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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
008 INSC 1381
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 8 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 136 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 148 of the Code
  • Article 136 of the Constitution of India, Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
008 INSC 1381
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 8 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 136 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 148 of the Code
  • Article 136 of the Constitution of India, Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction in 2002 and simultaneously sought a temporary injunction. Summons were served on the defendants on 6-7-2002 and they entered appearance on 19-7-2002. Despite multiple opportunities and several applications for extension of time, the defendants did not file a written statement for more than three years.

On 31-1-2005 the plaintiff invoked Order 8 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking judgment due to the defendants’ default, whereupon the defendants for the first time moved an application to place their written statement on record without an accompanying application for condonation of delay. By order dated 24-10-2005 the trial court rejected the defendants’ request and proceeded to fix the suit for the plaintiff’s evidence.

The defendants’ revision (Civil Revision No. 322 of 2005) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Mathura on 29-8-2007. The defendants then filed Writ Petition No. 45197 of 2007 before the Allahabad High Court. On 20-9-2007 a learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, set aside the concurrent orders of the trial court and revisional court, directed that the written statement be taken on record, and permitted the defendants to contest the suit upon payment of Rs 10,000 as costs to the plaintiff.

The present appeal challenges the High Court’s order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the circumstances of prolonged default, the High Court was justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to allow the defendants to file a written statement beyond the 90-day outer limit stated in Order 8 Rule 1 CPC.
  2. Whether the High Court could set aside reasoned orders of the trial court and revisional court without finding illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Summons were served on 6-7-2002 and the defendants took no steps to file a written statement for three years; therefore, the High Court erred in allowing the belated filing.
  • The High Court exceeded its limited supervisory jurisdiction because both the trial court and the revisional court had given cogent reasons for rejecting the defendants’ request.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The trial court’s order-sheet showed repeated listings for filing the written statement, indicating the court itself had granted time.
  • The plaintiff’s own appeal against refusal of temporary injunction consumed time, which explains the delay.
  • Relying on Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480, Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is only directory; hence the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 should not be invoked to interfere.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480 Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is directory; filing of written statement after 90 days permissible only in exceptional situations. Relied upon to underline that extensions beyond 90 days are rare; used to show High Court should have identified exceptional circumstances before permitting delayed filing.
M. Srinivasa Prasad v. Comptroller & Auditor General of India, (2007) 10 SCC 246 Court must record reasons before accepting a written statement after the prescribed period. Cited to demonstrate that absence of recorded reasons vitiates acceptance of a delayed written statement.
R.N. Jadi & Bros. v. Subhashchandra, (2007) 6 SCC 420 Emphasised that extensions beyond statutory limits are not automatic and must be granted only for adequate reasons in rare cases. Quoted to reinforce that routine condonation defeats the legislative intent of curbing delay.
Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd., (1968) 2 QB 229 Observation on the intolerable nature of legal delays. Referenced illustratively to support the need for strict adherence to procedural timelines.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that Order 8 Rule 1 CPC, though directory, allows the filing of a written statement beyond 90 days only in exceptional circumstances. Previous authorities—Kailash, M. Srinivasa Prasad, and R.N. Jadi—all stress the need for recorded reasons and caution against routine extensions.

In the present case, both the trial court and the revisional court had given “sufficient and cogent” reasons for refusing to accept the belated written statement. The High Court, however, set aside those concurrent findings without addressing illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety, and without recording any exceptional circumstances justifying further extension.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 is confined to correcting jurisdictional errors and does not permit re-appreciation of facts merely to reach a different conclusion. Because the High Court provided no supporting reasoning and overlooked binding precedent limiting extensions, its judgment was unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment dated 20-9-1997 (allowing the writ petition and permitting the written statement) is set aside.

Consequences: the orders of the trial court and the revisional court rejecting the defendants’ written statement stand restored. The defendants may withdraw the Rs 10,000 earlier deposited as costs. No new legal principle has been created; the decision reiterates strict adherence to Order 8 Rule 1 CPC and the limited scope of High Court supervisory jurisdiction.

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    Mohammed Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad And Others

    Order

    1. Leave granted.

    2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 20-9-1997 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad allowing the writ petition filed by the respondents herein questioning the validity of an order dated 29-8-2007 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Mathura in Civil Revision No. 322 of 2005 affirming the order dated 24-10-2005 passed by the learned Civil Judge whereby and whereunder while rejecting the application filed by the appellant herein under Order 8 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a date was fixed for recording the evidence of the plaintiffs and the application filed by the respondents herein praying for condoning the delay in filing the written statement was rejected.

    3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute:

    The appellant herein filed a suit for a decree for permanent injunction in the year 2002. A separate application for grant of temporary injunction was also filed. Summons upon the defendants was served on 6-7-2002. The defendants appeared through their learned advocate on 19-7-2002.

    4. The appellant filed an application for grant of temporary injunction which was rejected on 28-1-2004. An appeal was preferred thereagainst which was disposed of by an order dated 14-5-2004. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the respondent-defendants filed applications for extension of time for filing written statement a number of times. The matter was also adjourned on one ground or the other.

    5. On or about 31-1-2005, the appellant also filed an application before the learned trial Judge for pronouncing judgment in terms of Order 8 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inter alia, on the premise that the respondent-defendants did not file any written statement. It is on the same date the defendants filed an application for filing written statement. No application for condonation of delay in filing the written statement was, however, filed. However, on 23-9-2005, as indicated hereinbefore by reason of an order dated 24-10-2005, while rejecting the said application of the respondents, the trial Judge allowed the plaintiff to examine his own witnesses in support of his case.

