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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 498
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 243-ZG of the Constitution
  • Article 243-O of the Constitution
  • Section 58, Chapter X of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994
  • Section 44, Chapter VIII of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Rule 31 of the Punjab Panchayat Election Rules framed under the Punjab State Election Commission Act
  • Section 89 of the Punjab State Election Commission Act
  • Section 89(1)(d)(iv) of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994
  • M.P Municipalities Act, Rule 12
  • Section 105 of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
  • Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 498
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 243-ZG of the Constitution
  • Article 243-O of the Constitution
  • Section 58, Chapter X of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994
  • Section 44, Chapter VIII of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Rule 31 of the Punjab Panchayat Election Rules framed under the Punjab State Election Commission Act
  • Section 89 of the Punjab State Election Commission Act
  • Section 89(1)(d)(iv) of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994
  • M.P Municipalities Act, Rule 12
  • Section 105 of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
  • Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant and the first respondent contested the election for Chairman of the Gram Panchayat, Block Samiti, Dhilwan, District Kapurthala (Punjab). The Special Secretary authorised the Deputy Commissioner to conduct elections on 28-1-2003. Both candidates received seven valid votes each. When the Returning Officer attempted to resolve the tie by drawing lots, supporters of the first respondent allegedly caused a commotion, forcing an adjournment “keeping in view the law and order situation”.

The Returning Officer re-scheduled completion of the election for 30-1-2003. The first respondent disputed his authority, asserting that under Rule 31 of the Punjab Panchayat Election Rules only the State Election Commission could fix a fresh date. The Deputy Commissioner dismissed this objection, citing Rule 45(1).

The respondent then filed CWP No. 1987 of 2003 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking (among other reliefs) to quash the election process and declare himself elected. The High Court accepted the challenge and set aside the appellant’s election. The present appeal is against that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should entertain a challenge to the validity of an election when a statutory election-petition remedy exists.
  2. Incidental to the above, whether the Deputy Commissioner/Returning Officer had statutory authority to adjourn and re-fix the date for completing the tied election.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Relied on C. Subrahmanyam v. K. Ramanjaneyullu and Jaspal Singh Arora v. State of M.P. to contend that election disputes must be raised only through an election petition; the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 226.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Submitted that substantive election provisions are contained in the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 and Rules; the Deputy Commissioner was merely a delegatee without power to fix a new date.
  • Argued that only a meeting—not an “election”—had occurred on 28-1-2003; hence an election petition was inappropriate and Article 226 relief was available.
  • Contended that an election petition could not examine the Deputy Commissioner’s jurisdiction, making writ review necessary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C. Subrahmanyam v. K. Ramanjaneyullu (1998) 8 SCC 703 Writ jurisdiction should not be invoked where the election statute provides a specific election-petition remedy. Relied on to hold that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition.
Jaspal Singh Arora v. State of M.P. (1998) 9 SCC 594 Bar on court interference in municipal elections under Article 243-ZG and availability of election petition. Cited to reinforce the principle that statutory election remedies oust writ intervention.
Sanjana M. Wig v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 242 Article 226 jurisdiction is discretionary and normally withheld when an efficacious alternative remedy exists. Invoked to underscore the discretionary nature of writ powers and the presence of an alternative remedy.
Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar (2000) 8 SCC 216 Court should postpone adjudication of election disputes until after the electoral process; Section 100 RPA provides complete remedy. Discussed while observing that the Punjab Act contains a parallel provision (Section 89) supplying a complete post-election remedy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that the meeting on 28-1-2003 was part of an ongoing election process which was merely adjourned; only the drawing of lots remained for completion. Prayers (b) and (c) in the writ petition sought to scrutinise ballot validity and declare the respondent elected—reliefs squarely falling within an election petition, not writ jurisdiction.

Article 243-O of the Constitution and Section 89(1)(d)(iv) of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 provide that election disputes alleging non-compliance with statutory provisions must be resolved by an Election Tribunal. Section 89 mirrors Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the People Act, furnishing a complete remedy.

Applying the principles from C. Subrahmanyam, Jaspal Singh Arora, and Sanjana M. Wig, the Court held that the High Court should have declined to exercise writ jurisdiction because an efficacious statutory remedy existed. The Court also recorded that the respondent had notice of, and participated in, the adjourned proceedings, undermining any claim of prejudice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s judgment; the appellant’s election as Chairman stands restored. No costs were awarded.

Implications: The decision reinforces the constitutional and statutory scheme that election disputes must ordinarily be pursued through dedicated election-petition mechanisms, limiting High Court intervention under Article 226 to exceptional situations. It does not establish new substantive precedent but affirms existing jurisprudence on the bar to writ jurisdiction in electoral matters.

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    Harnek Singh v. Charanjit Singh And Others

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.

    2. Whether a writ court should entertain a dispute as regards validity or otherwise of an election falls for decision in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 18-9-2003 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP No. 1987 of 2003.

