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2008 INSC 450
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 450
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Specific Relief Act
  • Hindu Marriage Act
  • Constitution of India
  • Negotiable Instruments Act
  • Contract Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Partnership Act
  • Evidence Act
  • Indian Penal Code
  • Hindu Succession Act
  • Transfer of Property Act
  • Limitation Act
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
  • Right to Information Act
  • Code of Civil Procedure
  • Criminal Procedure Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Delhi High Court advertised 16 vacancies in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service to be filled by direct recruitment. The selection was to occur in two stages: (i) a written examination worth 250 marks, for which minimum qualifying scores were 55% (General) and 50% (SC/ST); and (ii) a viva voce (interview) with no minimum marks prescribed in the advertisement.

The petitioners sat for the written test on 12-3-2006, but the High Court never published the written-exam results. They were nevertheless called for interview on several dates, each of which was postponed multiple times. On 13-12-2006—after the written test was over but before interviews were finally held—the Full Court resolved to impose minimum qualifying marks in the viva voce (55% for General category, 50% for SC/ST).

Interviews were ultimately held on 27-2-2007. A notice dated 10-4-2007 declared only three candidates successful; the petitioners were excluded for not meeting the newly introduced viva voce cut-off. Via the Right to Information Act, each petitioner learned her scores in both stages. They then filed writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking inclusion in the select list and amendment of the 10-4-2007 notice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent High Court could validly introduce, after the written examination had been conducted, a new requirement of minimum qualifying marks in the viva voce.
  2. Consequent to the above, whether the petitioners were entitled to inclusion in the merit list and recommendation for appointment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The post-advertisement introduction of viva voce cut-off marks is impermissible and violates the principle laid down in Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and K. Manjusree v. State of A.P.
  • The selection ultimately rested solely on interview marks (750) as opposed to the written marks (250), rendering the process arbitrary and contrary to Shetty Commission recommendations.
  • Had the original criteria been maintained, the petitioners—among only five candidates who cleared the written test—would have ranked within the available 16 vacancies.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The High Court was entitled to prescribe minimum viva voce marks, as was done in the 2000 recruitment and upheld in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana and K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala.
  • The petitioners failed to secure the stipulated viva voce marks and therefore could not be recommended.
  • The petitions attacking the prescription of minimum viva voce marks are not maintainable and should be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan (1981) 4 SCC 159 Weightage between written examination and interview; legality of viva voce cut-off. Reinforced petitioners’ contention that cut-off marks in viva voce should not override written-test performance.
K. Manjusree v. State of A.P (2008) 3 SCC 512 Impermissibility of altering selection criteria by adding interview cut-offs after commencement of the process. Treated as binding authority; Court applied it to hold the High Court’s late introduction of viva voce cut-offs illegal.
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (1985) 4 SCC 417 Authority’s power to prescribe minimum marks for both stages. Cited by respondent; Court distinguished it, noting it did not address post-hoc introduction of criteria.
K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala (2006) 6 SCC 395 Same principle as above—power to set minimum marks. Also distinguished for not dealing with ex-post change in criteria.
P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India (1984) 2 SCC 141 Fairness in selection procedures. Referenced in Manjusree; indirectly supports petitioners.
Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India (1985) 3 SCC 721 Validity of selection criteria. Referenced in Manjusree; underscores illegality of altering criteria mid-process.
Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa (1987) 4 SCC 646 Selection norms must be fixed in advance. Referenced in Manjusree; supports petitioners.
All India Judges' Association v. Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 247 Approval of Shetty Commission recommendations (50 marks for viva, no cut-off). Used to demonstrate that the High Court’s 750-mark viva and cut-off deviated from accepted norms.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Court noted as undisputed that the original advertisement did not prescribe minimum viva voce marks, and that such marks were introduced only on 13-12-2006, after the written examination had been held.

2. Relying squarely on K. Manjusree, the Court held that changing the evaluation criteria mid-stream “amounts to changing the rules of the game after the game was played,” which is impermissible.

3. The respondent’s reliance on Ashok Kumar Yadav and K.H. Siraj was rejected because those cases dealt with situations where the criteria—including interview cut-offs—were set before the selection process began.

4. The Court further found the viva voce allocation of 750 marks to be disproportionately high and contrary to the Shetty Commission recommendation (50 marks, no cut-off) accepted in All India Judges' Association.

5. As both petitioners had cleared the written examination, the only bar to their selection was the illegal viva voce cut-off. Therefore, their written and viva voce marks had to be aggregated without applying the cut-off.

Holding and Implications

Rule Made Absolute; Petitions Allowed in Part.

The Supreme Court directed the Delhi High Court to:

  • Add each petitioner’s written-exam marks to her viva voce marks without applying any interview cut-off.
  • Prepare a combined merit list accordingly and amend the 10-4-2007 notice to include the petitioners as selected candidates for appointment to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service.

