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court undertook a textual and doctrinal analysis of Sections 2(b) and 6 of the Act in light of the principles established in Bridge & Roof and subsequent cases:

  • Universality Test. “Basic wages” encompass only those emoluments that are “universally, necessarily and ordinarily” paid to all employees. Payments contingent on individual choices or circumstances are excluded.
  • Nature of Leave-Encashment Payments. Encashment occurs only when an employee opts to forgo available leave, often at retirement or upon death. Because some employees avail themselves of leave and others do not, the payment lacks universality and is contingent on personal choice and uncertain future events.
  • Comparison with Incentive Wages. Drawing on TI Cycles, the Court likened leave-encashment payments to incentive wages or overtime allowances—amounts triggered by specific, non-universal contingencies—and therefore outside the statutory definition.
  • Beneficial Legislation Argument Rejected. The Court observed that the doctrine of “beneficial legislation” aids interpretation only where ambiguity exists; where the statutory text and prior binding precedent are clear, extending the benefit would amount to “misplaced philanthropy.”

Holding and Implications

HELD: Leave-encashment amounts are not part of “basic wages” under Section 2(b) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The appeals were accordingly allowed, and the Commissioner’s contrary demands were set aside.

Implications: Employers are not required to make provident-fund contributions on sums paid for encashed leave. Any contributions already remitted may be adjusted against future liabilities, but no refunds will be ordered because the provident-fund is a running fund. The judgment harmonises the law with long-standing Supreme Court precedent and resolves conflicting High Court decisions on the issue.

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    Manipal Academy Of Higher Education v. Provident Fund Commissioner .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— In all these appeals common points of law are involved and therefore they are disposed of by a common judgment.

    2. The dispute in each case is whether the amount received by encashing the earned leave is a part of “basic wage” under Section 2(b) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (in short “the Act”) requiring pro rata employer's contribution. In each case the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (in short “the Commissioner”) held that the amount received on encashment of earned leave has to be reckoned for the purpose of Section 2(b) of the Act. Accordingly, demands were raised. Appeal was preferred before the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (in short “the Tribunal”) which held that it is not a part of basic wages. However, it was observed that a different view was taken by the Bombay High Court and, therefore, the respondent in the appeals i.e the Commissioner should take up the matter before the Karnataka High Court. Accordingly, writ petitions were filed before the Karnataka High Court. A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions and set aside the impugned orders. The present appellant preferred writ appeals before the Karnataka High Court which came to be dismissed by the common impugned judgment.

    3. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained as it merely followed the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Hindustan Lever Employees Union v. Regl. Provident Fund Commr. (1995) 2 LLJ 279 (Bom) It is pointed out that different view has been taken by the Madras High Court in Thiru Arooran Sugar Ltd. v. Provident Fund Commr., Employees Provident Funds Organisation and connected cases disposed of by judgment dated 12-10-2007. It is submitted that the controversy was settled long back in Bridge & Roofs Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1474, (1963) 3 SCR 978 which was followed in Jay Engg. Works Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1480, (1963) 3 SCR 995; and the concept of beneficial legislation is misplaced philanthropy where the statutes and principles underlying it are clear and the question is no longer res integra.

    4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that even applying Bridge & Roofs case AIR 1963 SC 1474, (1963) 3 SCR 978 the view taken by the Bombay High Court and the Karnataka High Court in the present impugned judgment reflects the correct position in law.

    5. Sections 2(b) and 6 of the Act read as follows:

    “2. (b) ‘basic wages’ means all emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave or on holidays with wages in either case in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment and which are paid or payable in cash to him, but does not include—
    (i) the cash value of any food concession;
    (ii) any dearness allowance (that is to say, all cash payments by whatever name called paid to an employee on account of a rise in the cost of living), house rent allowance, overtime allowance, bonus, commission or any other similar allowance payable to the employee in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment;
    (iii) any presents made by the employer;
    6. Contributions and matters which may be provided for in Schemes.—The contribution which shall be paid by the employer to the Fund shall be eight and one-third per cent of the basic wages, dearness allowance and retaining allowance (if any), for the time being payable to each of the employees (whether employed by him directly or by or through a contractor) and the employee's contribution shall be equal to the contribution payable by the employer in respect of him and may, if any employee so desires and if the Scheme makes provision therefor, be an amount not exceeding eight and one-third per cent of his basic wages dearness allowance and retaining allowance (if any), subject to the condition that the employer shall not be under an obligation to pay any contribution over and above his contribution payable under this section:
    Provided that in its application to any establishment or class of establishments which the Central Government, after making such enquiry as it deems fit, may, by notification in the Official Gazette specify, this section shall be subject to the modification that for the words ‘eight and one-third per cent’, at both the places where they occur, the words ‘ten per cent’ shall be substituted:
    Provided further that where the amount of any contribution payable under this Act involves a fraction of a rupee, the Scheme may provide for the rounding off of such fraction to the nearest rupee, half of a rupee or quarter of a rupee.
    Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section dearness allowance shall be deemed to include also the cash value of any food concession allowed to the employee.
    Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section ‘retaining allowance’ means an allowance payable for the time being to an employee of any factory or other establishment during any period in which the establishment is not working, for retaining his services.”