    3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The appellant and the first respondent contested an election for the post of the Chairman, Gram Panchayat, Block Samiti, Dhilwan, District Kapurthala, Punjab. The Special Secretary, Government of Punjab, Department of Rural Development and Panchayats by a letter dated 10-1-2003 fixed the date for election to the post of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Panchayat Samitis on 28-1-2003. The date 4-2-2003 was fixed for election to the post of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Zila Parishads. The Special Secretary authorised the Deputy Commissioner of each district to chalk out the election programme of Chairman and Vice-Chairman. It is not in dispute that pursuant to or in furtherance of the said authorisation the Deputy Commissioner appointed the District Transport Officer, Dhilwan as the Returning Officer. A meeting was called for holding election on 28-1-2003. In the said meeting both the contestants secured equal number of votes. A party which was led by the first respondent herein allegedly created commotion and stopped the legal process of electing the Chairman by toss which was the next step for completion of the electoral process. The situation could not be controlled by the local police and hence the election process was adjourned by the Returning Officer stating:

    “Keeping in view the law and order situation, the election of the Chairman, Block Samiti, Dhilwan is hereby adjourned.”

    4. Election process was to be completed on 30-1-2003 at 11.00 a.m in the office of DPO, Dhilwan. The first respondent came to know thereabout and by a letter dated 29-1-2003 questioned the authority of the Returning Officer to fix 30-1-2003 for holding re-election stating:

    “That now the petitioner has come to know that the abovesaid officer without any authority and against all provisions of law has fixed election for 30-1-2003.”

    5. It was contended that in terms of Rule 31 of the Punjab Panchayat Election Rules framed under the Punjab State Election Commission Act, the Election Commission could only fix a fresh date for poll and fix a time at which such poll shall be held. Therein it was prayed:

    “That the petitioner prays that action may be taken in this respect according to law and the matter be referred to the Election Commission for fixing of date, time, hour and place for holding the election of Chairman, Block Samiti, Dhilwan. It is further prayed that the abovesaid officer be directed not to hold any meeting or proceeding in connection with the election of Chairman, Block Samiti, Dhilwan on 30-1-2003 or any other date until a direction is issued by the Election Commissioner, Punjab.”

    6. The Deputy Commissioner, however, by an order dated 29-1-2003 relying on or on the basis of Rule 45(1) of the Punjab Panchayat Rules refused to refer the matter to the Election Commission stating:

    “The officer appointed under Section 105 of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 to conduct the meeting of Panchayat Samiti for election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman is empowered to adjourn the meeting and fix time, place and hours of polling. The present application is devoid of any merit and hence is dismissed.”

    7. A writ petition was filed by the respondents in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana alleging inter alia therein that the Returning Officer did not have the power to fix a date of the adjourned meeting to elect the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti and only the State Election Commission is empowered therefor. Accepting the contention of the respondents, the High Court set aside the election of the petitioner as Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant is before us.

    8. Mr S. Muralidhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, relying on the decisions of this Court in C. Subrahmanyam v. K. Ramanjaneyullu (1998) 8 SCC 703 and Jaspal Singh Arora v. State of M.P (1998) 9 SCC 594 would contend that an election dispute could not have been entertained by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    9. Mr R.S Randhawa, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that whereas the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act only lays down the manner of holding election the substantive provisions therefor are to be found in the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 and the Punjab Panchayat Election Rules, 1994.

    10. Drawing our attention to various provisions and in particular Section 44 occurring in Chapter VIII of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 as also Section 58 occurring in Chapter X thereof as well as Rule 31 of the Rules, the learned counsel would contend that the Deputy Commissioner is merely a delegatee of the State Government. According to the learned counsel, only a meeting was fixed and not an election and as such an election petition will not be maintainable.

    11. It was further contended that recourse to filing of an election petition as envisaged under Section 89 of the Punjab State Election Commission Act could not be resorted to as therein jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner could not have been questioned.

    12. It is not correct to say that only a meeting was fixed. The meeting was fixed for holding election. The parties hereto took part in the election process on 28-1-2003. The Returning Officer in his proceeding dated 28-1-2003 observed:

    “After the completion of the process of election, ballot box was opened in the presence of all. Fifteen votes were found in that box and these votes were counted in the presence of all the members. During counting of votes, one vote was declared invalid due to wrong marking and from the rest of 14 valid votes, 7 votes have gone in favour of Shri Harnek Singh and 7 votes in favour of Charanjit Singh. Therefore, both have secured equal number of votes.
    Now due to this, result of the election will be declared as per Rule 35 of the Punjab Panchayat Election Rules, 1994. As soon as they were informed regarding draw of lots, Shri Charanjit Singh and his supporter Shri Sukhapal Singh Khera came inside and started creating ugly scenes. They created interruption in the process and started raising slogans and tried to do manhandling. Due to this law and order problem was created and local police was unable to control the same. Therefore, the remaining process for the election of Chairman is being stopped due to compulsion and seriousness of the situation.”