Seniority and salary will accrue only prospectively from the date of appointment. No costs were awarded. The decision reinforces that selection authorities cannot introduce new qualifying thresholds after a recruitment process has begun, thereby strengthening procedural fairness in public employment.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Hemani Malhotra v. High Court Of Delhi .

    J.M Panchal, J.— These petitions are filed under Article 32 of the Constitution wherein the common prayer made is to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order to direct the respondent i.e the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi to amend notice dated 10-4-2007 issued by the Registrar (Vig.), High Court of Delhi to the effect that the petitioner of each petition, is also declared as selected for being recommended for appointment to the vacant post in Delhi Higher Judicial Service and prepare a combined merit list on the basis of total marks obtained in written examination as well as proportionate marks of the interview, as if, the viva voce test was of 75 marks instead of 750 marks or by adding marks obtained in written examination and the marks given to the petitioner in the interview out of 750 marks without cut off.

    2. In order to resolve the controversy raised by the petitioners in the petitions it would be advantageous to refer to certain basic facts.

    3. The respondent i.e the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi through Registrar General issued an advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates for 16 vacant posts to be filled up by direct recruitment to Delhi Higher Judicial Service. Detailed information was given in the instructions annexed with the application form. The relevant particulars stated in the advertisement were as under:

    “Delhi Higher Judicial Service Examination shall be a two stage selection process comprising the following:
    (a) There shall be a written examination comprising one paper only of 250 marks. It shall have two parts. Part I shall be objective and Part II shall be descriptive. Syllabus for written examination shall comprise General Knowledge, Current Affairs, English Language and topics on Constitution of India, Evidence Act, Limitation Act, Code of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure Code, Indian Penal Code, Contract Act, Partnership Act, Principles governing Arbitration Law, Specific Relief Act, Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Succession Act, Transfer of Property Act and Negotiable Instruments Act.
    (b) Interview/viva voce.
    Minimum qualifying marks in the written examination shall be 55% for General candidates and 50% for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates.”

    4. The petitioner of each petition submitted application in the prescribed form. They were allotted relevant roll numbers. A written examination was conducted on 12-3-2006 wherein the petitioners appeared. The written examination was of three hours' duration and comprised both multiple questions as well as questions with descriptive answers. The respondent High Court did not declare the result of the written examination at all. However, the petitioners received letter dated 14-6-2006 from the respondent asking them to appear for interview on 12-7-2006. Since the result of the written examination conducted by the respondent was not declared, no merit list of the successful candidates who had passed the written test was displayed and therefore it is the case of the petitioners that they were not in a position to find out details about the number of candidates who were declared successful in the written examination or for that matter, the number of candidates who had qualified for viva voce test.

    5. According to the petitioners, the Registrar General of the Delhi High Court verified testimonials and other documents submitted by them and informed them that the interview had been deferred and that the next date would be intimated in due course. What is averred by the petitioners is that the respondent issued letter dated 4-9-2006 directing the petitioners to appear for interview on 20-9-2006 at 2.30 p.m, but on 19-9-2006 another letter was issued intimating the petitioners that the interview fixed on 20-9-2006 was deferred. It may be mentioned that no next date of interview was intimated to the petitioners. The respondent High Court issued letter dated 9-11-2006 intimating the petitioners that the interview was fixed on 29-11-2006, but again on 28-11-2006, another letter was issued intimating the petitioners that the interview fixed on 29-11-2006 was deferred. This last letter of 28-11-2006 specified that the interviews were to take place on 7-12-2006. According to the petitioners on 7-12-2006 five candidates who had cleared written test gathered in the office of Registrar General of the Delhi High Court for appearing at viva voce test and all the five candidates were collectively called in a chamber by the Selection Committee comprising five Hon'ble Judges of the Delhi High Court to be informed that the interview had been postponed.

    6. Meanwhile, the Selection Committee met and resolved that as it was desirable to prescribe minimum marks for the viva voce the matter be placed before the Full Court. Accordingly, the matter was placed before the Full Court for considering the question whether minimum marks should be prescribed for viva voce test. The Full Court, in its meeting held on 13-12-2006, resolved as under:

    “Considered. It was resolved that for recruitment to Delhi Higher Judicial Service from Bar, the minimum qualifying marks in viva voce will be 55% for General candidates and 50% for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates.”

    7. The respondent High Court thereafter, issued letter dated 17-1-2007 intimating the petitioners that the viva voce was fixed on 23-1-2007, but on 22-1-2007 another letter was issued intimating that the interview fixed on 23-1-2007 was postponed. Again by letter dated 2-2-2007 the petitioners were intimated that they were required to appear for interview on 5-2-2007, but even on that day also, no interview could be held.

