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2007 INSC 95
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citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Article 311 of the Constitution
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act
  • Certified Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
  • the Act on account of a wholly ad hoc approach adopted in the implementation of the Act
  • the provisions of the Act
  • Section of the said Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the Act
  • Section 11 of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990
  • Industrial Disputes Act
  • Article 309 of the Constitution of India
  • Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 3 of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990
  • Article 235 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 12 of the Act
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 95
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 311 of the Constitution
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act
  • Certified Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
  • the Act on account of a wholly ad hoc approach adopted in the implementation of the Act
  • the provisions of the Act
  • Section of the said Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the Act
  • Section 11 of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990
  • Industrial Disputes Act
  • Article 309 of the Constitution of India
  • Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 3 of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990
  • Article 235 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 12 of the Act
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents were originally appointed as employees of Doordarshan and Akashvani (All India Radio). When Parliament brought the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 into force, Prasar Bharati began functioning on 23-11-1997. Although Section 11 of the Act empowers the Central Government to transfer staff to the new Corporation, no formal transfer or deputation orders were ever issued. Nevertheless, the employees continued to work under Prasar Bharati’s administrative set-up, receiving salaries and other emoluments without any change to the Central Government service rules that had earlier applied to them.

In 2000 Prasar Bharati issued a batch of transfer orders intended “to optimise the use of manpower.” The employees challenged those orders before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh (OA No. 725-PB/2000). On 6-10-2000 the Tribunal quashed the transfers, relying on S.P. Kohli v. Union of India. The Corporation’s writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court. Against that backdrop the present appeals were filed before the Supreme Court, which had earlier expressed displeasure (order dated 29-3-2005) at the protracted uncertainty concerning the employment status of Akashvani/Doordarshan staff. Because Union of India had still not made up its mind under Section 11, it was impleaded as a party during the Supreme Court proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of a formal transfer order under Section 11 of the Prasar Bharati Act, Prasar Bharati nevertheless possesses the power to transfer employees who continue to be Central Government servants in law but work under its functional control.
  2. Whether the continued working arrangement amounts to “deemed deputation,” thereby carrying with it an implied power of transfer.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jawaharlal Nehru University v. Dr. K.S. Jawatkar, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 679 An employee ordinarily cannot be transferred from one employer to another without consent. Distinguished; Court held the principle inapplicable because the present case involves a statutory scheme resulting in deemed deputation.
Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649 Expounded the breadth of the term “control.” Used to emphasise that Prasar Bharati exercises effective control over the employees, supporting an implied power to transfer.
State of W.B. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447
Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (1999) 3 SCC 396
Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal, (1998) 3 SCC 72
Article 235 “control” confers wide supervisory powers. Cited collectively to illustrate that “control” denotes a broad capacity to regulate and direct, reinforcing the Corporation’s authority.
B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka, (1986) 4 SCC 624 Transfer is an ordinary incident of service and does not per se alter service conditions. Relied on to show that, even absent specific rules, an employer generally has an inherent power to transfer staff.
Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 169 Reaffirmed that transfer is normally within the employer’s discretion. Used to bolster the view that Prasar Bharati’s transfers were within administrative competence.
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Damodar Prasad Pandey, (2004) 12 SCC 299 Transfer does not generally disadvantage service conditions. Cited for the same proposition as above.
Public Services Tribunal Bar Assn. v. State of U.P., (2003) 4 SCC 104 Court interference with transfers is limited to exceptional cases (e.g., vindictiveness). Invoked to caution against judicial intervention in routine administrative transfers.
BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333 Employees may face hardships due to governmental policy decisions, which are nonetheless valid. Used to underline that administrative inconvenience to employees cannot negate statutory or organisational powers.
Workmen of Nilgiri Coop. Mkt. Society Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2004) 3 SCC 514
District Rehabilitation Officer v. Jay Kishore Maity, (2006) 12 SCC 380
Applied the “functional test” for determining employer–employee relationships. Supported the conclusion that, functionally, Prasar Bharati is the de facto employer, justifying its control over transfers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Statutory Vacuum. The Central Government never issued the transfer orders contemplated by Section 11(1) of the Act, nor did Prasar Bharati frame its own service regulations. This created an administrative limbo lasting more than nine years.