    6. In Bridge & Roofs case AIR 1963 SC 1474, (1963) 3 SCR 978 it was inter alia observed as follows: (AIR pp. 1476-77, paras 7-8)

    “7. The main question therefore that falls for decision is as to which of these two rival contentions is in consonance with Section 2(b). There is no doubt that ‘basic wages’ as defined therein means all emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave with wages in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment and which are paid or payable in cash. If there were no exceptions to this definition, there would have been no difficulty in holding that production bonus whatever be its nature would be included within these terms. The difficulty, however, arises because the definition also provides that certain things will not be included in the terms ‘basic wages’, and these are contained in three clauses. The first clause mentions the cash value of any food concession while the third clause mentions any presents made by the employer. The fact that the exceptions contain even presents made by the employer shows that though the definition mentions all emoluments which are earned in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment, care was taken to exclude presents which would ordinarily not be earned in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment. Similarly, though the definition includes ‘all emoluments’ which are paid or payable in cash, the exception excludes the cash value of any food concession, which in any case was not payable in cash. The exceptions therefore do not seem to follow any logical pattern which would be in consonance with the main definition.
    8. Then we come to Clause (ii). It excludes dearness allowance, house rent allowance, overtime allowance, bonus, commission or any other similar allowance payable to the employee in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment. This exception suggests that even though the main part of the definition includes all emoluments which are earned in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment, certain payments which are in fact the price of labour and earned in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment are excluded from the main part of the definition of ‘basic wages’. It is undeniable that the exceptions contained in Clause (ii) refer to payments which are earned by an employee in accordance with the terms of his contract of employment. It was admitted by counsel on both sides before us that it was difficult to find any one basis for the exceptions contained in the three clauses. It is clear however from Clause (ii) that from the definition of the word ‘basic wages’ certain earnings were excluded, though they must be earned by employees in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment. Having excluded ‘dearness allowance’ from the definition of ‘basic wages’, Section 6 then provides for inclusion of dearness allowance for purposes of contribution. But that is clearly the result of the specific provision in Section 6 which lays down that contribution shall be 6¼ per centum of the basic wages, dearness allowance and retaining allowance (if any). We must therefore try to discover some basis for the exclusion in Clause (ii) as also the inclusion of dearness allowance and retaining allowance (if any) in Section 6. It seems that the basis of inclusion in Section 6 and exclusion in Clause (ii) is that whatever is payable in all concerns and is earned by all permanent employees is included for the purpose of contribution under Section 6 but whatever is not payable by all concerns or may not be earned by all employees of a concern is excluded for the purpose of contribution. Dearness allowance (for example) is payable in all concerns either as an addition to basic wages or as a part of consolidated wages where a concern does not have separate dearness allowance and basic wages. Similarly, retaining allowance is payable to all permanent employees in all seasonal factories like sugar factories and is therefore included in Section 6; but house rent allowance is not paid in many concerns and sometimes in the same concern it is paid to some employees but not to others, for the theory is that house rent is included in the payment of basic wages plus dearness allowance or consolidated wages. Therefore, house rent allowance which may not be payable to all employees of a concern and which is certainly not paid by all concerns is taken out of the definition of ‘basic wages’, even though the basis of payment of house rent allowance where it is paid is the contract of employment. Similarly, overtime allowance though it is generally in force in all concerns is not earned by all employees of a concern. It is also earned in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment, but because it may not be earned by all employees of a concern it is excluded from ‘basic wages’. Similarly, commission or any other similar allowance is excluded from the definition of ‘basic wages’ for commission and other allowances are not necessarily to be found in all concerns, nor are they necessarily earned by all employees of the same concern, though where they exist they are earned in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment. It seems therefore, that the basis for the exclusion in Clause (ii) of the exceptions in Section 2(b) is that all that is not earned in all concerns or by all employees of a concern is excluded from basic wages. To this, the exclusion of dearness allowance in Clause (ii) is an exception. But that exception has been corrected by including dearness allowance in Section 6 for the purpose of contribution. Dearness allowance which is an exception in the definition of ‘basic wages’, is included for the propose of contribution by Section 6 and the real exceptions therefore in Clause (ii) are the other exceptions besides dearness allowance, which has been included through Section 6.”

