AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 813
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 9(2) of the Rules read with proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A of the Act
  • the amendment relatable to notification on 27-3-1987
  • Section 6 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • a statute or things existing before the statute in question
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 813
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 9(2) of the Rules read with proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A of the Act
  • the amendment relatable to notification on 27-3-1987
  • Section 6 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • a statute or things existing before the statute in question
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant, M/s Jay Mahakali Rolling Mills, alleging wrongful availment of exemption under Notification No. 208/83-CE dated 1-8-1983 on rolling products falling under Tariff Item 25(9)(ii). The Department charged the appellant with contravening multiple provisions of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, asserting wilful mis-statement and suppression of facts to evade duty. Recovery of Rs 12,67,006.19 toward central excise duty for the period 23-8-1984 to 31-8-1987 and the imposition of penalties were proposed.

The appellant contended that Notification No. 101/87-CE dated 27-3-1987, which amended the earlier exemption, was merely clarificatory and therefore applied retrospectively, negating any duty liability or penalty. The adjudicating authority rejected this stand, confirmed the demand, and imposed penalty. On appeal, the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) upheld the demand but limited it by excluding duty from 27-3-1987 to 31-8-1987 (Rs 2,28,898.80) and reduced the penalty to Rs 75,000.

The appellant’s writ petition before the Gujarat High Court was dismissed, the High Court concurring that the 1987 amendment operated prospectively. The present civil appeals before the Supreme Court challenge that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Notification No. 101/87-CE dated 27-3-1987 is merely clarificatory and therefore operates retrospectively, entitling the appellant to exemption for the period prior to 27-3-1987.
  2. Consequently, whether the demand of duty and the imposition of penalty on the appellant are sustainable in law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The 27-3-1987 amendment only clarified the existing exemption; hence it should be applied retrospectively.
  • CEGAT and the High Court erred in treating the amendment as prospective.
  • Material on record, including contemporaneous departmental communications, allegedly indicated an intention to accord retrospective effect.

Respondent's (Revenue) Arguments

  • The amendment introduced new inputs and therefore could not be considered merely clarificatory.
  • Circular dated 31-3-1987 demonstrates that the exemption was intended to apply prospectively, as evidenced by the use of the word “now”.
  • The findings of the adjudicating authority, CEGAT, and the High Court were correct and should be affirmed.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined Circular F. No. 374/71/86-TRU dated 31-3-1987, which explains the effect of Notifications Nos. 101/87 and 103/87. The Court highlighted that the circular states that products “would now be exempt from excise duty”, the term “now” signifying a forward-looking application.

Clarifying the legal concept, the Court differentiated between “retrospective” and “prospective” legislation, noting that retrospective laws look backward and affect pre-existing rights, whereas prospective laws operate only for the future. Applying this principle, the Court found that the 1987 amendment added items not previously covered; thus it was not a clarification of existing coverage but an expansion of the exemption to new inputs.

Because the amendment was prospective, the appellant remained liable for duty and penalty for the period prior to 27-3-1987. The High Court’s view that no retrospective effect was intended was, therefore, affirmed.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are dismissed.

As a result, the Gujarat High Court’s dismissal of the writ petition stands, along with CEGAT’s modified demand and penalty. The decision resolves the dispute between the parties but does not establish any new precedent beyond reaffirming settled principles on prospective versus retrospective operation of fiscal notifications.

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    Jay Mahakali Rolling Mills v. Union Of India And Others

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court dismissing the writ petition filed against the orders of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, West Regional Bench, at Mumbai (in short “cegat”).