2. Deemed Deputation. Despite the absence of formal orders, the Court held that the employees’ long-standing, undisputed work under Prasar Bharati’s hierarchy amounted to “deemed deputation.” They were paid by, supervised by, and functionally integrated into the Corporation.

3. Control Equals Power. Drawing on the jurisprudence surrounding the word “control,” the Court reasoned that effective control necessarily carries basic managerial powers, including transfers.

4. Transfer as an Incident of Service. Transfer is ordinarily an implied term of service. In the public-sector context, unless specifically prohibited, an employer’s inherent authority encompasses transfer.

5. Rejection of High Court View. The Punjab & Haryana High Court’s conclusion—that the Corporation lacked transfer power because the employees remained Central Government staff—was deemed legally unsound. The functional and administrative realities outweighed the formal defect.

6. Administrative Interest and Non-Arbitrariness. The impugned transfers aimed to optimise manpower and were neither arbitrary nor punitive. According to precedent, such administrative decisions merit minimal judicial interference.

7. Need for Finality. Exercising Article 142 powers, the Court directed the Union of India to resolve the Section 11 issue within six months, ending prolonged uncertainty.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeals are allowed; the judgments of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Punjab & Haryana High Court are set aside. Prasar Bharati has the authority to transfer the respondents. The Union of India is directed to take a firm decision under Section 11 of the Prasar Bharati Act within six months and file an affidavit of compliance.

IMPLICATIONS: Immediately, the contested transfer orders stand validated, and Prasar Bharati may administer further transfers of similarly situated personnel. The directive to the Union of India, if complied with, will finally clarify whether these employees remain Central Government servants or become permanent Prasar Bharati staff. No broader precedent on employee transfer law is created beyond this specific statutory context, but the judgment underscores the Court’s willingness to infer “deemed deputation” and managerial powers from sustained functional control.

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    Prasar Bharati And Others v. Amarjeet Singh And Others

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted in the SLP.

    2. The respondents herein were appointed by the “Doordarshan” and “Akashvani”. Parliament enacted the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 (for short “the Act”) to provide for the establishment of a Broadcasting Corporation for India, to be known as Prasar Bharati, to define its composition, functions and powers and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The said Act though came into force on and from 15-9-1997, Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) (for short “the Corporation”) came to be established on 23-11-1997, the date on which the “appointed day” was notified in terms of Section 3 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act provides that it shall be lawful for the Central Government to transfer to the Corporation any of the officers or other employees serving in the Akashvani and Doordarshan and engaged in the performance of those functions, where the Central Government has ceased to perform the functions which in terms of Section 12 are the functions of the Corporation. Sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act, however, provides that every officer or other employee transferred by an order made under sub-section (1) shall, within six months from the date of transfer, exercise his option, in writing, to be governed by the conditions enumerated therein and such option once exercised under the Act shall be final. However, once the services of the officers or employees of Akashvani and Doordarshan are transferred to the Corporation, sub-section (4) of Section 11 would be attracted which is in the following terms:

    “11. (4) An officer or other employee transferred by an order under sub-section (1) shall, on and from the date of transfer, cease to be an employee of the Central Government and become an employee of the Corporation with such designation as the Corporation may determine and shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6), be governed by such regulations as may be made as respects remuneration and other conditions of service including pension, leave and provident fund and shall continue to be an officer or other employee of the Corporation unless and until his employment is terminated by the Corporation.”

    3. No order of deputation in respect of any of the employees or officers of the Doordarshan or Akashvani had also been passed. The officers and employees of erstwhile Akashvani and Doordarshan, however, continued to work with the Corporation. They drew their salaries and other remunerations. The same terms and conditions of their services were continued to apply to them as if they were the Central Government employees.