    7. Similarly in Jay Engg. case AIR 1963 SC 1480, (1963) 3 SCR 995 it was observed as follows: (AIR pp. 1483-84, paras 8-9)

    “8. Finally, it was urged that even if the payment for production between the quota and the norm is not production bonus which can be taken out of the definition of basic wages in the Act, it should be treated as payment in the nature of ‘other similar allowance’ appearing in Section 2(b)(ii). We are of opinion that this payment for work done between the quota and the norm cannot be treated as any ‘other similar allowance’. The allowances mentioned in the relevant clause are dearness allowance, house rent allowance, overtime allowance, bonus and commission. Any ‘other similar allowance’ must be of the same kind. The payment in this case for production between the quota and the norm has nothing of the nature of an allowance; it is a straight payment for the daily work and must be included in the words defining basic wage i.e ‘all emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave with wages in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment’.
    9. In the view we have taken of the scheme in this case, the petition succeeds partly. We direct that the portion of the payment which is made by the petitioner for production above the ‘norm’ would be production bonus and would be covered by the judgment of this Court in Bridge & Roofs Co. AIR 1963 SC 1474, (1963) 3 SCR 978, but that portion of the payment which is made by petitioner for production up to the quota as well as production between the ‘quota’ and the ‘norm’ is basic wage within the meaning of that term in the Act. The petition is therefore partially allowed as indicated above. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.”

    8. It is to be noted that in the case before the Bombay High Court the factual scenario was somewhat peculiar. There the employer was including the amount of leave encashment as emoluments for the purpose of calculating provident fund dues from the employer as well as the employee's contribution. When the Employees' Union took up the issue to the Commissioner it was informed that the provision does not provide for deduction of provident fund on leave encashment.

    9. On the strength of the letter dated 3-7-1991 of the Commissioner, Hindustan Lever Ltd. decided to make provision for deduction. It was this direction of the department which was challenged by the Union. In this context the High Court has held that the Commissioner's letter/circular was illegal and leave encashment dues should be included for provident fund contribution. In fact it was the understanding of the parties over the period that leave encashment will be included in the wages.

    10. The basic principles as laid down in Bridge & Roofs case AIR 1963 SC 1474, (1963) 3 SCR 978 on a combined reading of Sections 2(b) and 6 are as follows:

    (a) Where the wage is universally, necessarily and ordinarily paid to all across the board such emoluments are basic wages.
    (b) Where the payment is available to be specially paid to those who avail of the opportunity is not basic wages. By way of example it was held that overtime allowance, though it is generally in force in all concerns is not earned by all employees of a concern. It is also earned in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment but because it may not be earned by all employees of a concern, it is excluded from basic wages.
    (c) Conversely, any payment by way of a special incentive or work is not basic wages.

    11. In TI Cycles of India v. M.K Gurumani (2001) 7 SCC 204 it was held that incentive wages paid in respect of extra work done is to be excluded from the basic wage as they have a direct nexus and linkage with the amount of extra output. It is to be noted that any amount of contribution cannot be based on different contingencies and uncertainties. The test is one of universality. In the case of encashment of leave the option may be available to all the employees but some may avail and some may not avail. That does not satisfy the test of universality. As observed in Daily Partap v. Regl. Provident Fund Commr. (1998) 8 SCC 90 the test is uniform treatment or nexus under-dependent on individual work.

    12. The term “basic wage” which includes all emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave or on holidays with wages in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment can only mean weekly holidays, national holidays and festival holidays, etc. In many cases the employees do not take leave and encash it at the time of retirement or same is encashed after his death which can be said to be uncertainties and contingencies. Though provisions have been made for the employer for such contingencies unless the contingency of encashing the leave is there, the question of actual payment to the workman does not take place. In view of the decision of this Court in Bridge & Roofs case AIR 1963 SC 1474, (1963) 3 SCR 978 and TI Cycles case (2001) 7 SCC 204 the inevitable conclusion is that basic wage was never intended to include amounts received for leave encashment.

    13. Though the statute in question is a beneficial one, the concept of beneficial legislation becomes relevant only when two views are possible.

    14. The appeals deserve to be allowed which we direct. But if any payment has already been made it can be adjusted for future liabilities and there shall not be any refund claim since the fund is a running one. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Manipal Academy Of Higher Education v. Provident Fund Commissioner .
    (Mar 12, 2008)