    6. A revision petition was filed by the respondents which by reason of an order dated 29-8-2007 was dismissed by the learned District Judge. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, the respondents filed a writ petition which was marked as CMWP No. 45197 of 2007 before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court has allowed the said writ petition, directing:

    “Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner should be permitted to contest the suit on merit.
    In view of the aforesaid, the order of the trial court refusing to keep the written statement on record is set aside. The written statement shall be kept on the record and the defendant-petitioner shall be permitted to contest the matter on merit subject to payment of cost of Rs 10,000, which shall be deposited by the defendant-petitioner in favour of the plaintiff by means of a bank draft within two weeks. The amount so deposited can be withdrawn by the plaintiff. The writ petition is allowed.”

    7. Mr R.S Hegde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that keeping in view the fact that the summons upon the defendants were served on 6-7-2002 and no step having been taken to file the written statement for a period of three years and only on 31-5-2005, an application for filing the written statement having been filed, the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment.

    8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend that from a perusal of the order-sheet before the trial court, it would appear that dates after dates were fixed for filing the written statement and, furthermore, having regard to the fact that the appellant himself preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge against an order rejecting his application for grant of temporary injunction, the written statement could not be filed.

    9. It is urged that the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure having been held to be directory in nature by this Court in Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480, this Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:

    “1. Written statement.—The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence:
    Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.”

    Although in view of the terminologies used therein the period of 90 days prescribed for filing the written statement appears to be a mandatory provision, this Court in Kailash (2005) 4 SCC 480 upon taking into consideration the fact that in a given case the defendants may face extreme hardship in not being able to defend the suit only because he had not filed written statement within a period of 90 days, opined that the said provision was directory in nature. However, while so holding this Court in no uncertain terms stated that the defendants may be permitted to file written statement after the expiry of period of 90 days only in exceptional situation.

    10. The question came up for consideration before this Court in M. Srinivasa Prasad v. Comptroller & Auditor General of India (2007) 10 SCC 246, (2007) 5 Scale 173, wherein a Division Bench of this Court upon noticing Kailash (2005) 4 SCC 480 held as under:

    “7. Since neither the trial court nor the High Court have indicated any reason to justify the acceptance of the written statement after the expiry of time fixed, we set aside the orders of the trial court and that of the High Court. The matter is remitted to the trial court to consider the matter afresh in the light of what has been stated in Kailash case (2005) 4 SCC 480. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.”

    11. The matter was yet again considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in R.N Jadi & Bros. v. Subhashchandra (2007) 6 SCC 420. P.K Balasubramanyan, J., who was also a member in Kailash (2005) 4 SCC 480 in his concurring judgment stated the law thus: (R.N Jadi case (2007) 6 SCC 420)

    “14. It is true that procedure is the handmaid of justice. The court must always be anxious to do justice and to prevent victories by way of technical knockouts. But how far that concept can be stretched in the context of the amendments brought to the Code and in the light of the mischief that was sought to be averted is a question that has to be seriously considered. I am conscious that I was a party to the decision in Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480 which held that the provision was directory and not mandatory. But there could be situations where even a procedural provision could be construed as mandatory, no doubt retaining a power in the court, in an appropriate case, to exercise a jurisdiction to take out the rigour of that provision or to mitigate genuine hardship. It was in that context that in Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480 it was stated that the extension of time beyond 90 days was not automatic and that the court, for reasons to be recorded, had to be satisfied that there was sufficient justification for departing from the time-limit fixed by the Code and the power inhering in the court in terms of Section 148 of the Code. Kailash (2005) 4 SCC 480 is no authority for receiving written statements, after the expiry of the period permitted by law, in a routine manner.
    15. A dispensation that makes Order 8 Rule 1 directory, leaving it to the courts to extend the time indiscriminately would tend to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the amendments to the Code. It is, therefore, necessary to emphasise that the grant of extension of time beyond 30 days is not automatic, that it should be exercised with caution and for adequate reasons and that an extension of time beyond 90 days of the service of summons must be granted only based on a clear satisfaction of the justification for granting such extension, the court being conscious of the fact that even the power of the court for extension inhering in Section 148 of the Code, has also been restricted by the legislature. It would be proper to encourage the belief in litigants that the imperative of Order 8 Rule 1 must be adhered to and that only in rare and exceptional cases, will the breach thereof will be condoned. Such an approach by courts alone can carry forward the legislative intent of avoiding delays or at least in curtailing the delays in the disposal of suits filed in courts. The lament of Lord Denning in Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd. (1968) 2 QB 229, (1968) 2 WLR 366, (1968) 1 All ER 543 (CA) that law's delays have been intolerable and last so long as to turn justice sour, is true of our legal system as well. Should that state of affairs continue for all times?”

    12. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court should not have allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents, particularly, when both the learned trial Judge as also the Revisional Court had assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support of their orders.

    13. As indicated hereinbefore, the High Court allowed the writ petition and thereby set aside the orders passed by the trial court as also the Revisional Court without assigning any reason therefor. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is limited. It could have set aside the orders passed by the learned trial court and the Revisional Court only on limited grounds, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The High Court did not arrive at a finding that there had been a substantial failure of justice or the orders passed by the trial court as also by the Revisional Court contained error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by a superior court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

    14. For the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

    15. In this view of the matter the respondents would be entitled to withdraw the sum of Rs 10,000 deposited by them as costs.

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    Mohammed Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad And Others
    (Dec 2, 2008)