    4. The Corporation passed orders of transfer of the operational and administrative staff. Allegedly, such transfers were made with a view to optimise the use of manpower available with the Corporation so that every station and kendra became fully functional. The legality and/or validity of the said orders of transfer were questioned before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh, by the respondents herein on or about 7-9-2000 which was marked as OA No. 725.PB/2000. By a judgment and order dated 6-10-2000, the orders of transfer were quashed relying, inter alia, on an earlier decision of the Tribunal in S.P Kohli v. Union of India. The writ petition filed by the appellants herein for quashing the said order of the Central Administrative Tribunal has been dismissed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.

    5. At the very outset, it may be noticed that a Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 29-3-2005 noticed the unsatisfactory state of affairs prevailing in the matter as the Central Government employees who had been working in Akashvani Stations and Doordarshan Kendras continued to work in the Prasar Bharati for nearly eight years stating:

    “… Prima facie, this uncertainty has continued since appropriate steps were not undertaken either by the Central Government or by the Corporation. The Corporation has not framed requisite regulations. The option of the employees under the provisions of the Act has not been taken. In fact, that occasion has not arisen even after eight years of operation of the Act on account of a wholly ad hoc approach adopted in the implementation of the Act. At this stage, it is not necessary to specifically indicate as to who has contributed more to this state of affairs resulting in two views being expressed by two High Courts in the country—one by the Madras High Court holding that the employees can be transferred and the other by the Punjab & Haryana High Court holding in favour of the employees that they cannot be transferred by the Corporation. The stand of the Corporation has been and is that the employees continue to be the employees of the Central Government. It is in the interest of neither the employees nor the Central Government nor the Corporation to continue the uncertainty for any further period of time.
    Let the learned Solicitor General discuss the matter with the officers concerned of the Corporation and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting so that the Act can be properly implemented and uncertainty comes to an end. We hope that the matter would be resolved expeditiously.”

    6. Disputes and differences between the parties were said to have received consideration at the highest level in the Government, namely, a Group of Ministers. Although the Corporation had forwarded a draft note for consideration of the Group of Ministers in regard to the restructuring of Prasar Bharati, no final decision admittedly has yet been taken. This Court adjourned the matter times without number so that the Union of India and Prasar Bharati can arrive at a decision but the same is yet to come. By an order dated 21-11-2006, this Court refused to grant any further time. However, having regard to the fact that the Union of India should be heard in the matter, on an oral application made by the learned Additional Solicitor General, the Union of India was impleaded as a party.

    7. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether in the peculiar situation obtaining in the matter, the Corporation can be said to have any power of transfer of the employees who although are working in its establishment, but continue to be the employees of the Central Government.

    8. Before adverting to the question raised in these appeals, we may notice that whereas the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh as also the Punjab and Haryana High Court were of the opinion that no such power existed, the Madras High Court has taken a different view.

    9. The Division Bench of the High Court in its impugned judgment posed a question as to whether the officers/employees of the Central Government employed under the Directorate of Doordarshan could be deemed to have become officers/employees of the Corporation by virtue of the provisions of the said Act. As would appear from the discussions made hereinafter, the said question was wholly irrelevant.

    10. The High Court relied upon a large number of decisions of this Court as also of other High Courts to arrive at a finding that the respondents were not the employees appointed in the services of the Corporation by transfer and, thus, their service conditions cannot be controlled or regulated by its authorities. It was held:

    “We have given serious thought to the arguments of the learned counsel, but have not felt persuaded to agree with him that the impugned order is vitiated by any such legal infirmity which may warrant issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari. A careful reading of the averments made in the writ petition and the two letters relied upon by Shri Sanjay Goyal shows that even as per the Central Government, the employees working in AIR and Doordarshan Kendras immediately before the formation of the Corporation continued to be its employees because no order transferring their services was passed by it in terms of Section 11 of the Act. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the argument of Shri Goyal that with the creation of the Corporation, the services of Respondent 1 stood transferred to the Corporation and the competent authority of the Corporation could transfer her from one place to the other.”