    13. It is, therefore, clear that on 30-1-2003, only lot was to be drawn and, thus, the election process which was started on 28th January, and could not be completed owing to commotion created by the respondents' group, was to be completed.

    14. It may be true that the respondent herein questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner and/or the Returning Officer in fixing a date for election but in his writ petition he had prayed inter alia for the following:

    “(a) Issue a writ, order or direction quashing the entire process, manner and method adopted by Respondent 3 in holding the election and for quashing the result declared by Respondent 3 in declaring Respondent 4 elected as Chairman of the Block Samiti to be illegal and bad.
    (b) Issue a writ, order or direction, quashing the action of Respondent 3 in rejecting the valid votes cast in favour of the petitioner, the same being actuated with malice and motive and otherwise being arbitrary and illegal.
    (c) Issue a writ, order or direction declaring the petitioner elected as Chairman of the Block Samiti on the basis of votes cast in his favour if necessary by calling for the records of the election and ballot papers and after examining the same.
    (d) Issue a writ, order or direction commanding the respondents to restart the election process from the stage Respondent 3 illegally adjourned and reassemble the meeting or, alternatively, to direct the respondent to hold a fresh election by following the process of law and the procedures and rules prescribed in the Act and the Rules.
    (e) Issue a writ, order or direction quashing the order passed by DC on the representation filed by the petitioner, the same being illegal and in violation of the statutory provision.
    (f) Dispense with service of advance notice on the respondents.”

    15. Prayers (b) and (c) aforementioned, evidently, could not have been granted in favour of the petitioner by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the High Court exercises a plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such jurisdiction being discretionary in nature may not be exercised inter alia keeping in view the fact that an efficacious alternative remedy is available therefor. (See Sanjana M. Wig v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 242, (2005) 7 Scale 290)

    16. Article 243-O of the Constitution mandates that all election disputes must be determined only by way of an election petition. This by itself may not per se bar judicial review which is the basic structure of the Constitution, but ordinarily such jurisdiction would not be exercised. There may be some cases where a writ petition would be entertained but in this case we are not concerned with the said question.

    17. In C. Subrahmanyam (1998) 8 SCC 703 a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed that a writ petition should not be entertained when the main question which fell for decision before the High Court was non-compliance with the provisions of the Act which was one of the grounds for an election petition in terms of Rule 12 framed under the Act.

    18. Yet again in Jaspal Singh Arora (1998) 9 SCC 594 this Court opined:

    “3. These appeals must be allowed on a short ground. In view of the mode of challenging the election by an election petition being prescribed by the M.P Municipalities Act, it is clear that the election could not be called in question except by an election petition as provided under that Act. The bar to interference by courts in electoral matters contained in Article 243-ZG of the Constitution was apparently overlooked by the High Court in allowing the writ petition. Apart from the bar under Article 243-ZG, on settled principles interference under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of setting aside election to a municipality was not called for because of the statutory provision for election petition and also the fact that an earlier writ petition for the same purpose by a defeated candidate had been dismissed by the High Court.”

    19. Mr Randhawa placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar (2000) 8 SCC 216. In that case while laying down the law as to under what circumstances an application for judicial review would be maintainable against an order passed by the Election Commission and referring to the provisions of Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, this Court observed:

    “The conclusions which inevitably follow are: in the field of election jurisprudence, ignore such things as do not materially affect the result of the election unless the requirement of satisfying the test of material effect has been dispensed with by the law; even if the law has been breached and such breach satisfies the test of material effect on the result of the election of the returned candidate yet postpone the adjudication of such dispute till the election proceedings are over so as to achieve, in larger public interest, the goal of constituting a democratic body without interruption or delay on account of any controversy confined to an individual or group of individuals or single constituency having arisen and demanding judicial determination.”

    20. It was held that Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act provides for a complete remedy.

    21. Section 89(1)(d)(iv) of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 reads thus:

    “89. Grounds for declaring election to be void.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the Election Tribunal is of the opinion,—
    (d) that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected,—
    (i)-(iii)***
    (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of India or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act;
    the Election Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.”

    In view of the aforementioned provision, which is in pari materia with Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the People Act, a writ petition may not be held to be maintainable.

    22. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised its writ jurisdiction.

    23. Furthermore, it was not even a case where the respondent was not aware of the postponed date. It is not in dispute that the respondent was present on the adjourned date of poll but refused to sign the proceeding book as would appear from the records which have been produced before us. The respondent, however, contested the said statement contending that the same had been done with a mala fide motive. But, it is not in dispute that he took part in the proceedings.

    24. We, therefore, do not think that it was a fit case in which the High Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction.

    25. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

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    Harnek Singh v. Charanjit Singh And Others
    (Oct 7, 2005)