    8. The respondent High Court issued letter dated 23-2-2007 fixing the oral interview on 27-2-2007 and on that day viva voce test was finally conducted by the Selection Committee. Thereafter, the Registrar (Vig.) issued a notice dated 10-4-2007 mentioning that only three candidates were selected and the petitioners had not been selected. This notice was posted on the website of the Delhi High Court. What is claimed by the petitioners is that the Selection Committee had not drawn final merit list on the basis of combined result of written examination and interview because if the merit list had been drawn on this basis, the petitioners would have obtained fourth or fifth position in the final merit list as only five candidates had qualified for the viva voce test, and no cut-off marks were prescribed for viva voce test.

    9. The petitioners claim that they filed an application under the Right to Information Act before the Public Information Officer of the High Court of Delhi on 28-4-2007 seeking information about the result, etc. of Delhi Higher Judicial Service Examination, 2006. According to the petitioners the Public Information Officer of the High Court did not supply most of the information demanded by them on the pretext of confidentiality, but in reply dated 20-6-2007 only a part of the information was given to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 490 of 2007 that out of 250 marks for which written test was conducted, she had secured 141 marks and 363 marks out of 750 marks for which viva voce test was conducted. The petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 491 of 2007 was informed by intimation dated 20-6-2007 that she had obtained 153.50 marks out of 250 marks for which written test was conducted and 316 marks out of 750 marks for which viva voce test was conducted.

    10. What is maintained by the petitioners is that the petitioners have been excluded from being considered for appointment to the post of Higher Judicial Service exclusively on the basis of cut-off marks prescribed at the stage of viva voce test, which is illegal and contrary to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan (1981) 4 SCC 159, AIR 1981 SC 1777. According to the petitioners what weightage should be attached to written test and interview depends upon the requirement of service for which selection is being made, but minimum cut-off marks could not have been prescribed for viva voce test, after process for selection had commenced. It is stressed that the oral interview was the only criteria adopted by the respondent for selection to the posts in question which is illegal and therefore the notice dated 10-4-2007 issued by the Registrar (Vig.), High Court of Delhi should be directed to be amended to include names of the petitioners also as selected candidates for appointment to the posts in question. Under the circumstances the petitioners have invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and claimed the reliefs to which reference is made earlier.

    11. On service of notice, Mr Ramesh Chand, Deputy Registrar, Delhi High Court has filed reply-affidavit controverting the averments made in the petition. In the reply it is stated that the writ petitions filed against prescription of minimum percentage of marks for qualifying at the viva voce test, is not maintainable and therefore should be dismissed. It is mentioned in the reply that as far as selection made in the year 2000 was concerned, a candidate was required to get minimum of 55% marks if he belonged to the General Category and 50% marks if he belonged to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes category for passing the viva voce test and as the petitioners who belong to the General Category did not secure the minimum marks stipulated for the viva voce, but failed, their names were not recommended for appointment. It is mentioned in the reply that another advertisement dated 19-5-2007 was issued for recruitment to the vacant posts in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service wherein the petitioners had appeared but failed and therefore also they are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the petitions. What is pointed out in the reply is that a candidate is required to secure the stipulated minimum marks in the written examination in order to qualify for the next stage i.e viva voce test and therefore the respondent was justified in prescribing cut-off marks at the viva voce test. By filing the reply the respondent has demanded dismissal of the petitions.

    12. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered the documents forming part of the petitions.

    13. From the record of the case it is evident that the public advertisement was issued by the respondent for direct recruitment to Delhi Higher Judicial Service. As per the said advertisement written examination was to be held on 12-3-2006. The selection process was of two stages: stage one was written examination comprising one paper only of 250 marks, whereas stage two included interview/viva voce. As per the advertisement minimum qualifying marks in the written examination were specified to be 55% for General candidates and 50% for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates but no cut-off marks were prescribed for viva voce test at all. The averments made in the petitions which are not effectively controverted by the respondent would indicate that oral interview was postponed by the respondent on six occasions and was finally conducted by the Selection Committee only on 27-2-2007. However, before that date criteria of cut-off marks for viva voce test was introduced by the respondent.

    14. It is an admitted position that at the beginning of the selection process, no minimum cut-off marks for viva voce were prescribed for Delhi Higher Judicial Service Examination, 2006. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration of the Court is whether introduction of the requirement of minimum marks for interview, after the entire selection process was completed would amount to changing the rules of the game after the game was played. This Court notices that in K. Manjusree v. State of A.P (2008) 3 SCC 512 the question posed for consideration of this Court in the instant petitions was considered and answered in the following terms:

    “33. The Resolution dated 30-11-2004 merely adopted the procedure prescribed earlier. The previous procedure was not to have any minimum marks for interview. Therefore, extending the minimum marks prescribed for written examination, to interviews, in the selection process is impermissible. We may clarify that prescription of minimum marks for any interview is not illegal. We have no doubt that the authority making rules regulating the selection, can prescribe by rules, the minimum marks both for written examination and interviews, or prescribe minimum marks for written examination but not for interview, or may not prescribe any minimum marks for either written examination or interview. Where the rules do not prescribe any procedure, the Selection Committee may also prescribe the minimum marks, as stated above. But if the Selection Committee wants to prescribe minimum marks for interview, it should do so before the commencement of selection process. If the Selection Committee prescribed minimum marks only for the written examination, before the commencement of selection process, it cannot either during the selection process or after the selection process, add an additional requirement that the candidates should also secure minimum marks in the interview. What we have found to be illegal, is changing the criteria after completion of the selection process, when the entire selection proceeded on the basis that there will be no minimum marks for the interview.”

    From the proposition of law laid down by this Court in the abovementioned case it is evident that previous procedure was not to have any minimum marks for viva voce. Therefore, prescribing minimum marks for viva voce was not permissible at all after the written test was conducted.

    15. There is no manner of doubt that the authority making rules regulating the selection can prescribe by rules the minimum marks both for written examination and viva voce, but if minimum marks are not prescribed for viva voce before the commencement of selection process, the authority concerned, cannot either during the selection process or after the selection process add an additional requirement/qualification that the candidate should also secure minimum marks in the interview. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that prescription of minimum marks by the respondent at viva voce test was illegal.

    16. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the decision rendered in K. Manjusree (2008) 3 SCC 512 did not notice the decisions in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (1985) 4 SCC 417 as well as in K.H Siraj v. High Court of Kerala (2006) 6 SCC 395 and, therefore, should be regarded either as decision per incuriam or should be referred to a larger Bench for reconsideration, cannot be accepted. What is laid down in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is that it is always open to the authority making the rules regulating the selection to prescribe the minimum marks both for written examination and interview. The question whether introduction of the requirement of minimum marks for interview after the entire selection process was completed was valid or not, never fell for consideration of this Court in the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent. While deciding the case of K. Manjusree (2008) 3 SCC 512 the Court noticed the decisions in: (1) P.K Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India (1984) 2 SCC 141; (2) Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India (1985) 3 SCC 721; and (3) Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa (1987) 4 SCC 646, (1987) 5 ATC 148, and has thereafter laid down the proposition of law which is quoted above. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case this Court is of the opinion that the decision rendered by this Court in K. Manjusree (2008) 3 SCC 512 can neither be regarded as judgment per incuriam nor good case is made out by the respondent for referring the matter to the larger Bench for reconsidering the said decision.

    17. At this stage this Court notices that as per the information supplied by the respondent to the petitioners under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 490 of 2007 had secured 141 marks out of 250 prescribed for the written test and 363 marks out of 750 marks in viva voce test, whereas the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 491 of 2007 had secured 153.50 marks out of 250 marks in the written test and 316 marks out of 750 marks in viva voce test. There is no manner of doubt that the prescription of 750 marks for viva voce test is on higher side. This Court further notices that Hon'ble Justice Shetty Commission has recommended in its Report that:

    “The viva voce test should be in a thorough and scientific manner and it should take anything between 25 to 30 minutes for each candidate. What is recommended by the Commission is that the viva voce test shall carry 50 marks and there shall be no cut-off marks in viva voce test.”

    18. This Court notices that in All India Judges' Assn. v. Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 247 subject to the various modifications indicated in the said decision, the other recommendations of the Shetty Commission were accepted by this Court. It means that prescription of cut-off marks at viva voce test by the respondent was not in accordance with the decision of this Court. It is an admitted position that both the petitioners had cleared written examination and therefore after adding marks obtained by them in the written examination to the marks obtained in the viva voce test, the result of the petitioners should have been declared. As noticed earlier 16 vacant posts were notified to be filled up and only five candidates had cleared the written test. Therefore, if the marks obtained by the petitioners at viva voce test had been added to the marks obtained by them in the written test then the names of the petitioners would have found place in the merit list prepared by the respondent. Under the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the petitions filed by the petitioners will have to be accepted in part.

    19. For the foregoing reasons both the petitions succeed. The respondent is directed to add the marks obtained by the petitioners in the written examination to the marks obtained by them in the viva voce test and prepare a combined merit list along with the other selected candidates. The respondent is directed to amend the notice dated 10-4-2007 issued by the Registrar (Vig.), High Court of Delhi, New Delhi and declare the petitioners as selected for being recommended for appointment to the post in Delhi Higher Judicial Service. It is clarified that the petitioners would neither be entitled to, seniority or salary with retrospective effect. Their seniority shall be reckoned from the date of their appointment and salary as allowable be paid from that date only. Rule is made absolute accordingly in each petition. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Hemani Malhotra v. High Court Of Delhi .
    (Apr 3, 2008)