    11. The decision of the Madras High Court was not followed on the aforementioned premise.

    12. This case raises practical problems which are the creation of the Union of India and the appellants. It is difficult for us to comprehend as to why the Union of India did not exercise its statutory functions for such a long time. It was, in our opinion, obliged to take a decision one way or the other. It was for the Union of India to transfer the officers or employees of the Doordarshan and Akashvani to the Corporation. In such an event, the employees could have exercised their option as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act. The consequences of passing of an order under sub-section (1) of Section 11, as noticed hereinbefore, are provided for under sub-section (4) thereof. The transfer of an employee deputed under sub-section (1) of Section 11 is that of a permanent nature. So long an order under sub-section (1) is not passed, indisputably the employees and officers would continue to be the employees of the Central Government. They shall unless otherwise an order is passed would be governed by the terms and conditions of services evidenced by the rules framed by the President of India under proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Indisputably, no such order having been passed, the respondents continued to be the employees of the Central Government. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the services of the respondents have been placed at the disposal of the Corporation although no order of deputation has been passed.

    13. There exists a distinction between “transfer” and “deputation”. “Deputation” connotes service outside the cadre or outside the parent department in which an employee is serving. “Transfer”, however, is limited to equivalent post in the same cadre and in the same department. Whereas deputation would be a temporary phenomenon, transfer being antithesis must exhibit the opposite indications.

    14. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that ordinarily no employee can be transferred without his consent from one employer to another. (See Jawaharlal Nehru University v. Dr. K.S Jawatkar 1989 Supp (1) SCC 679, (1989) 11 ATC 278.) But, the said principle has no application in the instant case.

    15. A transfer of an employee may be governed by the provisions of a statute or the terms and conditions of a contract of service.

    16. The situation as obtaining in the present case, however, in our opinion, would amount to be a case of deemed deputation. It is true that no order has been passed by the Central Government in this behalf, but the respondents acted in the manner as if such an order had been passed. The respondents have been working with the Corporation for a long time without any demur whatsoever. They are undoubtedly under the control and supervision of the officers of the Corporation. There exists a hierarchy of the officers in the Corporation. There are a large number of departments. Each department has separate functions. Work of one department, however, would be related to another.

    17. It has not been disputed that the functions of the Central Government have been taken over by the Corporation in terms of Section 12 of the Act, when the Corporation has started functioning on and from the appointed day. It requires manpower for managing its affairs. It has been doing so with the existing staff. They are being paid their salaries or other remunerations by the Corporation. They are subjected to effective control by its officers. The respondents, for all intent and purposes, are therefore, under the control of the Corporation.

    18. In Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 it was noticed:

    “230. The word ‘control’ has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary in the following terms:
    ‘Control.—Power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or oversee.’
    231. In Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 Dixon, J. observed that the word ‘control’ is an unfortunate word of such wide and ambiguous import that it has been taken to mean something weaker than ‘restraint’, something equivalent to ‘regulation’. Having regard to the purport and object of activities of the Board, its control over ‘cricket’ must be held to be of wide amplitude.”

    19. The expression “control”, although is not defined, in the light of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, has been held to be conferring wide power upon the High Court. (See State of W.B v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi AIR 1966 SC 447, Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar (1999) 3 SCC 396, Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra (1999) 7 SCC 739 and High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal (1998) 3 SCC 72, AIR 1998 SC 1079.)

    20. The concept of control implies that the controlling officer must be in a position to dominate the affairs of its subordinate. It unless otherwise defined would be synonymous with superintendence, management or authority to direct, restrict or regulate. It is exercised by a superior authority in exercise of its supervisory power. It may amount to an effective control, which may either be de facto or remote.