    2. Background facts in Civil Appeal No. 5109 of 2002 in a nutshell are as follows:

    A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant alleging that the appellant was not entitled to the exemption under Notification No. 208/83-CE dated 1-8-1983 on the final product falling under Tariff Item 25(9)(ii). Allegation was that the appellant, M/s Jay Mahakali Rolling Mills had contravened the provisions of Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (in short “the Rules”) read with Section 6 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (in short “the Act”) and Rules 173-B; 53 read with 173-G(4); 9(1), 49, 52-A read with 173-G(1), 173-G(2) and 174-F; 54 read with 173-F(3) of the Rules and thereby committed the offence of the nature described in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 173-Q of the Rules by reasons of wilful misstatement, suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of Central excise duty. The appellant was, therefore, asked to show-cause as to why Central excise duty amounting to Rs 12,67,006.19, on 3473.705.2.2 (sic) MT excisable goods i.e rolling products manufactured and cleared by it without payment of duty for the period 23-8-1984 to 31-8-1987 should not be recovered from it under Rule 9(2) of the Rules read with proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A of the Act. They were also required to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed under Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 173-Q and Rule 9(2) of the Rules. In response, the appellant submitted that in Notification No. 101/87-C.E. dated 27-3-1987 materials were specified as inputs in view of the amendment. It was submitted that there was no ill intention or suppression of facts and/or intention to evade duty. Therefore, penalty cannot be imposed. The adjudicating authority rejected the contention and held that duty and penalty were leviable. The order was challenged before cegat which dismissed the appeal. It was held that the amendment made to the notification on 27-3-1987 has prospective application and has no retrospective application as contended by the appellant. It was further held that items which were earlier included were specified. Therefore, the stand that the amendment was merely clarificatory is without any substance. It was held that duty liable was to be reduced by the duty payable from 27-3-1987 to 31-8-1987 amounting to Rs 2,28,898.80. The penalty was reduced to Rs 75,000.

    3. In the appeal before the High Court stands taken before the adjudicating authority and cegat were reiterated. The High Court by the impugned order held that there was no basis to accept the contention that the notification was intended to be given retrospective effect. The writ petition was dismissed.

    4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the view of the authority, cegat and the High Court cannot be maintained. The amendment brought about by Notification No. 101/87-C.E. dated 27-3-1987 was merely clarificatory. Cegat wrongly held that the said notification was operating with prospective effect. Material on record pointed to the contrary. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the orders of the courts below and the High Court.

    5. Circular dated 31-3-1987 reads as follows:

    “cbse Circulars & Clarifications on

    Excise & Customs

    Customs circulars

    F. No. 374/71/86-TRUDated: 31-3-1987
    M.O Fin. (Deptt. of Rev.)
    Subject: Changes in the customs duty structure in respect of ships for breaking up falling under heading No. 89.08 and the excise duty structure in respect of ship breaking scrap falling under heading Nos. 72.15 and 73.09 regarding.
    In accordance with the Customs Notifications Nos. 142/87 to 143/87 and Central Excise Notifications Nos. 101/87 and 103/87, all dated 27th March, 1987, certain changes have been made in the customs duty structure relating to ships—for breaking and excise duty structure in respect of ship-breaking scrap.

    Thus, various products like bars and rods made from such ship-breaking scrap would now be exempt from excise duty.

    6. A bare reading of the circular clearly shows that it was intended to have prospective effect.

    7. It is to be noted that in the Circular dated 31-3-1987 it has been stated that the “products like bars and rods made from such ship-breaking scrap would ‘now’ be exempt from excise duty”. The effect of the word “now” is that it is to operate henceforth. If the intention was to give retrospective effect, it would have been stated to be so specifically.

    8. “Retrospective” means looking backward, contemplating what is past, having reference to a statute or things existing before the statute in question. Retrospective law means a law which looks backward or contemplates the past; one, which is made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it comes into force. Retroactive statute means a statute, which creates a new obligation on transactions or considerations or destroys or impairs vested rights.

    9. By the amendment relatable to notification on 27-3-1987, items which were earlier not included were specified as inputs have been included. That being so, the contention that the amendment merely clarified the notification as it stood prior to the amendment, is not untenable.

    10. Looked at from any angle the High Court's order does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed.

    11. In view of dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 5109 of 2002, Civil Appeal No. 855 of 2006 is dismissed.

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    Jay Mahakali Rolling Mills v. Union Of India And Others
    (Aug 6, 2007)