    21. The Corporation has not framed its own rules. In absence of any rules, however, an employer, it is well known, would have an inherent power to deal with its employees. In a situation of this nature, we have no doubt that the same would include a power of transfer. It is one thing to say that an employer does not possess any power to transfer in terms of the extant rules or conditions of service or the nature thereof; but the same does not mean that the employer must have the power to transfer its employees only in terms of a statute.

    22. The position of an industrial workman, however, would stand on a different footing. The terms and conditions of industrial employees are governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the Certified Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

    23. An establishment like the Corporation, moreover, in absence of the rules may have an implied power of transfer. Transfer is an ordinary incident of service. It does not result in alteration of any condition of service to its disadvantage. (See B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka (1986) 4 SCC 624, (1986) 1 ATC 763, Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa 1995 Supp (4) SCC 169, (1996) 32 ATC 107 and Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Damodar Prasad Pandey (2004) 12 SCC 299.)

    24. In Public Services Tribunal Bar Assn. v. State of U.P (2003) 4 SCC 104 this Court observed:

    “37. Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the courts. This Court consistently has been taking a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a vindictive manner.”

    25. In BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333 this Court opined that in case of policy, the employees may suffer to certain extent, but such sufferings should be taken to be incidence of service. Therein, the Court observed:

    “48. Merely because the workmen may have protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, by regarding BALCO as a State, it does not mean that the erstwhile sole shareholder viz. Government had to give the workers prior notice of hearing before deciding to disinvest. There is no principle of natural justice which requires prior notice and hearing to persons who are generally affected as a class by an economic policy decision of the Government. If the abolition of a post pursuant to a policy decision does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution as held in State of Haryana v. Des Raj Sangar (1976) 2 SCC 844 on the same parity of reasoning, the policy of disinvestment cannot be faulted if as a result thereof the employees lose their rights or protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In other words, the existence of rights of protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot possibly have the effect of vetoing the Government's right to disinvest.”

    26. The respondents, therefore, in our opinion by reason of their conduct as also that of other players in the field, namely, the Union of India and the Corporation must be held to have been deputed in the services of the Corporation. They would, therefore, be governed by the general principles of deputation. For the said purpose they are under the functional control of the Corporation which in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, in our opinion, would also imply that the Corporation had a power of transfer.

    27. Functional test, as is well known, is also employed for the purpose of determining the relationship of the employer and employees. (See Workmen of Nilgiri Coop. Mkt. Society Ltd. v. State of T.N (2004) 3 SCC 514 and District Rehabilitation Officer v. Jay Kishore Maity (2006) 12 SCC 380, (2006) 11 Scale 545.)

    28. We do not find that the action taken by the appellants herein in transferring the respondents is in any way arbitrary or irrational. The orders of transfer have been passed in the interest of the administration and with a view to carry on its functions.

    29. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct in opining that the respondents could not be transferred by the Corporation.

    30. We would, however, before parting with the case, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India issue a direction upon the Union of India. We have noticed hereinbefore that the Union of India itself had been filing writ petitions before the different High Courts. It did not do so in the instant case. It had to be impleaded as a party-respondent.

    31. We have furthermore noticed hereinbefore that the question as to whether the Central Government should pass an order in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act or not is pending consideration before its highest authority for a long time. No decision has been taken for more than nine long years. Despite observations made by this Court, the Central Government has failed and/or neglected to take a decision one way or the other. Ordinarily, this Court would not have issued a direction but the present state of affairs cannot be permitted to continue. The rights of the respondents cannot be allowed to remain in uncertain position for a long time.

    32. We, therefore, while allowing the appeal, direct the Union of India to take a firm decision in terms of Section 11 of the Act within six months from date. The Secretary, Department of Personnel and Training shall file an affidavit before this Court within or immediately after the expiry of the aforementioned period.

    33. Subject to the directions and observations made hereinbefore, the impugned judgments are set aside. These appeals are allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

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    Prasar Bharati And Others v. Amarjeet Singh And Others
    (Feb 2, 2007)